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ABSTRACT 
Within the context of the intemationalisation of business organisations and human 
resource practices, this thesis contributes to an enhanced understanding of the factors 
influencing the establishment and operation of European Works Councils (EWCs) in 
multinational companies. Specifically, the thesis examines EWCs in the banking sector, 
a sector whose EWCs have not previously been subject to a great deal of analysis. A 
cross-case comparison of four highly internationalised banks - HSBC and Lloyds TSB 
in the UK, and BSCH and BBV A in Spain - is undertaken. 
The thesis explores debates in the literature regarding the establishment and impact of 
EWCs. Theories based on the internationalisation of business strategies, structures and 
cross-border HR management are drawn on to build a novel integrated analytical 
framework, which identifies the factors likely to shape first the establishmentlnon-
establishment of EWCs and second their operation. Analysis of the specific cases is 
then carried out, based on extensive qualitative fieldwork in the case companies. 
The premise of the thesis is that the internationalisation of business operations and 
company/management organisation and structure are fertile ground for the 
internationalisation of management approaches to HR and employment practice. In tum, 
this suggests a promising future for EWCs. However, the analytical findings suggest a 
mismatch between the prospects for EWCs and the organisational reality of some 
'European' multinational firms whose operations are strongly orientated towards other 
parts of the world. In particular, it is found that the non-existence of EWCs in the two 
most internationalised Spanish banks is strongly related to their internationalisation, 
whereby their international businesses, management structures and cross-border HR 
coordination are all heavily oriented towards Latin America. These factors are found to 
be key in shaping not only management but also trade union policy towards EWCs. The 
thesis also finds that such factors are central in shaping differences in the operation of 
the EWes at two of the largest UK-based financial groups. The overall findings of the 
thesis suggest several potential avenues for further research and for consideration in 
revising the European Works Councils Directive. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this research is transnational employee information and consultation 
arrangements in the context of the internationalisation of business organisations and 
human resource (HR) practices. Hence, within the context of Europe, there is a 
particular interest in the establishment and operation of European Works Councils 
(EWes). One aim is to enhance understanding of the factors that influence the decision 
to set up an EWC in multinational companies (MNCs), and, equally the factors that lead 
to the decision not to set up an EWe. A second aim is to understand more about the 
factors that shape the operation and role of EWCs. 
Analysis of the constitution and operation of EWCs is a fast developing field with a 
growing number of streams of inquiry. This thesis looks at the case of EWes in banking 
organisations of UK and Spanish origin. A cross-case comparison of four large and 
highly internationalised financial groups (HSBC and Lloyds-TSB in the UK; BSCH and 
BBV A in Spain), based on extensive fieldwork, forms the main empirical base for the 
research. The specific focus is therefore twofold. First, to understand what determines 
the existence of EWCs in banks, differentiating the most internationalised UK banks -
where they do exist, from the most internationalised Spanish banks - where they do not. 
Second, to understand differences in the nature of EWCs, their level of activity, and 
their influence in those organisations in which they already exist, that is in the two UK 
banks. 
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
There is considerable academic interest in the consequences of European integration for 
industrial relations (IR) and human resources (HR) within MNCs. European integration 
has facilitated restructuring and consolidation within national boundaries, and also 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions and the organic internationalisation of firms. 
Within this context, this study addresses questions concerning the implications of 
changes in the organisation of production and markets for the management of IR and 
HR within banking corporations. In order to do so, special reference is afforded to the 
implications of one of the most prominent developments in terms of European 
legislation at company level, the EWCs. 
EWCs are a relatively new institution in international firms. Although the first voluntary 
established arrangements for transnational information and consultation at company 
level date back to the late 1980s, it was only after the enactment of the EWCs Directive 
in 1994 that the number of EWC-type arrangements rapidly increased. Recent figures 
show that already 639 MNCs have established EWCs (Kerckhofs, 2002). Research on 
EWCs has flourished and now comprises a significant body of literature with a great 
variety of contributions, a comprehensive review of which has been compiled by Muller 
and Hoffinann (2001). Despite undeniable advance in understanding this novel 
institution, however, there remains significant scope for further research. 
This study will contribute to existing knowledge, both on the factors surrounding the 
establishment of EWCs and on their operation and functioning. It will take a 
2 
comparative case study approach, complementing existing studies which have 
previously developed this methodology (Lecher et aI., 1999; Lecher et aI., 2001; Lecher 
et aI., 2002; Hall et aI., 2003; Marginson et aI., 2004). However, unlike existing studies, 
this research will embrace both MNCs without EWCs and those with them. This is 
important because only approximately one third of the MNCs covered by the EWCs 
Directive have EWCs (Kerckhofs, 2002), and, to the researcher's knowledge, with the 
exception of Blokland and Berentsen (2003), all EWC related research has been carried 
out in MNCs with EWCs. It is claimed here that while an understanding of the factors 
which trigger the constitution of EWCs is key to studying the reasons behind the 
existence/non-existence of an EWC, a more comprehensive picture can be obtained by 
investigating why some companies have not established an EWC, and which factors are 
important in this choice. On a different note, Lecher et aI.'s research (1999; 2001,2002) 
has not paid systematic attention to the management side in their analysis. This study 
also therefore addresses this imbalance, in line with the recent work of Warwick 
Business School researchers (Hall et aI., 2003; Marginson et aI., 2004). 
Whilst the study of a number of case company studies in this research will add to 
existing studies, numerical addition is not the only contribution. Further, it is intended 
to expand knowledge on the limited available evidence on the service sectors, and 
specifically the banking sector (note that sector and industry will be used indistinctively 
in this thesis). A great deal of empirical EWC research has focused on manufacturing 
companies, which tend to present more integrated product and internal structures. By 
focusing on the banking sector, an aim is to contrast findings with previous research and 
examine whether the results of this earlier research are applicable to the banking sector. 
Also, much empirical evidence originates from French-based MNCs, Germany and 
other Northern European countries, and to a lesser extent from Anglo-Saxon countries 
3 
(Milller and Hoffmann, 2001). Through this study, I intent to explore whether previous 
analysis conducted on the basis of such empirical findings is applicable to Spain, a 
country that belongs to a different tradition of IR and socio-economic and political 
systems. In addition, because of the historical links of the country, MNCs tend to be 
strongly oriented towards Latin America rather than Europe, something that is 
anticipated to be a likely influence on EWC-related activity. Research on EWCs in 
Spain is itself scarce, due to the small number of EWCs in Spanish-based companies 
and the consequently marginal role they play in domestic IR practice. This research 
therefore aims to fill this gap. Furthermore, it aims to do so from an empirically 
informed approach, more typical of the UK IR research tradition (Hyman, 1995). In this 
sense, it complements the predominantly legalistic Spanish research on IR, which until 
now has dealt mostly with the implementation of the EWC Directive. 
1.3 THE ARGUMENT AND APPROACH OF THE THESIS 
It IS argued that the intemationalisation of business operations and 
company/management organisation and structure are fertile ground for the 
intemationalisation of management approaches to HR and employment practice. In tum, 
this suggests a promising future for EWCs. However, the findings of this study suggest 
a mismatch between the prospects for EWCs and the organisational reality of some 
'European' MNCs whose operations are strongly oriented towards regions other than 
Europe. More broadly, implications are drawn with regards to the debate on the 
Europeanisation of IR. Within the current trend towards decentralisation of IR to the 
enterprise level, there are two possible trajectories: 'organised' and disorganised' 
decentralisation (Traxler, 1995). In so far as disorganised decentralisation becomes 
more widespread beyond the UK, which is the current main instance of this form of 
decentralisation, Ewes could promote convergence of workplace employee 
4 
representation across Europe and act as a driving force for the harmonisation of trade 
union policies on employment issues and collective bargaining. It is within this context 
that EWCs have been seen as a vehicle for the Europeanisation of IR at company level. 
However, it is often assumed in the 'Europeanisation' debate that Europe is the 
principal destination of the European MNCs' foreign investment and growth, which due 
to historical and cultural links is not always the case. When this happens, interest in the 
EWCs as a European transnational structure for enterprise-based IR is expected to 
decline both for management and trade unions. 
The analysis of voluntary EWC agreements has been used as a starting point from 
which to draw implications regarding the factors that influence the emergence of EWes 
and their structural and operational features. Four factors have been identified: national, 
sector, company-specific and legislative influences. As MUller and Hoffmann (2001) 
have found in their in-depth review of relevant literature, the influence of these four 
categories of factors might not happen simultaneously, and there appears to be a time 
factor in the framework. Moreover, these authors suggest that whilst national factors 
seemed to play a greater role in the emergence of early voluntary EWe agreements, 
sector and legislative factors appear to have been more prominent in the agreements 
concluded during the implementation period up to 1996. 
Despite being useful both for EWe practitioners and posterior EWe research, this 
initial analysis of EWCs presents methodological shortcomings in that the analysis of 
agreements might only provide partial explanations for the real factors influencing the 
emergence and shape of EWes. In the words of Lecher et al. (1999:97), an EWe 
agreement "is merely the starting point not the end of the EWC's development". As the 
practice and experience of newly established EWCs has developed, parallel 
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methodologies to investigate them have proliferated, including survey and interview-
based (often in the form of case study) research into the practice of Ewes. Early case 
study research was mainly single case-based (Wills, 1998; Royle, 1999; Whittall, 2000), 
which while useful, tended to consider the influencing factors in an isolated manner, 
and therefore made difficult the creation of a systematic framework for the analysis of 
EWe existence and practice. Muller and Hoffmann (2001 :77) point out that the work of 
Lecher et al. (1999; 2001) is the first systematic attempt "to take into account the 
complex and interdependent relationship between the development of EWes and the 
variety of 'external' and 'internal' influencing impinging on this process". 
The limited amount of in-depth comparative research into EWes justifies the approach 
of this study: a qualitative comparative study of the existence and evolution of EWes 
carried out through a cross-case comparison of four different firms of the same industry 
in two countries. The nature of the research allows for intra-country as well as cross-
country comparison, with cross-case comparisons among two banking firms of Spanish 
origin and two banking firms of UK. origin. It also enables the issue under study to be 
addressed from multiple perspectives, by investigating the position of employee 
representatives and management, the two main groups intervening in the EWe process. 
In tum, the methodology of this research has facilitated two main sets of case-specific 
findings, from which more general implications can be drawn. Firstly, it is found that 
the non-existence of EWes in large, international Spanish banks as compared to their 
similarly internationalised UK. counterparts can be related to a number of key factors. 
These are the banks' strategy of internationalisation and the existence of international 
management structures, both strongly oriented towards their operations in Latin 
America, which playa key role in shaping the extent of cross-border business and HR 
integration within the firms. In tum, such factors strongly influence both management 
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and trade union policy on pursuing the establishment of an EWCs. Secondly, it is found 
that the operation, activity and influence of the existing EWCs in the two UK banks 
significantly differs, a finding which a number of factors can help to explain. Among 
these, particular importance is again placed on the banks' strategy of 
intemationalisation, the nature of their business and management structures, and the 
degree of cross-border HR integration pursued within the firms. These related factors 
were found to significantly influence management and trade union policy towards the 
EWC. Also of particular importance is the cohesion of the employee side, both at UK 
domestic level and internationally. 
1.4 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
Following this introductory Chapter in which the main features and rationale of the 
research are outlined, the thesis is organised as follows. 
Chapter 2 opens with an exploration of the major developments that have taken place in 
the banking industry of most industrialised countries, with a special focus on the 
European Union (EU). The aim is to set the context of the study and map sector 
developments that will be important for grounding the analysis of employee information 
and consultation practices in the banking sector. This is followed by an exploration of 
the key sets of influences on the way in which labour is managed within MNCs. As 
firms intemationalise, the role of human resource management (HRM) in managing the 
complexity and heterogeneity of their international business activities is becoming 
increasingly important. This is argued to have clear implications for the decision to 
establish or not an EWC. 
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Chapter 3 addresses the main debates in the literature regarding the establishment and 
impact of EWCs. Given the burgeoning research on EWCs, the chapter aims to be 
selective in order to present only findings directly relevant to the area of concern. After 
introducing the background to the EWCs Directive (EWCD) and current quantitative 
developments on EWCs, the chapter goes on to analytically review, first, the available 
evidence on factors promoting the establishment of EWCs, and second, the available 
evidence on the factors shaping the operation and influence of EWCs. This review 
establishes the need for further research using alternative approaches. The chapter then 
explores the debate linking EWCs' impact with the drive towards a European system of 
IR, and raises awareness of some potential limitations of this perspective. Finally, on 
the basis of the analysis conducted in Chapters 2 and 3, the analytical framework is 
proposed. This integrates a range of structural and behavioural factors, and its purpose 
is to inform the approach taken in addressing the two main questions of this study: 
What determines the existence or not of EWCs, differentiating the most 
internationalised British banks from the most internationalised of Spanish banks? 
- What determines the differences in the nature, level of activity and influence of 
EWCs in the banks in which they do exist? 
Chapter 4 presents the methodological underpinnings and the research design and 
methods adopted to conduct the empirical part of the research. A qualitative 
methodology using a comparative case study approach at the firm level, and drawing on 
four main case studies in one industry and two countries, has been chosen to address the 
research questions set up in previous Chapters. 
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From Chapter 5, the empirical investigation of the thesis is presented. Chapter 5 
highlights relevant features of the UK and Spanish banking sectors, providing an 
analysis of the context for the operations and decision-making of the case study firms. 
Attention is particularly focused on the market organisation and structure of the firms, 
the employment systems, and the IR context, including the role of the state and of 
collective representation structures. 
Chapters 6 and 7 present issue-organised chronological case study analysis of the UK 
and Spanish companies respectively. The main aim of these Chapters is to outline the 
significant strategic, structural and organisational changes within the four case studies, 
elements of which shape the later establishment and/or operation of their EWCs. 
Chapter 8 and 9 constitute the main analytical part of the thesis. Chapter 8 presents a 
detailed comparative analysis of the four case study firms, focussing on the factors 
shaping the decision to establish or not establish an EWe. This is done by drawing on a 
number of issues/categories selected on the basis of their relevance to the establishment 
of EWCs. Chapter 9 carries out a comparative analysis of the two British-based case 
study firms in which EWCs are currently in operation, and aims to unveil the factors 
shaping the operation and role of the EWCs over time. 
Chapter 10 concludes this thesis by summarising the main research findings. A number 
of implications from the research findings are also discussed. The Chapter ends with 
suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF BANKING IN EUROPE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent decades have seen radical restructuring within the banking sectors of most 
industrialised countries. While various factors lie behind these transfonnations, three 
primary driving forces can be identified. First, there are the globalisation processes that 
have characterised the world economy in the last twenty years. These have affected the 
banking sector both directly, through the increasing interdependence of national 
financial markets, and indirectly, through the parallel internationalisation of enterprises, 
which constitute an important customer base (Walter, 1988, cited in Canals, 1996).1 
Accompanying this has been the relaxation of regulations affecting the banking industry 
in most countries, including the decreasing intervention of central banks. Finally, the 
introduction of new infonnation and communication technologies (ICTs) has been a 
third important factor behind the transfonnations. 
Above all, these changes have been associated with a rapid increase in competition, 
both at national and international level, often resulting in significant profit reductions 
for the less competitive banks. In order to maintain or gain competitiveness many 
banks have seen the need to modify their competitive strategies and traditional fonns of 
organisation, and often to search for international markets. This Chapter seeks to 
analyse these changes with a view to exploring the implications for processes of 
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transnational information and consultation m international banks, 2 with specific 
reference to the role of EWCs. 
Debate surrounding the impact of MNCs on employment and IR practices has often 
focused on the dichotomy between 'national business systems' and more 'global' 
approaches (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). A distinctive variant of these arguments has 
highlighted the significance of developments at a European level, in particular the 
emergence of distinct forms of company organisation around specific employment and 
IR policies (Marginson, 2000). This has emerged partly as a response to Community 
legislative developments, and this research is concerned with one particularly important 
legislative development, the Directive on EWCs (European Commission, 1994). The 
aim is to address the tension between the legislative requirements for MNCs operating 
within Europe and the general economic and organisational behaviour of these firms. 
On the one hand, institutional pressures for a European dimension to corporate activity, 
for example in the form of European-level employee information and consultation, are 
said to promote internal IR structures that might generate more integrated approaches to 
IR across European countries. On the other hand, however, international competitive 
pressures and historical developments shape company's choices regarding the structure 
and evolution of their operations, including outside the EU, and hence the orientation of 
their IR practices. 
Section 2.2 explores banks' strategic responses to the aforementioned changes, 
discussing in particular their internationalisation strategies. Section 2.3 then examines 
I In this sense, globalisation can perhaps be considered a more complex process for banks than for 
companies in other sectors (Canals, 1996). 
2 I follow Marginson (1992:63) and refer to international banks in terms of direct ownership of production 
and service provision in overseas operations, taking the form of wholly or partially owned operations or 
joint ventures. 
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the nature of intemationalisation with specific regard to company structures. Section 2.4 
discusses the relationship between the strategic and structural nature of 
intemationalisation and the management of HR. This is done by first exploring the way 
in which transnational management influence can take place within firms, and second 
by comparing developments in job content and work organisation across borders. 
Section 2.5 then suggests links between the intemationalisation of firms and HRlIR-
related issues, in particular European company-level transnational processes for 
information and consultation. Finally, Section 2.6 draws some conclusions. 
Throughout, it will be important to distinguish between two distinct, but often linked, 
parts of the sector; retail and wholesalelinvestment banking. Whereas in retail banking 
the national context continues to play an important role, with local presence and 
knowledge important, in wholesale and particularly investment banking, the local 
element is less significant in the context of truly global markets dominated by 
institutional investors (Kalff, 1996:176). The focus of this thesis is primarily on retail 
banking, where most employment is concentrated and were there is a higher presence of 
collective employee representation. 
2.2 STRATEGIC RESPONSES: INTERNATIONALISATION AND 
DIVERSIFICATION 
2.2.1 A Changing Competitive Environment: European Developments in Banking 
The transnational integration of financial markets has affected the operations of banks 
throughout most of the industrialised world. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
within the EU, including the establishment of a single currency and the definition of a 
common monetary policy by the European Central Bank, has accelerated developments 
towards a single European market. Moreover, moves towards increasing deregulation 
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have further hastened such integration processes. Although various degrees of financial 
deregulation had previously taken place in different countries, regulatory barriers to 
cross-border activity remained widespread until recently. These included the need to 
attain permission from the host country's regulatory authority before starting to operate 
in their domestic market, exchange controls, and restrictions on the range of financial 
services that could be provided by the entering bank (Harris, 1999:213). The relaxation 
of these barriers, and, in the case of Europe, the unification of national regulations 
precipitated by the transposition of EU directives on banking into the Member States' 
legal systems,3 has increased the exposure of banking firms to other competitors, from 
both national and foreign markets. This has often implied a threat to profit margins and 
market share. 
As a result, and with regard to banking organisations, various trends can be observed: 
A rapid restructuring process affecting the banking industry following increased 
competition within and across countries. This is mainly reflected in a significant 
growth in the number of mergers and acquisitions between banking firms, leading to 
higher concentration of the industry in each respective country.4 As an illustration, 
49% of the turnover of the Spanish banking industry in 1998 was produced by five 
firms, and in Denmark only 2 firms were responsible for 58% of the total turnover 
(European Commission, 1998:12). Similarly in Portugal, the combined market share 
of the five biggest banks has climbed to 85%, the highest in Europe after Finland 
and Sweden, and on a par with the Netherlands (Financial Times, 3/2103). 
3 Steps towards the establishment of an EU single market in financial services have included the 
introduction of seven main banking directives, alongside changes in 12 existing banking directives, most 
of which have been largely implemented through national laws (Harris, 1999:213). Among them are the 
first banking coordination Directive (1977); the second banking coordination Directive (1989); the second 
Non-Life (Services) Directive (1990); the third non-life Directive (1991); and the third Life Directive 
(1994). For a more detail explanation of these, see Walker (1995). 
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• A juxtaposition of the activities traditionally carried out by other financial finns, 
altering conventional distribution channels. There has been a trend of finns 
expanding the range of their activities and new entrants to financial services 
provlSlon. Examples include building societies and savings banks becoming banks 
with PLC status (Storey et aI., 1999:131), banks conducting both retail and 
investment activities, and the blurring of the traditional divide between banking and 
insurance activities. In Portugal, for instance, the percentage of life insurance 
distributed through bank branches rose from 13 % to 80% between 1991 and 1996 
(European Commission, 1998:13). Competition is also emerging from new players 
in the fonn of major retail and manufacturing companies, and even football clubs, 
following the relaxation in regulations. Indeed, traditional banking activities, such as 
credit provision, are threatened by the services offered by mortgage finns, leasing 
companies or the stock market. This trend has stimulated responses from the banks 
themselves towards a greater diversification of the products and services on offer. 
Canals (1996:27) labels the creation of new products and services 'financial 
innovation', and notes that this new development has important implications, not 
only for the range of products offered by the banks, but also in tenns their 
distribution channels,5 as stressed in the next point. 
• A further transfonnation of traditional distribution channels. This is occurring due 
to the appearance of new fonns of banking stimulated by advances in ICTs, as well 
as their more widespread use. These new ICTs include automatic cash machines 
4 While throughout most of Europe such merger activity is occurring largely within individual countries, 
there are signs of cross-national mergers in certain regions such as Benelux and the Nordic countries. 
5 By way of illustration, one way of coping with product diversification has been the creation of business 
divisions within banks, sometimes with legal independence. New leTs have also intervened in the 
distribution of new products; for example with the expansion of A TMs and Internet banking, which have 
contributed to pronounced reductions of branch networks. 
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(ATMs), the electronic payment of bills, and the emergence of telephone and 
Internet banking. 
• The functional separation of different activities. The most striking example of this is 
the creation of cheque processing and call centres specialised in certain operations. 
This is especially significant, and is currently extremely topical, because it is 
associated with both opportunities for outsourcing and the establishment of new off-
shore operations. 
In sum, the banking sectors of most ED countries have experienced a continuous wave 
of transformations over recent years, in terms of markets serviced, products offered, and 
methods of delivery. These have given rise to additional competitive pressures at both 
national and international level. Such important changes, and the rapid pace of 
developments, have been particularly important for the formulation of banks' business 
strategies, as there is a well-recognised need for successful organisations to quickly 
respond to the competitive environment in which they operate (Deakins and Mackay, 
1995:158). In order to maintain and/or increase banks' competitive positions, Canals 
(1996 :445) notes that the relaxation of legal barriers and the increasing interdependence 
of national financial markets have led to the increasing search for international markets. 
2.2.2 The Extent of Internationalisation 
The study of intemationalisation has its origins in the intemationalisation processes of 
industrial enterprises, where growth and size have traditionally been associated with 
increased competitiveness. In the banking sector, however, companies of a medium size 
and operating at national level may be among the most efficient (Crawford, 2000). In 
consequence, there are indeed significant differences between the intemationalisation of 
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banking, and that of enterprises belonging to other sectors of the economy. One reason 
for this is the characteristics, such as intangibility and heterogeneity, which define their 
services. A further reason is the diversity found within parts of the banking industry 
itself, each with different degrees of pressure to internationalise. Investment banking, 
for example, has a relatively long internationalisation history, following the initial 
liberalization of capital movements and globalisation of international financial markets. 
Likewise, corporate banking responded early to the increase in the number of MNCs 
which had become global themselves and were demanding an integrated service from 
their banks across national borders.6 Retail banking on the other hand has until recently 
remained largely a national business. 7 However, initial movements towards 
internationalisation in retail are now taking place, either through cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions or through the establishment of subsidiaries in foreign countries. 8 
Although in most cases at early stages of development, there are increasing examples of 
banks taking elements of their national practices when they operate abroad, or even of 
the emergence of uniform corporate policies, implemented across large parts of the 
group, both nationally and internationally. For example, in the case of the Spanish bank 
BBVA, its international expansion has been accompanied by the 'implementation of the 
BBVA management model', defined by, among other things, common principles in 
performance evaluation, remuneration systems and training (BBVA, 2000). 
6 For example, Gruzin and Davidow (2000:29) note that "in the period 1993-96 the proportion of 
revenues derived from foreign markets among the top 100 transnational companies increased by 20 per 
cent" and that, today, almost one third of the world's largest financial services companies have operations 
in three or more continents. 
7 Competitive environments have traditionally varied between countries, providing structural barriers to 
foreign entry. Economies of scale are an important incentive for intemationalisation, and while clear 
economies exist in areas such as corporate finance, treasury and foreign exchange, it has been claimed 
that there are few clear economies in merging retail banking operations across countries, partly due to the 
structural differences in national markets. See C. Harry, 'Consolidation Route is unclear: Banking 
Restructuring in Europe', Financial Times, September 24th, and J. Willman, 'Friends in Other Places', 
Financial Times, November 22nd 2000. 
8 See J. Willman, 'Freeze or Jump? That is the Question' , Banking in Europe, Financial Times, May 26th 2000. 
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When considering the extent of internationalisation, also significant are the type of 
financial system and the regulation that characterises each home country, since these are 
likely to condition to a greater or lesser extent the strategic moves of the banking groups. 
In this sense, there are distinct differences in the internationalisation processes of 
European and American banks. Two discrete ways in which financial activities are 
organised in the industrialised world can be distinguished. On the one hand is the 
market-oriented capitalist system found in the US and also the UK, where firms are 
mostly financed directly through their operations in the stock market. On the other hand, 
the model in most other Western European countries, and in Japan, is for banks to play 
an important direct role in managing firms' financial needs over the longer-term, often 
including an ownership stake. Within this second model there are also variations; in 
Spain, for example, there is a stronger relationship between the public sector and the 
banks, whereas in Germany and Japan the tendency is towards strong links between the 
banks and non-financial enterprises such as commercial firms. 
These two financial systems are polar models, and in reality there are variations 
between the two extremes. Moreover, the models themselves are not static, and recent 
developments have demonstrated increasing parallels between the two. Indeed, Canals 
(1996: 190) maintains that an increasing number of countries in the industrialised world 
are evolving towards a financial system that combines advanced capital markets with 
major banks offering more extensive and sophisticated products. Recent legislative 
developments in the US, for example, have ended the traditional separation between the 
activities of investment banks and those of retail banks, imposed by the Glass-Steagall 
Act in 1933 (Santomero, 1990). Legislation in Europe, particularly the Second Banking 
Coordination Directive (89/646IEEC), has also reinforced the principle of universal 
banking by extending the range of business activities allowed for by credit institutions. 
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Although universal banks present obvious advantages deriving from a large and 
relatively stable customer base, they also present problems, mainly related to the 
increased risk involved in their large number and range of operations. In addition, at the 
organisational level there is the problem of complex coordination of their different 
activities, which might present very different characteristics. This might help explain, 
for example, why the main British banks did not try to offer universal banking services 
in their attempt to expand to other European markets during the 1990s, and chose 
instead to specialise in market segments such as medium-size corporate clients that can 
be serviced through a limited number of branches (Dixon, 1991; Bums, 1997). 
The extent to which a bank decides to intemationalise its operations will be strongly 
influenced by the rationale behind the desire to intemationalise. It has been suggested 
that there are an increasing number of banks that are European in both size and 
orientation (European Commission, 1998: 11). However there is variation within this. 
There is scope, for example, while having operations throughout Europe, for firms to 
maintain the core of their business at the national domestic level; for example Banco 
Popular in Spain. There are also a significant number of banks that, despite maintaining 
their major business operations within their country of origin, are positively expanding 
into foreign markets, mainly within Europe. Examples of this second type include La 
Caixa Group in Spain, Lloyds ISB, or Barclays Group. Finally, there are those banks, 
generally of a larger size, which besides having a leading role in their domestic market, 
already have a significant proportion of their business revenue (and often workforce) in 
foreign countries. Ihis is the case for example of the two largest Spanish banking 
groups, BBVA and BSCH, which have important percentages of their assets in countries 
other than Spain (mainly in Latin America), a figure that rises to more than 40% in the 
case of commercial banking activities (Sanchez Peinado, 2000). In the case of the 
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British HSBC Group, a broader 'global' orientation can be observed, with a major 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region and Western Europe, but operations also in America, 
the Middle East and Africa.9 
Generally it can be said that increasing concentration and consolidation within national 
boundaries is propitiating internationalisation. The banks' international expansion is 
happening towards different geographical regions depending on the companies' history 
and strategic choices, and it is resulting in an increasing number of banks operating in a 
variety of different countries. As discussed later in this Chapter, this does not always 
mean their business is truly international, but may be geographically segmented. 
2.2.3 Specific Strategies for Internationalisation 
When it comes to the actual process of internationalisation, Canals (1996:322) has 
distinguished between three types of strategies followed by banking firms in recent 
history. Some banks have opted for the development of their own network of branches 
in the foreign country/ies in which they operate. A perhaps more popular strategy has 
been the acquisition of foreign banks, an example of which is Barclays Bank's recent 
acquisition of Banco Zaragozano (Financial Times, 915/03). An alternative to direct 
acquisition is merger, as in the example of the Franco-Belgian bank Dexia, one of the 
few truly cross-border European financial institutions (Minder, 2001). Finally, a third 
strategy is partial acquisition through financial participation, often within the framework 
of an alliance or some other arrangement for cooperation. This is by far the most 
widespread strategy when referring to European markets, examples of which are the 
cross-share holdings of the Spanish BSCH with Societe Generale, Commerzbank and 
San Paolo-IMI, or that ofBBVA with the Italian Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. 
9 Although it has an advantageous position in Europe, with 37,6% of its overall revenue, HSBC continues 
expanding in the AsialPacific and other locations worldwide. See The Banker, September 2000, p.20. 
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Each of these strategies presents both advantages and disadvantages, and selection 
depends on a number of factors, varying from the size and resources of the bank, to the 
characteristics of the market to be entered, to the nature of the bank's businesses. 
Internationalising through development of a banks own set of branches is an attractive 
option from the perspective of establishing close relationships with clients, and 
initiating practices based on the bank's principles and strategy in its current country of 
operation. It also avoids the coordination problems of expansion by merger or 
acquisition. For retail banks in particular, however, such a strategy is costly. This is 
especially so in the European context, where national markets are often characterised by 
large branch networks. Expansion through merger and/or acquisition is an alternative 
that, despite complexity from an organisational and cultural point of view, has been 
popular in the last decade or so. This has resulted in considerable consolidation in 
banking sectors around the world; to a larger extent in the US, but also among European 
banks. Merging with or acquiring a foreign bank can solve to a large extent the problem 
of high costs associated with the organic international expansion of, in particular, retail 
banks. Mergers and acquisitions pose alternative problems, however, in terms of 
organisational complexity and tensions from forging together two previously separate 
and different companies. Indeed, the Benelux and Nordic countries are the only regions 
within Western Europe where cross-border bank mergers appear to have had good 
results, and this is due mainly to the affinity of the countries within those regions in 
terms of culture, language and history (Robinson, 2000). An attractive option for retail 
banks, then, is often the third strategy. This fulfils the goal of a prese~ce in new 
markets without the costs of branch expansion or the organisational complexity 
involved in afull merger. Participation through part-ownership and alliances, however, 
has the disadvantage of potentially not fully realising the benefits of an international 
presence inherent in the alternative strategies. 
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This Section has introduced some key developments regarding the internationalisation 
and diversification strategies of banks, in particular as a response to globalisation and 
deregulation trends in financial systems. Deregulation and European integration have 
lead to restructuring processes and consolidation of the industry within national 
boundaries, which has subsequently facilitated international expansion - tighter 
competition policy accompanying domestic consolidation has meant smaller scope for 
future domestic mergers. This trend can be seen in recent cross-border mergers, and as 
a result the number of multi-country or international banks has notably increased, even 
iftheir business is not always wholly international. 
The internationalisation of banks shows commonalties with parallel processes in other 
sectors in the economy. However there are also marked differences, mainly derived 
from the peculiarities of the sector and the products offered. Whereas wholesale and 
commercial banking have a pronounced international character, retail banking tends to 
present a more geographically limited scope of operation. It is common for corporate 
and investment banking activities to be carried out worldwide, yet retail operations are 
often confined to a national territory. However, this appears to be changing, and the 
scope for internationalisation of retail operations is broadening, certainly to incorporate 
foreign regions that are geographically close or with cultural and/or historical links. The 
Spanish bank BBV A and to lesser extent BSCH, for example, are increasingly 
coordinating their retail operations across the Iberian Peninsula and many Latin 
American countries. Moreover, the strategy followed by Deutsche Bank in the 1980s 
and 1990s involved the establishment both of worldwide investment banking services 
and of retail activities at European level. 
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Although internationalisation of the retail banking industry in institutional tenns is still 
claimed to be in its early stages, in subsequent Sections of this Chapter discussion will 
focus on other processes at work, such as work organisation, corporate policies and 
technological developments, which are arguably promoting converging practices across 
countries. 
2.3 THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONALISATION: STRUCTURE AND 
DECISION-MAKING 
2.3.1 The Choice of Corporate and Decision-Making Structures 
As seen in the previous Section an important factor behind the restructuring of banking 
firms has been the choice between specialisation and diversification of activities, at 
national and/or international level. From this, implications are derived for the 
organisation of work and the company's general structure. As Purcell and Ahlstrand 
(1994:21) note, "the more diversified the enterprise the more likely it is that the internal 
operating procedures will change and a fonn of multidivisional structure will be 
adopted". The basic idea behind this type of organisation is "a structure based on quasi-
autonomous divisions or even wholly owned operating finns, organized on either a 
product or a geographical basis"(Ibid: 15). While the drive towards a multidivisional 
type of organisation is not universal, statistics nevertheless show that the number of 
multidivisional companies has increased considerably over the past century, and its 
popularity is likely to continue (Ibid: 21). Moreover, following the tendency towards 
decentralisation into quasi-autonomous units in finns belonging to other sectors of the 
economy (Fligstein, 1985; Franco, 1974; Marginson, 1992), the development of these 
organisational fonns, which originated in the USA and UK (Maycock, 1986), has 
certainly been the trend in financial organisations over the last quarter of a century. 
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Hill and Pickering (1996:48) maintain that in reality "there is a great variety of 
structures and decision procedures within the broad multidivisional structure", and 
maintain that divisions themselves are often complex and diffuse organisations. 
Although it can be argued that divisional organisations are decentralised, variations can 
be expected with respect to the degree of decentralisation. Birkinshaw (2000) describes 
four types of structures behind international companies; international division, global 
product division, area division and global matrix. 10 In reality, firms may combine 
elements of Birkinshaw's organisational forms, having their own specific structure for 
organising their operations across international markets, with some divisions established 
on a product basis and others on a territorial basis. The seminal work of Porter (1986) 
and Barletll and Goshal (1998) provide alternative categorisations of MNCs according 
to their organisational structure, which as Table 1.1 shows can be related to 
Birkinshaw's typology. 
Table 2.1. MNCs according to their Organisational Structure: Typologies 
Author TypeofMNC 
Birkinshaw International Division Global Product Division Area Division Global Matrix 
(2000) 
Barlett &Ghoshal International Global Multinational Transnational 
(1998) 
Porter Global Multidomestic Mix of global and 
( 1986) multidomestic 
In whatever form, a crucial issue in managmg these complex organisations is the 
relationship between HQ and the units, and among the units themselves (Quintanilla, 
1998). In examining the nature of the former relationships, various factors have been 
10 International division refers to companies whose structure is organized in product units under the HQ, 
with an additional international division in charge of the distribution of the products to all foreign markets. 
In those companies organised under a global product division, each product unit under HQ would be 
responsible for a different geographical area. Area division is where under HQ the operations are 
organized by area, with separate product divisions falling under the area units. Finally, a global matrix 
structure would be a mixed approach which aims at achieving global integration and differentiated 
responses for the various geographical areas under which the company operates, by creating a network of 
managers responsible for each geographical area and each different product line (Birkinshaw, 2000). 
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analysed. These include external factors, such as contextual circumstances like the local 
institutional environment (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997), and internal factors, such as the 
size and scope of operations of different business units and the role exerted by central 
management, including their control and coordination mechanisms (Welge, 1981). The 
nature of corporate control at subsidiary/division level has important implications for 
how decision-making is allocated between the different units of the company, both 
between the HQ and divisions, and among divisions themselves. 
Lamers (1998:33) distinguishes four mam levels at which decisions are made in 
international groups: central group level; the level of the national holding; the 
international business unit; and at the level of corporate offices such as the directors of 
the different departments. The fact that there are different structures associated with 
internationalisation implies scope for different levels of decision-making, although it is 
acknowledged that the concept of absolute 'responsibility' is one difficult to define 
because of the variety of people and levels that might intervene in decision-making 
processes. In this sense, Birkinshaw's four structures can be associated with Lamers' 
corresponding levels of decision-making. For example, in companies structured along 
'international divisions', decisions are likely to be taken at the level of the international 
business unit. In companies structured as 'global product divisions', decisions are likely 
to be taken at international business division level. In companies organized by 'area 
division', where separate product divisions fall under different area units, decision-
making is likely to rest partly at the level of the different corporate offices and partly 
with the national holdings. Lastly, for companies structured along 'global matrix 
structures', responsibility on decision-making is likely to rest both at the level of the 
national holding and the international product divisions with overall guidance from HQ. 
Nevertheless, both Lamers' levels of decision-making and Birkinshaw's typologies can 
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be seen to vary within groups, and other intermediate levels can be found; for example 
an international level under the central group level, or a European level under either the 
international level or the central group level. 
Within the global-multidomestic debate around MNCs' structure and organisation, one 
stream argues that the current pressures of operating in a global environment are leading 
MNCs to develop globally uniform organisation structures. This however has been 
opposed by a number of authors who have questioned the genuine integration of some 
MNC's operations across borders as opposed to an extension of their national 
capabilities (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Ruigrok and Van rulder, 1995; Dicken, 1998). 
A third viewpoint, however, has emerged in recent years introducing the concept of 
'regional' integration. Government regulation and cultural differences are increasingly 
dividing the world into supra-national defined regional trading blocks, a phenomenon 
which is particularly strong in Europe, with the EU being the regional block with the 
highest degree of economic integration (Berndt, 2001 :23). In consequence, the 
importance of a regional strategy and organisation building has been increasingly 
recognised (Morrison et aI., 1991; De Koning et aI., 1997). Pressures to achieve 
integration across their international operations are likely to be higher, therefore, in 
those companies organised around global and regional product divisions. 
It has been implicitly assumed in much of the literature that the primary regional focus 
of MNCs is their own home region, i.e. Europe for European MNCs. However, little 
attention has been paid to the circumstance where the primary geographical focus of a 
European MNC is not Europe, or where 'Euro-centres' (Ferner and Edwards, 1995) 
have not emerged within non-European MNCs. In this case the implications of 
organisational building, integration and decision-making may differ. 
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Strategic choices in company structures are likely to have important implications for 
management processes and decision-making within the company (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1998). In the words of Hendry (1996:485), "structural solutions are not sufficient, but 
require a new management mentality". These processes are in tum likely to influence 
the degree of centralisation/decentralisation between HQ and subsidiaries in the 
different areas of the business. In this study, the area of particular interest is that of the 
management of the workforce. In the context of intemationalisation, a key question 
relates to the way in which firms sustain their overseas operations from an HR point of 
view, and the extent to which management of the workforce is also internationalised or 
remains mainly a matter of subsidiary management discretion. In the next Section this 
issue is further explored in the specific context of the changes taking place in banking 
organisations. 
2.3.2 Implications of Business Strategy and Structure for the Management of HR 
As already suggested in Section 2.3.1, firms vary in the degree of autonomy conferred 
from central HQ to business units, divisions and subsidiaries. Indeed, the large research 
project on divisional companies conducted by Purcell and Ahlstrand (1994) revealed 
distinct differences in the control systems and degree of centralisation in the companies 
studied. The degree of autonomy among the different units of the firm might be 
conditioned by the nature of the industry in which the firm operates (inter-industry 
differences), by the nature of the company itself (intra-industry), or within companies 
by the nature and activities of the business units themselves (intra-firm). For example, 
contextual factors from the competitive environment in which the firm operates, such as 
the nature of the industry or the local institutional environment, shape the degree of 
autonomy among the different units of the firm (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997). As regards 
to intra-industry differences, Beechler et al. (1993) showed that the likelihood of 
achieving internal fit between business strategy and HR strategy varies according to 
different companies and sub-industries. For example, those internationalised firms with 
a strategy centred on cost leadership within an industry affected by global competition 
will be more interested in maintaining internal HR consistence across borders than those 
based on product differentiation and where the nature of competition is 'multidomestic' 
(Porter, 1986). This question of 'fit' might therefore differ between the distinct parts of 
the banking industry, which present very different industry features and, often, degrees 
of internationalisation. As a result, different levels of HR integration are likely to be 
expected in the different banking businesses such as retail, commercial or corporate 
banking. Furthermore, in line with the variety of business structures and associated 
levels of decision-making, factors such as the size and scope of the business units, the 
structure of international operations, the international orientation of HQ, and the role 
exerted by central management, are likely to place differing levels of pressure on 
corporate functions to maintain policies that are consistent with the general strategy and 
operational structure of the group (Harris and Brewster, 1999:3). With regards to intra-
firm differences, overseas subsidiaries and divisions within a given firm might differ in 
the extent to which they conform to parent or local pressures according the degree of 
local embeddedness of the subsidy itself, the nature of the business, or the type and 
frequency of information flows between the HQ and the subsidiary/division 
(Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). 
In this Section I shall address a main theme within the literature regarding the extent 
and forms of dissemination of HR and employment practices across borders within 
MNCs. A recurring debate discusses the dual pressures for local adaptation and internal 
consistency affecting management practices. According to the first, management 
perceptions of the world and their way of managing and organising are significantly 
influenced by the particular culture and society (Hosftede, 1991), which diminishes the 
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importance of universal principles (Hickson, 1993). The latter, on the other hand, argues 
for a more dynamic transition from national models of HRM towards the increasing use 
of cross-national forms of coordination through, for example, the emergence of 
international HRM across the firm (Ohmae, 1989; 1990). The balance between the 
creation of an effective domestic organisation and international HR policies across the 
entire organisation is a complex issue. As noted in the previous Section, the nature of 
this balance varies across firms and within firms across their different divisions, 
depending on endogenous and exogenous factors. Furthermore, different HR policies 
may be shaped by the interaction of conflicting pressures for internal corporate 
consistence and isomorphism with the local institutional and socio-economic 
environment to different degrees. Those practices, for example, that might have to 
comply with local regulations and institutions are more likely to resemble local 
practices. As Evans and Lorange (1989) claim, it is common that companies develop a 
dual HRM policy, with the centralisation in HQ ofHR issues regarding top management 
positions, and the decentralisation to national subsidiaries of issues regarding the 
management of the general workforce. For this reason, the majority of the studies in the 
area of international HRM have focused on management transfers and expatriation, 
including issues of executive compensation and training (Brewster, 1991; Dowling et aI., 
1994; Harris and Brewster, 1999). The study of HRM for non-managerial employees 
remains more underdeveloped. 
There are, however, increasing pressures for the international homogenisation of certain 
elements of HRM for non-managerial employees. More sophisticated forms of 
management organisation in the form of international business divisions or 
global/regional management structures (including personnel management structures at 
the international level) have resulted in a growing number of MNCs having the 
capability to implement common transnational policies and practices (Coller and 
Marginson, 1998). For this study, corporate hannonisation of general HR policies, 
affecting the majority of the workforce, are equally if not more important. Firstly, they 
reflect to a larger extent management interest towards the establishment of common HR 
practices across the organisation, and secondly they are more likely to be covered by 
collective employee information and consultation processes. 
A number of studies have focused on identifying the forces influencing the way that 
labour is managed within MNCs (Edwards, 1998; Edwards and Ferner, 2000). Although 
in-depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is interesting to 
explore the ways in which integration of employment and HR issues might be pursued 
cross-nationally within MNCs. There is variety in the type of transnational policies and 
practices used by the different MNCs. In some cases, integration has been achieved 
through the implementation of explicit common personnel policies on a number of areas 
such as performance-related pay and employee development related policies 
(Marginson and Sisson, 1996). This kind of development is far from widespread, 
however, and more likely to be put into practice in sectors where the pressures to 
achieve international integration are stronger, such as automotive or electronic firms 
with plants closely coordinated. Similarly it can be expected for explicit common 
personnel policies to be more prominent in certain parts of the banking sector, such as 
wholesale and commercial banking, where businesses and markets are more integrated 
internationally, and less so in retail banking businesses. Given the difficulties inherent 
in the explicit harmonisation of HR policies across countries, a more common 
alternative among MNCs has been the use of less explicit methods (Ferner and Edwards, 
1995), or 'unobtrusive' control (Coller, 1996), where central HQ intends to shape the 
decisions made at division or subsidiary level by controlling issues underlying decision-
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making. Among these less direct methods, common is the diffusion of 'best practice' 
and use of benchmarking across units/subsidiaries by international management, in 
particular in manufacturing sectors (Martinez Lucio and Weston, 1994; Mueller and 
Purcell, 1992; Martin and Beaumont, 1998). Similarly, increased technology is fuelling 
greater management control, and therefore potential coordination through international 
computer information networks, also making possible regular collection of data on 
employment indicators at business division, national or international level (Margison et 
aI., 1995). This on occasion has been used to measure performance on a number of 
aspects as a means of exerting coercive comparisons across sites, to which decisions 
regarding management development, control or investment allocation are linked 
(Martinez Lucio and Weston, 1994; Frenkel, 1994). 
Another important issue when exammmg the extent of internationalisation and 
coordination in the HR area is the nature of corporate control (Egelhoff, 1988). 
Corporate control embraces all of the mechanisms put in place by the firm to co-
ordinate the operations and decisions within and across the different units to ultimately 
attain coherence within the enterprise. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) suggest that within 
what they term 'transnational' companies, a combination of three types of coordination 
mechanisms are needed to operate; centralisation, formalisation and socialisation 
mechanisms. Harzing (1999) makes a similar distinction in her comprehensive study of 
control mechanisms in 'multinational' firms more widely defined. She refers to 
'personalised central control', 'bureaucratic formalised control' and 'control by 
socialisation and networks', with an additional category of 'output control'. This latter 
category refers to control mechanisms which focus on the realisation of outputs rather 
than behaviour. A distinctive characteristic of output control mechanisms is that instead 
of focusing on a specific pattern of action, there are certain goals, results or targets 
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which are specified and need to be achieved by the employees (e.g. financial controls). 
Centralisation (the accumulation of decision-making in top management positions) and 
formalisation (the institutionalisation of systems and procedures across the company to 
ensure increased homogeneity) have been briefly touched upon in the above discussion. 
The third mechanism, socialisation involves a process of harmonisation of company 
values and principles to influence management choices and behaviour, corresponding to 
what Martinez and Jarillo (1989) refer to as 'informal and subtle' mechanisms for 
control. Such mechanisms would include, for example, the development of international 
personnel management networks, with activities for instance around regular meetings of 
HRlIR managers across sites (Edwards, 1998:700), or adequate recruitment and 
development of managers (Ferner and Edwards, 1995:240). Related is the concept of 
'corporate culture', which attempts to create a set of common values and acting 
principles so that exchange relations can take place coherently within the organisation. 
Activities that can contribute to the process of acculturation within MNCs include, for 
example, programmes for the international transfer of managers. 
The extent to which HR policy and practice is coordinated both at domestic level and 
across national borders, in particular within specific product divisions, is a sign of 
whether the institutional intemationalisation in terms of business ownership is followed 
by organisational and actual internationalisation of working practices. An important 
determinant of this is also the existence of commonalities in working methods and 
practices across countries (within specific sector-based labour markets) in the current 
context of organisational change embracing the banking sector in general. 
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2.4 ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR JOB 
CONTENT AND HR IN BANKING 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this Chapter have examined the impact that the radical 
restructuring of the banking sector in Europe has had for the banks' business strategies 
and organisational structures. This Section explores the implications for qualitative 
aspects of employment of technological innovations and changes in the institutional 
environment and market conditions. A number of effects can be identified: 
• Decrease in the number of administrative jobs. The automation of many of the tasks 
previously carried out in the branches is causing a shift of work towards regional or 
national, even international, processing centres, as well as a widespread reduction in 
the number of bank branches and employees. Increasing workloads can now be 
processed in an automated form with fewer employees. Decreases in branch 
numbers can also be seen as part of a cost-reduction strategy in response to 
increased competitive pressures (Storey et aI., 1999) alongside post-merger or 
acquisition rationalisation. New ICTs are likewise contributing to the change in the 
role of the traditional branch, enabling the automatisation of operations and the 
introduction of new delivery channels such as ATMs, telephone banking and 
Internet banking. An increasing number of the remaining branches are experiencing 
a re-focus in the nature of their activities. In particular, increased emphasis on 
selling activities, with movement from a 'transaction-based' organisational model 
towards a 'sales and service' orientation (Baethge et aI., 1999: 1 0), is resulting in a 
reduction in clerical positions in favour of more commercial type jobs. 
• Changes in employee career structure and progression. In the past the branch 
system was the basis for employees' career structures and progression within the 
firm, which was typically achieved through seniority and years of service. This is no 
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longer the case in a large number of banking organisations, where the changing role 
of branches, marked dualisation of employment and separate recruitment policies 
for each group, and the introduction of performance management techniques, are all 
leading to segmented patterns in career progression. Seniority is no longer the main 
factor on which progress is based, and whereas graduates entering the firm would 
normally be given a career path, this would not usually be the case for clerical 
workers. Similarly, automatic pay increases are no longer the norm, and payment is 
now based on contingent performance, profit-related payor other new appraisal 
systems (Storey, 1999:135). 
• Variations in Working Time. Longer openmg hours, increased competition and 
workload, and the establishment of 24-hour call centres have altered the traditional 
working times in the banking sector. Employees are now required to be more 
flexible, and long working hours are common in the banking sector. This is true 
both in retail and investment banking, where the nature and inter-relation of 
financial markets, as well as servicing customers in different parts of the world, 
increases the importance of longer 'opening' hours. 
• Decline in job security and changing patterns of recruitment. As a consequence of 
the above trends, the pattern of recruitment is also undergoing significant 
transformation, again becoming increasingly segmented (Regini et aI., 1999). At one 
extreme lies full-time, specialised, skilled and highly-paid jobs, mainly directed 
towards graduates, and at the other lie lower paid jobs, often on a part-time or 
temporary basis. 
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• Performance-Based Payment Systems. A shift from fixed pay with seniority-based 
increments to the widespread use of contingent remuneration systems based on 
performance-related pay has been the trend generally across the sector, with the aim 
of increasing motivation and productivity (Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal, 1999: 150). 
Such changes in work organisation and the nature of jobs themselves reflect the current 
issues which HRfIR departments have to confront in a large number of banking firms. 
One question that arises is whether these developments are simultaneously affecting 
particular countries within Europe. This aspect is in tum explored with specific 
reference to the cases ofthe UK and Spanish banking sectors. 
2.4.1 International Convergence in Working Practices? 
There has indeed been considerable debate in recent literature on whether the economic, 
technological and structural pressures affecting the banking industry in each respective 
European country, and in particular the resulting effects on employment and 
employment relations, are leading towards convergence across borders, or whether 
national distinctiveness tends to remain. Regini et a1.'s (1999) extensive cross-national 
study on the banking sector of 11 industrialised countries in Europe, North America, 
Asia, Australia and New Zealand, suggests similar effects in all of the countries 
resulting from the widespread deregulation of the industry. These include increased 
competition, cost-minimization strategies and business diversification, higher levels of 
concentration in the industry and a general decrease in employment. Such developments 
are consistent with technology-driven theories, also called 'neo-contingency' theories 
(Kohler and Wordward, 1997). In this approach, the market relations that tie factors 
such as products, markets, technology and organisational structures lie behind trends 
operating across countries. This helps to explain the convergence in work organisation 
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and employment relations found in individual companies across countries, as a result of 
choices in their business strategies with regards, for example, the company's size or 
market position. However, Regini et al. 's (1990) study also highlights diversity across 
the different countries in their HR and IR responses, partly because of the different 
institutional settings present in each country. This finding is in line with the theoretical 
approach that stresses the importance of institutions and social structures, such as 
educational or IR systems, in explaining the differences found in working systems and 
organisational structures across countries (Whitley, 1992; Smith and Meiksins, 1995). 
These two approaches are by no means exclusive, and might indeed coexist m 
explaining convergence and divergence trends across countries. Kohler and Woodard's 
(1997) comparative study, conducted in the manufacturing industry of four countries, 
suggests, for example, that while the institutional and social framework affects higher 
level factors such as the structure of the industry, the neo-contingency theories 
emphasizing convergence based on common technological and market developments 
are more likely to be influential at company and plant level. 
In the cases of the UK and Spain, the comparative aspect - in terms of the implications 
of current changes in banking for the HR policies within firms - is instructive. These 
countries represent two very different institutional frameworks and IR traditions, which 
are expected to influence the actions and policies adopted by management. Whereas 
Britain is characterized by a "voluntarist" approach to IR (Edwards et aI., 1998) and 
dismantled sector-level collective bargaining in the banking sector more than a decade 
ago, Spain has a more institutionalised framework, with multi-employer collective 
bargaining in place, and legal support for trade unions organisations (Ortiz, 1999). 
Furthermore, the UK and Spain are representatives of the two distinct model-types of 
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financial systems introduced earlier; the Anglo-Saxon model based on the relevance of 
the financial markets, and the 'continental' model based on stronger relations between 
banks and industry. The different traditions in each of these models could also be 
expected to shape developments in employment practices. The following comparison 
across the two countries, with reference to the trends identified above, reveals points of 
both similarity and difference. 
• Decrease in the number of administrative jobs. There has been a general reduction 
in total employment in both the UK and the Spanish banking sectors. In the UK, 
employment in retail banking has dropped from 456,782 employees in 1990 to 
386,757 in 2000 (Andersen, 1997:114). In Spain, employment levels in the industry 
have followed a downward trend from 252,607 in 1990 to 240,345 in 2000 (La 
Caixa, 2001b). Spain's downward trend (-4,9%) appears to be less pronounced than 
that in the UK (-15,3%), something that might be explained by stronger legal 
protection against dismissals. Indeed, most redundancies take the fonn of voluntary 
redundancies and pre-retirement schemes. Falls in employment have been 
accompanied by branch restructuring in both countries, reSUlting in more aggressive 
marketing policies and a change of orientation from administrative to a more 
commercial type of function, and falling figures in the number of employees per 
branch. Between 1990 and 1995, the number of employees per branch dropped 
from 32.2 to 30.6 in the UK, and from 9.4 to 8.2 in Spain (Lawlor and Serrano del 
Rosal, 1999: 149). Subcontracting some bank activities - in particular administrative 
functions or IT - appears to be another strategy employed in both Spanish and UK 
banks in order to balance the less administrative role of their branches. 
• Changes in employee career structure and progression. Gender segmentation 
predominates at higher levels of the career structure, that is in tenns of managerial 
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promotion. A more marked segmentation trend, however, is that between 
recruitment of clerical staff for more routine tasks in processing or call centres, and 
graduates for more specialised commercial or managerial jobs. This task 
differentiation is extended to skill formation and training programs, which have 
raised concerns in UK banking about an increasing divide between career and non-
career staff (Baethge et aI., 1999). In Spanish banks career segmentation seems to be 
more pronounced in the larger banks, and not so much in smaller and less traditional 
banks, where more versatile employees often share administrative and commercial 
tasks, in particular when workload increases and as branch employment falls 
(Miguelez et aI., 1999). 
• Variations in Working Time. In some European countries, such as Spain or Germany, 
working time is regulated and established through collective bargaining at industry 
level, whereas in others arrangements tend to be more individualised. In reality the 
situation is not so clear cut, and even within those countries where collective 
agreements exists, the use of unpaid overtime is widespread, in particular among 
middle-ranking and higher level employees often subjected to new payment 
methods based on contingent compensation (for example, performance-related pay). 
In Spain for instance, extra-time and its association with higher commitment are a 
means of exerting pressure on employees with a view on the extension of temporary 
contracts, the conversion of temporary into more permanent employees, or even 
future promotions. The fact that middle-ranking and higher level employees are 
more affected by overtime pressure is important because of the trend towards an 
increasing proportion of high-skilled employees in relation to the total number of 
37 
employees. Directors and specialists accounted in 1996 for more than 50% of the 
total workforce in the Spanish banking sector (Miguelez, et aI., 1999:238).11 
• Decline in job security and changing patterns of recruitment. The transition in the 
last 20 years or so from a traditionally 'job-for life' industry to high levels of 
turnover is one of the most striking features of the banking sector of most 
industrialised countries. Cost-minimization strategies have led to rationalization and 
extensive reduction in employment levels, an important part of total costs. Although 
job losses have been widespread in both the UK and Spain, in the latter case the 
transition has been smoother and less dramatic. A key reason behind this is the role 
of trade unions in Spain, which enjoy legal backing. Agreements have been reached 
with management to structure redundancies in a less dramatic way, for example 
emphasizing early retirement schemes rather than involuntary redundancies 
(Bermejo Parra, 1999). Similar situations have been reported in other European 
cOWltries where unions have traditionally played a more institutionalised role in 
employment relations, such as France, Italy or Germany, where redundancy 
payments tend to fall under the discretion of specific arrangements and legislation 
(Baethge, et aI., 1999). Nevertheless, the processes in both the UK and Spain 
present clear similarities in terms ofthe issues presented. 
Extensive rationalization processes are also associated with lower levels of 
recruitment, with new hiring particularly directed to young people, who have higher 
training. In Spain, new recruitment has been reported to be higher in banks pursuing 
expansion strategies as opposed to traditional banks of larger size (Miguelez, et. 
II Furthermore, there have been signs of firms moving the more standardised activities performed by low 
paid/skilled employees (e.g. in processing centres( to other countries with lower labour costs. This is the 
case of HSBC, which has recently moved back-office activities previously undertaken at the bank 
branches to centres in East Asia (Sisson and Marginson, 2000:63). 
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aI.,1999:230), which shows the presence of divergence within, as well as across, 
countries. The use of part-time employment as an adjusting mechanism in 
recruitment needs has gained popularity in countries like the UK where employment 
legislation is more relaxed. Thornley et ai. (1997:93) report significant increases of 
part-timers, often employed on short-term and casual basis in UK bank's processing 
and telephone centres. Although the proportion of part-time employment is 
generally lower in countries with 'tighter' regulations and IR systems - in countries 
such as Spain, France and Italy it represents a minimal part of total employment in 
the sector - differences seem to lessen in tenns of the activities carried out by bank 
employees hired under part-time contracts (Andersen, 1997). The association 
between female employees and lower paid/part-time work is another pattern 
identified in both the UK (Baethge et aI., 1999: 143) and Spain (Carrasquer et aI., 
1996). Finally, another source of flexibility has been the widespread use of 
temporary and agency workers. Although exact figures tend to be scarce, this 
phenomenon has been on the increase generally across Europe, but perhaps more 
dramatically in countries like Spain, as a counter to the greater statutory protection 
against dismissal of full-time staff (Miguelez et aI., 1999). 
• Performance-Based Payment Systems. Companies in both less-regulated countries 
like the UK (Gall, 1997) and those with more legal provisions such as Spain, are 
increasingly moving away from national and homogeneous pay rates and systems. 
Despite the existence of sector collective agreements - increasingly turning into 
framework accords - in the Spanish banking sector, banks of a larger size, and 
therefore more likely to have operations in foreign markets, are establishing their 
own company agreements, with sector collective bargaining affecting mostly 
smaller banks (Sisson and Marginson, 2000). 
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The above analysis suggests caution in accepting arguments based on international 
differences in workplace practices and HR policies related to distinct national 
institutional and social frameworks. There are two main reasons behind this thinking. 
Firstly, national IR systems are under similar processes of transformation, in which 
despite different degrees of trade union strength and traditions in each state, outcomes 
show a degree of convergence. Thomley et al. (1997), for example, argue that despite 
differences in trade union organisation in the UK and French banking sectors, trade 
unionists' perceptions of current restructuring processes and IRIHR changes coincide to 
a considerable extent. Moreover, there is increasing harmonisation of working practices 
and experiences in both countries. Secondly, the business strategies of the individual 
banking groups play an important role in establishing patterns of convergence or 
divergence in HR matters, both within and across countries (Mtiller-l entsch and 
Sperling, 1996:234). 
As a result, it is suggested that the debate on convergence-divergence of working 
practices and HR policies in the banking sector might go beyond the cross-national 
dimension, and focus on diversity within countries and convergence across borders 
based on the singularities of individual firms (Katz and Darbishire, 2000). Authors 
accentuating convergence in employment matters across countries have stressed the 
effects of improved technology (Kerr, 1973), management culture and techniques 
specific to the particular sector (O'Neil, 1986), and deregulation (Dermine, 1990). 
However, as Andersen (1997) maintains, deregulation might also act as a factor of 
divergence - within countries and the industry itself - since it allows for greater 
discretion in the strategic choices as companies search for their competitive position in 
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the market. 12 This would help to explain the disparities found among banking finns 
within specific countries, at the same time as suggesting growing similarities in work 
organisation issues in banks in different countries. 
From this review, a number of issues arise. Intemationalisation in the banking sector 
can be appreciated in various dimensions. The extent to which institutional 
internationalisation of banking finns is pursued as a business and HR strategy will 
clearly vary according to the specific context. This includes both the external 
competitive environment in which the finns operate and structural issues to do with the 
structure and management policy of the banks themselves. Accordingly, and in relation 
to the banking sector, it is reasonable to expect greater cross-border coordination of HR 
in wholesale and commercial banking, where market competition is more global in 
scope, service provision more standardised internationally and companies' strategies 
and structures more integrated across borders. Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis has 
explored some of the main trends and developments in tenns of work organisation, and 
has suggested a process of international isomorphism in banks in different countries. 
Even though internationalisation is not always explicit in retail banking, it is becoming 
implicit in the underlying processes of work organisation, which in tum coincides with -
or facilitates- a growing tendency to institutional internationalisation in the fonn of 
organic growth or cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Furthermore, combined with increasing pressures for international finns to achieve 
economic synergies, this is in some cases leading towards cross-national coordination to 
12 As an example, despite the general trend of a decreasing administrative role for branches in favour of 
regional/national processing centres, a bank might alternatively decide to maintain a higher proportion of 
processing work in branches as part of its business strategy. This will obviously have implications for 
HR issues such as job losses, recruitment, career progression and training. The Spanish group "La Caixa" 
(La Caixa-Annual Report, 200la) is an example of a bank opting for the decentralisation of operational 
tasks as a means for quicker decision-making and a better service for individual customer needs. 
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varying degrees also within retail banking, with employment and HR issues increasingly 
subject to various transnational channels of management influence. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In summary, increased competition has strongly affected banking organisations 
throughout the industrialised world, and there is now greater diversity than ever before 
in the activities and markets in which banks decide to operate. Deregulation and 
technological advances have facilitated restructuring processes within national 
boundaries, with increasingly larger organisations dominating national markets. Within 
the context of growing European integration, this process of national consolidation has 
also facilitated the expansion of banking organisations into foreign countries. 
Consequently, the number of international banks with 'multi-country' operations has 
notably increased, even if their business activity, especially in retail banking, is not 
necessarily fully integrated internationally. That is, there remains a certain degree of 
continuity in organisational structure, decision-making and coordination that are 
bounded nationally. Moreover, it has been argued that the strategy, organisational 
structure of the groups and allocation of decision-making in various issues within this 
structure are important factors for the role and effectiveness of EWCs. 'Multi-country' 
banks, with more than 150 employees in at least two EU countries, are required to have 
EWCs. However, because of the nationally segmented operations of those banking 
groups, EWCs can potentially result in meaningless bodies with little scope for 
functional operation or even non-existent consequence of little interest on the part of 
management and employee representatives. 
As for the implications for banks within the Spanish context, there might be cases where 
despite the majority of their operations and revenue originating from the national market, 
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the prospect of further European expansion might contribute to a meaningful use of a 
transnational device for information and consultation at European level. In the case of 
more internationalized banks the fact that outside Spain their interests are geared 
towards culturally bonded areas such as Latin America poses doubts on the relevance of 
EWCs, and indeed their appeal to both management and trade unions. 
In the UK context, variations are also likely to be found. On the one hand are banks 
which have clear priorities in the national domestic market, and minimum foreign 
operations often concentrated in particular sites or countries (e.g. Ireland), or limited to 
offices of representation and alliances with foreign institutions. For these banks, 
information and consultation at a European level is likely to be secondary to national 
system concerns. On the other hand, for larger and more internationalised banking 
groups, interest in a supranational body of employee information and consultation at 
European level is likely to depend on the extent and level of coordination of their 
business and HR activity within Europe, and the existence of a European level as a 
distinct unit in the organisational structure. Within certain more homogeneous regions 
of Europe such as the Nordic countries, the chances are greater that banks will operate 
in a more coordinated way or even merge across countries, creating a series of sub-
European levels of analysis. There is also a case that smaller European countries, such 
as the Netherlands, may have greater incentive to expand across European borders, and 
thus benefit from a supranational system of information and consultation, due to the 
limitations (e.g. in terms of size) of their domestic markets. 
Within this context questions about the future of EWCs in banking arise. The emerging 
similarities in work organisation issues across national borders and within the 
international operations of 'multi-country' banks suggest a more promising future for 
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EWCs. Common work issues around, for example, working time, the emergence of 
telephone banking and call centres, career progression and back office processing 
suggest that the potential exists for employee representatives and management across 
Europe to engage in more meaningful information and consultation processes. Whether 
this is achieved or not will very much depend on company-based decisions around firm 
strategy (e.g. size, location and nature of international operations) and organisational 
and management structures (e.g. facilitating cross-border integration of policies and 
practices). It will also depend on how the agenda is set in terms of defining what is 
meant by 'transnational issues'; whether management pursue a narrow agenda, leaving 
few real issues beyond general performance, or decide that the EWC could be useful in 
for example disseminating HR practices internationally, and thus allow a wider remit. 
In turn, the setting of this agenda is also likely to be a function, to some extent, of the 
firm's history regarding, for example, mergers, management policy and 
internationalisation. In consequence, a need for further research around these issues 
following a firm-based approach arises. 
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Chapter 3 
THE CONTEXT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF EWCs 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The EWC's Directive (EWCD) was approved by the EU Council of Ministers in 1994 
under the terms of the Maastricht agreement on social policy. It is the culmination of 
two decades of attempts by the European Commission to regulate the area of 
transnational employee information and consultation at European level. With an 
increasing number of companies operating at an international scale, the EWCD aims to 
improve the information and consultation of employees about transnational matters 
(Art. 1 ). It applies to companies, or groups of companies, that employ at least 1,000 
people within the member states, and have an establishment or subsidiary with 150 
employees or more in each of at least two countries of the European Economic Area.13 
Latest figures show that over 1,800 MNCs are estimated to be covered by the EWCD, 
although only 639 MNCs actually have an EWC in place (Waddington and Kerckhofs, 
2003:325). 
The aim of this Chapter is to address the main debates in the literature regarding the 
establishment and impact ofEWCs. The organization of the Chapter is as follows. First, 
the broad area of transnational employee information and consultation (background to 
the EWCD) is presented. Second, available literature on the factors promoting the 
J3 Created in 1992, the European Economic Area includes the 15 EU Member States (soon to be 25) plus 
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. 
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establishment of EWCs is reviewed, followed by an analysis of the factors influencing 
the role played by EWCs. Third, the main arguments in the debate surrounding the 
impact of EWCs on the Europeanization of IR are summarised. An analytical 
framework based on the arguments presented in this Chapter is then proposed to 
underpin the investigation conducted in this thesis. 
3.2 TRANSNATIONAL EMPLOYEE INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION 
Early signs of transnational structures for employee cooperation emerged in the 1960s 
with bodies known as 'World Company Councils' within some MNCs. While these 
councils were never recognised by management (Schulten, 1996), more formal origins 
of informing employees at international level within MNCs can be traced to the 1970s. 
The 1976 OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises includes guidelines on the provision of information to employee 
representatives on the performance of local subsidiaries or, where appropriate, the 
multinational as a whole (Gold and Hall, 1992: 10). This initiative was reiterated in the 
1977 ILO Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy (Blanpain, 1986: 17). These two initiatives formed the basis of EU legislation on 
employee information and consultation in MNCs (Hamilton, 1986). European 
information committees first appeared in the late 1980s in French owned MNCs, often 
closely linked to the socialist government, and based on voluntary agreements between 
central management and employee representatives (Gold and Hall, 1992). With the 
announcement of the first draft of the EWCD in 1990, the prospects of legal backing in 
this area meant that European trade unions tried to instigate the creation of EWes. 
There was initially only limited success, however, due to strong opposition from the 
employer side (Schulten, 1996:312). At the time the EWCD was adopted - September 
1994 - some 40 EWCs were estimated to be in existence (Hall et aI., 1995), and it was 
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only after the passage of the EWCD in 1994 that the emergence of EWCs really gained 
impetus. The greatest impact was during the two year period until September 1996, 
during which some 450 Art.13 EWCs, based on 'voluntary agreements', were 
established (Platzer et at, 2001 :90). From September 1996 until December 2002 the 
number of new agreements grew more slowly, with a further 300 new EWC agreements 
concluded under Art. 6 of the EWCD (Waddington and Kerckhofs, 2003). 
According to the principle of subsidiarity, Art. 14 of the EWCD requires EU national 
members to adopt national legislation incorporating the provisions of the EWCD, with 
some leeway to implement the agreement according to the laws and traditions of each 
country (Hall, 1994; Muller and Platzer, 2003). In order to reduce divergence, a 
'transposition working party' was created by the Commission, and a result has been 
national measures of implementation that display significant similarities. Nevertheless 
differences in the transposition can lead to variation in the establishment and 
functioning of the EWCs, most notably in the validity and interpretation of Art. 13 
agreements, the size, composition and process of the Special Negotiating Bodies 
(SNBs),14 the content of Art.6 agreements, and subsidiary requirements (Eironline, 
1997). 
3.2.1 State a/Playa/EWes 
During the nine-year period since the adoption of the EWCD there has been a steady 
increase in the number of EWCs established, with a total of739 EWCs in 639 MNCs by 
the end of 2002 (Kerckhofs, 2002).15 Nevertheless, when compared with the number of 
14 After the two year transposition deadline, agreements have to be negotiated under the procedures set 
down by Articles 5 and 6 of the Directive, which require the formation of a SNB to negotiate the 
establishment of an information and consultation body. The setting up of the SNB can be triggered either 
bl. central management or by a transnational const~tuency of employees or employee re?resentatives. 
1 The difference between the number ofMNCs WIth EWCs and the number of EWCs IS accounted for by 
two or more EWCs being established for the different international divisions within a number ofMNCs. 
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companies covered by the EWCD (1865 at the end of 2002), those companies which 
have set up an EWC are still in minority of 34% (Ibid: 33). 
Compliance rates, in terms of the proportion of companies affected by the EWCD that 
have actually established an EWC, vary considerably according to country of origin. At 
the top end are companies of Norwegian and Belgian origin, which are the only ones 
within the EEA to have achieved compliance rates of greater than 50%. On the other 
hand, compliance is particularly low amongst those of Portuguese (0%), Spanish (5%), 
Irish (12%) and German origin (25%). The UK falls somewhere in between these two 
groupings, with 40% of companies covered by the EWCD having established an EWC 
(Kerckhofs, 2002:32). 
According to sector, the higher compliance rates occur in public services, chemicals, 
and construction, where over 40% of companies covered by the EWCD have EWCs 
(Kerckhofs, 2002:38). At the other end, transport, textiles and services are the sectors 
with lowest compliance rates; 26%, 32% and 33% respectively (Ibicf). 
Table 3.1: EWCs Established According to Sector of Activity 
2000 2002 
No. companies Companies that No. companies Companies that 
covered by have Installed covered by have installed 
Sector of Activity EWC EWCs EWC EWCs 
Building & Woodwork 198 83 (42%) 208 88 (42%) 
Chemicals 451 185 (41 %) 451 199(44%) 
Food, Hotel Catering and Agriculture 225 78 (35%) . 235 81 (34%) 
Metal 649 226 (35%) 667 261(39%) 
Public Services 16 7 (43%) 13 6 (46%) 
Services 785 267 (34%) 684 227 (33%) 
Textiles 92 30 (33%) 98 31(32%) 
Transport 73 21 (29%) 79 21 (26%) 
Other 134 47 (35%) 65 15 (23%) 
Source: Kerckhofs (2000; 2002) 
Size also appears to be a significant factor in determining compliance rates, with large 
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MNCs associated with higher compliance (Kerckhofs, 2002).16 For example, 66% of 
large MNCs affected by the EWCD have established an EWC, compared with 42% of 
medium-sized MNCs, and 23% of small MNCs (Ibid: 36). 
Kerckhofs also suggests the degree of internationalisation as indicative of the degree of 
compliance with the EWCD. The higher the number of EEA countries in which the 
companies have operations, the higher is the rate of compliance; there is 62% 
compliance amongst companies with operations in ten or more EEA countries, as 
opposed to 14% and 22% in companies with operations in two and three EEA countries 
respectively (Ibid. :41). The degree of intemationalisation is even more significant when 
related to company size, with 85% compliance amongst large MNCs with operations in 
ten or more EEA countries, as opposed to 70% amongst medium-sized companies and 
40% amongst small companies. 
The importance of the degree of intemationalisation of firms' activities within the EEA 
for the existence/non-existence of EWCs must be stressed, as it is precisely the degree 
of international is at ion within the EEA (as opposed to outside of the EEA) which seems 
to influence decision-making on the potential establishment of EWCs. Attention needs 
to be paid not only to the number of countries of operation but also to the nature of the 
operations in each country, that is whether or not they belong to the same sector or 
business. In relation to this last point, and as suggested in Chapter 2, when a company's 
operations across borders belong to the same line of business, it is more likely that there 
is a higher degree of international integration, which in tum is likely to positively 
influence the corporate management decision to establish an EWC. 
16 Company size is defined by the author as small «5,000 employees), medium (between 5,000 and 
10,000 employees) and large (>}0,000 employees) (Kerckhofs, 2002:36). 
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Similarly, the proportion of the EEA workforce concentrated in the country with the 
highest number of employees is also a significant factor. In those MNCs where less than 
half of the EEA workforce is concentrated in one country, 45% have an EWC. This 
compares with 26% in those MNCs where more than 70% of the workforce in the EEA 
is concentrated in one country (Kerckhofs, 2002:42). Again, when related with the 
company size, this factor appears to be more significant in large companies than in 
medium-sized and small companies (Ibid. :42). 
It has been shown that a range of variables, including country of origin, sector, size, 
degree of intemationalisation, and the concentration of employees account for the 
variation in the propensity of companies covered by the EWCD to establish EWCs. 
Nevertheless, further in-depth qualitative analysis is needed to look behind these factors 
associated with current trends, and obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
existence or non-existence of EWCs. 
3.2.2 EWes in the Financial Services Sector 
To focus the analysis on the financial services sector, Table 3.2 shows a breakdown of 
financial services MNCs by country of origin. This is compiled for the financial 
services sector broadly, due to difficulties in confining the data to reflect only 
companies involved explicitly in banking activities. Nevertheless, it provides a useful 
summary of the current state of play in the broad sector of which banking is an 
important part. 
As shown in Table 3.2, around 35% of financial services MNCs affected by the EWCD 
have established an EWC, a figure which shows alignment with that seen in the 
preceding section for companies within the broader 'services' sector (33%). However, 
Lecher (2001 :70) documents that around half of the companies in the banking sector 
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falling within the scope of the EWCD had concluded 'voluntary' Art. 13 agreements by 
the 1996 transposition deadline. Perhaps even more significant is the high ratio of 
EWCs, and indeed Art. 13 EWCs, in UK-based financial services MNCs, a country not 
initially affected by the 1996 deadline. This is likely to be a reflection of the high level 
of intemationalisation of the UK-based companies as compared, for example, to the 
German ones, where the ratio of EWCs established is low. Equally, the Benelux 
countries and Switzerland present a high ratio, whereas Italy has a low ratio, and in 
Spain, Ireland and Sweden there are no EWCs amongst financial service MNCs. 
Table 3.2: EWCs in the Financial Services Sector by Country of Origin 
Country of Ori2in Number of MNCs MNCs with EWCs Art. 13 EWCs 
Germany 17 4 (23%) 4 
France 13 5 (38%) 4 
UK 12 7 (58%) 5 
US 11 3 (27%) 1 
Italy 9 2 (22%) I 
Switzerland 7 5 (71%) 5 
Nederlands 6 4 (66%) 2 
Spain 6 o (0 %) 
Belgium 5 4 (80 %) 4 
Sweden 4 o (0 %) 
Ireland 3 o (0 %) 
Austria 2 1 (50 %) 1 
Norway 1 1 (100%) 
Portugal 1 o (0 %) 
Canada 1 o (0 %) 
Australia I 1 (100%) 
Japan 1 o (0%) 
Total 100 35 (35%) 27 
Source: Own, usmg mformatlOn from vanous sources, mamly Kerckhofs (2002). 
3.3 THE RATIONALE FOR ESTABLISHING AN EWe 
The analysis of the establishment of an EWC emerges from the assumption that the 
decision to establish an EWC or not is dominated by two parties; central company 
management and employee representatives. National traditions of workplace employee 
representation play an important role in determining whether the employee influence in 
the establishment of an EWC is dominated by trade unions on the one hand or works 
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councils on the other. In countries like the Netherlands, labour law separates the work of 
trade unions and works councils, and the role of the fonner in the workplace is largely 
limited, including lack of legal status to initiate the fonnation of an EWC. In other 
countries, such as France, Belgium or Spain, trade union presence in the workplace is 
much more prominent. In Spain, trade unions often dominate works councils, the 
unitary legal organs of representation of workers at firm and workplace level (Escobar, 
1993). In the UK, with no statutory system of representation at company level, trade 
unions are the only influential party on the employee side. 
Early EWC-related literature presents us with a number of clues as to the kinds of 
factors that stimulate the establishment of EWCs. These include political, structural, 
and behavioural considerations. I shall now explore some of the ideas arising from this 
early literature and its links with later research based on empirical studies. 
One of the earliest contributions is Northup et al. 's (1988) study on French MNCs, 
which stresses the favourable political conditions at the time deriving from the Socialist 
government. These include the enactment of French legislation in the 1980s to introduce 
the group works councils (comites de groupes) via the Auroux Laws, and the influence 
exerted by the traditionally more open approach to employee consultation among the 
management of a number of major firms recently nationalised by the Government. 
Streeck and Vitols (1995) support the political argument by stressing the influence of 
the French Socialist party in creating an environment conductive to the establishment of 
transnational information and consultation bodies. More generally, in their early study 
of voluntary European works councils, Streeck and Vitols (1993:26) argue that "the 
very existence of European works councils seems to be conditioned by a company's 
national industrial relations system". The authors report that out of their sample, 18 
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companies had EWCs, and 17 of those had their headquarters in countries with strong 
traditions of works councils or employee representation legislation. In her study of early 
voluntary EWC-type agreements Rivest (1996) maintains that in the period 1985-1992, 
such agreements were more likely to be found in countries such as Germany and France 
with a long-standing tradition of information and consultation at national company 
level. However, Rivest (1996) finds that during the 1993-1996 adoption period, 
following the EWCD, these agreements extended to other countries, such as the UK and 
US, with a tradition of weaker legal provisions for information and consultation at 
company level. Such a finding suggests that the legal requirement posed by the EWCD 
has to some extent countered the country of origin effect. However, the potential 
importance of the country of origin effect has also been highlighted in a later study by 
Knudsen and Bruun (1998); they found a considerable spread of transnational group-
level consultation arrangements across a set of countries. According to these authors, 
variation could be explained by strong national employee representation rights and the 
long tradition of employer-employee cooperation at company level in Nordic countries. 
According to this, one can expect that the extent of employer-employee cooperation (a 
focal element of which is the degree of information and consultation/negotiation at 
company level), might be an influential factor in determining the existence of certain 
EWCs. 
Business and company-structure related reasons have also been put forward as potential 
contributors to the rise of EWe-type arrangements. Northup et al. (1988), for example, 
argue that the emergence of European company level information and consultation is 
partly a response from company management to evolving HR issues which transcend 
national borders. Schulten's (1992) study in French MNCs similarly suggests that 
company restructuring of European operations led management to consider the EWC to 
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disseminate and help implement such changes. Rehdfeldt's (1998) study of French 
MNCs supports this argument, with EWCs seen as a tool to increase management 
legitimacy over changes as well as attempting to create a common corporate identity 
among the European workforce. However, given the focus of available research on a 
limited number of French MNCs, it remains uncertain whether these arguments apply 
more widely. 
Marginson (1992) has made more general propositions about the types of companies in 
which European consultative arrangements are more likely to be established. He 
suggests arrangements are more likely in those companies organised around product 
divisions that are international in scope, and European-wide in particular, and those 
involved in mergers and acquisitions to access a European market, which in tum might 
involve the integration of production/service provision facilities. In these cases, 
Marginson argues, common labour relations problems are likely to arise, and a 
European-wide consultative forum is more likely to be established as a result. 
More recent research on EWCs has often taken the form of small-scale surveys or single 
or comparative case studies which have predominantly dealt with the perspectives and 
experiences of both employee representatives and management. These have usually 
been explored in terms of potential benefits and/or costs for each side, on which it can 
be argued that a conscious decision regarding the establishment of an EWe has been 
based. Thus the factors identified in the literature surrounding the perceived benefits of 
establishing an EWC for both management and trade unions are likely to inform their 
policies towards the potential establishment of an Ewe. 
Until recently, debate on EWCs had predominantly focused on the perspectives and 
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implications for employee representatives and trade unions. Prior to the enactment of 
the EWCD, Gold and Hall's (1992) pioneering study identified the potential that EWC-
type arrangements provide for employee representatives to increase pressure on policy-
making to support the adoption of statutory employee representation at European level. 
An additional benefit for employee representatives is the potential for trade union 
collaboration. This has been seen to be the case, for example, with the Nat West works 
council in the UK. This was the first council in the financial services sector with 
worldwide coverage, and was set up following collaboration between NWSA and BIFU, 
two UK unions with a previously hostile relationship (Cressey, 1998). EWCs have also 
been identified as a potential platform for trade unions to establish closer relations and 
network activities across national borders (Whittal, 2000). A survey carried out by 
Hancke (2000:43) in the car manufacturing industry revealed that more than half of the 
trade unions representatives, also members of EWCs, believed EWCs were a good tool 
for the exchange of information between plants of the same company. Moreover, Gold 
and Hall (1992) note that the potential platform provided by EWCs can lead not only to 
improved international contacts, but can also facilitate the development of joint trade 
union initiatives and policy at international level. A comparative cross sectional case 
study conducted by Lecher et al. (1999) further shows the potential for trade unions to 
extend their networks, not only with trade unions from other member states, but also 
with European institutions such as the European Trade Union Congress. More recently, 
at an international trade union conference of EWC employee representatives, the 
president of one of the main Swedish trade union confederations stressed that the 
growing intemationalisation of businesses required better cross-border trade union 
cooperation, and that EWCs were a key vehicle for this (EWCB, 2003a:4). 
Improved access to information has been identified as another positive outcome for 
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trade unions. The idea is that information is now centrally organized and distributed to 
different levels of the company, which in tum provides trade union branches with 
information previously handled mainly at central level (Turner, 1996). Furthermore, the 
existence of EWCs provides potentially valuable opportunities for trade union members 
and workers to establish closer contacts with senior management. As Cressey (1998:77) 
notes in his study of the NatWest transnational council, "the union could now talk 
directly with the financial director for the first time, be given insight into early 
budgetary deliberations for the group and the domestic companies, and be involved at a 
crucial stage in the strategic thinking of the bank". A related advantage of unions' 
greater access to corporate information is the possibility to use such information in 
collective bargaining activities at national or local level (Gold and Hall, 1994, Cressey, 
1998). However, despite general agreement among employee representatives that there 
are advantages from EWCs, in a recent survey (EWCB, 2003b), company management 
of some 24 major MNCs reported lack of interest from employee representatives in 
EWC activities, particularly in companies with decentralised structures and those with 
large, geographically dispersed workforces. 
With regards to managers VIews of EWCs, initial employer resistance to the 
introduction oflegislation was based on a view of EWCs as an obstacle for management 
decision-making and a costly mechanism (UNICE, 1991). Nevertheless, pioneering 
research found that despite the financial burden, management often perceived a net 
benefit in that EWCs can greatly facilitate communication with, and the involvement of, 
employees (Freeman and Rogers, 1993). Indeed, a number of studies have reflected this 
switch from early sceptical views, by focussing on the potential benefits that EWCs can 
have for the management of MNCs. For example, Gold and Hall's (1992) study of 
voluntary EWC-type agreements offered one of the earliest attempts to outline the 
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perceived potential benefits for management. These include the opportunity to improve 
international contacts and communication, and to integrate across the organisation in a 
way that can facilitate corporate restructuring and provide a vehicle for filtering down 
management strategy. 
These findings have been echoed in later research. See, for example, survey work by 
Wills (1998) on UK-owned companies, and by Nakano (1999) on Japanese-owned 
firms. In both of these studies, the majority of the management respondents gave a 
fairly favourable evaluation of EWes. According to Wills (1998:16), management in 
firms which had an EWe "valued the EWe for the opportunity it provided to exchange 
information with employee representatives, as a new forum for getting management 
views over to employees, as a chance to hear the voice of employees and as a means to 
involve employees in the business". EWes were also seen as a tool to increase 
employee identification with the firm's corporate culture (Ibid: 21). Similarly, Nakano 
(1999) reports that management found EWes a useful tool for employee information 
and the promotion of cooperation, for the enhancement of employee involvement, and 
for the development of a corporate culture or identity. More specifically, this study 
identified one company that hoped to use the EWe to increase the integration of its 
sales operations in Europe. 
Despite the advantages mentioned, both the Wills (1998) and Nakano (1999) studies 
also indicated that management rarely saw the EWC as an institution capable of 
affecting organisational change or managerial decision-making. Moreover, the two 
studies show little evidence on the actual effect of the EWCs in the companies 
surveyed. As suggested by the authors, this indicates that some of the management 
respondents were speCUlating towards a desired outcome, rather than reflecting on 
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actual practice. Weber et al. (2000) found similar results, suggesting that the real 
interest of the EWe for management lay in recognising it as a symbol of their social 
obligation and commitment towards employees; it was expected to have little impact on 
the firm. 
With regards explicit recognition of the disadvantages of EWes, Wills (1998) 
distinguishes between the responses of management in firms with and without EWes. 
Among the first group, the increased employee expectations and the financial burden 
were claimed to be the main disadvantages, whereas among the second group increased 
bureaucracy and the duplication of existing arrangements were seen as key issues. The 
fuelling of transnational trade unionism and European collective bargaining were also 
perceived as possible disadvantages by management from both groups. However, 
according to Wills, the survey again demonstrated little evidence as to whether these 
were real effects as opposed to mere speculation. Indeed, Wills (1998:33) suggests that 
these threats did not appear to be 'live issues' at the time of the survey. In addition to 
those disadvantages highlighted by Wills (1998), Nakano (1999) reports that some 
managers saw EWes as a burden because they constitute an essential mismatch with 
increasing decentralised corporate structures and autonomous profit centres. Moreover, 
individual studies, such as that by Weston and Martinez Lucio (1997), have shown more 
solidly that EWes can pose a threat of disruption to the management of the company 
through the challenge they represent to existing structures of information and control. 
Lamers' (1998) study of twenty EWes in companies based in the Netherlands provides 
the largest account to date of qualitative data on employer perceptions and expectations. 
Specifically, it examines the extent of the 'potential added value' of EWes in the eyes 
of management. Although Lamers (1998) addresses the methodological shortcomings of 
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other survey work conducted in the area (Wills, 1998; Nakano, 1999), it might still be 
noted that the concept of 'potential added value' again touches the borderline between 
what it is and what might be desirable. The results revisit most findings of previous 
work (Gold and Hall, 1992; Wills, 1998) and identify new perceived benefits. These 
include, for example: a new means to improve existing information and consultation 
provisions by including issues other than production; the potential to enhance 
managerial decision-making processes by adding transparency; the facilitation of a more 
coherent internal management, in particular through improving communication 
processes between different levels of management and geographical locations; the 
facilitation of communication between local works councils and management at 
different levels; and the potential for promoting cohesion among employees from 
different sites and developing a common corporate culture awareness. 
There are indications that management from different national business systems 
approach EWes in different ways. In their comprehensive analysis of EWe literature, 
MUller and Hoffmann (2001) note that managers from countries where there is no 
tradition of statutory information and consultation tend to assess the potential 
effectslbenefits of EWes in terms of the traditional HRM concepts of communication 
and organisational culture (Wills, 1998; Nakano, 1999). On the other hand, managers 
where traditions of collective interest representation and statutory information and 
consultation are embedded more deeply tend to assess the effects also in terms of their 
impact on the regulation of terms and conditions of work (Deppe, 1992; StUtzel, 1997; 
cited in MUller and Hoffmann, 2001). Likewise, perceived benefits include effects on 
company IR, such as the establishment of national collective representation structures 
set up in response to the EWe (Lamers, 1998). It was also noted that for management in 
systems with a stronger tradition of statutory information and consultation, the financial 
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expense that EWCs involved was considered less of an issue because companies are 
already accustomed to such a cost at national level (MUller and Hoffinann, 2001). 
Two more recent contributions have addressed managers' actual expenences with 
EWCs, focussing on practice rather than perception. The first survey was carried out in 
2002, and included 24 major MNCs with experience of EWCs (EWCB, 2003b). The 
findings reveal that out of the 24 companies, 16 agreed that the EWC had 'added 
valued' to the company. The reasons given for this included increased management 
planning and coordination as a result of the EWe, the ability to gauge employee 
representatives reactions to initiatives at an early stage, the use of the EWC as a focal 
point for the presentation of business results and future objectives within Europe, and 
the facilitation of restructuring and organisational change (lbid:6). 
The second study (EWeB, 2003c) lists a number of benefits identified by corporate 
management when questioned about the three greatest benefits from their EWes. The 
general, over-arching advantage was seen to be the contribution EWes make to the 
exchange of information and communication within companies. Within this, responses 
included the following: better employee understanding of pan-European company 
strategy and 'vision'; better understanding of national developments by central 
management; raised international awareness of both managers and employees; 
development of a 'group' spirit and increased networking; creation of a 'trust' 
relationship between central management and national representatives; helping to 
promote a 'partnership approach' in countries with little tradition of partnership; 
increasing non-HR manager's awareness ofHR and social issues; equating all countries 
in terms of access to information; and helping management to anticipate the reaction to, 
or consequences from, major decisions (Ibid: 18). Among the mam 
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disadvantages/problems identified included: the lack of a common language and cultural 
attitude; the different economic levels of different countries; the lack of common issues 
or lack of interest in company-wide issues; the uneven status of different national 
delegates (area of work and size of Group operations in the country); and the financial 
costs of EWC meetings (Ibid: 18). 
As is clear from the preceding analysis, there is ample diversity regarding management 
perceptions of EWCs. The variety of different views suggest that the differing 
perceptions of managers are likely to inform decisions regarding the actual 
establishment of EWCs very much on a case by case basis, depending on the company's 
specific circumstances. The same might also be said of employee representatives and 
union officials. It is worth noting that the majority of these studies, in particular those 
from earlier years, focus on manufacturing companies. It therefore remains to be seen 
whether the perspectives gathered applied to other industries, such as the one on which 
this thesis is focused. 
Given the statistics examined in the preceding Section regarding the number of 
companies which whilst affected by the EWCD have not set up an EWC, it is perhaps 
surprising that, with the exception of the very recent study of Blokland and Berentsen 
(2003) on Dutch multinationals, there has been no published research into the reasons 
within finns for not establishing an EWC. Whilst an understanding of the factors which 
trigger the constitution of an EWC is key to studying the reasons behind the existence or 
non-existence of an EWC, a more comprehensive picture can be obtained by 
investigating why some companies have not established an EWC, and which factors are 
important in this choice. Blokland and Berentsen (2003) examined why most Dutch-
based companies covered by the EWCD have not as yet established an EWC. They 
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found that the decision of whether or not to establish an EWC is company specific, and 
a conscious choice by either management or the Dutch works councils. In particular, 
management in the case companies was found to be rather passive in initiating the 
process of establishment of an EWC since "they wait for the employee-side to take 
action and see no real benefit in an EWC" (Ibid: 18). This, combined with the negative 
expectations of Dutch works councils representatives (related to low expectations of the 
EWCs, limits to their own capacity, and a priority given to the national works council), 
were seen to be important in explaining the lack of EWCs in Dutch MNCs. Moreover, 
reinforcing Kerckhofs' (2002) findings, Blokland and Berentsen (2003) stress the 
relevance of firm size (in terms of the number of employees); employee representatives 
in larger MNCs are more positive about forming an EWC than their counterparts in 
smaller companies who see no advantage in an EWC. 
In summary, the discussion of relevant literature in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this Chapter 
and in Chapter 2 has identified a number of factors likely to influence the existence of 
an EWC. Among these are country-specific conditions. These include the general socio-
economic and political context, and factors related to national IR systems, such as 
existing traditions of employee representation legislation and employer-employee 
cooperation. Business-related and company structure-related reasons, such as company 
size and the extent and nature of intemationalisation that is pursued, have also been 
identified. A closely related and influential set of factors are the extent to which 
integration of business strategies and company and management structures is pursued 
alongside intemationalisation, which is in tum likely to shape the extent of cross-border 
coordination ofHR within companies. Finally, the influence played by management and 
trade union policy has also been acknowledged as a potentially key factor. 
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3.4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ROLE OF EWCs 
Understanding the potential, scope and focus of EWCs has been one of the main 
emphases of both survey and interview-based empirical research into the practice of 
EWCs (Muller and Hoffmann, 2001). In contrast with previous initiatives in the field of 
transnational IR and information and consultation in MNCs, the EWCD "is rooted in 
subsidiarity, the provision of options, voluntarism and the specification of procedures 
rather than outcomes" (Lecher et aI., 2001 :45). Moreover, the relatively short history of 
EWCs makes them an experimental area in the field of IR, with widespread variation 
present in terms of their internal structure, cohesiveness, and 'capacity to act' (Lecher et 
aI., 1999). 
Marginson et ai. (1998) made an early attempt to categorise the different development 
paths of EWCs; they distinguish between 'symbolic' EWCs, being those that merely 
function, and 'active' EWCs, being those that play an active role to various extents. 
More recently, a key reference point is the typology developed by Lecher et ai. (2001), 
which offers a more differentiated approach to 'active' EWCs. Following their 
comparative study of 15 cases in the food, insurance and banking sectors, the authors 
categorise EWCs in four ideal types, representing different development stages and 
according to what they refer to as their 'ability to act': 'symbolic'; 'service-oriented'; 
'project-oriented'; and 'participation-oriented'. At one extreme, the symbolic EWC, 
although formally established, does not truly operate; there is little activity between the 
stipulated annual meetings. At the other extreme, the participation-oriented EWC refers 
to a situation where the employee side is cohesive and the forum is recognised by 
management to the extent that it allows for the conclusion of agreements or joint 
projects. In between the two extremes, the service EWC serves as a channel for the 
mutual exchange of information and provision of support between employee 
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representatives both at the EWe meeting and in between meetings, and the project-
oriented EWe defines and implements projects independently of management by 
creating transnational structures for interaction. These categories result from the 
different configurations possible from combining four 'fields of interaction'; the 
relationship between 'EWe and management', 'EWe and trade unions', 'EWe and the 
national level of representation', and 'internal interaction within the EWe' (Lecher et 
aI., 1999). Moreover, the authors note that the four ideal types of EWe are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, and they do not represent a sequence through which all 
EWes necessarily go through. 
There is indeed argued to be a dynamic complexity between actors and structures in 
shaping the development of EWes. Analysing the role of EWes requires consideration 
of the actions and interests of the two main parties within EWes; management and the 
employee side. This in tum requires understanding a complex inter-relation of factors 
that shape the former. These can be divided into behaviour-related factors (focusing 
mainly on the individual approaches and characteristics of the actors involved in the 
EWes) and structure-related factors (for example, group structures and national IR 
structures). 
3.4.1 Actor-Centred Factors and their Influence on EWCs 
Employee Side Organisation and Cohesion 
A well-established factor with the potential to influence the role played by EWes is the 
organisation and degree of cohesion of the employee side (Fulton, 1995; Lamers, 1998; 
Lecher et aI., 1999; Miller, 1999; Wills, 2000; Marginson et aI., 2004). Whether an 
EWe develops an influential role depends on the extent of cooperation among 
employee delegates and their ability to formulate a common position on key issues. 
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Indeed, provided that effective links exist between the EWC and national representation 
arrangements, a strong employee side has the potential to control deficient management 
behaviour (Naggel, 1996). 
In their comprehensive research into the establishment and development of EWCs, 
Lecher et al. (1999) highlight three dimensions of particular importance for the internal 
development of EWes: the communicative; the socio-cultural; and the institutional. The 
communicative dimension relates to the framework in which employees from different 
countries and backgrounds can become familiar with each other and engage in mutual 
exchange. For example, language barriers have been extensively documented in the 
literature as inhibitors to the development of internal employee side cohesion (Fulton, 
1995; Lamers, 1998; Miller and Stirling, 1998; Lecher et aI, 1999). The socio-cultural 
dimension relates to the understanding that needs to be developed among employee 
representatives of each others' national traditions and practices, in terms of for instance 
political and IR systems. Alongside language factors, problems presented by differing 
social, political, legislative, IR and cultural backgrounds should not be underestimated 
in leading to the formation of SUb-groupings and further inhibiting the development of 
an effectively operating EWe (Fulton, 1995; Lamers, 1998; Miller and Stirling, 1998; 
Lecher et aI., 1999; Veersma, 1999; Wills, 2000). In this sense, training has been 
recognised to be crucial to the development of cooperation among the employee side 
(Gohde, 1995; Miller and Stirling, 1998; Miller, 1999; Fitzgerald et aI., 2000). Finally, 
the institutional dimension concerns the EWe's attainment of the necessary democratic 
legitimacy and efficiency to be respected by both its members and by employee 
representatives at national and local level. Problems of legitimacy may arise in 
particular if there is dominance on the council by anyone employee group. This might 
be especially so, for example, if the home workforce dominates proceedings by virtue of 
65 
their being the largest contingent and/or having the strongest national IR structures and 
rights, giving them direct access to central management (Lecher et aI., 1999). As Wills 
(2000) illustrates in her longitudinal study of an EWC in an Anglo-French-American 
MNC, the greater experience with national-level information and consultation structures 
of the French delegation is negatively perceived by the British employee side. 
Trade Union Policy: A key element shaping the activities and organisation of the 
employee side is the extent oftrade union support and cooperation. In this sense, Lecher 
et ai. (1999:229) argue that "effective employee interest representation at European 
level can only take place if certain preconditions are met, .. , the most important of which 
is close cooperation between EWCs and trade unions". Prior to the enactment of the 
EWCD, it was common trade union strategy to try to reach voluntary agreements in the 
hope that they would lend weight to the demand for a legal provision (Lecher et aI., 
1999). Following the initial foundation period, the relation between EWes and trade 
unions can vary greatly, depending not only on the degree of interest on the trade union 
side, but also on the national IR and regulatory system of each country. For example, 
integration between EWCs and trade unions is close in countries like Spain, France or 
the UK, where EWC delegates are often trade union representatives. In such cases, the 
interest of the trade union(s) in establishing efficient European level information and 
consultation is central to the success of the EWCs, and in turn their willingness to 
cooperate with each other. In countries where there is a larger gap between workplace 
and trade union representation, the relationship between EWCs and trade unions (in 
particularly at national level) will depend to a larger extent on the existence of 
procedures for exchanging information between EWCs and trade unions, as well as on 
trade union support for EWCs (e.g. legal support, information material or training). 
However, it might be the case that in such countries, while they formally separated, a 
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closer relationship exists in practice between trade unions and works councils (e.g. in 
Germany). It is thus likely that company specific and sector related factors will be more 
influential than country factors in shaping the relationship between trade unions and 
EWCs. 
Management Attitude Towards the EWe 
Although the initiative to establish an EWC tends to originate from the employee side, 
active management support of EWC-related activities plays a key part in the employee 
side being able develop an efficient communication and working structure (Gohde, 
1995; Cressey 1998; Lecher et aI., 1999; Royle, 1999; Wilson, 1999; Marginson et aI., 
2004). Marginson et al. (2004) distinguish between 'minimalist' and 'proactive' 
management approaches. The former is when there is not an active pursuit of EWC-
activity and management is driven by the need to comply with the EWCD. The latter is 
when management pursues the integration of the EWC within company activities, often 
because they see the EWC as potentially underpinning wider corporate objectives. 
Whereas management willingness to control and minimise EWC's activity often 
underlies a minimalist approach (Weston and Martinez Lucio, 1997), the adoption of a 
more proactive approach tends to be reflected in: the amount of resources dedicated to 
the EWC, for example the number of annual EWC meetings; provisions for 
extraordinary meetings, training and time-off; willingness to have a co-chaired 
management-employee EWC; quality of information provided before the EWC meeting; 
scope of the EWC agenda; and willingness to inform, consult and/or negotiate at the 
EWC (Lecher, 1999). Other indicators of the degree of management interest in EWCs 
are, for example, the participation of senior management in EWC-related activities, in 
particular the presence of group management, the attendance of management 
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representatives from foreign subsidiaries, and the functional role of management 
routinely involved in the EWe (Marginson et aI., 2004). 
Nature of Interaction between Management and the Employee Side 
The respective management and employee-side approaches to the EWe inform the 
nature and pattern of interaction between management and the employee side, in 
particular whether it is positive and continuous or adversariaI. Hall et at. (2003) focus 
on the degree of 'jointness' in the control of the EWe's agenda and activities as a key 
area to determine the nature of interaction between management and the employee side. 
3.4.2 Structural Factors and their Influence on EWes 
National Systems of IR and Employee Representation Structures 
Existing literature has argued that the national IR arrangements in the company's 
country of origin tend to be a strong source of influence on the features and operation of 
EWes (Streeck, 1997; 1998). Such influence occurs through number of elements, such 
as national works council legislation. Rehfeldt (1998), for example, points to the strong 
sway of French company works councils in shaping the voluntary European-level 
information and consultation arrangements set up in several French-based MNCs in the 
1980s. The early study by Gold and Hall (1992) differentiates between joint 
management-employee EWCs, which tended to be established in French-based 
companies, and the employee-only EWCs emerging in some German based MNCs. 
Each ofthese mirrors national works council arrangements in the respective countries. 
Research has shown that strong national representation rights in the parent company can 
influence the operation of works councils in a number of ways. The strong position 
held by the EWCs' delegates of the parent company can be channelled towards the 
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development of an effective functioning employee side networking structure within and 
through EWCs. Whittall's (2000) research of the EWC at BMW shows, for example, 
the positive effect of the German representatives' stronger position, both at national 
level and at the EWC, in leading to increased transnational trade union cooperation 
through their lobbying activities on behalf of their British counterparts. Similarly, 
studies by Lamers (1998) and Veersma (1999) of EWCs in Dutch MNCs report benefits 
derived from strong parent company representation rights and structures as being 
reflected in the more experienced and general approach taken by the employee 
representatives in information and consultation processes. Strong representation rights 
can also be conducive to obtaining better resources in terms of, for example, time off to 
attend EWC related duties, funding, relevant information and power (Lecher, 1999). 
Nevertheless, the existence of strong national representation rights can be also 
conducive to power imbalances, depending on the willingness of the home country 
delegation to use their position for the benefit of the EWC. For instance, Lecher (1999) 
warns that if the parent company delegates view the EWC as an extension of the 
national representation system, it is likely that their willingness to contribute to a truly 
transnational EWC will diminish. It has indeed been suggested that employee 
representatives from countries with well-developed representation rights and structures 
may have little incentive to develop the role of EWCs (Streeck, 1997; Lecher, 1998). In 
this sense, Lecher (1998) argues that the integration between the EWC and the various 
national systems of IR is necessary for it to function as an institution in its own right 
rather than being an extension of national IR arrangements. 
A further set of structural conditions likely to shape the role of EWCs relates to the 
existence of an IR 'platform', on which the EWC can build (Marginson et aI., 2004). 
This factor encompasses two areas: the existence of national group-level structures of 
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employee representation in the countries with the largest operations; and the presence of 
a pre-existing international network among employee representatives that can provide a 
base for EWe activity. 
Strong national IR rights can also shape management attitudes towards EWCs. In his 
study of the EWe at Volkswagen, Helbig (1999) (cited in Muller and Hoffmann, 2001) 
reports the positive effect that the company culture of cooperative management has on 
management's approach to the EWes, visible for example in their appreciation of the 
EWe for the general success of the company and in a generous allocation of resources. 
Nevertheless, other studies (Cressey, 1998; Wilson, 1999) have shown that a 
cooperative management approach can be used by the home employee delegation to 
pursue their own interests at the expense of the foreign workforce, partly restraining the 
development of the EWe as a truly transnational information and consultation body. 
The analysis of the influence of national IR factors on Ewes has assumed a dominant 
role for employee representatives from the company's home workforce, often the largest 
national group of employees and from countries with well-established practices of 
employee information and consultation such as Germany or France. Similarly, it has 
often been assumed that the management practice influencing EWes is that of the home 
country management. Less attention has been focused on companies headquartered in 
countries with weaker national IR arrangements for information and consultation, such 
as the UK, or even the USA where central management might not be directly involved 
in the EWe. 
In trying to address this imbalance, a more differentiated approach on the influence of 
national IR arrangements has been offered by recent research on UK-based and US-
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based MNCs by Hall et al. (2003). The authors found that home country influences 
diminish when management from the home-country's HQs are not directly involved, for 
example in the case of US-based companies where the EWC is managed from the 
company's European HQs. In this case, the influence of the host country appears to gain 
importance, in particular when the management involved in the EWC originates from 
the host country or has experience in countries with stronger institutional models of 
employee information and consultation. Hall et al. (2003) report the cases of US MNCs 
where the management in charge of the EWC had continental background or 
experience, which was thought likely to have contributed to limiting the influence of 
home country US management attitudes, often hostile to European employee 
participation practices (Ferner, 2000b). 
Regarding the employee side, Hall et al. (2003) argue that the country of origin effect is 
particularly weak when the UK is the home or largest workforce; something that is 
derived from the secondary role played by the EWC's UK delegates with limited 
experience on works councils and group-level consultation processes. In a similar vein, 
Wills' research (2000) on the EWC of an Anglo-French-American company provides 
evidence of French dominance on the employee side over the UK delegation, again due 
to their greater experience. Both studies throw some doubt on Lecher's argument 
(1998:236) that in countries with little tradition of employee representation at company 
level such as the UK, EWCs have the potential to become an innovative forum for 
group level employee representation, partly addressing the shortcomings of the weaker 
British regulatory framework. Indeed, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
potential identified by Lecher is being realised. 
Organisation, Product and Management Structures 
A number of studies have related the organisation and production structure of MNCs to 
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their EWCs' development and activity. Early studies primarily focused on the 
relationship between the organisation of production and restructuring activities on the 
one hand, and the development of transnational employee contacts and networking 
structures on the other, based on the idea that networking activities on the employee 
side indicate the development of a distinct role of the EWC in the IR of MNCs in 
Europe. The early contribution by Gohde (1995) suggested that when firms relocate 
production internationally this is likely to lead to increased employee relationships 
across countries. Weston and Martinez Lucio (1997) and Hancke (2000) have pursued a 
similar idea in separate studies in the context of manufacturing firms, and have found 
contrasting results. Hancke (2000) found that an integrated production structure and 
benchmarking activities across company sites in different European companies led to a 
situation of increased competitiveness in which employee representatives used the EWC 
as a tool to pursue their national and local interests, thus impeding international 
cooperation. Weston and Martinez Lucio (1997), on the contrary, suggest that the above 
conditions can lead to increased contact and information exchange between employee 
representatives, through what is hinted to be a more mutually beneficial relationship. 
Rather than focusing on the existence of cooperation on the employee-side, recent 
research has paid more attention to the potential role of EWCs based on the impact of 
management activity and decision-making (Marginson et aI, 2004). In her study of 17 
Dutch groups with EWCs, Lamers (1998:43) suggests the importance, for EWC 
effectiveness within groups with complex organizational structures, of having an 
"equivalent in the corporate structure at European level in order to establish clarity in 
the chain of command within the internal organization". As a result, information and 
consultation at European company level may prove a useful mechanism for both the 
management and employee representatives of those companies, as the key HRM issues 
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and decision-making power for both parties are strategically determined at European 
level, and hence invite a European level of consultation. Those companies, on the other 
hand, with extensive operations elsewhere, may have developed structures that give 
their HR function and policies an orientation other than European. Information and 
consultation at this level may therefore not be as worthwhile, something that may be 
reflected in the attitudes of management and employee representatives. Finally, for 
those companies falling under Porter's notion of 'multi-domestic' MNCs (Porter, 1986), 
transnational employee information and consultation is not likely to be very relevant 
given the lack of integration of their activities across borders. 
Recent empirical research of eight EWCs in US and UK manufacturing MNCs found 
that the capacity of the EWC to influence lower IR structures within the company (and 
therefore to contribute to defining the role of the EWC) can be explained by the degree 
to which the EWC 'fits' management decision-making structures (Hall et aI., 2003). The 
same research goes further in identifying two factors with the potential to influence the 
impact of EWCs on management decision-making (which therefore shape their role); 
the first factor is the focus, spread and integration of the company's business activities 
in Europe, or 'business alignment', and the second factor is the existence and nature of 
European level management structures which serve as a counterpart to the EWC 
(Marginson et aI., 2004). A greater impact on the outcome of management decision-
making is evident in single business companies with highly integrated operations across 
several countries, as this scenario is more likely to lead to greater international 
management coordination, as well as the identification of common employee interests. 
Furthermore, the existence of a European management structure operating at the level at 
which EWCs are established is likely to result in a stronger impact of the EWCs on 
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management decision-making, in particular if such a structure is matched by 'proactive' 
management willing to make the EWC 'work for the company' (Ibid). 
Following the above analysis, it is clear that both structural and behaviour related 
factors are potentially important in explaining variation in the role and activity of EWCs. 
Indeed it is often likely to be a complex interweaving of the two types of factors that 
determines the EWC's experience. 
3.4.3 The Role of Ewes in Financial Services Firms 
Following the above analysis, the situation in the financial sector is now considered on 
the basis of evidence provided by a number of published case studies. Table 3.3 
summarises available evidence from the banking and insurance sectors; insurance is 
included for comparison given that there are few banking studies on which to draw 
(Fortis Group encompasses both banking and insurance businesses). The table has been 
compiled by conducting analysis of data presented in a number of cases, of which 
Lecher et al. (2001) is the core source. Columns four, five and six represent elements 
identified in the analysis conducted in the previous Sub-section. Employee-side 
cohesion and networking (column four) refers to nature of the EWe's employee side 
organisation and the propensity of the employee-side to engage in networking activity. 
Management policy (column five) refers to the approach taken by management to the 
EWe, which can be differentiated between 'minimalist' and 'proactive' (Marginson et 
al., 2004). Finally the interaction between management and the employee-side (column 
six) refers to the nature and frequency of interaction between the two groups, and which 
group tends to lead it. Lecher et al. (2001) find that frequent and constructive interaction 
is a key influence to the EWC's 'capacity to act'. 
Of the 12 EWes examined, four (one banking and three insurance groups) can be 
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characterized as 'symbolic ' (Marginson et al., 1998; Lecher et al., 2001), being confined 
to the annual EWC-meeting and not truly operating despite existing for a number of 
years. 
Table 3.3: The Role ofEWCs in the Financial Services Sector 
Company Origin· Date Employee Management Interaction Type of EWC·· 
Established side policy between ~: 
cohesion; towards management 
networking EWCs and employee 
s .•• '.; side " ' .. -; 
BANKING 
Kredietbank BE 1994 Medium: Minimalist Joint/manage Symbolic 
Art.13 increasing towards ment led; Iservice 
contact proactive infrequent 
Credit FR 12/09/1994 Low: little Minimalist Adversarial; Symbolic 
Lyonnais Art. 13 contact Management 
led 
ABN Amro NL 12/1211997 Medium; Minimalist Joint, limited Active 
Art. 6 increasing (Heading towards 
contact project oriented) 
Deustche DE 10109/1996 Strong: Pro-active Employee led; Active 
Bank Art. 13 frequent frequent (Participative) 
contact 
Basler CH 06/1996 Medium: Minimalist Employee led; Active 
Versicherung Art. 13 periodic frequent (Service) 
contact 
Nat-West*** UK 09/1996 Strong: Pro-active Joint; frequent Active 
Art. 13 frequent (Project-oriented) 
contact 
INSURANCE 
Fortis NL 09/1996 Strong: Moving Employee led; Active 
Art. 13 frequent towards frequent. (Project-oriented) 
Renegotiated contact proactive Moving away 
in 2000 from adversarial 
DBV- CH 12/09/1996 Low: little Minimalist Management Symbolic 
Winterthur Art.13 contact led; limited 
Allianz DE 24/07/1996 Low; Minimalist Joint; limited Symbolic 
Art. 13 increasing (heading towards 
contact service/project 
oriented) 
Bayerische DE 11109/1996 Low: little Minimalist Management Symbolic 
Vereisbank Art. 13 contact led; limited 
Victoria DE 06/1996 Strong: Proactive Employee led; Active 
Art. 13 frequent frequent (Participative) 
contact 
Axa-AUP FR 20106/1996 Strong; Pro-active Employee led; Active 
Art.13 periodic frequent (Project Oriented) 
contact 
Source: Own. Information on Nat West has been obtamed from Cressey (1998). InformatIOn on FortiS has 
been obtained from Demaitre (EWCB, 2003). The rest of the cases have been obtained from Lecher et al. 
(2001). 
* BE=Belgium, FR=France, NL= Nederlands, CH= Switzerland, DE= Germany, UK= United Kingdom 
** Categorised according to the distinction between ' symbolic' and ' active ' by Marginson et al. (1998) 
and the 'symbolic' , 'service', 'project oriented ' and ' participative' typology proposed by Lecher et al. 
(2001). 
*** Nat-West World Counci l does not currently exist. Following the Royal Bank of ScotlandlNat-West 
merger in March 2000 a re-negotiation process was initiated which is still in progress at the time of 
writing. 
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The case of the French bank Credit Lyonnais is of particular significance since a 
combination of an adversarial management approach and a lack of interest from the 
dominant home-country EWC delegation (more interested in national domestic 
arrangements) might have permanently blocked any future development of the EWC. 
The lack of development of the EWC in Bayerische-Vereinsbank is mostly attributable 
to the bank's structure, with fewer than 10% of its employees in foreign subsidiaries. 
This is coupled with the dominant position ofthe German home country delegation and 
an EWC chair with little interest in extending the scope of the forum. Similarly, in 
DBV -Winterthur, the development of the EWe has been inhibited by the group 
structure (a Swiss parent company and no Swiss employee representatives included) as 
well as little interest from the German employee delegation (the largest), which is fully 
informed by virtue of domestic legislation. Somehow different is the case of 
Kredietbank, where despite the numerical and political dominance of the home Belgian 
delegation, there is willingness to cooperate with foreign representatives as well as an 
increasingly supportive management approach. 
At the other extreme, one bank and an insurance group have developed 'participative' 
EWes that operate beyond the scope of information towards formalized consultative 
and negotiating procedures. In the German Deustche Bank a proactive management 
approach has been met by a cohesive employee side, a product of strong links between 
the EWe's employee side and a domestic company representation system that is keen to 
extend the same privileges to foreign subsidiaries' employees. A similar case, although 
within a company with lower degrees of internationalization, is that of the German 
insurance group Victoria, where the EWe is rooted in the German system of co-
determination. 
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The other EWCs in the Table have managed to develop their own internal capabilities 
and structures to either serve as a forum for the mutual exchange of information and 
employee representatives support (a 'service' EWC) or to implement specific projects (a 
'project-oriented' EWC). In the case of the Swiss group Basler-Versicherung, the 
initiative and national co-determination rights conceded to the German EWC 
delegation, and in particular to its chair, a German representative from a small 
subsidiary, has meant increased management recognition and improvement of the 
original agreement. In AXA-UAP, available financial and staff resources offer the 
EWC the scope to develop its own projects, although a recent merger with another 
French insurance company has hindered further development given the reorganisation 
of the existing EWC, which has set back its practical operation. In the Dutch group 
Fortis, a renewal of the original Art. 13 EWC agreement following a merger has been 
the catalyst for management to adopt a more pro-active approach, with the employee 
side also engaging in more systematic contact, having set up a number of technical 
committees and a more formalized approach to the EWe. In ABN-Amro further 
development is blocked by a restrictive management approach regarding the limited 
scope for employee participation conceded. Nat-West was the first UK-based financial 
services company to set up a council inspired by the EWCD, and did so with a 'ground-
breaking' format in terms of its worldwide scope. Nevertheless, the selling of most 
foreign Nat-West subsidiaries and the Nat-WestIRoyal Bank of Scotland merger have 
resulted in the disappearance of the worldwide forum, which is being replaced at the 
time of writing. 
In sum, the above analysis has shown ample variation in the role played by the EWCs of 
both banking and insurance groups, ranging from the limited 'symbolic' EWCs to the 
'active-participation based' EWCs. Whilst it is clear that a pro-active management 
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approach is necessary for the development of an EWC in the latter category, there is 
also evidence that group structure related factors can affect developments, not only by 
shaping management policy towards EWCs, but also the employee side's approach. 
Section 3.6 will draw together the arguments from this Section and Section 3.3 in the 
fonn of an analytical framework that underpins the research conducted in this thesis. 
First, however, Section 3.5 introduces analysis of the potential implications of EWCs 
for a framework for a European system of IR. In particular, it is suggested that some 
companies might necessitate an analysis that extends beyond European boundaries. 
3.5 EWes AS A DRIVER OF EUROPEANIZATION IN INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS 
The 1994 EWCD has prompted the creation for the first time of a 'European' institution 
for the development of a company-level transnational system of IR. In consequence, 
EWCs have been seen as highly significant initiatives (Platzer, 1998; Lecher et aI., 
2001), especially in the context of an increasing number of European-scale MNCs that 
are playing a key role in the development of IR at European level (Marginson, 2000). 
Indeed, in parallel with a drive towards European integration, a growing number of 
finns have opted to re-organise their production, distribution and management 
structures into pan-European networks. This in tum has prompted MNCs to "develop a 
cross-border, European dimension to their own company specific IR practice" 
(Marginson and Sisson, forthcoming). This process has taken place either formally, 
through the establishment of common cross-border practices at 'Euro-company' level, 
or more informally through the use of benchmarking or coercive comparisons. Within 
this scenario EWCs have been seen to offer infrastructural potential to co-ordinate 
cross-border action. 
Despite initial expectations, however, the complexities surrounding the development of 
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EWCs and their interaction with IR structures at local, national and European level, 
means that there is little clarity regarding the impact of EWCs on the development of a 
European IR system. As with the more broadly defined debate on the Europeanization 
of IR, the range of competing diagnoses can be assigned to the camps of the Euro-
optimists and the Euro-pessimists (D0Ivik, 1997). Euro-pessimistic positions have 
tended to highlight structural factors such as the diversity of national IR systems or the 
rather liberal character of the European integration process as inhibitors of any 
significant moves to a truly integrated system (MUller and Hoffmann, 2001 :108). 
Arguably influenced by the characteristics of the German system of co-determination, 
Streeck (1997), for example, claims that the provisions of the EWCD itself are a key 
factor in precluding the development of an effective supranational regime of IR 
regulation. Firstly, the EWCD fails to provide comprehensive and universal 
participation rights, and secondly, the EWCD fails in the mode of implementing 
participation rights by allowing for voluntarism rather than statutory provisions. 
Furthermore, Streeck warns that the voluntarist approach of the EWCD leaves ample 
room for the emergence of management-employee coalitions aimed at increasing 
competition among national workforces, therefore preventing the establishment of an 
integrated European IR system. In a similar vein, Schulten (1996) argues that although 
the development of company level arrangements as a consequence of EWCs may bring 
improved working conditions, they may not necessarily avoid social dumping given 
differences in national standards. Thus they may further weaken existing national 
systems of IR regulation. 
Contrary to the more sceptical views, the Euro-optimistic approach emphasises the 
scope offered by the EWCs with regards to employee cross-border cooperation and 
political action over the limitations placed by the structural framework conditions 
(Turner, 1996; D0lvik, 1997; Lecher et aI., 1999). This argument supports the idea that, 
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alongside other institutional developments at European level, the EWCD is the catalyst 
for national and European trade unions to adapt their structures to the European scenario, 
both structurally (e.g. seminars, conferences, support and guidance) and through 
changing the mind sets of the main actors involved. Lecher (1998) stresses, however, 
that the establishment of links between EWes and trade unions are a necessary 
condition in the drive towards Europeanization and to prevent EWCs from becoming 
detached from national and European developments at sector/multi-sector level. He 
argues that only if such links are established are EWCs likely to obtain the legitimacy 
and support they need for their internal development, rendering them able to reach 
company-based negotiations. Furthermore, it has been suggested that EWes can serve 
as the base for the emergence of a European system of collective bargaining at company 
level, provided they manage to develop from mere information committees to social and 
political actors (Lecher et al., 1999). Alternatively, Marginson and Sisson (1998) argue 
that EWes can be a platform for the establishment of 'joint opinions' or 'framework 
agreements', applied either formally or informally at national or local level in 
negotiations characterised by what they call 'virtual collective bargaining'. 
In sum, the more optimistic views asses the impact of EWes on the Europeanization of 
IR by emphasising the potential role that they have in fuelling cross-border relationships, 
which are likely to foster both the internal development of EWes and the 
Europeanization of trade union structures and policies. In other words it strongly 
focuses on employee-side collective organisation processes, in particular trade unions. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that this framework assumes that both trade unions (and 
implicitly also employers) are willing to turn their attention to newly established 
institutions at European level such as the EWes. Whilst such analysis might be 
appropriate in the light of empirical evidence of EWCs in the manufacturing sector, 
where integrated production structures are more likely, there are reasons to argue that it 
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might not be universally applicable. According to the analysis developed in Chapter 2, 
the extent to which the institutional internationalisation of banking firms is pursued as a 
business strategy will vary from firm to firm and across different banking businesses. 
Markets and hence businesses in investment banking are much more internationalised 
(and integrated) than in retail banking, for example. Potentially, as important is the 
nature of intemationalisation pursued, since historical factors have traditionally played a 
significant role in the areas to which banking firms have focused their international 
operations, within and outside Europe. For example, if the firm's internationalisation 
strategy bypasses European frontiers to focus on a different continent, there are reasons 
to expect that trade unions (and the employee side in general), as well as management, 
might not be interested in institutions at European level. It is suggested, therefore, that 
there is a risk that EWCs are caught in the middle of the different speeds at which 
intemationalisation is taking place. More specifically, the role of EWCs is expected to 
vary from firm to firm depending on company-based decisions around strategy and 
organisational and management structures. In terms of the proposed framework for a 
European IR system, it might be found that while some companies can fit very well into 
this idea, others instead rely on the more traditional national systems of information and 
consultation to feed into their personnel function and strategies, or might opt for more 
innovative mechanisms at international level. This opens up a new area for research. 
3.6 RESEARCH OPERATIONALISATION: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Drawing on the arguments of both this Chapter and Chapter 2, this Section presents an 
analytical framework that aims to capture the main factors that have a direct and/or 
indirect influence on (1) the existence, and (2) the operation of EWCs. This framework 
intends to provide a basis from which not only the role of these factors but also their 
interaction can be explored, and the framework will be refined in Chapters 8 and 9 in 
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response to the actual process of comparative analysis. Whilst the combination of some 
of these forces may trigger the establishment and/or a more 'active' operation of EWCs, 
others might run counter to it. Indeed, the study aims to show why in some 
organisations the relevant actors have been pioneers in the establishment of EWCs, 
whilst in others they have shown persistent reluctance to their fonnation and/or 
development of an 'active' role. The proposed framework suggests complex and 
multiple linkages, which need to be investigated in the context of specific firms since it 
is not evident a priori which of these linkages will be most important. It is anticipated 
that the nature of these forces and their interaction vary when examining their influence 
on the establishment of an EWC on the one hand, and on the EWC's role and 
development on the other. 
Figure 3.1 depicts the initial analytical framework derived from the discussion of 
Chapter 2, and Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of this Chapter, in which continuous lines represent 
influences within individual firms on the decision to establish or not an Ewe. In Figure 
3.1 the main factors identified as influencing the existence or non-existence of EWCs . 
These are company size, the finn's activities; the firm's business alignment and 
geographical focus of its internationalisation strategy; the finn's business and 
management structures; the degree of international coordination of HR policy and 
practice; the; the extent of infonnation and consultation at national domestic level in the 
country of origin or with the majority of employees; management policy; and trade 
union policy. Influences relating to the country of origin of the finn (such as the 
national institutional, business or socio-economic context) and sector, are examined 
through elements intrinsic to the finn, such as, for instance, the influence of national 
company level representation structures, or management and/or trade union policy. The 
analysis is conducted in this way because the focus of this thesis is a comparative 
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company-based case study research of firms within a single sector, and it is expected 
that country of origin or sector effects should manifest themselves through different 
aspects of the firms ' behaviour. 
Figure 3.1: Factors Influencing EWC's Establishment - Diagrammatic Representation 
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A first consideration in the decision to establish an EWC is company size. As seen 
earlier in this Chapter, evidence shows the larger the MNC the more likely to have an 
EWC in place. Another influential factor is the extent of overseas workforce and 
operations, and the extent to which they are concentrated in one or more countries, as 
well as the geographical location of that country or countries. In the case of significant 
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overseas operations, EWCs will be more likely to be established if internationalisation 
is concentrated in Europe, and in EEA countries in particular. In those cases where 
historical and cultural links have resulted in large company operations in other world 
regions, it might be that there is little management and/or trade union interest to set up 
an EWC, despite the European origin of the company. Likewise, whether the company 
is single or multi-businesses and the alignment of the operations in the different 
countries in which the company operates is likely to influence the decision to establish 
an EWC. For example, companies with different businesses developed in several 
overseas countries might be less likely to engage in the establishment of EWCs because 
of the potential lack of common working areas and businesses/IR/HR issues. A related 
factor is the extent to which company operations, whether single- or multi-business 
based, are integrated across borders, since the greater the integration the more the 
likelihood of common employee concerns across countries, and the need for greater 
cross-border management co-ordination. The firm's internal corporate structure, 
including management structures, and the resulting allocation of decision-making 
within these structures, are argued to be important shaping factors of the existence of 
EWCs. Firms with nationally segmented operations and business structures are less 
prone to engage in the establishment of an EWe. The business activities of the firm, 
including the nature of internationalisation, and the business and management structures, 
as well as the degree of alignment between the strategy pursued and the company and 
management structure adopted to follow the strategy are likely to have implications for 
the degree of international coordination of HR policy and practice within the firm. This 
later aspect can also be key to shaping decision-making on the establishment of EWCs, 
since the larger the extent of international coordination pursued by company 
management, the greater management interest and involvement one can expect in EWC-
type structures. 
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A related factor which has tended to be explicitly examined in relation to the operation 
of EWCs has arguably the potential to influence also their initial establishment. This is 
the existence of cooperative practices of employer-employee information and 
consultation. As explored in Section 3.3, management policy is also likely to playa key 
role in the establishment of an EWC, since those companies in which management sees 
the EWC as potentially underpinning wider corporate strategies, structures and 
objectives, are more likely to fuel the establishment of such forums. Similarly, trade 
union policy can exert a direct influence on the establishment and development of 
EWes. An active interest of employee representatives and in particular trade union 
officials can be crucial for the actual establishment of an EWC. As has been suggested 
earlier in this Chapter, issues related to the firm's organisational reality can also 
influence trade union policy towards potential EWes. 
Figure 3.2 resembles Figure 3.1, but depicts the proposed analytical framework 
corresponding to the factors influencing the operation and role of EWCs because the 
analysis of factors influencing the existence on one side, and the operation and role on 
the other, will be conducted separately. Again, the main factors identified as shaping the 
operation and role of EWes follow from the analysis conducted in Chapter 2 and in 
Section 3.4 of this Chapter. These are: the finn's activities; the firm's business 
alignment and the geographical focus of its internationalisation strategy; the firm's 
business and management structures; the extent of international coordination of HR 
policy and practice; management policy; the nature and extent of information and 
consultation practices within the company; the degree of 'jointness' of IR; the existence 
of an IR platform at national level and the nature of the employee side organisation and 
trade union policy. 
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Figure 3.2: Factors Influencing EWe's Role and Development - Diagrammatic 
Representation 
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When examining the forces likely to shape the operation of an EWe many of the 
considerations are similar to those regarding the establishment of EWes. Firstly, the 
extent and location of the company's international operations, and the nature of the 
company's businesses and alignment across borders are likely to be important. When 
companies have considerable overseas operations, with a high degree of concentration 
in European countries (EEA countries in particular), and have high business integration 
across borders, management is more likely not only to engage in the establishment of an 
Ewe but also in the development of an 'active' EWe. Secondly, the business and 
management structures of a firm can be important shaping factors in the role of EWes. 
The existence of an international management structure at an equivalent level to the 
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transnational structure for information and consultation is likely to be important; the 
level at which employee representatives are organised and consultation takes place 
should ideally correspond to the level of management decision-making on employee 
issues, so that there is less potential for mismatch, inviting more meaningful 
consultation. More meaningful consultation, and hence a more 'active' role for the 
EWC, can also be expected the greater the degree of international coordination of HR 
policy and practice within the firm. 
As seen earlier in this Chapter, the role that a proactive management policy can play in 
the development of influential and 'active' EWCs is already well-established in the 
literature. 
The existence of an IR platform from which the EWC can build on is another crucial 
factor. There are two dimensions to this point. Firstly, the existence of national 
company and/or group level structures in the European country in which the majority of 
the company operations are based, often the country of origin of the firm. This aspect 
will certainly be shaped by the IR arrangements, including legal framework and 
workplace representation structures, of the sector and country in which the company's 
major operations are developed, although it is important not to underestimate the 
choices and practices of the main actors involved in the specific firms. Secondly, pre-
existing employee networks at international company level can be expected to aid in the 
development of EWCs. Moreover, with relation to the previous factor, the extent to 
which cooperative practices of employee information and consultation, or even 
negotiation, exist within the firm at home country national level (or within the European 
country in which the majority of the company operations are based) can playa critical 
role in shaping EWe's role. Existing IR arrangements within the firm, including the 
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existing of a national IR platfonn, and a cooperative management policy are two 
elements likely to detennine the extent to which infonnation and consultation 
practices/processes are exercised within the finn. The influence of employee-side 
organisation refers to the organisation and degree of cohesion of the EWe's employee 
delegation. This includes the cohesiveness of EWe employee delegates, both at home 
country level and among the foreign delegations, and their tendency to engage in 
networking activity and collaboration both nationally and internationally. Other aspects 
include the nature and activity of the steering committee or the response of the 
employee delegates to situations of transnational restructuring. Understood in this sense, 
employee side organisation is likely to influence the operation and role of EWCs. In 
tum, the degree of cohesiveness of the employee side is likely to be influenced by 
existing IR arrangements within the sector in each country, the existence of an IR 
platfonn at national level, and trade union policy towards national and international 
cooperation. 
This chapter has examined the context for the development of EWCs, addressing some 
of the main debates in the literature regarding the establishment and operation ofEWCs. 
The analytical framework presented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 draw on the arguments 
outlined in both Chapters 2 and 3 and will guide the investigation of this thesis. A main 
aim is to test the extent to which existing evidence and literature on EWCs infonns the 
existence or non-existence of EWCs, and their role, in the specific context in which this 
research is based; four case study banking groups in two different countries. The 
framework will be refined in the process of the comparative analysis conducted in later 
Chapters, to reflect the findings of the research. 
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Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this research is the study of transnational employee infonnation and 
consultation arrangements in the context of the intemationalisation of business 
organisations and HR practices. The aim is to uncover the key influential factors behind 
the establishment and operation ofEWCs in four European MNC banks. 
This Chapter presents a research design which operationalises the analytical framework 
of the study outlined in Chapter 3. The analytical framework suggests a number of 
factors, with complex and mUltiple linkages among them. It is not evident a priori which 
of these factors and linkages are most significant, necessitating the conduct of empirical 
research to clarify understanding around the issue. A comparative study of the existence 
and evolution of EWCs will be carried out through a cross-case comparison of four 
different finns of the same industry in two countries. The nature of the research allows 
for intra-country as well as cross-country comparison, with cross-case comparisons 
among two banks of Spanish origin and two of UK origin. It also enables an addressing 
of the issue from multiple perspectives, by investigating the position of both employee 
representatives and management, the two main groups intervening in the EWC process. 
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The organisation of the Chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 the epistemological 
underpinnings of the research are explained, and in Section 4.3 the methodological use 
of a 'finn in sector' approach (Kenis, 1992) in investigating the existence and operation 
of EWCs is justified. Section 4.4 elaborates on the research design of this thesis, 
induding the rationale for the selection of the countries, sector and firms. Section 4.5 
then briefly describes the methods, highlighting the form of investigation, data 
collection, analysis and interpretation. The final Section concludes with a stating of the 
limitations ofthis research. 
4.2 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING 
Every research framework is based on a series of assumptions or 'taken for granted' 
notions which are often implicit rather than explicit. Nevertheless, as researchers it is 
important to be aware of one's implicit position, and ultimately the potential 
implications of that position for the research findings. The seminal work of Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) offers an alternative approach for disentangling the 'taken for granted' 
assumptions, as opposed to those who present "their favoured approach to research in a 
way that makes their assumptions evident" (Morgan, 1983:378). According to Burrell 
and Morgan (1979), the social world can be viewed through four distinctive 
frameworks, defined in relation to two main independent dimensions~ the subjective-
objective dimension and the regulation-radical change dimension. Both dimensions are 
formed by a series of assumptions that relate to the ontological, epistemological, human 
nature and methodological nature ofthe subject area under consideration. 
4.2.1 Meta-Theoretical Assumptions 
Ontology refers to the very nature of the area under investigation. Bryman (2001) 
differentiates between two marked ontological positions~ objectivism and subjectivism. 
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Whereas objectivism views social phenomena as external to the individual, subjectivism 
sees reality as socially constructed. From this latter viewpoint Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
argue that there are often multiple and sometimes conflicting social realities. The 
ontological assumptions of this research seek to straddle both objectivism and 
subjectivism. Giddens' structuration theory (1979; 1984) provides a useful bridge 
between the subjectivist and objectivist position. This is done by proposing a revision of 
the dichotomous relationship between the two analytic units favoured by positivist 
approaches: the voluntarism of individuals and deterministic forces which shape 
individuals' actions. 
The epistemological assumptions refer to the theory of knowledge itself, in the sense of 
the type of findings the researcher aims to obtain. My epistemological position is based 
on the anti-positivist approach "set against the utility of a search for laws or underlying 
regularities in the world of social affairs" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:5). Given that I am 
exploring the perspectives of those involved in the operation of EWes, direct 
involvement with the subject of study is essential in order to gain adequate 
understanding. Positivist approaches are mainly concerned with the establishment of 
causal relationships between the causal power and the object of study. This implies 
creating the appropriate conditions so that the object studied responds to the cause or 
power a priori established by the researcher. Such an approach lies against the principles 
of my research, where no previous conditions are fixed. In this sense, Tsoukas 
(1989:552) argues that "the impossibility of constructing the conditions of closure in the 
social sciences means that they [social sciences] are primarily explanatory and not 
predictive". Obtaining my findings through a cross-cultural comparison means being 
alert, not only to the impact of language and meaning which we attach to things, but 
also to the influence of other variables in a broader context - political issues, for 
example. Indeed, research into the political behaviour of international business has 
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proved that "crossing borders introduces firms into other sovereignties" (Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994:137). 
The human nature assumptions are based on the debate around determinism versus 
voluntarism, the former posing the human being as completely determined by the social 
situation in which he or she is located. Again, it can be argued that employee 
representation measures in different European states are strongly shaped by national 
level regulations. However, rather than deciding on either a radical deterministic view 
or one completely free from any social constraint, I would argue that my specific area of 
research falls somewhere between the two. I therefore adopt an intermediate standpoint 
which allows for the influence of both situational and voluntary factors over the 
individual responses and experiences in connection with the establishment and 
development of EWCs. 
The methodological debate is based on two extreme approaches; ideographic and 
nomothetic. "The ideographic approach to social science is based on the view that one 
can only understand the social world by obtaining first hand knowledge of the subject 
under investigation" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979:6). In order to obtain fruitful 
conclusions about the positions of the actors involved in EWC activity, namely 
management and employee representatives, I systematically studied the actors and 
organisations involved and their background. Moreover, I did so within the context of a 
specific industry embedded in varying national political and social circumstances. In the 
words of Child and Tayeb (1983), "in the ideographic approach, the relations between 
organisation and their context are assumed to form configurations that are peculiar to 
defined space and time" (cited in Tsoukas, 1989:555). 
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4.2.2 Finding a Suitable Paradigm 
Returning to the initial paradigms fonned by the four sets of assumptions, my 
theoretical position is situated within the broad interpretative paradigm whilst also 
acknowledging the more holistic approach offered by Gidden's structuration theory 
(1979; 1984). While an account of the agent's activities can be built up from an 
interpretative analysis of their actions, such an account would be inadequate unless it 
included the factors guiding these actions and their results (Giddens, 1979). As a 
'qualitative' researcher, I understand that different realities are interpreted differently by 
different people, interpretations also conditioned by time and context. Social situations 
are constructed by individuals' backgrounds and previous experiences, and thus one of 
my aims as a researcher was to acknowledge the existence of multiple realities within 
the apparently 'uniform' concept of EWCs. In this sense, my research was exploratory 
in nature, and also designed to be open to evaluation against reference points provided 
by existing studies in the area. 
4.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1 Research into EWCs: The Need/or a Comparative Case Study Approach 
The preceding Chapter has acknowledged the lack of in-depth, comparative research 
into EWC-related issues. Debates in the research methodology literature have focused 
on the distinction between qualitative and quantitative approaches (Bryman, 1988; 
Easterby-Smith et aI., 1991; Bryman and Burgess, 1994), these being more or less 
appropriate depending on the research questions of the study in question. In this 
research on the existence and operation of EWCs I adopt a qualitative approach, 
characterised by its concern with constructionism, interpretation and subjective 
perception, rather than with identification of a rational truth underpinned by a natural 
science model (Bryman, 1988). This allows the thesis' aims and objectives to be best 
accomplished. 
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The need for a deep understanding of the dynamics surrounding the subject justifies the 
selection of comparative cross-case study research for the conduct of this study. Case 
studies are appropriate as a research strategy when the aim is to understand the 
dynamics present within single settings (Eisenhardt, 1989:534), or when the investigator 
has little control over the process (Yin, 1994: 1). Among the various classifications of 
case studies, there is a distinction between exploratory and explanatory case studies. 
Yin (1994:6) refers to the first type when the questions to be addressed focus mainly on 
the 'what', and to the second type when emphasis is put on the 'how' and the 'why'. 
This research draws on both types of case studies. It is anticipated that the study reveals 
aspects distinctive to each case, which thereafter allow for explanations of how and why 
those aspects differ. The influence of the companies' environment and various (internal 
and external) developments, are likely to permeate the actions and behaviours of actors 
involved with the EWe process and decision-making. Therefore a retrospective analysis 
of the firms is essential, so that the research can grasp the succession of events that 
might have triggered (or not) the establishment of EWes, as well as uncovering the key 
features of their operation. To this end, the research has tracked EWe developments 
since their creation, as well as their activity over a fifteen-month period. 
Locke and Thelen (1995) advocate the use of the 'contextualised approach' that takes 
account of the different 'starting points' of each case under investigation, and therefore 
minimises misleading or oversimplified conclusions. Moreover, the need to consider 
both the external and internal contexts affecting EWes requires the use of a multilevel 
analysis (Hendry and Pettigrew, 1990). As Pettigrew (1990) argues, the case study 
method allows the opportunity to study the process in question in its context, and 
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therefore to incorporate the influence of various interconnected levels of analysis. These 
will be explored in the following Section. 
Case studies are explicitly designed to suggest, develop or test generalisations with 
broader application (Whitfield and Strauss, 2000). By building on some tentative 
propositions from recent research, the case studies in this research will contribute to the 
generation of a theoretical framework around the existence and operation of EWCs in 
banking firms of British and Spanish origin. This can be achieved without making a 
case for the statistical representativeness of the case study companies (Edwards, 1992). 
The word 'theory' in this context refers to a certain set of characteristics that are more 
likely to occur in an environment with certain assumptions, constructs and variables, 
different to those existing in a context where previous research has been undertaken. 
As identified in Chapter 3, there is a lack of in-depth comparative studies into the 
existence and operation of EWCs. Comparative case studies have strong advantages 
over single case studies in that they facilitate the uncovering of the importance of 
different contextual factors in ways that a single study is not able to do. Comparing 
across different contexts can lead to a deeper and more sophisticated understanding of 
the underlying factors at work. This is particularly true when there are large differences 
in context, such as when comparisons are cross-national. This study is based on cross-
case comparative research within one sector in two countries, and as such it addresses 
this gap in the current literature. 
4.3.2 Levels of Analysis 
When the phenomena under investigation is under the influence of interconnected levels 
of analysis, there is a need to demarcate these levels (Pettigrew, 1985). These levels are 
outlined below. 
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The firm is the main unit of analysis of this research. EWCs are based within firms, 
institutions characterised by their complexity, evolving nature and context-specific 
entities (Porter, 1991 :97). As such, the establishment and operation of EWCs is the 
result of interaction among management and employee representatives from different 
levels and within different units of the organisations. In particular, large MNCs with 
extensive international operations constitute the main level of analysis. Moreover, the 
nature of the case study firms as large and dominant players within their field means 
that they are influential in shaping sector trends (Marginson and Sisson, 1996). Thus 
their influence enables analysis of the differential impact of country and sector factors 
on organisational transformations, and facilitates the drawing of some wider 
conclusions relevant to other firms. Furthermore, large organisations have larger scope 
to shape their own actions and approaches given their often dominant market position 
and their leading role within institutions such as employers federations. As stated above 
and in Chapter 3, company-specific features (Marginson et aI., 2004) as well as 
management strategic choices (Child, 1972) are important in shaping EWC-related 
developments in each specific firm. Indeed, a detailed analysis of each firm is required 
given that, because of their size and range of activities, MNCs are often multi-level, 
where it is not rare to find diverging approaches and experiences in different business 
streams, subsidiaries, etc. 
Besides company-specific features such as the nature of activities, extent of 
internationalisation and IR climate, which are key in shaping the EWC process, there 
are other factors external to the organisation that help to shape the context in which 
decisions are made. The sector level has an immediate impact on the organisation, life 
and performance of the companies (Pettigrew, 1990, McGahan and Porter, 1997). 
Indeed the sector level is particularly important because, as Hollingsworth et a1.(1994:9) 
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argue, "sectoral regimes within nation-states are in tum influenced and transformed by 
international competitive pressures, which may well constitute one of the most 
important and independent sources of institutional change in the contemporary world of 
high interdependent national capitalisms". In this sense, and following the propositions 
of earlier research (Smith et aI., 1990; Arrowsmith and Sisson, 1999; Arrowsmith et aI., 
2003), the sector is considered an important reference point in this study. A 'firm in 
sector' (Kenis, 1992) approach is therefore suggested as the analytical framework in 
which the research presented in this thesis is conducted. 
The importance attached to the sector does not mean that it is the only influence. A 
number a theoretical frameworks, such as the institutionalist (Whitley, 2000) or 
culturalist (Hofstede, 1991) approaches have stressed the importance of studying 
national contexts. An influential contribution is that of the 'institutional' school, which 
has been extensively explored through the 'national business system' concept (Whitley, 
1992; 2000; Ferner, 1997).17 Later contributions within this school have acknowledged 
that the domestic national business system is not the only determinant of firm's 
behaviour. In particular, as firms internationalise and depart from their home-based 
institutional context (as is the case of the firms examined in this research), additional 
driving forces such as host and international context matter (Belanger et ai. 1999; 
Ferner, 1997; Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998; Ferner et aI., 2001). Moreover, the effects 
and interrelation of the home, host and international context are likely to manifest 
themselves differently depending on the sector, each with its own structural 
characteristics and internal dynamics (Morgan and Whitley, 2003). 
17 The idea behind the national business system is that the national state often serves as a confine for the 
existence of specific institutions, traditions and cultures, a combination of which generate distinct 
business systems, and help to configure the relations between the main actors within particular 
organisations and institutions at the different levels, as well as the relationships between this 
organisational and the external environment. 
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In the next Chapter the specific context of the UK and Spanish banking sectors, the 
sector and countries of this study, is explored. Among the institutional features to be 
examined are the market organisation and structure of the firms, the regulatory 
framework, the employment system, and the IR context, including the role of the state 
and of collective employee representation structures. All of these are mediating 
variables in understanding differences within firms. 
4.4 THE RESEARCH DESIGN OF THE THESIS 
The empirical operationalisation of the study took the form of case studies in four 
companies. Out of the four main case studies, two were headquartered in the UK and 
two in Spain. All four were drawn from the banking sector. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the research design of the investigation. The consideration of four 
main case studies from the banking sector, and in two different countries, makes 
possible a multi-level analysis, as introduced in the previous Section. It also enables 
'within country' as well as 'cross companies' comparison within a single sector. In 
particular, the selection of the firm as the main level of analysis allows an in-depth 
investigation of the company-specific factors identified in the analytical framework 
presented in Chapter 3. 
A justification for the selection of the countries, sector and firms on which the study is 
based follows after figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 
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4.4. J Selection of Countries 
The UK and Spain have been selected as countries of origin for the case study 
companies of this research. A number of considerations justify this choice. 
Contextual considerations 
Firstly, the UK and Spain are each characterised by distinct business systems, which 
offer a rich source of contrast. In particular, there are important differences among the 
social, institutional and business organisation and environments of the two countries. In 
terms of corporate governance, for example, while the UK is associated with the Anglo-
Saxon tradition of an 'outsider' system that gives priority to shareholders' value, Spain 
is traditionally associated with the Continental 'insider' system that places emphasis on 
the interests of employees as 'stakeholders'. 
A further, related point of contrast can be found in the distinctiveness of the IR systems 
of each country. The UK, in its Anglo-Saxon tradition, has a strongly deregulated IR 
system. Indeed, the establishment and operation of EWes have particular implications 
for companies head-quartered in the UK (and other Anglo-Saxon economies), where 
there are no statutory systems for employee information and consultation (Hall et aI, 
2003). On the other hand, Spain is part of the southern European tradition of IR, where 
state regulations and elements of the business systems markedly intervene in IR 
institutions. It has been argued, for example, that the national collective agreement for 
the banking sector in Spain constrains the labour relations and HRM choices of MNCs 
(Comfia, 1999). 
Finally, the two countries' economies differ in their degree of international orientation 
and openness. The UK economy is characterised by the importance of large home-based 
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MNCs, often oriented towards North America and Europe. This contrasts with Spain's 
economy, which until very recently had few home-based MNCs, with a very strong 
orientation towards Latin America. 
Analytical considerations 
The UK and Spain present an interesting analytical contrast in terms of the different 
impact of the EWCD at this stage. As described in Chapter 3, the compliance of 
companies affected by the EWCD differs markedly, with a compliance rate of 40% in 
the UK and 5,2% in Spain (Kerckhofs, 2002). This is despite the domestic system of 
employee information and consultation being acknowledged as less developed in the 
UK than in Spain. 
Furthermore, this investigation redresses the comparative lack of case study research 
focussed on the operation of EWCs in UK- and Spanish- based firms. Indeed, while 
UK-based firms represent the third largest national total - 15% - among companies 
identified by the ETUI as having EWCs (Ibid), there is a particular lack of detailed case 
studies. Existing research in the area has tended to concentrate on mainland-European 
countries-of-origin, in particular on French- and German-based companies. Hence there 
is also very little reference to Southern European countries, and the lack of available 
studies of Spanish-based companies is striking. 
Subjective considerations 
An additional consideration in choosing the UK and Spain was the command of the 
English and Spanish languages by the researcher, a key factor in effectively 
understanding the different nuances of the languages in which interviews had to be 
conducted. Moreover, it should be stressed that the familiarity of the researcher with 
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both countries and cultures, having lived, work and studied for considerable periods of 
time in each of them, was a central consideration. 
4.4 2 Selection of the Industry 
The banking industry is the context of this study. The selection of all case study firms 
from a single industry enables comparison of business strategies and responses across 
firms facing similar environmental conditions and changes (Meyer et aI., 1993; Fox-
Wolgramm et aI., 1998). While most studies on the establishment and operation of 
EWCs have focussed on the manufacturing sector, there is a relative lack of research 
focussed on service sector companies. This seems a particularly important gap given 
that the service sector currently dominates the economy of most EU member states. 
Among services, the banking sector in Europe is extremely appropriate for a study 
around the establishment and operation of EWCs. The significant changes undertaken 
by the sector in both the UK and Spain, as described in Chapter 2, include its rapid 
restructuring, substantial technological transformation, and the important ongoing 
intemationalisation and concentration process whereby a small number of banks are 
increasingly dominating the market. These changes make the sector especially 
interesting for the study of developments around transnational forums for the 
information and consultation of employees. Moreover, banking stands out among the 
private services sector as having relatively high levels of trade union organisation, 
something of particular relevance given the important role of trade unions in triggering 
the establishment of EWes. Finally, the banking industry presents an interesting 
dichotomy worth exploring, and from which different responses might be expected. As 
Chapter 2 established, certain segments of the banking industry - for example retail 
operations - remain strongly driven by the national market and, more importantly, to a 
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large extent conditioned by national practices and regulations (European Commission, 
1998). Quintanilla (1998: 162), for instance, notes that "personnel policies and practices 
in Spanish banks are well rooted in the Spanish management style and the IR legal 
system, and also come under the strong influence of the banking industry labour 
practices". Having said this, however, the drive towards a European single market and 
monetary union is undoubtedly presenting new challenges to the banking sector in 
Europe. As also stressed by Quintanilla (1998), in his in-depth study of management 
processes in subsidiaries of foreign banks in Spain, there is a clear trend towards 
decentralisation of collective bargaining while establishing new HRM policies at 
company level in multinational subsidiaries. 
4.4.3 Selection of Firms 
The selection of specific cases is important because of its implications for the research 
findings. Given the nature of the research and unit of analysis, the design entailed a 
matched comparison of the banks most likely to establish EWCs in both the UK and 
Spain. This implied a focus on the largest and most internationalised banks of each 
economy, and only on universal banks - according to the definition given in Chapter 2. 
The high concentration of the industry in both countries made the choice of case study 
companies limited, with the research sample reduced to four companies in Spain 
(BBV A, BSCH, Banco Popular, and La Caixa), and four in the UK (Barclays, HSBC, 
Lloyds TSB and Royal Bank of Scotland). From this initial sample, feasibility concerns 
surrounding the scale and timeframe of the study, alongside the nature of access links, 
meant that two banks were selected from each country. Hence, BBV A and BSCH are 
the Spanish-based main case study companies, whereas HSBC and LTSB are the UK-
based main cases. 
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Two of the cases selected have set up EWCs (the two UK firms) whereas the other two 
have not (the two Spanish firms). In fact none of the Spanish banks affected by the 
EWCD had set up an EWC at the time this research was initiated. Since a central aim of 
this research is to improve understanding on the reasons behind the existence or not of 
EWCs, it is necessary to choose polar types as case studies, as they reflect opposites of 
the phenomena under investigation. In selecting cases that disconfirm patterns from 
early studies (e.g. firms with no established EWC, from different sectors, or from 
different countries of origin), it is intended to challenge chains of evidence by proposing 
chains of possible falsification (Yin, 1984; Whipp et aI., 1989; Pettigrew, 1985). 
4.5 RESEARCH METHODS 
As already mentioned, the case study method was selected as the most appropriate 
approach to conduct this investigation on transnational company-level employee 
information and consultation arrangements. Four main company case studies were used. 
Fieldwork was also conducted in two further companies, also from the banking sector 
(Royal Bank of Scotland from the UK, and La Caixa from Spain). The information from 
these additional companies has been used to build knowledge and to support the 
analytical framework and findings, rather than being explicitly analysed in the text. In 
each of the cases a series of interviews were conducted with management and trade 
union representatives, at group and business division level. Interviews were also 
conducted with trade union officials at sector level. This was complemented by 
attendance to EWC-related meetings, internal documentation from the banks, and trade 
union and sector information. 
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4.5.1 Data Collection 
Fieldwork was conducted between August 2000 and December 2002. Fontana and Frey 
(1994) distinguish between semi-structured, structured and unstructured interviews. 
The main research technique used was in-depth semi-structured interviews, with a view 
to investigating the underlying processes and discovering new areas related to the topic 
being researched. It was felt that structured interviews based on a questionnaire fonnat 
would not allow attainment of the same depth of infonnation as semi-structured 
interviews. Conversely, it was felt that unstructured interviews would not provide the 
necessary level of consistence to carry out an adequate comparison across cases. 
Interviews were conducted with a variety of respondents, whose answers were cross-
checked to add validity to the infonnation obtained. Additional infonnation was also 
collected through other research techniques, with the aim of drawing on the different 
strengths of various data collection methods (Pettigrew, 1990), thus enhancing, 
triangulating and verifying the infonnation from the interviews (Yin, 1994:92). These 
alternative sources of data included internal documentation from the banks and trade 
unions, relevant documentation about the banking sector both in the UK and Spain, 
internet-based sources including corporate and trade union internet pages, and specialist 
press. Internal documentation containing valuable speeches given by key members of 
the finns on strategic plans were also used, and further additional infonnation was 
obtained through access to meetings related to EWC-activity; for example, employee-
side meetings prior to the renegotiation of the EWe agreement. The collection of data 
was an iterative process, with various types of data often being collected simultaneously. 
Given that the issues on which the research is focused were regarded as sensitive by 
company management, negotiation of access was in most cases protracted and arduous. 
It has been also widely acknowledged that access to top management in large 
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organisations is notoriously hard to arrange because of time constrains and the political 
nature of organisational life. It must be noted that a further difficulty was the lack of 
tradition for Spanish companies to cooperate with business researchers in qualitative 
research projects, alongside the national socio-cultural influence of several political and 
economic scandals that had taken place following the disclosure of confidential 
information (Quintanilla, 1998: 1 02). 
First contacts were made with trade union officials. In the UK, the research officer of 
the main banking and finance union, UNIFI, provided the contact names of trade union 
officials from the case study banks. These agreed to participate in the research, and 
provided a list of useful contacts (EWC members) that were later approached 
individually. The trade union officials also provided management contacts, who were 
also later contacted with different degrees of success. A two-page statement specifying 
the objectives of the research and access requirements was sent to those management 
identified. Access to the management of HSBC generally proved easier than to that of 
LTSB, although the latter was developed through the useful assistance of a Warwick-
based research team who had recently conducted research in the Bank. The Spanish 
subsidiaries of both HSBC and L TSB were approached separately, and access was 
gained in both cases. In the case of Spain, contact details of both trade union officials 
and bank management were kindly provided by an earlier doctoral researcher at 
Warwick Business School. Again, as in the UK cases, management proved more 
difficult to agree access, also because in both of the two main case banks the 
management contacts provided were no longer at the bank. However, a written 
statement was again sent to other management members identified, and interviews 
arranged. Whereas access in BSCH was greatly facilitated by a specific manager, in 
BBV A the fact that the Group was going through an uncertain restructuring process 
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meant that the initial contact was less keen to facilitate wider access. To counter-balance 
this difficulty, the UK subsidiary of the bank was approached separately and access 
gained. 
A total of 73 interviews were conducted, the majority of which were single one-to-one 
interviews; just two were conducted simultaneously with two individuals from the 
company. The number and distribution of the interviews case-by-case is depicted in 
Table 4.1, and the average interview lasted around one-and-a-half hours. Interviews 
with both management and employee representatives were conducted at different levels 
in order to provide a range of different perspectives to be contrasted (Pettigrew, 1990). 
On the management side, target interviewees were mainly management at central HQ 
and subsidiary level that were involved in EWC policy and practice. This included 
central HR and IR management, HR and IR management from the different divisions 
and subsidiaries, and general country managers. 
Table 4.1: Distribution of Interviews by Company and Respondent Category. 
Bank Main (Case Studies) Management Employee Reps. TOTAL 
HSBC 5 8 13 
LTSB 5 8 13 
BSCH 7 7 14 
BBVA 4 7 II 
Sub Total 21 30 51 
Bank (Other) Management Employee Reps. 
La Caixa 3 4 7 
RBS 0 8 8 
Barclays* 0 3 3 
- -Other 
Unifi, UK 1 1 
Spanish Banking Union Federation - 2 2 
Comfia, CCOO 
Spanish Banking Sector Federation - 1 I 
Fes, UGT 
TOTAL 23 49 73 
* A limited number of mtervlews were also conducted with trade umon offiCials and representatives in 
Barclays Bank. 
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On the employee side, interviews were also conducted at different levels, with 
interviewees ranging from current and ex-EWC delegates (both union and non-union 
members), full-time officers involved with EWCs, and trade union officers in the 
banking federations in charge of sector policy and developments. Efforts were made to 
achieve a balance between management and employee representatives in each company, 
as well as with regards to the interviews at the different levels within each category (see 
Table 4.2). However, it was evident that the personnel with the relevant tacit knowledge 
varied across the cases. Furthermore, internal documentation and archival material 
obtained from each of the cases presented slight variations. In the case of BBV A where 
a fewer number of interviews with management respondents were conducted, access to 
more detailed and extensive internal documentation was gained. This in turn facilitated 
relevant information to a similar level than in the rest of the cases. 
Table 4.2 : Distribution ofInterviews within each Case Study Firm. 
Company HSBC L1oyds- BSCH BBVA RBS La Caixa 
TSB 
Management 
.' Group HQ 2 2 4 2 0 3 
Divisional 2 2 3 0 0 0 
Subsidiaries 1 1 0 2 0 0 
Subtotal 5 5 7 4 0 3 
Employees -
Full-Time 2 3 4 4 4 3 
Officials 
National Rep. 3 2 1 1 4 1 
Local 2 2 2 2 0 0 
Subsidiaries 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal 8 8 7 7 8 4 
Interviews were conducted at different times during the eighteen-month period of 
fieldwork. The sequencing of interviews was designed to allow information obtained in 
earlier interviews to refine the next set of interviews and to ensure an understanding of 
emerging issues. Likewise, data collection at different periods captured the evolution of 
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the companIes m response to vanous internal restructuring processes and ongomg 
internationalisation. There was a limited number of follow-up interviews, where second 
interviews were conducted with previous respondents. These were pursued where it was 
felt that further data needed to be obtained to clarify, improve and complete previous 
information (Jones, 1991). A general interview pro-forma was designed following the 
analysis conducted through the literature review, and then slightly adapted for the 
different contestants' categories and areas of responsibility. The interviews focused on 
the group's activities and structure, the general organisation of the HR function 
(including the degree of integration of the HR function and policies across countries), 
the extent of information and consultation, negotiation within the firm, and the overall 
process of constitution, operation and evolution of the EWe. 
Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish. In research that spreads across two 
different cultures careful consideration must be given in selecting the language. In this 
case, it was imperative to conduct the interviews in both English and Spanish, as 
otherwise it would not have been possible to interview such a range of respondents. 
However, it was also felt that this was the best strategy. The researcher is fluent in both 
English and Spanish, and interviewing in both allowed respondents to feel comfortable 
in expressing exactly what they meant in their own language, and simultaneously 
facilitated a more accurate interpretation of their actual thoughts on issues. All but six 
interviews were tape-recorded. Where tape-recording was not allowed, the researcher 
took extensive notes. The interviews were fully transcribed by the researcher in order to 
avoid misunderstandings and capture the spirit of the interview. 
4.5.2 Data Analysis and Interpretation 
The analysis of data and its interpretation in qualitative studies is arguably the most 
challenging stage of the research (Yin, 2003). In order to avoid problems associated 
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with the extensive amount of data involved in qualitative research, the approach 
followed has been guided by Hubennan and Miles (1994), who break the process into 
three stages: data reduction, data display and drawing and verifying of conclusions. 
Data reduction was achieved through the coding of the infonnation into broad 
categories and subsequent sub-categories, following those established in the interview 
pro-forma. In order to display the data, it was decided to organise and structure the 
infonnation by writing issue-organised chronological case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Hubennan and Miles, 1994) through which to offer an extensive description of each 
finn while at the same time avoiding the lack of conceptual and theoretical integrity 
(Doz and Prahalad, 1991). The next step in moving from description to explanation 
involved a cross-case analysis, again drawing in the categories and sub-categories 
established in the interview pro-fonna and case study write ups. In order to assist this 
process, facilitating a preliminary comparison of the cases, a specifically designed 
database (including comparison tables) was created. 
Many researchers experienced in comparative case study research have acknowledged 
the untidy iterative nature of the research process (Strauss, 1987; Van de Ven et at, 
1989). During the course of this research continual cross-referencing was undertaken 
between the case data and the relevant literature, to ensure the development and 
refinement of an appropriate analytical framework. This is in line with literature that 
suggests a strong relation between inductive (data driven) and deductive (theory-driven) 
fonns of analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hubennan and Miles, 1994). The use of existing 
software packages such as NUD*DIST or NVIVO, designed for facilitating qualitative 
data analysis, were considered for providing assistance in this complex research process. 
However, while such tools are particularly helpful with data storage, searching and 
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retrieval, they cannot replace the process of intuition, the 'artistic part' of the research 
process. This can only take place in the researcher's mind (Webb, 1999). In the course 
of the research it was felt that considerable familiarity was achieved through the 
continual handling of the data by the researcher (through the design, conduct, 
transcription, reading and re-reading of interviews), something that has been suggested 
to form part of the analytical process itself (Morison and Moir, 1998:115). A further 
issue to be considered is the kind of research being undertaken and how applicable any 
computer package is in relation to the perspective and methods adopted. In this case, the 
collection of interview data in English and Spanish meant that a computer programme 
would have been inappropriate as an analytical tool, as it cannot replace the 
understanding of different nuances in the language of the primary researcher. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has considered the meta-theoretical underpinnings and related 
methodology for addressing the analytical framework set out in the preceding Chapter. 
The fieldwork of this research has been conducted using a research methodology based 
on comparative case study research of four main cases, in one industry and two 
countries. A long process of data collection has made possible the collation of a set of 
valuable and not easily accessible data on which this study is based. The data collection 
process has been successful since it has facilitated analysis that meets the aims of the 
study and will hopefully contribute to ongoing research in this field. 
Nonetheless, in any research it is important to be aware of the traditional criticisms 
concerning the validity and reliability of the findings. In particular a danger in 
conducting interpretative qualitative research is that the researcher might inadvertently 
influence the outcome by introducing hislher own opinions and beliefs. In previous 
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Sections there are references to how the researcher has developed a systematic 
procedure for designing and conducting the research and therefore minimise the risks of 
incurring such a problem. Among the mechanisms used to ensure trustworthiness in this 
study have been: a purposeful research design, including careful selection of countries, 
industry and cases; the use of multiple sources of evidence and data triangulation; 
pluralism of informants; tape recording and transcription; deductive and inductive 
processes between theory and practice; exposure of case reports, analysis and findings 
to key informants and experts in the area; and presentation of conference papers to peer 
academics and practitioners. 
With regards to the potential generalisation of the research findings, it is not the aim of 
this research to claim statistical representativeness, but rather 'analytic generalisation' 
(Yin, 1994). By developing and testing an analytical framework aimed at understanding 
the existence/non-existence and operation of EWes, the emphasis has been on 
general ising about the meaning, not the frequency, of the subject of research. The next 
Chapter opens with an overview of the UK and Spanish banking sectors, the context of 
the case companies of this research. 
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Chapter 5 
THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN THE UK AND SPAIN 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
While company-specific features are important In shaping EWC developments, a 
number of features common to other large firms that shape a shared sector and country 
context for decisions must also be considered (Smith et aI., 1990). The importance of 
sector is shown in an emerging strand of literature in comparative IR that highlights 
increasing variation of industrial and employment systems within countries according to 
sector and company differentiation, whilst there is a simultaneous convergence at these 
levels across countries (Ferner and Hyman, 1998; Katz and Darbishire, 2000; 
Marginson et aI., 2003). In this Chapter the institutional context of the banking sector in 
the UK and Spain (the home countries of the case study firms) are analysed, since they 
are considered an important mediating variable in understanding differences among 
firms. Among the institutional features to be examined are the market organisation and 
regulatory framework, the structure of the firms, the employment system, and the IR 
context, including collective employee representation structures. 
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 briefly introduces broad developments 
in the banking sector at European level, key to understanding the current situation of the 
UK and Spanish banking sectors. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 elaborate respectively on the 
features of the UK and Spanish banking sectors. Finally some conclusions are drawn. 
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5.2 EU DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BANKING SECTOR 
As seen in Chapter 2, the banking and financial services industries in the EU have 
undergone significant restructuring over the last two decades as a result of two main 
factors: the introduction of new ICTs and deregulation. 
New technology is leading to changes in both the range of products/services delivered 
and their distribution channels. The financial sector is becoming an increasingly 
integrated industry with a trend towards products that satisfy mass needs (e.g. mixed 
products combining credit, saving and insurance). Regarding changes in distribution 
channels, the widespread introduction of cash machines, telephone and Internet banking 
have paved the way to automation. In most countries, banks now offer routine banking 
services by telephone or Internet, dealing with these enquiries from call centres rather 
than a particular branch (Sisson and Marginson, 2000:41). 
Deregulation processes have been especially significant in the European context given 
the moves towards EU integration, a landmark of which was the 1985 Single European 
Act which established the commitment of EU countries to complete the liberation of 
capital, services and goods by the end of 1992. Further deregulatory measures include 
the removal of all remaining controls on capital flows through the 1988 Directive on 
Capital Flows, and the removal of barriers which had hitherto limited the roles of the 
different types of credit institutions though the 1989 Second Banking Directive (Vesala, 
1993). The implementation of the EU Directives and regulations in the member states 
has taken place at differing speeds in the different countries, affecting more lightly 
regulated countries such as the UK to a lesser degree than countries such as Spain, 
where fewer deregulatory measures had been already taken. 
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5.3 THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN THE UKI8 
5.3.1 Market Organisation and the Structure of Banking Firms 
UK banking has a long tradition as a premier financial centre and it is among the most 
internationalised banking sectors in the world. The UK ranks fourth on the list of 
countries with the highest number of global banks; there are four, with total assets of 
US$ 1,103,802 million (Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal, 1999: 142, Table 6.1). In terms 
of the number of resident non-EU banks, the UK ranks first in the EU with a total of 
170; Germany lags far behind as second with 91 (Ibid.: 142, Table 6.3). The sector is 
indeed very important to the UK economy, with more than 7% of GDP generated by 
banks and insurance companies (Canals, 1993: 145). High internationalisation is a result 
not only of British political leadership at international level in the 1900s, but also of a 
traditionally relaxed approach to financial regulation. Further liberalisation took place in 
the 1970s and 1980s; while a key measure was the liberalisation of capital flows in 
1979, it was in the 1980s that the bulk of reforms took place. Formal measures such as 
the Financial Services Act and the Building Societies Act, both in 1986, as well as less 
formal policy relaxations, lead to dramatic changes in the UK financial services sector 
during this time (Anderton, 1995 :7). 
Concentration characterises the UK banking sector. Despite the proliferation of a large 
number of banks in the nineteenth century, low interest rates and customer preference 
for banks with large capital resources following the 1890 Baring Crisis meant that by 
1920 a handful of clearing banks already controlled two thirds of the country's banking 
resources (Orbell, 2001 :7). Gradual consolidation followed in the 1930s, in the 1960s as 
a result of the relaxation of long-standing official constraints, and in the 1990s. The big 
18 While some statistics refer to Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) and some to the UK (which 
also includes Northern Ireland), for the purpose of this thesis I refer to them indifferently given that the 
differences can be ignored for the analysis of IR (Hyman, 2001: Ill). 
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four clearing banks, Barclays, Lloyds TSB, Royal Bank of Scotland-Nat West and 
HSBC (previously Midland Bank), account for around half of total UK banking 
employment (Storey et aI., 1999). Such a consolidation process has meant a domination 
of national banks as opposed to regional players, which while they do exist, are less 
prominent than in other countries. 
The wide ranging spectrum of financial institutions in the UK can be divided into two 
large groups. On the one hand there are commercial, merchant, and 'other' British 
banks. On the other there are building societies and national savings societies (Canals, 
1993:154). Foreign banks also playa leading role in the British banking system 
alongside the large retail banks and building societies (Ibid.: 154). Compared to other 
European countries, the UK system is characterised by a lack of tradition of 'universal 
banks' (large scale, joint-stock, mixed banks); indeed in the decades leading up to 
World War One the British financial system was the most specialized (Fohlin, 2000:1). 
It is only in recent years that traditional demarcations have been notably eroded, as 
banks have widened the range of products/services offered to compete more actively 
with each other and with other financial institutions. While when widely defined the UK 
banking sector includes a whole range of institutions, for the purposes of this thesis I 
will use a narrower definition, embracing only the commercial banks that undertake a 
mix of personal retailing and investment banking services and commercial lending. 
Finally, a key characteristic of the UK banking system is a highly developed stock 
market and an 'arms-length' relationship between banks and industry; the latter mainly 
obtains funding through the stock market. As a result, UK firms are associated with the 
'outsider' system of corporate governance, based on the importance of shareholders and 
an emphasis on short-term financial returns (Marginson and Sisson, 1994). In terms of 
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the implications for HR and IR practices, the British system has led to high levels of 
decentralisation of decision-making at subsidiary levels, with control and coordination 
primarily taking the form of performance management systems and strictly limiting 
total labour costs (Quintanilla, 1998: 136). 
5.3.2 Trends in the UK Banking Industry 
In contrast with much of the wider UK economy, the banking sector has been 
characterised by a marked degree of stability up to the 1980s. It was a regulated 
industry with continuous growth and high profitability, which in tum offered secure 
employment and paternalistic welfare-oriented employment conditions (Storey et aI., 
1999). This general picture has significantly changed in the last two decades, when 
increased levels of competition have led to new tensions that have destabilised previous 
practices. Lifetime employment, growing levels of employment and paternalistic 
welfare cultures have been substantially replaced by less-secured contracts, widespread 
redundancies and sales-oriented practices and policies. 
A number of factors account for the increased levels of competition affecting the UK 
banking sector, deregulation and the introduction of new technology being the most 
prominent ones. The relaxation of regulatory measures has blurred, for example, the 
distinction between banks and other financial and non-financial institutions by 
liberalising the range of activities in which the latter can engage. Building societies are 
now allowed to offer similar products to traditional banks and some of them have even 
converted to banks with PLC status. Similarly, the emergence of other competitors such 
as supermarkets and other retail firms has put increasing pressure on banks' profit 
margins. A second major phenomenon has been the introduction and extensive use of 
information and communication technologies, which has caused further reorganisation 
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of the industry, both in tenns of products and channels of delivery. In this sense, the use 
of new technologies is also partly responsible for helping new entrants to retail banking 
markets (Storey et aI., 1999). 
Cressey and Scott (1992) argue that technical innovation has occurred in two phases. 
The first was primarily concerned with process development, involving the 
automatisation of back-office administrative work and development of the cash machine 
network. The second phase has been increasingly concerned with transfonning the 
scope and nature of the product/service range as well as the ways in which these are 
delivered. The widespread introduction of cash machines and telephone/Internet 
banking has reduced the need for an extensive branch network. It is now commonplace 
for high street banks and financial providers to offer a wide range of products on-line or 
through 24-hour call centres. It has been estimated that around 390,000 people work in 
call centres in the UK, a substantial proportion of which is in the financial sector 
(Sisson and Marginson, 2000:41). One important implication of this is the changing role 
of bank branches, many of which have evolved to what Wilson (1992) calls 'finance 
shops', with more staff and resources concentrated in sales driven activities. As a result, 
reductions of the branch network and staff numbers have taken place, particularly in the 
'big-four' clearing banks, which had the largest branch networks (Storey et aI., 1999). 
The transfonnation and turbulence of the market context was compounded by recession 
in the early 1990s, which resulted in increased pressure to develop labour flexibility in 
order to compete in a more competitive market (Carter, 1992). Banks have thus been 
forced to respond to these challenges with intensive cost reduction strategies, leading to 
widespread job cuts in the industry and changes towards more flexible and perfonnance 
related remuneration systems 
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5.3.3 The Employment System and HR at Company Level 
The historical British institutional context, with high voluntarism and the absence of a 
legal framework shaping employment systems and work organisation, has been well 
documented in the literature. However it can also be claimed that alongside generalised 
features there is variation between sectors. Indeed, until very recently the UK banking 
industry and its employment system diverged from the wider UK economy (Storey, 
1995). For most of the post-war period, when the industry operated within the context 
of steady growth and high profitability, the banks "offered life time employment, 
structured careers, and paternalistic and welfare-oriented personnel policies" (Ibid.: 25). 
The current tight economic situation and financial pressures faced by the UK banking 
industry has meant that this state of affairs has been reversed. Recent changes in the 
employment practices of UK banks have been extensively documented in a number of 
studies (Storey, 1995; Storey el aI., 1997, Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal, 1999), with 
overarching trends being job cuts and increased flexibility. Greater competition and 
reduced margins have led to cost reduction practices in which more flexible personnel 
practices are key, introduced, for example, through changes in grading and job 
classifications, and through market-driven and individually determined reward systems. 
Indeed, Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal (1999) argue that the UK has been a pioneer 
regarding systems of individual performance related pay. There is a trend not only 
towards an increasing proportion of the overall pay that is variable and performance-
based, but also to such practices affecting a greater proportion of the total workforce, 
including lower administrative and managerial levels. Another move towards higher 
flexibility can be seen in changes to recruitment practices, where there are increasing 
levels of part-time or temporary workers, often outside the remit of formalised 
employment and IR arrangements. In connection with this, a trend towards 
segmentation of recruitment practices and the workforce in general has taken place in 
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major British banks; in particular, a division between core and non-core staff has 
determined two distinctive sets of terms and conditions of employment as well as 
training and development opportunities. Working time has been a further area of 
increased discretion in the HR agenda, with more flexible arrangements and unpaid 
overtime at business level to accommodate to the nature of the business. Overall, this 
shift has lead to a marked individualisation of the employment relationship, in an 
attempt to reduce overall costs while maintaining direct employee commitment (from 
the core staff in particular) to the bank (Thomley et aI.,1997). 
5.3.4 The IR Context and Collective Employee Representation 
There is general agreement as to the key features of the British system of IR: the 
importance of history and tradition in the configuration of its characteristics; the limited 
state intervention in solving conflicts between actors; the minor importance of legal 
regulation; and the vital role of the workplace in the collective bargaining sphere 
(Hyman, 1995; Edwards et al. 1998). The limited statutory provisions have led to 
considerable 'voluntarism' in British IR; the extent and nature of any IR and collective 
bargaining at firm and sector level is primarily left to the will of the relevant employer 
organisations, individual company management and trade unions. Nevertheless, this 
voluntarist character has been severely eroded in the past 20 years or so. Two main 
reasons can be put forward. Firstly, Conservative legislation during the Thatcher period 
aimed at undermining trade union organisation, activity and collective bargaining rights 
which previous governments had established (Edwards et aI., 1994; McIlroy, 1995).19 
Secondly, a growing body of statutory regulations, particularly since the 1990s, as a 
result of the requirements of EU directives and rulings of the European Court of Justice 
(Edwards et aI., 1998:15). Despite the prospects of further EU intervention, which is 
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likely to mean future changes in UK law and practice, there is not yet a strong 
regulatory framework that governs collective employment relations. Much still depends 
on firm-level choices. 
Employee representation m the finance sector has changed from the traditionally 
divided (according to profession and function) staff representation which characterised 
the finance sector until in the late 1970s.2o Unifi is the largest finance union and was 
created in 1999 as a result of the merger of three unions: BIFU; the Nat-West Staff 
Association; and Unifi (Barclays Bank Staff Association). In line with the non-
politicised nature of unions in the UK (Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal, 1999), there has 
recently been further alignment in the workings of a number of unions in the finance 
sector, as part of what Gall (1997) refers to as 'unionateness' of the unions. For 
example, the National Union ofInsurance Workers and MSF merged in 2000, and Unifi 
and MSF have engaged in closer working bi-Iateral relations (Gall, 2001). However, 
this is not to say that there is no competition between trade unions in the banking sector, 
in particular between staff unions and trade unions, whose relationships have been 
characterised by continuous rivalry (Storey, 1995; Morris et aI., 2001). Most, but not all, 
trade unions and staff associations in banking are affiliated to the TUe, the main trade 
union confederation in the UK. In contrast to the Spanish case, the TUe acts more as an 
'umbrella' organisation rather than a directly higher hierarchical body to the member 
trade unions (Hyman, 1995), and has no real power to negotiate collective agreements. 
When compared with other sectors of the economy, the banking sector continues to 
have extensive recognition of trade and staff unions for representation, consultation and 
19 A series of employment acts in the 1980s aimed at curtailing trade union action meant that in the 1980s 
and 1990s a significant change from collectivism to individualism dominated the IR sphere throughout 
the UK, with an even weaker trade union movement with little legal protection. 
20 Although sector or industry demarcations tend to continue, particularly in sectors such as civil service, 
construction, communication or banking, the tendency is towards generalist unions, a category to which 
the five largest unions in the UK belong. This structure reflects a series of past mergers. 
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collective bargaining (Cressey and Scott, 1992; Storey, 1995). Gall (1999: 126) points 
out that union density in the UK banking sector has remained resilient despite the 
reduction in total employment and total membership, with around 48% density in the 
late 1990s (Cully and Woodland, 1997). This compares with an average union density 
in the UK of37% (Storey, 1995:30). 
On the employer side, firms in the banking sector are organized in the British Bankers 
Association (BBA), which is in tum part of the Confederation of British of Industry 
(CBI), an association that covers UK employers across sectors. 
National collective bargaining in the banking sector in England ceased in 1987 
following the withdrawal of employers and the dismantling of their employers' 
association (Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers). Therefore, collective 
bargaining, where it occurs, takes place at company level between trade unions and 
employers. As Muller-Jentsch and Sperling (1995) point out, company level collective 
bargaining allows employers to exercise greater discretion in the introduction of 
changes related to business restructuring. For most of the post-war period, IR in the 
British banking sector was relatively harmonious due to the oligopoly market model and 
national wage bargaining, which minimised competition for labour (Storey et al., 1997). 
Nevertheless, because of new competitive pressures, traditional 'orderly, peaceful and 
centralised' IR in the banking sector gave way to considerable union-employer tensions 
in the 1990s, moving towards conflict and adversarial relations (Snape et aI., 1993, 
Storey et al., 1998). More recently, however, the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 
present decade has seen a further change of tendency, this time from adversarialism to 
cooperation and partnership. Gall (2001:355), for example, reports 14 union-employer 
'partnership' agreements in the UK banking sector since 1997, the highest concentration 
of this type of deals in any economic sector in the country. 
122 
5.3.4.1 Workplace Representation and Employee Information and Consultation 
The historical voluntarism of British IR has meant that there is no legal system for 
workplace representation in the UK.21 For representation to exist there must be 
agreement from the employer to negotiate or consult with one or more unions over 
issues affecting the workforce. Collective bargaining has traditionally been a key 
regulating element of the employment relationship, and within this framework it is often 
problematic in banking to consider negotiation and consultation as separate spheres, as 
both activities often take place through the same channel. 
Workplace and company representation in the UK banking sector occurs through trade 
unions. Along with the dominant role of trade unions, IR in the sector is characterised 
by a loose relationship between those representing and the constituency represented, a 
situation which differs from the traditional concept of employee representation in the 
UK. There is a generalised move among finance unions towards the idea of individual 
representation, shifting away from the interest of collective representation. 
Since the 1970s, legislation has emerged to regulate information and consultation of 
employees in the UK, although the areas covered remain limited to specific issues such 
as collective redundancies, transfers of undertakings, collective bargaining, health and 
safety, occupational pensions and EWCs. The forthcoming European Company Statue 
(approved in October 2001, and expected to come into force in October 2004) will 
complement existing requirements. Similarly, the 2002 EU Directive on Information 
and Consultation (EU 2002/14/EC), establishing a general framework for informing and 
consulting employees in the EU, needs to be transposed into national legislation by 
21 An exception is the existence of legal provisions for the existence of workplace safety representatives 
(1974 Health and Safety Act) and for the disclosure of information to trade unions with which the 
employer conducts collective bargaining (Employment Protection Act 1975) on a number of issues. Legal 
provisions also exist on the area of consultation over redundancies. 
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March 2005 and is expected to bring further changes. 
A combination of restructuring and mergers in the industry within a deregulated and 
increasingly competitive marketplace put pressure on previously cooperative IR. 
However, increasing workforce rationalisation and the election of a Labour Government 
in 1997, has fuelled interest in 'partnership' agreements within the industry 
(Waddington, 2001b). Whereas Barclays bank is perhaps the most salient example of a 
formal partnership agreement, a more general approach across the industry to 
management-union partnership relationships has been more implicit, through a shift 
away from the traditional adversarial approach. Trade unions have seen the need for a 
new approach to IR in order to achieve membership gains and the extension of 
unionisation (Earls, 2002). A recent survey among Unifi members found that members 
report better experiences on a range of issues including job security and satisfaction 
where management is positive about the union in their workplace (Cowie and Earls, 
2001). 
5.4 THE BANKING INDUSTRY IN SPAIN 
5.4.1 Market Organisation and the Structure of Banking Firms 
The last 25 years have been a period of radical transformation and modernisation for the 
Spanish banking sector. As was more generally the case across the Spanish economy 
during the Franco regime, the banking sector operated under strong state intervention 
and regulation, and was protected from external competition. Both factors are partly 
responsible for the traditionally high levels of fragmentation in the industry, which was 
formed by large numbers of small and medium-sized firms (Carreras and Tafunell, 
1996; Crouch, 1993), and also for the low levels of innovation in the sector (Caminal et 
aI., 1990). During the mid-1960s the first steps towards deregulation occurred. The 
removal of barriers to applying for a banking licence resulted in the creation of a large 
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number of new banks. However, the weak financial and management situation of the 
majority of these banks led to a series of crises during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
resulting in a cycle of mergers and acquisitions (Cuervo, 1988). This was the beginning 
of an intense process of concentration in the industry, a consequence of the economic 
crisis; Spanish banks grew in pursuit of appropriate scale to achieve greater efficiency. 
Spain's gradual opening to foreign operations and markets was accompanied by a wave 
of liberalisation in the banking sector. Deregulation included the removal of some entry 
barriers to foreign banks in 1978, the removal of barriers in 1988 which had restricted 
the operations of the saving banks in other than the confines of their native geographical 
regions, and the liberation of capital flows and interest rates.22 In parallel to this, in the 
late 1970s and early-mid 1980s many small and medium-sized banks were gradually 
bought by larger banks, contributing to an enlargement of firm size that precipitated the 
big mergers and acquisitions of the following two decades. 
The entrance of Spain to the EU in 1986 and the beginning of the European Single 
Market in 1993 are two further landmarks in the liberalisation of Spanish banking. The 
removal in 1993 of the last limits to the establishment of operations of foreign banks in 
Spain meant further market competition and concentration within the sector. By the end 
of 1996, the ten largest Spanish banks accounted for 70% of the sector's total assets 
(Miguelez et aI., 1999:223). Furthermore, the largest market players realised the need to 
increase their international presence in order to remain competitive in an increasingly 
globalised sector. In the last ten years the main Spanish banks have pursued intensive 
internationalisation strategies, particularly directed towards Latin America, where the 
precarious political situation has facilitated the acquisition of numerous ex-nationalised 
22 For a more detailed account of the deregulation process of the Spanish banking during the 1970s and 
1980s, see Miguelez et al. (1999: 224-225). 
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banks. Recent figures place Spain ninth in the list of countries with the highest number 
of global banks, a total of three banks and US$370,386 million of assets (Lawlor and 
Serrano del Rosal, 1999: Table 6.1). On the other hand, the legacy of historical 
protection from foreign competition still partly explains the low ranking of Spain in 
terms of the presence ofnon-EU foreign banks (Ibid.: Table 6.3). Cultural factors such 
as the priority to retain personal contact through extensive branch networks has become 
a significant entry barrier to foreign banks (Canals, 1996). 
Along with high concentration and the dominance of a few large players, a key 
characteristic of the Spanish banking sector is the increasing importance of savings 
banks, in particular following the deregulatory processes of the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Although savings banks still maintain significant differences in terms of, for example, 
corporate governance (employees have representation on the company board), they have 
become important competitors to traditional banks. Whilst the Spanish banking sector is 
dominated by three main banks - BSCH, BBV A and Banco Popular - a 1997 ranking 
places three saving banks - La Caixa, Cajamadrid and Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa - among 
the top ten financial institutions in Spain (Garcia Marco, 2000). Contrary to the banks, 
however, and because of the historical barriers to geographical expansion of savings 
banks, the internationalisation strategy of these institutions remains notably less 
developed. 
The dominance of small and medium-sized firms in most of the Spanish economy has 
meant that firm control and co-ordination systems have remained very centralised, 
"leading to confusion in many cases between management and ownership" (Quintanilla, 
1998: 13 7). The often family orientation and limited size of firms, combined with the 
lack of tradition of management education, has encouraged paternalistic management 
styles, which has been prevalent in Spanish banks until recently. Market 
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internationalisation, however, is altering some of the previous features of Spanish 
banks, with a rapid shift to more sophisticated internal control systems (Ibid.: 137). The 
larger Spanish banks, as leading firms in reaching international markets, are also 
responsible for significant innovations in the HRlIR areas, which are converging with 
dominant practices in industrialised countries. 
5.4.2 Trends in the Spanish Banking Industry 
The Spanish banking industry operated under significant protection until the 1970s. 
Two main factors appear as driving forces behind substantial and rapid changes over the 
last 25 years; the liberalisation processes and the introduction of new leTs, both of 
which have contributed to the stimulation of competition. As a result of new 
technologies banks have significantly diversified the range of products and services 
offered, including, for example, the widespread provision of insurance products through 
the branch network. Alongside this, there have been notable changes in the forms of 
delivery; for example, the number of ATMs per 10,000 increased from 3.9 to 6.4 only 
during the 1990-1994 period (Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal:147). Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that different strategies have been followed by different parts of the 
sector. Whereas the implementation of new technologies has been a tool for the 
modernisation of traditional banks, helping them to reduce their extensive branch 
networks, for saving banks it has been a vehicle for innovation, since it has coincided 
with their main expansion period (Miguelez et aI.,1999). In the case of the former, 
paternalistic, hierarchical and bureaucratic structures have been largely replaced by 
modem and efficient organisations where lifetime employment is no longer a key 
feature. Indeed, one of the main impacts of this re-organisation has been a downward 
trend in employment from 1979, when there were 179,382 banking employees. In 1996 
figures had dropped to 141,640 (Ibid.:232), and in only the nine-year period from 1991-
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1999 employment in traditional Spanish banks decreased by 37,735 or 24.7% (La 
Nueva Espana, 1119/2000). These figures are, however, countered by the increase in 
employment levels in savings banks; these rose by 22.7% in the same period, coinciding 
with the expansion strategies followed by this category of firms (Miguelez et aI., 1999). 
Falls in employment have been accompanied by branch restructuring, although in Spain 
banks do not seem to have abandoned the strategy of proximity to their clients to the 
same extent as in other European countries, including the UK. However, although the 
number of branches per capita is still relatively higher in Spain, the average number of 
employees per office has dropped significantly, from 14.66 in 1979 to 8.02 in 1999 
(Miguelez et aI., 1999:232). Subcontracting certain bank activities - in particular 
administration or IT - is another strategy employed in order to balance the less 
administrative role of branches. Subcontracting and the use of temporary agency 
workers has been an increasing trend among large Spanish banks, a strategy which 
partly eludes the rigid legislative framework guaranteeing statutory protection rights 
against dismissal of permanent staff. Extensive rationalization processes are also 
associated with lower levels of recruitment, and new hiring is particularly directed 
towards young people, who have higher training and greater capacity to adopt new 
working practices and technology. In Spain, new recruitment has been reported to be 
higher in banks pursuing expansion strategies (e.g. saving banks) as opposed to 
traditional banks of larger size (Ibid.: 230). 
5.4.3 The Employment System and HR at Company Level 
Traditionally the Spanish banking industry has operated within the context of 
protectionism and significant intervention mechanisms (Miguelez, et aI., 1999:223). In 
consequence employment in the sector was characterised by paternalistic and welfare 
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oriented policies, where life-time employment and structured career progress on the 
basis of seniority were the norm. The substantial transformation of the industry in recent 
decades has had a significant impact in terms of employment and personnel practices in 
Spanish banks. Alongside a relaxation of labour legislation, the greater international 
exposure and innovation capacity of large Spanish banks in particular, has meant that 
they have led the introduction of a number of personnel practices later followed by the 
sector as a whole. As with the UK case, welfare-working practices are progressively 
being replaced by less secure contracts, employment reduction and sales and 
performance oriented HR practices. Nevertheless, enduring institutional limits, such as 
the legalistic nature of the employment relationship and regulation over job category 
classifications through sector collective bargaining agreements, have shaped the extent 
and nature of the impact. An important impact in terms of the employment system has 
been the significant growth of flexible means of employment to circumvent the 
rigidities of current legislation, which has resulted in a marked dualization of 
employment whereby the effects of variability of the economic cycle have impacted to a 
greater extent on temporary workers (Richards and Garcia de Polavieja, 1997). This has 
materialised in diverging HR policies, with lower conditions, often outside the 
collective bargaining framework, aimed at temporary staff. 
Generalised staff decreases in Spanish banks have taken place mostly through voluntary 
redundancy schemes, often aimed at long-service, pre-retirement staff. This is mainly 
due to the strength of trade union rights and the potential social unrest which more 
dramatic measures would cause given the importance of the banking sector in the 
Spanish economy. It is also worth noting that the association between female employees 
and lower paid/part-time work is a feature of Spain (Carrasquer et aI., 1996) in a similar 
way to the UK (Baethge et aI., 1999:143). Moreover, while working time is regulated 
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and established through collective bargaining at industry level, attempts to introduce 
flexibility have implied that the use of unpaid overtime is not infrequent. This is 
particularly the case among medium and higher level employees subjected to new 
payment methods such as performance-related pay. Overtime, and its association with 
higher commitment, is seen as a means of exerting pressure on employees, with a view 
to extending temporary contracts, converting temporary into permanent employees, and 
even determining future promotions. The fact that overtime pressure plays such a 
central role in this is especially important given the trend towards increasing 
proportions of high-skilled employees in relation to the total number of employees; 
often these groups tend not to be members of trade union organisations. Directors and 
specialists accounted in 1996 for more than 50% of the total workforce in the Spanish 
banking sector (Miguelez, et aI., 1999:238).23 
Companies in both less regulated countries such as the UK (Gall, 1997) and those with 
more extensive legal provisions such as Spain are increasingly moving away from 
national and homogeneous pay rates and systems. Despite the existence of sector 
collective agreements - increasingly turning into framework accords - in the Spanish 
banking sector, banks of a larger size, and thus more likely to have operations in foreign 
markets, are establishing their own company agreements, with sector collective 
bargaining affecting mostly smaller banks (Sisson and Marginson, 2000). 
5.4.4 The IR Context and Collective Employee Representation 
The current Spanish system of IR has a relatively short history. Its creation can be 
traced to the end of the Franco dictatorship in 1975 and the advent of democracy. The 
23 Furthermore there have been signs of firms moving the more standardised activities performed by low 
paid/skilled employees (e.g. in processing centres) to other countries with lower labour costs. For 
example, HSBC has recently moved back office activities previously undertaken at bank branches to a 
centre in China (Sisson and Marginson, 2000:63). 
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1978 Constitution lays down the right to organise in a trade union and the right to 
collective bargaining between employers and employees, and the key role now played 
by 'social partners' had its origins in the period of 'social concertation . between 1977 
and 1986 (Martinez Lucio, 1992 :483). This refers to the inter-relation of state, unions 
and employers at national level during a particularly complex time in which not only the 
basis of the current system of IR was being defined, but also the basis of democratic 
Spain (Ortiz, 1999). Social concertation led to the conclusion of several agreements and 
a number of concessions to trade unions (such as economic benefits and trade union 
rights) which remain today. The importance of national IR also remains today; 
company level IR is generally overshadowed by agreements at sector level, with the 
exception of some large companies which often set developments in the sector. As a 
result, collective bargaining is highly fragmented in sector and company agreements, as 
well as regional agreements in some cases. 
At national level there are two main union confederations in Spain, which together 
organise about 80% of all unionised workers (El Pais, 2112112000). These are CC.OO, 
traditionally linked to the Communist Party, and UGT, historically associated with the 
Socialist Party. Within this framework, the trade union movement has been strongly 
linked with the political context, although it is also true that recent years has seen a 
considerable weakening of such links, and a parallel increase in collaboration between 
the two main trade unions at company level (Escobar, 1993). Both CC.OO and UGT 
have a number of federations linked to different industries. In the banking sector, 
CC.OO operates through Comfia, and UGT through Fes. Apart from the national 
confederations, a number of trade unions exist with either a national or regional base 
(such as ELNSTV in the Basque Country and CIG in Galicia), the majority of which 
have generalist (not linked to a particular profession) approaches. Average trade union 
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membership levels in Spain are estimated at around 10-15% (Martinez Lucio, 1998). 
The banking sector has, however, been more unionised than other sectors, with current 
figures of around 25-30% (Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal, 1999: 154). There are three 
suggested reasons for this: the higher percentages of stable and permanent employment 
in the sector; wealthier banking federations and better resourced unions; and growing 
affiliation levels in response to the perceived erosion of working terms and conditions. 
The generally low trade union membership levels (when compared to other European 
countries) may suggest lack of trade union strength. However, union membership is not 
sufficient to measure trade union influence in the Spanish context (Martinez Lucio, 
1998). Two other important factors are the capacity for mobilisation and the support 
obtained at works council elections (Fuhrer, 1996). In the banking sector, CC.OO. 
enjoys higher representation levels measured by the trade union elections of workers' 
representatives (at the last ones, held in Dec 2002/Jan 2003, CC.OO obtained 40.84% of 
votes, UGT 27.24% (Eironline, 2003). One of the key aspects of the elections is that 
they determine the trade union representation on the bargaining commission, which is 
responsible for negotiating the sector agreement. 
Employers in the banking sector are organized in the banking employers' association 
(AEB), which is in tum part of the highly unitary Spanish businesses' confederation 
(CEOE), representing large, small, national, foreign, public and private firms alike 
(Martinez Lucio, 1998:433). 
In recent years, a sector agreement at national level has regulated employment relations 
in the banking sector; the last (at the time of writing) was the XVIII Private Banking 
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Collective Agreement, valid from 1st January 1999 until 31 st December 2002.24 This 
agreement, negotiated between the most representative trade unions at national level and 
the AEB, establishes the terms and conditions of bank employees. It covers most 
aspects of the work contract, including professional categories and salary levels, 
promotions, remuneration of extraordinary hours, holidays and social benefits. The 
highly legalistic nature of the Spanish IR system is one of its key features (Martinez 
Lucio, 1998). Recent governments have pursued the liberalization of the economy 
through a number of labour reforms, for example in 1994 and 1997. These have 
affected, for example, the collective bargaining structure, through the transformation of 
traditional professional categories into new, more widely defined professional groups, 
thus adding flexibility to aspects such as compensation structures (Gomez and Montero, 
1997, cited in Quintanilla, 1998: 125). Despite greater flexibility introduced through 
such labour reforms, the rigidities associated with the banking sector agreement have 
implied a downward trend in the number of employees covered by the agreement in 
recent years (Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal, 1999). This is due to two reasons. Firstly, 
staff in areas such as cleaning and maintenance, traditionally also covered by the sector 
agreement, have largely been outsourced to non-banking firms outside the cover. 
Secondly, increasing numbers of employees are now outside the remit of the sector 
agreement; for example, telephone banking staff or agency staff. 
5.4.4.1. Workplace Representation and Employee Information and Consultation 
The 1980s Workers' Charter (the main Spanish labour law) and the 1985 Law of Trade 
Union Freedom provide the legal framework for employee representation at workplace 
level in Spain. It is based on a dual system of representation through works councils 
(the unitary organs of representation of workers at firm level) and trade unions. Trade 
24 At the time of writing, negotiations for a new sector collective agreement remained stalled due to 
differences between the unions' and employers' position. The unions' demands mainly concern higher 
pay, shorter working time and employment. 
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union representation is through union sections, a legally recognised entity that groups 
the members of a trade union at local, regional or national level in particular firms. Both 
channels of representation are inter-related to the extent that works councils are key to 
the operation of trade unions at firm level, often with works councils being controlled 
by the trade unions (Escobar, 1993; Knudsen 1995). 
Fifty employees is the threshold for the existence of representation through works 
councils, which otherwise is carried out by employee delegates with the same rights and 
duties as works councils. The law establishes that works councils must meet every two 
months, or alternatively at the petition of a third of either its members or the employees 
represented. Elections for works council members or employee delegates can be called 
by those trade unions whose presence in the firm is at least 10% of all employee 
representation in the firm, or by the workplace employees decided by majority. Works 
council elections take place every four years both at local and national company level. 
Three mam functions are assigned to works councils: to negotiate company or 
workplace collective agreements; to control the business activity of the firm according 
to the Worker's Statute legal provisions; and to exercise their right to be informed and 
consulted on a number of issues. Works councils have the right to be informed about the 
general economic sector to which the firm belongs, production and sales information, 
plans for future production, and the general evolution of employment in the firm. They 
also have the right to information on new contracts, including the number and type of 
new contracts. Consultation occurs in the form of a written document on the decisions 
taken by the employer, previous to their execution, on areas such as staff restructuring, 
temporal or permanent layoffs, working time reductions, building transfers, professional 
training plans, the implementation or modification of organisation and control systems, 
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the establishment of bonuses and incentive systems, and job evaluations. The 
importance of works councils within the Spanish IR system should not be 
underestimated, in particular for trade unions, for whom time allocation for union duties 
at company level, negotiation rights, and the state's financial subsidy are all directly 
related to the level of representation obtained in the works council elections. 
Furthermore, Kolvenbach (1978) refers to the traditional trade union fear of works 
councils taking over the collective bargaining function, in particular given the Spanish 
IR context with legal provisions supporting the compulsory election of works councils 
from among the whole workforce. 
The general characteristics of workplace representation outlined above are not truly 
representative of the situation in the banking sector, particularly in banks of a 
considerable size, such as the ones covered in this study. Workplace representation in 
large Spanish banks occurs through trade union sections. Works councils are largely 
inoperative or non-existent, their main function being to measure representation levels 
for the different trade unions. A number of reasons explain this situation. Firstly, the 
two main trade unions dominate works councils and therefore can on their own conduct 
collective bargaining negotiations with the employer.25 Secondly, the structure of the 
sector itself with a large number of small workplaces, makes organisation though the 
works council system a complex exercise. 
The employee participation arrangements in Spain must be analysed within the context 
of the Spanish tradition of class conflict and thus traditionally adversarial IR, with the 
associated scepticism towards cooperative structures in enterprises (Knudsen, 1995:79). 
Compared to the situation in other European countries, works councils and trade union 
2S According to the Workers' Charter (Art. 65.1), a trade union section can undertake collective 
bargaining negotiations if they are in a majority in the works council. 
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activity in Spain might then be interpreted as a defensive tool against management 
prerogatives, but with a lack of real power of employees to influence management 
decisions. Although it has been suggested that attempts by both employers and trade 
unions in the banking sector to engage in more dialogued-based participation are taking 
place (Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal, 1999), the historical and institutional legacy 
continues to mark current practices of employee participation. Miguelez et al. 
(1999:243) have argued that in the Spanish banking sector "the forms of collective 
participation can be characterized as an interchange, but absolutely not one of joint 
management", whereby interchange implies a mixture of management trying to restrict 
trade union influence, and unions mistrusting "in a rather defensive and reactive 
character" (Knudsen, 1995:80) any participation policy coming from top management. 
In fact, in 1989 the two main trade union confederations concluded an agreement 
defining trade union demands for the following two decades, in which they wished to 
have the present information, consultation and negotiation rights recognized as "real 
powers" (Ibid:78). 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
The last two decades have been a period of significant change for the banking sector of 
most industrialised countries. The movement towards the international integration of 
financial markets and the widespread use of technology has been particularly noticeable 
within the European context, following the creation of the Single Market and 
establishment of a single currency. In examining the nature of the transformation of the 
banking industry in specific countries such as the UK and Spain, this Chapter has shown 
a certain degree of international isomorphism, with common elements such as 
deregulation, concentration, widespread use of new technologies and increased levels of 
competition. In terms of the implications for the HRfIR agendas, it has meant that in 
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both the UK. and Spain, life-time employment, paternalistic and welfare-oriented 
policies have been replaced by intensive cost reduction strategies, including less secure 
contracts, widespread redundancies, and more flexible and performance-related 
remuneration systems. Similarities have also been observed regarding the nature of the 
company level organisation structures of trade unions, with group-level representation 
in both UK and Spanish banks. Nevertheless, the pace and impact of those changes 
differ according to the different national contexts, with distinct institutional influences 
mediating the responses and strategic choices of both management and trade unions 
within firms. 
In the UK, firm-level choices continue to predominate in large banks with regards 
regulation of employment relations, but as the elements of the traditional system were 
being dismantled, management-union conflict in the sector generally increased, 
reflecting the changes in pay systems and growing insecurity. However, although the 
pursuit of partnership with employers could also been seen as partly a reflection of 
union weakness (Kelly, 1998), recent developments reveal a more dialogue-based 
approach to collective employee participation. Changed attitudes from both employers 
and trade unions are evident, also perhaps based on the British tradition of relationship-
building and resolution of conflicts at workplace level. 
In the case of Spain, institutional constraints, particularly derived from highly legalistic 
IR, continue to influence the actions of both trade unions and employers in responding 
to the changes posed by developments in the sector. This refers, for example, to the role 
that unions have played in restructuring, somehow limiting to a large extent the negative 
consequences of organisational change. Trade unions have been crucial to the social 
orientation of their downsizing. Moreover, whilst company-level collective agreements 
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have no statutory rank, and in many cases management take unilateral decisions 
introducing a high degree of flexibility in the sector, sectoral bargaining has emerged as 
a source for establishing minimum working conditions. Nevertheless, past dependency 
continues to shape the overwhelmingly defensive approach to collective employee 
participation. 
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Chapter 6 
CASE STUDIES: THE UK BANKS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Chapter is to conduct an issue-organised case study analysis of the 
two main British-based banking groups of this research. A comparative analysis around 
these cases will later be developed in Chapters 8 and 9. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3 HSBC 
Group and Lloyds-TSB Group are presented respectively. The infonnation presented is 
mainly focused on the activities and characteristics of the two groups at the time of the 
study, although there are also historical references. The chapter is based on the 
fieldwork conducted in HSBC Holdings and Lloyds-TSB Group between August 2001 
and December 2002, mainly in the banks' premises in London, Bristol and Madrid. 
6.2 HSBC GROUP 
6.2.1 Group History 
HSBC is one of the largest financial organisations in the world. The Group was founded 
in Hong-Kong in 1865, where it maintained its head office for more than a century, 
during which time a large number of businesses were incorporated into the original 
Bank. In 1991 a holding company for the whole Group was created under the name 
HSBC Holdings PIc., and a year later the presence of the Group in Europe changed 
significantly following the acquisition of Midland Bank, fonned in England in 1893 and 
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one of the main UK clearing banks.26 In 1999, following the parent company's policy of 
unified branding, the name Midland Bank Pic. changed to HSBC Bank PIc .. While the 
acquisition meant that the Group's head office was transferred to London, it maintained 
its traditional concern for rapid decision-making and local accountability, meaning that 
the new head-office provided only the essential central functions, such as strategic 
planning, HRM, legal and company secretarial, and financial planning and control 
(HSBC, 2000). Indeed, the banking subsidiaries continued to be regulated locally in 
their countries of operation. As a result of this philosophy, a key organisational feature 
of the Group is a decentralised management system, which is nevertheless combined 
with a single brand across the globe, summarised by the words 'the worlds' local bank'. 
6.2.2 Group Activities and International Operations 
HSBC's international operations network employs around 170,000 people in 81 
countries in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, the Americas, the Middle East and Africa. 
Despite its Asian origin and extended worldwide presence, Europe has been a key area 
of development for the last two decades. Indeed, today Europe accounts for almost 40% 
of the Group's profits, closely followed by Hong-Kong with around 35% (Table 6.1). In 
terms of employment, by far the greatest proportion of employees (42%) are located in 
Europe, 78% of whom the UK. 
Table 6.1: HSBC's Profits and Employment Figures 
Region -- Profit before tax (percentage) 
c' 'J -~) , 
Europe 39.0% 
Hong Kong 35.9% 
Rest of Asia - Pacific 12.3% 
North America 9.6% 
Latin America 3.2% 
Source: Profits: HSBC Holdmgs PIc. Annual Report 2001 
Employment: Interim report HSBC Holdings PIc, 2001 
Employment Nun1tiers "Ie:;,;, 
~ 
71,405 (56,000 in the UK) 
25,167 
24,252 
18,533 
25,568 
26 In 1987 HSBC Holdings bought 14.9% of Midland Bank, and, after a three-year collaboration period 
and a long subsequent negotiation process, the merger between the two banks took place in June 1992. 
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HSBC Group in Europe 
HSBC Bank PIc. is the base for the operations of the HSBC Group in Europe. It 
operates through a network of 1,663 branches in the UK, and employs 56,000 staff 
(HSBC, 2001a). However, HSBC Bank' s activities stretch well beyond the UK through 
a number of subsidiaries, mainly in Europe. Activities embrace a large range of 
financial services including retail , commercial and wholesale banking activities. 
HSBC Bank divides its activities into five business segments: UK banking, international 
banking, treasury and capital markets, HSBC republic, and CCF. UK Banking includes 
personaVretail, commercial and wholesale banking. While personal banking clients are 
managed on a more national basis, corporate and institutional clients are managed 
centrally through a number of specialised teams within the HSBC Group, such as 
treasury and investment banking. The international scope of HSBC Holdings provides a 
competitive advantage to HSBC Bank in that it can provide services for the 
international operations of UK-based corporate clients through the international network 
of HSBC Holdings. International Banking provides a wide range of financial services, 
including personal, corporate and commercial banking, cash management, and treasury 
and capital markets. At the end of 2000, international banking had offices in 28 
countries, mainly in Europe and Latin America (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: HSBC pIc. International Banking: Sites of Operation 
Branches Representative Offices Subsidiaries 
Australia Argentina HSBC Bank Armenia 
Belgium Brazil HSBC Financial Services Cayman Limited 
Czech Republic Chile HSBC Pantalakis Securities SA (Greece) 
France Dubai HSBC (Hellas) AEDAK (Greece) 
Greece Hong Kong HSBC Bank International (Jersey,Guersey, Isle 
Guerseyl Jersey Mexico of Man) 
Ireland Singapore HSBC Fund Administration Limited (Ireland) 
Isle orMan Taiwan HSBC Bank Malta 
Italy Venezuela HSBC Bank A.S. (Turkey) 
Netherlands South Africa 
Panama 
Spain 
Sweden 
Source: HSBC Pic. Annual Report (2000) 
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Treasury and Capital Markets provides services for wide range of entities including 
international corporations, institutional investors, private investors and central banks. 
HSBC Republic is the international private banking division of the HSBC Group, and 
operates in 33 locations in the Americas, Asia, Europe and the Middle East (HSBC, 
2000:10). 
Finally, CCF is the latest and most important acquisition of HSBC Bank in Europe. 
CCF is the seventh largest bank in France and provides a wide range of services 
including personal, commercial and wholesale banking. In France it operates through a 
strong local presence of 682 branches (including nine regional banks that are part of the 
CCF Group). Following the unified branding policy, all CCF branches have 
incorporated HSBC's logo. Moreover, the acquisition has brought important changes to 
the operational procedures of HSBC. For example, management responsibility for 
HSBC's businesses in France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands has been 
transferred to CCF. Another change has been the alignment of CCF and the HSBC 
Group's corporate and investment banking business. 
In addition to HSBC Bank pIc, HSBC Group carries out operations in Europe through a 
number of entities. Table 6.a in the appendix to this Chapter shows the operations of the 
Group in Europe. 
6.2.3 Organisational Structure 
HSBC Group's structure is a complex holding divided into three main legal entities: 
HSBC Bank PIc., HSBC Finance (Netherlands) and HSBC Insurance Holdings Limited 
(Figure 6.1 shows a simplified structure chart of the Group's principal operating 
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companies).27 Each of these companies provides a wide range of financial services and 
operates in a variety of countries. An account of the activities of the HSBC Bank pic. 
has been already given. HSBC Finance is based in the Netherlands and has two main 
arms, HSBC Holdings BV (a large conglomerate of subsidiaries with operations in most 
parts of the world including Europe, North America, Latin America, Malaysia, Middle 
East, and Asia/Asia-Pacific) and the partial ownership of The Cyprus Popular Bank 
Ltd .. Finally, HSBC Insurance Holdings Ltd. is the insurance arm of the Group. 
Figure 6.1 : HSBC Holdings - Organisational Chart 
In operational terms, however, the HSBC Group is also organised in four major sections 
which correspond to four regions of the world: the US, Asia-Pacific, the UK and the 
Eurozone. A number of minor areas also exist, such as Latin America and 
AustralialNew Zealand. Each country has its own country manager who then reports for 
accounting purposes to the corresponding geographical area (note, however, that not all 
countries in the 'Eurozone' report to the 'Eurozone' area). The operational organisation 
of HSBC relies mainly on historical rationale, following the growth of the Group 
27 HSBC Investment Holdings is not considered separately here, because at the time of the study this was 
being integrated into HSBC PIc. 
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mainly through acquisition. As a consequence of this, lines of reporting for balance 
sheet and management purposes do not always coincide. 
6.2.3.1 Organisation Structure ofHSBC Bank PIc. 
Formally the Group in Europe is legally under a single entity, that of HSBC Bank PIc. 
As already mentioned, HSBC Bank's activities are divided into five different business 
segments, with all but UK banking having an overseas remit. Despite some grouping of 
European subsidiaries there is not a single clear unified structure, particularly in the case 
of the retail banking businesses. Before 2000, International Banking embraced most of 
the European subsidiaries other than those in specialist areas such as Treasury and 
Capital Markets or HSBC Republic. International Banking therefore included, for 
example, subsidiaries in Cyprus, Greece, Armenia and Malta, and branches in Spain, the 
Czech Republic and Italy. The acquisition of CCF has introduced significant changes in 
terms of the Group's structure in Europe, specifically in terms of management structure. 
Although most of the subsidiaries and branches continue to report to International 
Banking for balance purpose, some of them (e.g. French, Italian or Spanish branches) 
no longer do so in operational terms. Management responsibilities have been transferred 
to CCF, although at the time of writing, lines of management responsibility within 
HSBC Bank in Europe had not been totally defined. Integration at European level is 
nevertheless definitely happening, in particular with regards to the commercial and 
wholesale banking operations of the Group. The emergence of pan-European platforms 
is appreciable in a number of areas such as HSBC Private Banking, Treasury and 
Capital Markets, Asset Management, and Corporate and Investment Banking. 
6.2.3.2 The HR Function: Organisational and Management Structure 
The HR function in HSBC is highly centralised in the domestic UK operations, whereas 
decentralisation predominates in its overseas operations. A set of central policies and 
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standards as 'global footprints' are developed by HSBC Holdings as guidelines for the 
general operations of the Group. Within this, each subsidiary (including HSBC Bank) 
develops their own strategies and policies. 
HR Function in the UK 
The HR function in HSBC Bank has been transfonned during the course of this study. 
A model based on divisional management centres for the different business areas and a 
branch network HR function organised geographically has been replaced by an 'HR 
business partner' model. An HR business partner is allocated to each division or 
function to deal with strategic issues concerning that function, while day-to-day HR 
issues are centralised in a call centre. Other HR functions such as training and 
recruitment are also centralised. This model integrates all HSBC Bank operations in the 
UK with the exception of First Direct, the online 24-hour banking service, which has its 
own HR and IR team (although most HRJIR related decisions, including salary 
increases, redundancies etc., still have to obtain approval from central HR). 
The IR function is under a separate unit called the Employee Relations Department, 
which covers the whole of HSBC Bank, both in the UK and across Europe. 
Nevertheless, the IR function is very decentralised internationally, with local managers 
dealing with the different unions in each country. 
International HR Function 
Beyond the UK, the HR function of HSBC Bank is organised in parallel to the structure 
of the Bank. It is thus essentially divided into two: HR International oversees some of 
the European businesses such as Greece, Turkey and off-shore, while the HR function 
of CCF is the focal point for most of the Group's operations in the 'Eurozone'. 
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Accordingly most businesses within the 'Eurozone' report to CCF, whereas businesses 
in Greece, Turkey and off-shore (Channel Islands) report directly to the General 
Manager for International Operations in London, who subsequently reports to the Chief 
Operating Officer of HSBC Bank. Steps to integrate the HR function across borders 
have started with the extension of the 'HR business partner' model to include the 
businesses within 'HR International' (not yet CCF), which despite operating in quite a 
decentralised and autonomous form have access to the central call centre. Whilst lines 
of responsibility are still being defined, further integration of the European operations is 
expected in the future, including those of CCF and their dependent subsidiaries. 
6.2.4 HR Policy and Practice in HSBC Bank 
6.2.4.1 Home Country Coordination of HR Home 
As already indicated, HSBC's new HR system substitutes the previous regionally-based 
model. Although this provides a customised HR strategy for each specific business, 
there is also room for increasing convergence in terms of common features, with day-to-
day issues processed through a central call centre. Formal negotiations with the unions 
are also conducted centrally by Group IR at national level, but increasingly involve 
divisional HR management. A few peculiarities are worth mentioning. First Direct (the 
only HSBC business not under the global HSBC brand) has different HR and IR 
arrangements, as does Asset Finance, whose staff are still to be integrated in the 
Group's terms and conditions. Despite these exceptions, HSBC in the UK represents a 
case of strongly standardised HR policy, including terms and conditions of employment, 
pay scales and grades: "You can't sack someone in the Bank without having it gone 
through central HR in HSBC Pic., that would legally check whether is consistent, 
fair, etc. If any division wants to change anything in policy, you have to come 
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through them too, and the reason is to send consistency, to ensure that the 
different divisions are sending the same message".28 
With regards to their commercial and wholesale businesses, HR is also integrated in the 
business partner model. This has reduced duplication of certain policy units that 
previously existed in HR functions of HSBC Holdings, HSBC Bank, and the Corporate 
and Investment Banking divisions. The merger of policy units for the entire UK has 
increased the alignment of HR policies within and among the different divisions too, a 
process which has been facilitated by the centralization of HSBC Group central 
functions in Canary Wharf (London): "by closing 14 different offices across the UK 
and coming together into a single building, it has created an opportunity for HR to 
review HR practice, and so the merge has created three entities - the policy units, 
service centre and the HR business partners - to function across the UK operations 
of HSBC". 29 
6.2.4.2 International Coordination of HR 
Decentralisation of HR policy and practice has been, and continues to be, a key feature 
of headquarter-subsidiary relations in HSBC. However, following the acquisition of 
CCF and resulting management reorganisation, signs of increasing coordination (e.g. in 
remuneration systems) are starting to appear in the 'International Banking' division in 
charge of most of Eastern Europe, Greece, Malta and Cyprus. While CCF (in charge of 
most 'Eurozone' countries) coordination is lagging behind, given its more recent 
incorporation to the Group, it is also developing closer integration. Single management 
structures are starting to emerge in a number of areas including private banking, 
28 Interview with trade union official - Unifi (June 200 I). 
29 Interview with HR Business Partner - HSBC (November 2002). 
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treasury and capital markets, asset management, corporate, investment and commercial 
banking. 
6.2.5 Industrial Relations in HSBC PIc. 
6.2.5.1 Trade Union Recognition 
In HSBC Bank a single trade union is recognized, with no formal recognition in the rest 
of the UK operations of HSBC Holdings. Trade union density is around 50%. It is the 
Group's tradition in IR to give trade union recognition only where there is a tradition of 
union presence, this being the case for HSBC Bank, previously Midland Bank. HSBC 
Bank gives sole recognition to Unifi for the purposes of consultation and bargaining. 
Recognition is limited to UK operations, with separate arrangements for the 
international offices and subsidiaries. 
Unifi has recognised negotiating rights for the five grades (S I-S5) corresponding to 
administrative staff, and representing around 25,000-30,000 employees, rights which 
are exercised through a national negotiating council. Collective negotiation rights for 
managers (M -grades) were removed in 1996, when 'divisional councils' for 
consultation purposes only were introduced in each division, with members elected by 
managers themselves. Above these, there was a 'national council' elected by the 
'divisional councils'. Issues to be consulted at the 'divisional councils' included the 
bonus system, restructuring, overtime, job losses, etc.. Recently, a 'partnership 
agreement' has been reached for managers. As a result, the divisional and national 
councils were replaced in 2001 by a 'management forum', which re-establishes Unifi 
presence.30 Although the 'management forum' recognises Unifi's presence for 
30 The 'management forum' consists of nine non-Unifi people (one from each division elected by all 
managers) and six Unifi-elected people (chosen by the Unifi manager's committee), who meet with senior 
management of the Group (Chief Executive and Chief Operating Officer). The 'management forum' 
applies to all management but insurance, which is not in HSBC Bank. 
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information and consultation, it does not give its members negotiating rights. Gradually, 
the issues for discussion in the management forum have moved to, for example, 
performance issues, with also increasingly more involvement ofUnifi in these areas. 
Within First Direct, there is a different type of agreement by which Unifi has a full 
negotiating position for both managerial and non-managerial staff. Because of the 
peculiarities of the system, its 24-hour service and its recent origin, a non-strike 
agreement is also in place. First Direct has its own employee council, although its 
autonomy to make decisions is subordinated to the Unifi national committee.31 
Management-union relations within HSBC Bank 
Management-union relations appear to have improved in recent years, due to changes in 
the attitudes of both union officials and management. There appears to be two main 
reasons for this. On the one hand, Unifi has adopted a more open approach, with greater 
understanding of and compromise over the pressures currently facing the Bank. On the 
other hand, a number of individuals with a more open approach and attitude to union 
relations have been appointed within the HRIIR management team. As a union official 
interviewed stressed: "the head of employee relations comes from a previous union 
background so he understands and believes that it is extremely important to have 
good IR, and he has taken over the job of someone who didn't particularly like 
unions. That gives us the opportunity to build up relations. We have disagreements 
but the idea is that we are professional and there are things in which we will be 
fundamentally different but the relation is much better".32 There was a general 
consensus among employee representatives interviewed that consultation has 
significantly improved following these the changes within the central HRJIR 
31 At the time of the fieldwork, union officials expected this to change in the near future, with the view 
that it would be more beneficial for First Direct staff to become more autonomous in their decisions. 
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management team. It was perceived, however, that consultation seemed to deteriorate 
at times at lower levels within the Bank: "what happens is if it goes down to local 
management, the message there is, they don't see the importance of consulting".33 
6.2.5.2 Collective Bargaining Structure and Content 
In HSBC collective bargaining over pay and employee 'Group' terms and conditions is 
conducted at national company level through ad hoc arrangements, rather than being 
highly formalised. Negotiation rounds are conducted between the central employee 
relations team and a Unifi team.34 Negotiation of the Group's terms and conditions is 
therefore highly centralised at national level, with negotiations centred on the annual 
pay bargaining in terms of basic pay for each clerical grade and for technical staff. 
Geographical allowances are also negotiated, for example London allowances. While 
there is negotiation over pay and conditions, including holidays, there is no negotiation 
over bonus payments or managerial salaries. 
There is, however, an increasing tendency to conduct negotiations at divisional or local 
level on specific issues of the employment contract or areas concerning working time. 
There is not a formalised procedure for negotiation at local level, and collective 
bargaining takes place through ad hoc arrangements when issues appear. First Direct 
and Asset Finance have their own collective bargaining arrangements and do not fall 
under the general company collective agreement. 
32 Interview with trade union official- Unifi (May 2001). 
33 Interview with trade union official- Unifi (May 2001). 
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6.2.5.3 Main HRJIR Changes and Implementation of these Changes 
This Section explores the main changes affecting HSBC over recent years, and their 
HRJIR implications. An examination of how these have been dealt with enables a feel 
for the extent and nature of negotiation and consultation at company and local levels. 
1. Bank Restructuring 
One of the main current IRJHR issues within HSBC Bank are the implications, in 
particular for UK staff, of the Bank's strategy on global processing. This was initiated 
in 2000 with 'Project Monsoon', whereby a centre was opened in China for the transfer 
of processing work from other parts of HSBC, in particular from the UK. There are now 
two operating centres, one situated in China and one in India, with a total headcount of 
around 350 employees each and expanding. Although Unifi initially resisted this 
strategy, the union's attitude has gradually changed after initial fears of massive 
redundancies have not materialised. The Bank reassured the union that there would not 
be compulsory redundancies as a result, but relocation, re-training and schemes for 
voluntary redundancies. As a result Unifi and Bank management have reached a joint 
initiative in life-long learning, regarded as unique and pioneering among UK employers. 
2. Outsourcing and the Introduction of New Technologies 
Outsourcing as part of a cost reduction strategy is due to be reviewed in 2004 and has 
affected substantial areas of business within HSBC in the UK. Part of the strategy has 
involved the transfer to joint ventures of remaining processing staff, among other 
functions. Indeed, trade union sources mentioned that around 3,000 staff had gone into 
outsourcing in the 18 months previous to the time at which the interviews were 
conducted, 1,000 of which were in the cash delivery business and 2,000 in clearing and 
voucher processing. Cash centre activities have been outsourced to Securitas Cash 
34 The Unifi team consists of four people including a National Secretary and three full time officers. 
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Management, a joint initiative with Barclays whereby Barclays and HSBC each own 
15% of Securitas. This move was introduced following changes in UK tax legislation. 
The union has been generally involved in negotiations around the introduction of 
outsourcing practices. Negotiations at national company level have taken place around 
the terms and conditions of the HSBC staff to be transferred to the outsourcing 
companies, in particular in the case of major transfers. As an example of this, HSBC 
Bank and Unisys set up a joint company (IPSL) to which HSBC Bank is transferring a 
large amount of its processing work. Unifi participated in the negotiations towards a 
collective agreement for the staff transferred to IPSL. The agreement was seen by the 
union as quite unique, and has set a precedent. IPSL guaranties HSBC redundancy 
terms, and the agreement secures that those terms will not change for a minimum of five 
years. Part of the agreement is the possibility for staff that have already technically 
become IPSL employees to apply for job vacancies that arise in HSBC and become 
fully reinstated as HSBC with full pension rights as if they had not left. 
The use of temporary workers does not appear to be a prominent Issue III the 
employment relations at HSBC. Apart from the introduction of more flexible contracts 
for new staff, flexibility at workplace level has been introduced through the use of part 
time staff. Although initially part-timers' terms and condition were less favourable 
compared to those of full-time employees, there have been substantial improvements as 
a result of union-management negotiations at national company level. A Unifi official 
interviewed stressed the key role that European legislation in aspects such as pay and 
terms and conditions of part-timers have played for the outcome of these negotiations.35 
35 Interview with trade union official - Unifi (June 2001). 
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The umon approach to employment relations in HSBC IS characterised by an 
understanding of the dynamics of the business, and a willingness to achieve 
compromise. This is, for example, seen in negotiation over recent pay deals, where a 
compromise was achieved through the union acceptance of the introduction of regional 
pay, by which a single national pay scale was replaced by a three-level one. 
3. Flexibility and Working Time 
A number of 'flexible contracts' for new staff have been introduced in recent years. 
These allow more flexible working practices; for example, contrary to the 'old 
contracts', they allow management to change working hours without mutual agreement, 
as well as providing no difference in payment when working 'non-sociable' hours. The 
issue of new contracts was SUbjected to consultation with Unifi at national level, 
although it did not support the new terms and conditions. At the time of its introduction, 
staff under 'old contracts' were given the opportunity to convert to new contracts with, 
among other incentives, a lump sum of 500 pounds. According to Unifi, a number of 
staff did convert, and this is currently causing problems. There have also been some 
agreements, however, in certain workplaces at localldivisionallevel. 
There is a central company agreement setting out a framework for working hours. In 
addition, however, there are also negotiations at business and workplace level. This has 
included, for example, initiatives at regional level over changes in the holiday system, 
arrangements in certain branches and telephone centres, or individual arrangements 
towards more flexible working hours. It was reported from both trade unions and 
management that union resistance to more flexible arrangements had not been an issue, 
but more the attitude to change of middle management. In fact, issues over work life 
153 
balance had started to be addressed at business level with, for example, consultation 
over staff hours in the retail banking division. 
4. Pay and Systems of Variable Remuneration 
Remuneration systems within HSBC Bank have changed significantly over the last few 
years. In terms of the reward element of the salary, this has moved away from periodical 
incremental rises based on seniority to performance pay. A system based on 
performance related pay (PRP) for management was introduced in 1988, and it was 
extended to clerical staff in 1999. The structure of the PRP system is the same for all 
grades,36 with quarterly appraisals. There are three main factors determining the 
performance bonus (sales, individual performance and financial performance), moving 
away from a flat rate business bonus. The union has been involved in consultation and 
negotiation throughout these changes, although there is no negotiation on managerial 
salaries and bonuses, since trade unions were de-recognised for management levels in 
1996. Consultation for managerial issues takes place at the national management 
council. 
The last few years have been a period of relative peace in the IR of HSBC. Within the 
context of restructuring and change that has characterised the industry, the unions have 
managed to recover some lost ground in previous decades. A change in both 
management and union attitude, partly arising from changes in management and union 
teams, has contributed to this shift towards a more participative approach. 
36 First Direct and OtT-shore have different pay arrangements, although their systems are based on similar 
principles. 
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6.2.6 Trasnational Information and Consultation: HSBC Employee Forum 
An EWC was established in September 1996. The EWC is set up at Group level (HSBC 
Holdings) and is chaired by the head of HR of HSBC Holdings. There are two EWC 
meetings per year, each lasting a day and attended by 26 employee representatives, ten 
from the UK and five from France (French representation has notably increased 
following the acquisition of CCF). An 'expert' also attends the meetings, and at present 
this is the national Unifi official for HSBC in the UK, since the majority of the 
European staff in HSBC are still in the UK, and as such are widely covered by the Unifi 
collective agreement. As expressed by the 'expert' himself, this situation is likely to 
change as HSBC expands further into Europe with future acquisitions. Furthermore, 
there is a planned request for a larger number of 'experts' to be present at the EWC 
meetings, and from different national backgrounds. EWC members themselves are 
elected differently in each country. In the UK, Unifi is not allowed to select the 
candidates. Instead there are ten open constituencies, to which anybody can stand, and it 
is HSBC staff themselves who elect the representatives. In France, labour law 
establishes that all trade unions represented in CCF must be represented in the EWC. 
There are hence five seats allocated to CCF, through which four unions are represented. 
UK members of the EWC suggested that this was sometimes problematic given the 
different positions of the various French delegates, reflecting domestic tensions. An 
employee only pre-meeting is held the morning or day before the EWC meeting, so that 
the final issues to be included in the agenda, and questions to be raised, are determined. 
The initial EWC agreement was re-negotiated in 2001. The employee side 'negotiating 
team' was formed by four EWC members (two from the UK, one from Germany, and 
one from France) and the Unifi 'expert' already mentioned. The members of the 
'negotiating team' were elected by EWC members, and one of the two UK members 
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was the employee designated representative, a figure recognised in the EWe agreement 
itself, who serves as the main employee representative. The 'negotiating team' does not 
presently meet on any other occasion, for example between EWe meetings, but it is on 
the agenda of the unions to request the constitution of a 'select committee' for the 
purpose of 'in between' EWe meetings, a role presently only recognised for the 
employee-designated representative. A union official expressed the need to have more 
than one person in that role, as well as more structured meetings which would ensure 
that members of the council are involved in determining the agenda, time and any other 
issues relevant for the EWe meetings. 
As a result of the re-negotiation of the agreement the representation threshold of 150 
employees was lowered to 50, and all 11 EU countries where HSBe operates now have 
representation in the EWe, including Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands, which were 
previously not represented. Another clause of the re-negotiated agreement ensures that 
those European countries which have applied for EU membership will be able to attend 
the EWe meetings as observers a year before the actual accession. This will affect 
countries such as Malta. 
Management Attitude to the EWe 
According to Unifi sources, management approach to the EWe in its early days was 
rather minimalist, with little support to union officials involved in EWe activity in 
terms of communication tools or time off to carry out their duties. When asked about 
the impact of EWes in line with previous management approaches to international 
issues, an ex-EWe member responded: "everything was told to us after it happened, 
and often you would have read about it in the newspapers, so no, it didn't have 
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much impact".37 More recently, management attitude to the EWC has become 
increasingly positive, something that is reflected in the lowering of the threshold for 
representation and the presence of the chairman of HSBC in one of the most recent 
EWC meetings. In accounting for this change is the incorporation of CCF into the 
Group, which means that the Group's presence in Europe outside the UK has increased 
considerably. Another important factor has been the change of some members of the 
management team and the more positive predisposition from those to the concept of the 
EWC. For instance, the predecessor of the current employee relations' manager (who 
does attend the meetings) did not attend himself, but sent his deputy. 
Employee Side Attitude to the EWe 
At present UK delegates dominate the EWC's employee-side, followed by French 
representatives. It was suggested by a UK EWe member that the UK was still 
dominating the EWe, a situation that creates scepticism among other nationalities 
present. Another limitation to the functioning of the EWC suggested by a Unifi official 
was the fact that often there is a tendency for EWC members to prioritise national 
domestic employment policies, which has the potential to clash with the philosophy 
behind the EWC: "one of the other tensions is that we would not allow the work of 
the Council to undermine or impinge upon our role within the UK in terms of 
collective bargaining, .. , and I think that others would feel the same way about 
their own arrangements, they want to keep their own arrangements".38 This 
suggests difficulties in reaching Group consensus, and as expressed by the same 
official: "if we are going to be successful we should be less protective of our 
national arrangements, and push harder to work more on global or European 
workplaces, and perhaps seek agreements that even cut across national 
37 Interview with trade union official - Unifi (June 2001). 
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agreements, and that might help to take control". In fact, in the UK the issue of trade 
union versus works council representation was also raised by union officials as a 
concern among some staff who were apprehensive of the council as a replacement body 
of trade unions as democratically elected by its members to represent their voice. The 
perhaps not yet fully defined role of the EWe could be seen as a factor accentuating 
fears of this kind. On an individual basis, however, opinions among EWC members 
seem to converge in expressing a positive view for being members of the EWC, in 
particular for being able to benefit from the opportunity to obtain a broader view and 
understanding of the Group. 
Union sources talked about the EWC as the real link between HSBC Holdings and the 
global operations, and the UK operations. The EWC was hence an opportunity for EWC 
members, including the lead union official for negotiations with HSBC pIc., to meet the 
head ofHR ofHSBC Holdings and his team. 
Issues discussed/Agenda 
At present issues to be included in the agenda are determined both by management and 
EWC members. Previous to the changes in the management team mentioned earlier, the 
agenda was rather management driven with little impact from the employee 
representatives. Various union members of the EWC stressed the lack of information 
and consultation in important issues concerning the Bank and its employees. For 
instance, they mentioned that in previous meetings the information presented by 
management on the financial performance of the Group had been already published. 
They also referred to lack of information and consultation at the time of CCF's 
acquisition, despite a number of attempts by the designated employee representative to 
engage in dialogue with management. Lack of clarity in the chain of command, for 
38 Interview with trade union official-Unifi (May, 2001) 
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example over who knows (or should know) what infonnation, was also noted as a 
potential problem. 
Nonetheless, the EWC agenda has broadened over recent years. The fact that the 
business of HSBC in the UK is mainly retail banking, whereas in other parts of Europe 
it is investment or private banking poses problems in that there is the potential for lack 
of common issues to discuss. As explained by an EWC member: "I worked in 
commercial banking, then the guy in Luxembourg works in Treasury, etc. Well, 
first of all to try to understand his job is one thing, then if we speak a common 
language, then he might be from a business that we have acquired so it might be 
fundamentally a different bank all together".39 This problem appears to be 
diminishing to an extent after the acquisition of CCF, which includes another large 
retail banking business in Europe, and the prospects of additional future European 
acquisitions. Indeed, Unifi officials expressed optimism in tenns of future greater 
harmonisation in certain areas of the employment package across the Group, at least 
within the European boundaries. These areas could be non-pay benefits, such as 
holidays, and areas such as maternity leave etc., where there could be Group wide 
policies. A Unifi official pointed to areas covered by a European Directive as ideal areas 
to have a consistent approach across the Group, however the fact that once Directives 
are enacted they are left to national interpretation - which varies across borders - poses 
potential problems. In a recent EWC-meeting, the issue of consistency in approach 
towards employee share dealing options was brought up, for example. However, due to 
poor quality presentation and lack of a common position among delegate members, the 
issue did not transcend the meeting. Another problem suggested by a Unifi official was 
the lack of a common position within countries themselves, with cases like France, for 
example, where four different unions are represented in the EWCs, speaking with four 
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different voices. The inability to achieve consistency within individual countries poses 
problems for achieving Group consensus. 
An issue of recent concern is the HSBC strategy in global processing. Although at 
present most of the processing activities in other HSBC European businesses are still 
carried out locally, in particular within CCF, it is anticipated that in the near future there 
might be a further integration of the processing activities within the Group. An EWC 
member expressed discontent around consultation on global processing at the EWCs: 
"to raise an issue in the EWe has to affect two or more countries, and at the 
moment global processing which was raised in the agenda of the last EWe it hasn't 
affected any other country, it is only a UK issue, so the EWe wouldn't consult 
across" .40 
Links between the EWe and national structures of employee representation 
As a result of the establishment of the EWC, employment representation has emerged in 
areas of the Group where it did not previously exist.41 In general however, the profile of 
the EWe still remains low among the staff. It is perceived as 'distant', and generally 
staff are not yet clear about its functioning or benefits. In comparing the EWe and the 
National Council, a EWe member noted that "the national council has more teeth 
than the EWe because there is more link with the constituency, there are more 
common issues, and they isn't the problem of having to be an issue in more than 
two constituencies".42 The Bank:, however, edits a regular newsletter called 'European 
Focus' every six months, where an overview of issues concerning any of the businesses 
39 Interview with EWC member (June, 2001). 
40 Interview with EWC member (June, 2001). 
41 This is the case, for example, in one of the constituencies called 'Other Group Companies', which 
includes HSBC Insurance Brokers Ltd, a part of the Group that has grown in recent years as a result of 
minor acquisitions and organic growth. 
42 Interview with EWC member (June, 2001). 
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in Europe is given, including EWe meetings. This internal publication is distributed in 
English across the UK businesses. 
6.3 LLOYDS-TSB GROUP (LTSB Group) 
6.3.1 Group History 
The origins of L TSB Group stretch back to the establishment of the Lloyds and TSB 
banks in the UK. Lloyds Bank emerged in Birmingham in 1765 and expanded over the 
years through a series of mergers, both nationally and across borders. Its international 
expansion was carried out first within Europe, through the acquisition of a French-based 
bank, which later became a Lloyds branded subsidiary (Lloyds Bank Europe). 
Expansion across the Atlantic was initiated in 1918 with the acquisition of a Brazilian 
bank to fonn the Bank of London and South America (BOLSA), which would be later 
incorporated into Lloyds Bank in 1986.43 The international presence of Lloyds, with 
offices in 30 countries including the USA and Argentina, was extended in 1994 with the 
acquisition of two local banks in New Zealand.44 
L TSB' s international presence is largely due to Lloyds Bank's internationalization 
strategy, since TSB (which merged with Lloyds Bank in 1995 to form LTSB Group), 
had only limited international presence in Ireland. The origins of TSB lie in a large 
number of regional Trustee Saving Banks founded in the 1800s. These merged into four 
central institutions in 1983, which would become TSB Bank Plc .. 45 
43 By the early 1970s, Lloyds Bank was in control of the majority of BOLSA shares, and merged it with 
Lloyds-Bank Europe to form Lloyds and BOLSA International Bank. Both were incorporated into Lloyds 
Bank in 1986. 
44 These are National Bank of New Zealand and Rural Bank. They were, however, sold in 2003. 
45 The four central institutions were TSB England and Wales, TSB Scotland, TSB Northern Ireland and 
TSB Channel Islands. TSB England and Wales became TSB Bank Pic. in 1989, and the newly named 
TSB Bank Scotland Pic. and TSB Bank Northern Ireland Pic. became its subsidiaries in the same year. 
TBS Northern Ireland Pic. was bought by Allied Irish Banks in 1991, and TSB Channel Islands became a 
subsidiary ofTSB Bank in 1992. 
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Lloyds Bank and TSB Bank initially pursued a policy of differentiated branding 
following their merger in 1995, and it was only in 1999 when LTSB Group launched a 
single branded service and product range. Since the merger, internationalization has to 
some extent played a secondary role to diversification in the UK, with some ofthe UK's 
biggest financial services mergers in the 1990s. These included Abbey Life Insurance 
Company in 1998 (creating Lloyds Abbey Life which became a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the Group in 1996), the mortgage business Cheltenham and Gloucester 
(C&G) in 1995, the insurance provider Scottish Widows in 1999 and Chartered Trust in 
2000. 
6.3.2 Group Activities and International Operations 
LTSB is one of the main UK-based financial services Groups. With 81,400 employees 
(LTSB, 2001), the Group provides a range of banking and financial services both in the 
UK and abroad. The Group, however, is predominantly a British business, with 89% of 
profits and 85% of its workforce based in the UK (see Table 6.3). LTSB Group 
operates in the UK through a network of 2,000 branches of LTSB Bank, LTSB Scotland 
and C&G. More than a third of LTSB Group operating profits come from insurance 
and investments. A focus on retailing and bancassurance has been the strategy of the 
Group for several years, but further domestic consolidation is proving increasingly 
difficult following the tightening of regulations by domestic competition authorities. 
This is illustrated by LTSB's unsuccessful takeover attempt of Abbey National in 2001. 
Table 6.3: Profits and Employment Figures in LTSB Group by Division 
Division 'i Profit before tax EmRloyment'Numbers 
OJ 
.. 
, • J; . .;, .. ~ (percenta2e) • 
" 
", ' ~'" 
UK Retail Banking and Mortgages 33,4% 51 ,224 
Insurance and Investments 35,1% 6,316 
Wholesale Markets 17,8% 9,234 
International Banking 10,8% 12,254 
Central Group Items 2,7% 2,372 
Source: Lloyds-TSB Group Annual Report, 2001 
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The Group's activities are divided into four main business lines: UK retail banking and 
mortgages; insurance and investments; wholesale markets; and international banking. 
The first three areas are mainly UK businesses, and services are offered on a multi-
brand basis.46 International banking embraces the Group's overseas operations, 
encompassing all banking functions - retail, commercial, wholesale - across 22 
countries within America, Europe, New Zealand, Middle East and Asia. Table 6.4 
illustrates the Group's operations in Europe. 
Table 6.4: LTSB' s European Operations outside the UK (31/12/2001) 
Subsidiary's name Country Activities 
Lloyds Bank S.A.(Subsidiary) France PB and AM, Corporate Banking 
Lloyds TSB (Branches) Luxembourg PB and Commercial banking 
Lloyds TSB (Branches) Monaco PB and AM 
Lloyds TSB (Subsidiary) The Netherlands Corporate banking, Commercial banking 
Lloyds TSB (Subsidiary) Spain PB and AM, Corporate Banking 
Lloyds TSB (Branches) Switzerland PB and AM 
Lloyds TSB (Subsidiary) Gibraltar PB and AM 
Lloyds TSB (Branches) Guernsey Corporate Banking, Conunercial Banking 
PB and AM, RB and Consumer finance. 
Lloyds TSB (Branches) Isle of Man Corporate Banking, Commercial Banking 
and PB and AM, RB and Consumer finance . 
Lloyds TSB (Branches) Jersey Commercial Banking PB and AM, RB and 
Consumer finance. 
* RB- Retail Banking; AM- Asset Management; PB-Pnvate Banklllg 
Source: adapted from L TSB Group Annual Report, 2001 
While operating in nine European countries, the Group's operations in mainland Europe 
remain relatively small, with around 1,000 staff. The Spanish subsidiary is the largest 
operation with approximately 300 staff. Latin America has historically been the Group's 
main area of international expansion, along with New Zealand in more recent times. 
6.3.3 Organisational Structure 
LTSB Group's organisational structure follows a multidivisional form, with five main 
divisions based on functional criteria (see Figure 6.2). Two of these divisions are 
46 UK retail banking provides a full range of financial services, including retail banking, private banking, 
business banking and mortgages. Insurance and investments provides general insurance, pensions and 
brokering services through L TSB branches and the Scottish Widows partnership. Wholesale banking 
provides a number of specialized services, including treasury, corporate banking and asset finance. 
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supportive finance and IT functions; the other three are the main business of the Group : 
retail distribution; insurance and investments; and wholesale and international. All 
divisions depend directly from the CEO, who is assisted by the Deputy Group executive 
and three units (monitoring and planning, HR and the senior Group adviser) 
The international activities of LTSB Group are included in the 'wholesale and 
international' division, organized into two main units; wholesale, and international. The 
international unit is a geographically-based subdivision embracing the Group's 
activities abroad in all types of business. There is not a European unit, and the 
management of the different businesses is largely devolved from the centre, and 
conducted on a country by country basis. 
Figure 6.2: LTSB Group's Organisational Chart (31112 /01) 
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The international activities of L TSB Group are included in the 'wholesale and 
international' division, organized into two main units; wholesale, and international. The 
international unit is a geographically-based subdivision embracing the Group's 
activities abroad in all types of business. There is not a European unit, and the 
management of the different businesses is largely devolved from the centre, and 
conducted on a country by country basis. 
6.3.3.1 The HR Function: Organisational and Management Structure 
The HR function in L TSB takes a highly centralised structure in the domestic UK 
operations whereas strong decentralisation predominates in the overseas operations, 
both outside and within Europe. 
HR Function in the UK 
The HR function of LTSB in the UK has been transformed during the course of this 
study. As in HSBC, a model based on divisional management centres and a 
geographically structured branch network has been replaced by an 'HR business 
partner' model. This relies on the assignment of a strategic business partner for each 
division to deal with strategic issues concerning that division, whilst a number of 
centralised HR units are created to service the Group as a whole. Among these units are 
a call centre to deal with day-to-day HR issues, a discipline and grievances unit, a 
national recruitment centre, an HR projects unit, and the 'University for LTSB', which 
is in charge of staff training and development. Most of the Group's divisions in the UK 
are integrated in the new HR model. Exceptions are Charter Trust and C&G that still 
have their own separate HR functions, although their future integration is envisaged. 
The domestic IR function (Employee Relations) is a unit integrated within the HR 
function. Internationally, IR is strongly decentralised with negotiations of terms and 
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conditions of employment conducted locally by the country manager or his/her HR 
team, depending on the size of the operations. 
International HR Function 
The international division has its own HR business partner with a small HR team. There 
is not, however, a European unit, and nor there is a European business or HR strategy. 
The management of the international business is largely devolved from the centre on a 
country by country basis. Most of the central HR functions, including the call centre, do 
not operate for the international operations, nor this is currently envisaged. 
6.3.4 HR Policy and Practice in LTSB 
6.3.4.1 Home Country Coordination ofHR 
In L TSB the adoption of the new HR model has overlapped with the integration of the 
HR functions of some of the businesses acquired by the Group in recent years. Thus a 
general integration of HR policies is still in progress. Asset Finance, C&G and Lloyds 
UDT still have specific HR arrangements and policies. While there is not always 
reporting to the centre from these businesses, central HR is a key point of reference, and 
overall there seems to be a strong management will towards the integration of the 
different non-traditional banking businesses. The long process of harmonisation of 
terms and conditions which followed the Lloyds-TSB merger continued with the later 
business acquisitions, which means that the majority of employees are now under 
harmonised 'Group terms and conditions', the core of which applies across the Group 
with the detail determined within each business. 
166 
6.3.4.2 International Coordination ofHR 
With the exception of some businesses within the global wholesale banking division 
there is a high degree of HR autonomy at subsidiary level, both within the European 
businesses of the Group and beyond. Decentralization takes place in the form of ad hoc 
meetings between HR managers at international level, autonomous HR policies and no 
cross-country HR measurement and control systems. 
6.3.5 Industrial Relations in LTSB 
Both management and union officials interviewed agree that IR within L TSB in the UK 
is generally 'hannonious'. Nevertheless, the fact that the workforce is strongly divided 
between two unions that barely communicate provides a potential area of conflict. 
6.3.5.1 Trade Union Recognition 
L TSB Group in the UK recognises a number of trade unions. Trade union density levels 
are high in LTSB, with around 63% of the staff unionized. The company-based Lloyds 
TSB Trade Union (L TU) and the TUC affiliate Unifi are the two largest trade unions, 
with around 40,000 and 10,000 members respectively. In addition, recognition to some 
other trade unions has been maintained following the acquisition of organisations where 
they were recognised; Amicus-MSF in Scottish Widows and GMB in Charter Trust.47 
With the exception of these two divisions, LTU and Unifi have recognition rights for 
bargaining at national company level. There are also currently negotiations for Unifi 
and L TU to gain the same rights within Scottish Widows, leaving rights for negotiation 
at local level to Amicus-MSF. Consultation and negotiation are conducted separately 
between the management team and the different trade unions. Negotiating rights are 
47Amicus MSF stands for Amicus Manufacturing, Science and Finance Union, and GMB for British 
General Union. In C&G there is no staff association. 
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recognised for all management and administrative staff levels except very semor 
management positions. 
Relations between the two main trade unions are qualified as 'competitive'. Interest in a 
potential merger between them appears to rest in Vnifi; LTV has continuously rejected 
the idea. A Unifi official interviewed maintained: "we would like to see ourselves and 
L TV merge so that we would have union rights across the finance sector, and 
that's a Vnifi policy overall, ... if you don't have competition you don't have to 
worry about other unions undermining you or trying to do things differently".48 
An EWe member from Unifi described the situation: "LTV just wouldn't speak to us 
and we don't go into negotiations together. It is only in two occasions that we sit at 
a table together, job evaluations and EWC".49 The strong division between the two 
main unions can be traced back to their origins. Whereas L TU is an in-house staff trade 
union with high levels of representation at management levels, Unifi is the result of the 
merger between two finance unions, one of which (BIFU) was the recognised union in 
Lloyds Bank with no management representation. A Unifi representative commented: 
"LTV was set up years ago to keep the trade unions out of the Bank, and although 
they are independent now they remain in competition with us in terms of 
representing stafr'.so 
Another point of interest mentioned by several union representatives was the lack of a 
common organisational 'culture' among the Group employees. The recent and 
numerous mergers and acquisitions of the entities making up the Group have not yet 
resulted in a homogeneous entity where staff feels identified with a common 'company 
culture'. A union official noted that "at national committee level we have 
48 Interview with trade union member - Unifi (June, 2001). 
49 Interview with EWe member - Unifi (June, 2001). 
168 
representatives from all the various divisions within the Bank, and some people or 
groups still see themselves as being separate and not very integrated".sl However, 
he also explained that this is expected to change in the medium to long-term given that 
Group management is currently pushing the idea of a 'Group' philosophy. 
6.3.5.2 Collective Bargaining Structure and Content 
Collective bargaining over pay and employee 'Group term and conditions' is conducted 
at national company level for all employee levels, with around 95% of Group staff 
covered. This includes retail, commercial and wholesale banking except asset finance. 
Asset finance originated from UDT, Lloyds Bowater and Chartered Trust, companies 
that have been gradually annexed to L TSB Group, and negotiations on terms and 
conditions are dealt with separately. Some of the other businesses within the Group also 
have their own employment arrangements, such as Scottish Widows and C&G. Both 
management and unions are, however, interested in harmonizing terms and conditions 
for Group employees in the UK, and this has been in progress for the last few years. 
Negotiations are carried out through the Joint National Committees (JNC), one for 
every recognised union. This situation often leads to long periods of negotiation, for 
example in the recent case on pay for IT staff, where the agreement reached by 
management and Unifi was not initially signed by L TU. The company collective 
agreement covers issues such as pay, hours of work, job security, and flexibility. There 
is annual pay bargaining, with a pay review around April, although the design and 
implementation of productivity measures are not subjected to negotiation. Other 
bonuses given on a discretionary basis and often on an individual basis by Bank 
50 Interview with trade union member - Unifi (July 2001). 
51 Interview with trade union official- Unifi (June 2001). 
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management are not subjected to negotiation either. Issues such as design of incentive 
schemes and bonuses are consulted with the union at national bargaining level. 
There is an increasing tendency to conduct negotiations at divisional or local level, 
partly as a result of the introduction of the new HR model by which the HR function 
becomes further integrated into each business. Negotiations at local level are conducted 
through ad hoc arrangements when issues appear, usually concerning working time or 
specific issues relating to that business division. There are also specific businesses, such 
as Card Services in the South East, Transmission Services in Birmingham, telephone 
centers, operations, and IT staff, which have separate bargaining arrangements. 
6.3.5.3 Main HRlIR Changes and Implementation of these Changes 
This Section explores the main changes affecting L TSB over recent years, and their 
HRlIR implications. An examination of how these have been dealt with enables a feel 
for the extent and nature of negotiation and consultation at company and local levels. 
1. Bank restructuring 
The 1995 Lloyds Bank -TSB merger led to the start of a lengthy process of business re-
organisation within the new LTSB Group, alongside ongoing acquisitions of a number 
of other businesses. Regarding HR, the harmonization of employee terms and 
conditions has taken around six years. The process has been accompanied by the added 
effect of changes affecting the banking industry as a whole, such as the introduction of 
new technology and changes associated with the provision of services, which have 
resulted in decreasing employment levels. Between 1995 and 2001 staff numbers 
decreased by 20,076 (LTSB, 2001). Most of the rationalisation of employment has 
occurred within retail banking, and in particular within the branch network. This has 
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meant a dramatic reduction in the number of employees per branch: "when I first 
joined the Bank 28 years ago, there were 35 people working in a branch whereas 
now you only have around six".s2 In the majority of cases the excess staff from 
branches have either moved to other parts of the Bank or followed voluntary 
redundancy programs often aimed at older staff willing to leave with lump sums or pre-
retirement schemes. There have been few compulsory redundancies to date. In the 
words of a union official, "the only departments that have been made redundant 
have been some specialist departments, some in the Treasury and some very 
specialist roles where they can't do re-deployment, but you are talking of less than 
100 over 5 years".53 Alongside staff reductions and the introduction of new 
technologies has been the minimization of back office activities in the branch network, 
consolidating processing operations into large-scale processing centres. 54 A global 
processing initiative was launched in 2003 with an experimental processing centre in 
India. While the unions showed opposition to the idea because of the potential 
implications for future LTSB employment in the UK, the project went ahead. 
The 1996 Job Security Agreement regulates negotiation and consultation over 
employment levels in LTSB. Employment levels and the harmonization of terms and 
conditions have been negotiated with the unions, mostly at national level, although 
occasional divisional negotiations have been carried out. However, this issue is 
acquiring an increasing profile and has started to be discussed at the Joint Negotiating 
Committee (JNC). When asked whether employee representatives are informed about 
mergers, restructuring or future plans, Unifi sources maintained that "on the main we 
52 Interview with employee representative - Unifi (July 2001). 
53 Interview with trade union official- Unifi (May 2001). 
54 This is part of the 'efficiency program', announced by the Group in February 2000, which includes the 
centralisation of computer operations, the expansion of lower cost delivery channels (such as telephone 
and Internet banking), and the rationalisation of non-personal banking activities through the progressive 
sharing and consolidation of operational functions. 
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are consulted or advised but not always with enough time, so it would be nice to 
have more support from legislation and to have information earlier".ss 
2. Outsourcing and the Introduction of New Technologies 
Outsourcing in L TSB includes non-banking services such as cleaning and security 
services, as well as areas regarded as typical banking activities such as processing and 
cash handling services. In August 2000, the Group announced the creation of IPSL, a 
new payments processing company. IPSL is jointly owned by LTSB Group, Unisys and 
Barclays, and handles all the Group's check -processing activities (L TSB, 2000). 
Numerous LTSB cash centres have been sub-contracted to Unisys, an independent IT 
company, to which LTSB staff have been transferred. Legislation establishes that 
consultation with the unions must be carried out on staff transfers. This is generally the 
case in LTSB, in particular in the case of larger staff transfers whereby the terms and 
conditions of the transferred staff have been negotiated at divisional level. 
The use of temporary agency workers is also a practice m L TSB, particularly in 
operation centres where processing or telephone banking is carried out. The terms and 
conditions of part-time staff in LTSB are part of the collective bargaining agreement 
and therefore subject to negotiations at national company level. 
3. Flexibility and Working Time 
With effect from January 2000 'flexible contracts' for new entrants were introduced 
with two main variations from the existing 'old contracts': more flexible working time 
in the branches and less favorable pension terms. The changes were subjected to 
negotiation at national company level. Other contracts specific to certain areas of the 
55 Interview with trade union official - Unifi (June 2001). 
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business, such as call centres, are negotiated at divisional level with the unions, and 
only if there is a dispute will this go to the national level (to the JNC subcommittees 
rather than the JNC itself). 
Working time is negotiated nationally with the unions as it is a contractual issue as part 
of the general terms and conditions. Additional working time arrangements at business 
level are negotiated at that level with the unions, with only disputes being referred to the 
national level in the consultative subcommittees of the JNC. In addition, there are also 
individual negotiations between managers at local/divisional level and staff over 
working hours. Overall, the union tries to make sure that working hours are not changed 
without acceptable notice and tries to oversee the issue of unpaid overtime. The issue of 
working time is related to the work-life balance campaign currently on the union's 
agenda, and reflecting a widening of the traditional union concerns of pay and terms and 
conditions. A number of sub-committees of the JNC have started to be developed as 
more 'specialist' subcommittees to encourage participation and dialogue. As an union 
official explained: "issues like unpaid overtime, work-life balance and gender 
equality are relatively new for the JNC; instead we have proposed to deal with it 
slightly separately because we feel it is more likely to lead to a more modern and 
participative dialogue if you have got specialists in there rather than generalist 
which tend to be more traditional about things".s6 
4. Pay and Systems of Variable Remuneration 
As generally across the sector, remuneration systems have undergone significant 
changes in L TSB over recent years. In terms of pay awards, there has been a move from 
across the board pay increases to a system that differentiates according to local market 
rates and it is based on pay-pots for performance pay. Although there was consultation 
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over the introduction of variable pay through a pay-pot system in 1997-98, no actual 
agreement was reached with the unions. Actual negotiations at central level are based on 
the size of the annual pay-pot. The implementation and distribution of the pay-pot is 
however more decentralised at business level and a cause of tension for unions that 
would like to see less discretion from local managers on its distribution. Increasingly 
there is not a formalised line between consultation and negotiation and, as management 
reported, informal debate outside the formal IR structure is a common practice in L TSB 
over recent years. 
Although a relatively peaceful IR climate has predominated in L TSB, the extensive 
process of restructuring and organisational change experienced by the Bank (and its 
HRlIR implications), and a number of unilaterally introduced management initiatives, 
have seen increasing dissatisfaction of the part of the unions in recent years. 
6.3.6 Transnational Information and Consultation: LTSB European Employee Forum 
An EWe at Group level was established in 1999. Although Unifi initially requested the 
Ewe in 1996, priority was given to the integration and harmonisation of terms and 
conditions following several mergers and acquisitions. As an IR manager explained, 
"back in 1996-97 Unifi wanted us to spend time on setting up an EWC, and I had 
lengthy debates with the officials, asking them whether they preferred to 
concentrate on creating a structure for the 60-70,000 UK-based staff or setting up 
an EWC which covered around 1,000 people. They decided that they rather 
concentrated on where their members were, so IR was very inward looking back 
then".s7 Once significant advances were achieved regarding integration, Bank 
56 Interview with union official from Unifi - LTSB ( Sept. 2002). 
57 Interview with IR manager-central HR (December 2002). 
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management expressed interest in setting up an Art. 6 EWC before the deadline for 
voluntary agreements following the UK opt-in to the Social Chapter. 
There is one EWC meeting per year, and a total of three EWCs up to December 2002, 
each lasting half a day. No extraordinary EWe meetings have been held to date. The 
Group's Deputy Chief Executive chairs the EWC. On the management side a team of 
UK based management sit as fixed members. These are the head of Group HR, the HR 
business partner for international, and the head of Group IR. The employee side is 
formed by 19 employee representatives, of which 14 are from the UK. Unifi and L TU 
have five seats each, and the C&G staff association, MSF from Scottish Widows, GMB 
from Charter Trust, and the non-recognised part of the Group each have one seat. In the 
UK, EWC members are chosen either by their respective union or by the staff 
themselves in non-recognised areas of the Group. Spain is the only other European 
country with more than 150 employees and holds one EWC seat. Spanish 
representatives have not, however, attended any EWCs. As a result, the first two EWC 
meetings were attended by UK representatives only, and thus had a strongly focused 
UK agenda. From 2002 a full member seat was conceded to each of the Netherlands, 
France, Belgium and Luxembourg (countries with less than 150 employees), who in the 
previous years had attended as invited guests with no voting rights. Furthermore, in 
2003 Switzerland, Monaco and Gibraltar attended as observers and will become full 
members in 2004. An employee-only half-day pre-meeting took place for the first time 
in 2003, directly before the EWe meeting. 
Management Attitude to the EWe 
Lack of management interest partly accounts for the three-year delay in the 
establishment of the EWe from the 1996 deadline for Art. 13 voluntary agreements to 
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the 1999 deadline for Art. 6 voluntary agreements. The large restructuring process 
undertaken by the Group in the UK during the 1990s was seen to be Group's 
management priority before committing resources to a European-level body. The 
relatively small significance of the Group's operations in mainland Europe has done 
little to alleviate the initial lack of emphasis of Group management in the EWe. 
Nevertheless a more enthusiastic approach about the role of the EWe has been 
demonstrated by management in recent months in parallel with their increasing 
involvement in European social policy developments. Group management interviewed 
from the employee relations department maintained that increasing time was being 
spent on company issues affected by EU legislation and less on UK-only matters. In 
relation to this, the head of the Group's IR function has become in the course of recent 
years one of two British members of the European Banking Industry Federation, 
representing the BBA. This more enthusiastic approach is also reflected in the 
extension of representation rights within the EWe to a number of countries that do not 
reach the legal threshold of staff numbers set out in the Directive. Management 
interviewed stated that their increased interest in the EWe was due to a desire to 
establish the appropriate structures in preparation for the prospects of the Group's 
international expansion, particularly in Europe. 
Employee-Side Attitude to the EWe 
In its short 'life', the EWe has not achieved a high profile among LTSB workforce. 
One of the main reasons put forward by employee representatives was the small impact 
of EWe activity on employees' working lives as a consequence ofit's low profile and 
activity in the initial stages and the lack of common transnational issues. In terms of 
dissemination, a communication called 'European Newsletter' is edited from both the 
Bank and the unions and is produced following the EWe meeting to be distributed 
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among the European workforce. 'Front Runner', another internal publication distributed 
across the UK, also occasionally contains information on the EWe. 
The majority of the British EWe members are also members of their respective trade 
union national committees, which means a direct link between the EWe and the 
national structures for employee representation. However in the case of the non-
unionised areas of the Group, the EWe has brought the possibility of collective 
employee representation to staff. At domestic level, support on the employee side is 
widely divided between the very supportive views of the trade unions affiliated to the 
TUe and the more sceptical views of those from the LTU. The former see the EWe as a 
potential advantage in terms of strengthening the role and position of trade unions. 
Unifi sources expressed that "the EWe has heightened the role of the trade union in 
terms of meeting management at senior level. I think L TSB management now 
recognises that they have to consult with us, not only in the UK but at European 
level".58 Unifi also viewed the EWe as a tool for establishing international trade union 
contacts in other parts of the Group to strengthen their position and knowledge within 
the Group. Nevertheless, interviews with employee representatives highlighted a 
general dissatisfaction with the nature and extent of information provided at the EWe 
meetings to date, as a result of delays in providing relevant information, short notice in 
distributing the agenda to delegates, management priority to national bodies of 
employee representation, and confidentiality related issues which deprived employee 
representatives of relevant information 
Issues discussed/Agenda 
At the end of the first EWe meeting in April 2000, it was agreed to set up a 'review 
committee'. This committee is in charge of setting the EWe agenda and meets on an ad 
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hoc basis. The review committee is formed by the UK Head of IR, and three employee 
representatives (from Unifi, Amicus-MSF and the non-unionized parts of the Group). 
The Head of IR reported that in 2003 the review committee would be expanded with a 
fourth employee representative, likely to be from another European country. A 
management-only steering committee formed by the head of Group IR, the HR business 
partner for international and the head of strategic planning outlines the EWC agenda. 
This proposed agenda is then sent to the review committee for suggestions, and is 
finalised in early March to be circulated four to six weeks before the EWC meeting. 
Given the short history of LTBS's EWC, interviews with trade union representatives 
and management reflected a widespread feeling around the EWC of still 'finding their 
feet'. Furthermore the fact that Group operations in Europe are mainly concentrated in 
two countries (the UK and Spain) appeared to add to the limitations given the lack of 
existing transnational issues affecting more than one country. 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has introduced the main features of HSBC and L TSB Groups, two of the 
UK's largest UK financial groups. HSBC is characterised by an extensive worldwide 
presence whose operations in Europe became much more significant following the 
acquisition of the French CCF Group. Although the Group is still primarily multi-
domestic, signs of multi-regionalism are starting to appear, particularly in Europe. IR 
have also significantly changed in the UK, following alterations in the union and 
management team. There is more co-operative dialogue between the two sides, 
something that has been reflected in the extent of information, consultation and 
negotiation of HRlIR related issues, and agreements recently reached following the 
Group's strategy on global processing. The Group has a Group-wide EWC, established 
58 Interview with trade union official - Unifi (June 2001). 
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in 1996, but mainly donnant until the acquisition of CCF, which has given it a new 
impetus. LTSB on the other hand, despite having a significant international presence, 
remains largely a British business with less of a global identity and presence, and is 
largely multi-domestic in its operation. Its IR are cooperative but extensively inward 
focused on a complex process of hannonisation following the integration of several 
financial institutions in the UK in recent years. A Group-wide EWC exists since 1999, 
although with little sign of being effectively operating. 
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Chapter 7 
CASE STUDIES: THE SPANISH BANKS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter provides background infonnation to the cases, introducing key features of 
the two main Spanish-based banks. Analysis around these cases will later be developed 
in Chapters 9 and 10. In Section 7.2 and 7.3 BSCH and BBVA Groups are presented 
respectively. The infonnation mainly focuses on the activities and characteristics of the 
two groups at the time the research was conducted, although there are also historical 
references. The chapter is based on the fieldwork conducted in both Groups from 2001 
to the end of 2002, mainly in the banks' premises in Madrid, Barcelona and London. 
7.2 BANCO SANTADER CENTRAL HISPANO GROUP (BSCH GROUP) 
7.2.1 Group History 
BSCH emerged in January 1999 as the result of a merger between two large Spanish 
banks, Banco Santander (BS) and Banco Central Hispano (BCH). BSCH was initially 
co-chaired by Emilio Botin (from BS) and Jose Maria Amusategui (from BCH), with 
Mr. Botin continuing as the only president from 2002. BCH was the result of a previous 
merger between Banco Central and Banco Hispanoamerica, two of the seven large 
banks that had dominated the Spanish banking system during the 1970s and the first 
half of the 1980s. BS on the other hand had acquired Banesto Bank in 1994 through a 
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public bid.59 Once created, BSCH maintained the policy of differentiated brands, both 
with regards to BS and BCH, as well as Banesto. Only in 2001 did the Bank strategy 
change towards a single BSCH brand policy, although maintaining Banesto as separate. 
The history of the Group's intemationalisation can be best understood by examining 
that of its predecessors. BS's intemationalisation strategy began in the 1950s with 
expansion towards Latin America through operating branches and offices of 
representation. Later on, BS entered the European market, initially through branches 
and offices of representation, and later through acquisitions, mainly in Southern Europe, 
and financial participation in major European banks. Presence in both the US and the 
Asia-Pacific region was achieved through organic growth, with the establishment of 
BS's own subsidiaries. BCH's more aggressive strategy of expansion in Latin America 
and Europe was based on external growth through major financial participation in local 
entities. In Europe, expansion was directed mainly to countries of certain cultural or 
geographical proximity, such as Portugal, Italy and France. Over the last decade or so, 
however, BSCH and its predecessors have focused on Latin America as the key target 
of their international operations, with numerous mergers and local acquisitions, and the 
occasional strengthening of financial participation in existing alliances. The low degree 
of maturity of financial markets in most Latin American countries, combined with 
economic crises, have been considered as key advantages of investing in the area. 
7.2.2 Group Activities and International Operations 
BSCH is a large diversified Spanish financial group operating in 40 different countries 
in Europe, America, Asia, Africa and Australasia. The Group employs 114,927 people, 
of which 42,165 are based in Spain and 72,762 overseas, mainly in Latin America. 
59 Banesto was originaIly a French financial institution, formed in 1902, and was converted to Spanish 
capital following the Second World War (BSCH, 1999: 14). 
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Likewise, the number of overseas branches (5, I 08) outnumbers the domestic branch 
network (4,316). In Latin America BSCH has operations in 12 countries, managing 16 
banks and accounting for a market share of around 10% (BSCH, 2001b:5). Table 7.1 
shows the geographical and business-based desegregation of profits and employment. 
Table 7.1: BSCH's Profits and Employment Numbers per Business Area 
Business Areas Profits after tax (percentage) 
( ~-l. 
" Retail and Commercial Banking 64% 
BSCH Spain 19% 
Banesto 9% 
Europe 5% 
Latin America 31 % 
Asset Management and Private Bankin~ 9% 
Global Wholesale Banking 9% 
Industrial Group and 18% 
Source: BSCH corporate webSite (www.gruposantander.com/es) - 31 / 12/2001 
* Approximate figure 
Employment 
Numbers 
105,483 
24,619 
10,577 
2,500* 
67,783 
6,804 
2,640 
nla 
The Group 's strategy in Latin America revolves around the' America Project' , a two-year plan 
based on strategic participation in banks and other financial institutions with high potential for 
growth.60 Integrated within this is a policy based on combining global and local management in 
order to adapt to each country's market circumstances. Tables 7.a and 7.b in the appendix 
illustrate the Group's operations in the Latin American continent. 
BSCH's presence in Europe, although growing, is considerably less important than that 
in Latin America. The largest presence is in Portugal, where there are around 800 
employees, and the acquisition of Bank Totta & Ayores and eredito Predial Portugues 
increased their market share from 2% to 10%, and meant the reorganisation of the 
BSCH structure in ,that country (BSCH, 2001b:13). As Table 7.2 shows, the Group has 
commercial banking activities in three other European countries and in Gibraltar, 
60 The main axes of this project are improvements in profitability, increased efficiency and increased 
market share. Demonstrating some degree of success, the net profits of BSCH in Latin America have 
increased considerably in recent years, almost doubling from $585 million in 1999 to $ 1.010 in 2000 
(BSCH 2001b:21). 
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through a number of banks in which they who lly or partially participate. The group also 
has offices of representation in Holland, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, the UK, 
Hungary, France and Italy, all of which operate asset management and private banking 
activities, as well in Luxembourg and Ireland where wholesale banking is also 
conducted. In terms of more general European presence, BSCH's position is completed 
by strategic financial alliances in three important banks; San Paolo IMI in Italy (6,48%), 
Commerzbank in Germany (3,37%), and the Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK (5%) 
(BSCH, 2002). 
Table 7.2: BSCH 's Operations in Europe 
Country Activity h~ Bank i, ",rl:', _: i' ·cO ;.~ %Participation 
Portugal Retail and Banco Totta Ac;ores 100% 
Commercial Banking Credito Predial Portugues 100% 
Banco Santander Portugal 82% 
Germany Commercial Banking CCBank 100% 
Commercial Banking Santander Direkt Bank 100% 
Italy Commercial Banking Finconsumo 50% 
Belf!ium Commercial Banking SCH Benelux 100% 
Gibraltar Commercial Banking Hispano Commerzbank Gibraltar 50% 
Commercial Banking Royal Bank of Scotland-Nat West Gibraltar 50% 
Source: BSCH 200 I b (31112/00) 
Thus despite the Group's significant presence in Europe, it is clear that its international 
business is strongly focused in Latin America, which represents an integral part of the 
Group in terms of branch network, number of clients, and net profits (see Table 7.3). 
Table 7.3: Summary ofBSCH Group 
Indicator Spain Latin America Rest of the World 
Number of branches (%) 5,518 (50,9%) 4,638 (42,8%) 671 (6, 1%) 
Clients (millions) (%) 10,3 (29,3%) 21 (59,8%) 3,8 (10.8%) 
Net Profits III Retail and 33% 24% 3% (Europe) 
Commercial Banking (% of BS-CH 22% 
total Group profits) Banesto 11 % 
(Source: HSBC 200lb - 31 /12/00) 
BSCH's business areas are as follows : Retail and Commercial Banking Spain; Banesto; 
Retail and Commercial Banking - Foreign Operations; Asset Management and Private 
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Banking; Global Wholesale Banking; and Corporate Activities. Retail and Commercial 
banking is the main activity, accounting for more than half of the Group's total profits, 
followed by wholesale banking with 11 % of net profits. 
Retail and Commercial Banking Spain includes the branch networks of BS and BCH, 
(which have merged during the course of this study into a single BSCH brand), as well 
as telephone and Internet banking. 
Banesto operates as an independent company within the Group, with its own brand, 
business strategy and corporate structure. Although Banesto's operations embrace retail, 
corporate and investment banking, retail banking remains its main activity. 
Retail and Commercial Banking - Foreign Operations involves the Group's retail and 
commercial banking activities overseas; both in Europe (Germany, Belgium, Italy, 
Portugal and Gibraltar) and Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Colombia, Chile, 
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Puerto Rico, Uruguay and Venezuela). 
Asset management and private banking comprises two main parts. Asset Management 
operates through Santander Central Hispano (SCH) Asset Management, SCH Insurance, 
and local brands in Latin America. Private banking is divided into Private Banking 
Spain (BSN BaniO and International Private Banking SCH, with offices in the 
Bahamas, Miami, Switzerland and Guernsey. 
Global wholesale banking involves corporate banking, treasury and stock markets, and 
investment banking. Business is conducted through the Group's own branches and 
offices of representation in foreign countries, as well as foreign societies. Abroad, 
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activities take place within the Group's local banks In Latin America, BSN Banif 
Portugal and Banco Santander Filipinas. 
Corporate Activities primarily involves the management of the financial participation of 
the Group in industrial firms. 
7.2.3 Organisational Structure 
The Group's internal structure is organised into 14 divisions, creating a mixed product 
and geographical divisional structure. Whereas some divisions, such as global 
wholesale banking or asset management and private banking, are based on product 
criteria with operations extending over domestic borders, others, such as Europe, Latin 
America or Retail and Commercial Banking - Spain, are based on geographical criteria. 
Figure 7.1: BSCH Group Organisational Chart 
A geographically-based division exists for retail and commercial activities in Spain, 
with the exception of Banesto, which is run separately from its own division. The Latin 
America division embraces the Group's retail, commercial and wholesale operations 
(including asset management and private banking) in that region, with activities carried 
out mainly through subsidiaries. While the day-to-day management of these activities 
chiefly depends from the subsidiary banks, there is also a supervisory relationship with 
the Latin America division at HQ. This division has an array of sub-divisions, in charge 
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both of different business areas (retail and commercial, wholesale, and asset 
management and private) and the various functional areas (e.g. risk, legal matters and 
HR). Indeed, the presence of functional sub-divisions signals the importance attached to 
this division within the Group and to the 'multi-regional' approach adopted for its 
management. In the case of wholesale, asset management and private banking, there is 
dependency from the respective global divisions at HQ, articulated through the Latin 
America division, where support teams are based and from where group policy 
decisions for that region emanate. Global wholesale banking, and asset management 
and private banking are two global divisions with operations in Spain and overseas. The 
Europe division, although also geographically based, is distinct from the Latin 
American division since relationships with subsidiaries are based around financial 
supervision as opposed to more coordinated management control. The European 
division also includes the Group's activities in nearby regions such as North Africa.61 
7.2.3.1 The HR Function: Organisational and Management Structure 
The central HR function is strongly domestically orientated, organised almost 
exclusively around BSCH's retail and commercial banking operations in Spain 
(integrated in the same network). It does not, however, include Banesto, which has its 
own HR department and policies. Decentralisation predominates in the retail and 
commercial foreign operations, whereby each local bank has its own HR function and 
policies. Nonetheless a degree of homogenisation is provided in Latin America through 
the Latin America division at HQ, which has its own HR department. This is also the 
case for business areas such as global wholesale banking and asset management and 
private banking, which have their own HR, which depends also from central HR. 
61 These take the form of participation in financial institutions in Morocco (Banque Commerciale du 
Maroc), Tunisia (Banque d'Affaires) and Egypt (MISR International Bank). 
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HR Function in Spain 
This unit is organised into three main areas: Administration and Operations, Training 
and Knowledge Management, and Branch Network Management and Corporate 
Policies. Geographically, the HR function is organised in 11 HR territorial units. These 
correspond to the 12 business divisions in which the Bank's retail and commercial 
branch network are organised within Spain (Madrid has two business divisions and only 
one HR unit). These territorial divisions provide services to both the BS and BCH 
networks (unified since September 2001), and operate with a high degree of autonomy 
in issues related to staff movements, promotions or new appointments. 
Figure 7.2: Stmcture of the BSCH Corporate HR Function 
Corporate HR • BSCH 
The central IR function is part of central HR. The IR manager of the Group maintained 
that "IR in the BSCH Group primarily concerns retail and commercial banking, 
where the majority of the staff are",62 indicating a low level of interference of IR in 
other business areas where a more individualistic approach predominates. Although the 
central IR function services both domestic and intemational operations, decentralisation 
62 Interview with IR Group manager (July 2001). 
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prevails in overseas operations. There, the role of corporate IR is to enact a set of Group 
principles (dialogue and participation), and provide guidance and technical assistance to 
ensure a degree of coherence. 
With regards the relation between central HR and the Group's European operations 
(other than Spain), there is little interaction in tenus of managing the overseas branch 
networks, as European operations concern mainly wholesale banking. Portugal, 
however, represents an exception because of its physical and cultural proximity. 
Interviews with Group management reflected that closer integration among the 
businesses in Spain and Portugal was taking place, and a further 'coming together' 
anticipated. Examples include product homogenisation and commercial strategy in 
general. The impression was given that this might extend to wider issues of 
organisation, possibly including HRM, and this is also reflected in the recent 
appointment of a Portuguese general director to the Group's executive committee. 
With regards Latin America there are two main aspects of collaboration between HR 
Spain and HR Latin America. These are the provision of top management positions in 
Latin America, and the design and implementation of remuneration policies, mainly for 
top management (e.g. the design of stock option remuneration plans). 
International DR Function 
There is not an international function as such in BSCH Group. However the Latin 
America division has its own HR function that generates general policies and principles 
to be adopted by subsidiaries. Two other divisions (global wholesale banking, and asset 
management and private banking) also have their own HR functions. 
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7.2.4 HR Policy and Practice in BSCH 
7.2.4.1 Home Country Coordination of HR 
BSCH has relatively high coordination of HR policy and practice, including with 
regards terms and conditions of employment, pay scales and grades. There is, however, 
more diversity than in BBV A. Two main factors account for this. Firstly, Banesto 
operates separately in terms of management structure and HR policies. Secondly, the 
two retail banking brands representative of BSCH in Spain operated separately (with 
different policies, corporate cultures and independent resources) until September 2001. 
Traditionally, HRM in BS has been more decentralised than in BCH, with higher 
autonomy at the HR territorial units. BSCH is moving towards the integration of BS and 
BCH working methods, with the aim of following BS culture whereby territorial units 
have greater autonomy to apply centrally determined policies. 
7.2.4.2 International Coordination ofHR 
Overall, the Group's retail and commercial operations are decentralised internationally. 
However, the majority of international BSCH branded activities are in Latin America, 
whereby the Latin America division establishes some degree of coordination through its 
own HR unit. Regarding wholesale banking, asset management and private banking, 
activities are organised in two global divisions with strong HR coordination within each 
division. For example, a system of internal grading has recently been implemented by 
which there are standard grade and job categories to be applied both nationally and 
internationally. Overseas operations report directly to the central divisions in terms of 
individual objectives, performance evaluation and remuneration, which are all approved 
centrally. Likewise, benchmarking of performance measures is widespread across the 
international operations in order to achieve internal balance. The wholesale, asset 
management and private banking activities of the Group in Latin America, although 
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depending hierarchically from the local subsidiaries, also depend functionally from the 
respective central divisions, with a high degree HR coordination. As the HR manager in 
Global Wholesale Banking noted: "when we nominate a person responsible for 
equities in e.g Argentina, we try to ensure that the person responsible for that area 
here in Spain can have an opinion in order to discuss it with us in the 'Latin 
America' division, and similarly when at the end of the year we want to discuss 
variable retribution or the bonus plan, we do it jOintly".63 
7 .2.5 Industrial Relations in BSCH 
7.2.5.1 Trade Union Recognition 
Trade union density is around 35% of the total workforce in BSCH Spain (this does not 
include Banesto), spread among an array of unions. Whereas some unions (UGT, 
CC.OO or AMI) operate at national level with recognition for all BSCH-branded 
Spanish operations, others (LAB or ELA in the Basque-Country) have a regional scope 
of operation. A system of proportional representation via union elections takes place 
every four years (the last in December 2002), and only those with more than 10% of 
nation-wide representation in the Bank have collective bargaining rights. CC.OO and 
UGT are the most widely represented in BSCH through their industry federations 
Comfia and Fes,64 which have 30.8% and 29,44% of representation respectively. 
Negotiations however also take place with two other unions, AMI and FITC, which 
hold around 14% and 7% of representation respectively (see Table 7.c in the Appendix 
for the representation levels of all trade unions in the Bank). 
In parallel with the employee representation system via trade unions, a dual system of 
representation exists through works councils at regional and divisional/local level. 
63 Interview with HR Manager - Global Wholesale Banking (July 2001). 
64 Comfia (Federaci6n de Servicios Administrativos y Financieros); Fes (Federaci6n Estatal de Servicios) 
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Works councils exist in their own right in workplaces with more than 50 employees, 
and otherwise a grouping process allows the establishment of a works councils at 
regional level. There is a council in each region, with the exception of larger cities like 
Madrid or Barcelona that often have more. Nevertheless, works councils tend to have a 
nominal rather than active role; to measure representation levels by the different trade 
unions rather than to engage in consultation or collective bargaining activity. 
Management-union relations within BSCH 
Signs of a confrontational-style relationship characterises IR in BSCH, something that 
restrains more positive relations and further cooperation. Words like "fight", "they and 
us" or "compete" were often mentioned in the interviews conducted both with 
management and union sources. A union official maintained that "the will of the Bank 
is not to achieve closer relations with the trade unions, but to limit our activities 
and scope to the minimum legal. .. you have to fight for the space constantly".6s 
Issues of work organisation are considered the prerogative of the Bank, and it is claimed 
to be a constant subject of petition for collaboration by unions. However, support from 
Spanish labour legislation has allowed the trade union confederations to reach sector 
agreements for temporary employees and telephone banking. It has even facilitated the 
collective agreement on temporary work agencies, by which temporary employees (e.g. 
those working in the banks) are entitled to receive an equal salary to that of the 
employee being replaced. 
7.2.5.2 Collective Bargaining Structure and Content 
The sector agreement applies generally across all parts of BSCH operations in Spain, 
although there is a higher proportion of employees in retail and commercial banking 
65 Interview with trade union officer - CCOO (July 2001). 
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activities whose terms and conditions are more aligned with the sector agreement.66 
Other areas, including wholesale banking, are characterised by their more international 
nature and the employment of highly qualified staff. Although in some of these areas 
the collective agreement might be of relevance, staff terms and conditions are more 
likely to be subjected to individual negotiation. 
Alongside the sector agreement, company-wide negotiations between management and 
unions occur over certain issues on an ad hoc basis. Such agreements take place 
between unions and management at national company level, with no operative works 
councils at this level. Negotiations are conducted through the trade unions separately. 
The areas covered in these agreements vary each year; examples of recent years include 
company collective agreements on employment, the terms and conditions of banking 
services and social benefits.67 The agreement on employment, for example, includes the 
percentage of contracts offered to people employed on a temporary basis, the agreed 
volume of employment for the year and the types of employment contracts. Company 
level agreements in addition to the sector agreement can only improve the conditions set 
in the later. Issues such as working time, non-variable salary or non-performance-based 
bonuses are established at the sector agreement. Although most agreements are national, 
at divisional/local level some agreements take place regarding specific issues 
concerning the nature of the work and specificity of the workplace in question (working 
time, flexible hours, health and safety). Local/divisional agreements generally take 
place between UnIons at that particular level and management, with agam often 
inoperative works councils. 
66 The majority of BSCH employees in retail and commercial banking have greater seniority, often with 
twenty or more years of service. Trade union affiliation tends also to be higher in retail and commercial 
banking operations. 
67 Further recent examples include an agreement on the homogenisation of working time, post merger 
(Jan. 2000); a holiday agreement (May 2000); an agreement on collective life insurance (May 2000); and 
an agreement on special banking conditions (July 2000). 
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Trade union input in BSCH is particularly concentrated among older employees with 
20-30 years of service, in mainly administrative tasks in retail and commercial banking. 
Employee terms and conditions in other segments of the bank, and for new staff, 
increasingly fall outside the sector agreement or are individually negotiated. 
7.2.5.3 Main HRlIR Changes and Implementation of these Changes 
This Section explores the main changes affecting BSCH over recent years, and their 
HRlIR implications. An examination of how these have been dealt with enables a feel 
for the extent and nature of negotiation and consultation at company and local levels. 
1. Bank Restructuring 
Following the BS-BCH merger, the Group has pursued a marked policy of cost 
reduction and improved efficiency that has resulted in a considerable reduction of the 
Spanish branch network (both BS and BCH). In 2000 alone the Group closed around 
500 branches (BSCH, 2000:29). The closure of branches has had an important effect in 
terms of employment. In 1999 BSCH had around 32,000 employees in Spain, and at the 
end of 2000 this figure had been reduced to around 27.000. In almost all redundancy 
cases company-wide collective agreements have guaranteed a smooth adjustment, 
mainly via pre-retirement schemes whose terms and conditions had been negotiated 
with the main unions at national company level. The main banks in Spain playa central 
role in the economy, but equally important for their success is their social image, and 
large-scale redundancies are feared to provoke social outcry. This factor, together with 
strict labour law provisions, probably lies behind the willingness of the Bank to agree to 
pre-retirement schemes. 
193 
2. Outsourcing and the Introduction of New Technologies 
Over the years outsourcing has affected an increasing number of areas, such as internal 
mail, processing, telephone banking and marketing/promotion activities. Exact figures 
on the extent and detail of outsourcing activities in BSCH was difficult to obtain, but it 
appears to be an issue of trade union concern. Despite Spanish labour law detennining 
that companies must provide unions with infonnation on the extent of outsourcing 
activities, sources reported inaccuracies in the infonnation provided. For example a 
union representative commented: "when we get there, (outsourced) staff are not 
often where we were told".68 An agreement between the main unions and management 
was reached so that subcontracting would not be used in areas considered the core 
business of the bank. Interviews with trade union officials, however, revealed that the 
agreement was in their view not respected, prompting them to denounce it to the labour 
tribunals. The trade unions claimed that BSCH is using 'service' finns to undertake 
work under bank premises and considered 'core business'. Although the labour courts 
pronounced in favour of the unions, officers interviewed claimed that practices of this 
kind were still carried out. They suggested that there are several finns which have been 
segregated from BSCH, and from which only top management are under BSCH 
conditions.69 These finns might be partially or totally owned by BSCH or might be 
independent finns. There is not consultation or negotiation with trade unions in this 
area, and representatives interviewed reiterated the lack of infonnation from the Bank in 
tenns of the activities subcontracted, despite a legal requirement. In reference to Gestel, 
a telephone-banking finn partly owned by the Group, a union representative noted: 
"there is a telephone banking centre of BSCH which is officially from Gestel, but 
68 Interview with trade union representative - CCOO (July 200 I). 
69 Examples of companies segregated from BSCH are Open Banle Examples of 'service' firms to which 
BSCH is outsourcing are Coritel and Humano. 
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from Gestel there are only a few, the rest is staff hired on a temporary basis so it is 
very difficult to establish union representation or maintain any kind of control".70 
The use of temporary workers is closely related to outsourcing, since according to union 
sources, 'service' firms often use staff hired under less favourable economic conditions 
and often on a temporary basis. Moreover, union sources claimed that 'service' firms 
are sometimes part of temporary work agencies, and their emergence has partly 
responded to recent labour legislation by which the conditions of temporary 
employment levelled the conditions of permanent employees carrying out an equivalent 
job. As a result, 'service' firms, which do not have the status of temporary work 
agencies and thus are not covered by the sector agreement on temporary work agencies, 
can provide services with lower labour costs. 
3. Flexibility and Working-Time 
Regarding flexible contracts, legislation in Spain provides for trade unions to receive 
regular information on the types and number of contracts within companies. However, 
there is no consultation or negotiation over new contracts' terms and conditions at 
company level. Negotiation over the terms and conditions of specific contracts, to adapt 
to the nature of the business and specific needs, were reported by union officials to be 
subjected to negotiations with unions at local/divisional level, but only occasionally. 
The normal course of events was for there to be no negotiation at this level. 71 
Working time is regulated under the sector agreement, which establishes the official 
working hours for bank employees. BSCH, and in particularly the BS network, 
however, has a reputation for long hours, an issue which appears at the centre of union-
70 Interview with trade union officer - CCOO (July 2001). 
71 Interview with trade union officer - CCOO (November 2002). 
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management differences in BSCH. A national survey conducted by the two mam 
Spanish unions in the banking sector (Fes-UGT, 1997) highlighted BS as the Spanish 
bank with highest staff overtime rates (73,49% of staff, of which around 40% worked 
on average three hours extra per day). Consequently, union officials described the 
working time issue as "an area of daily struggle with continuous disputes".72 In 
BCH, only around 28% of employees appeared to work longer hours than those 
established in the sector agreement (Fes-UGT, 1997). In various discussions with trade 
union representatives it became clear that BS culture in this regard was progressively 
taking-over since the merger, with increasing pressure among ex-BCH employees to 
extend their working hours. Since working time is officially established in the sector 
agreement, there is not further consultation or negotiation over this issue at national 
company level. Disputes tend to be individually-based with unions at regional/local 
level. Indeed, at regional/local and divisional level there are occasional agreements on 
working time because of the nature and business needs of certain parts of the business, 
with negotiations being carried out between unions and management at that level. 
4. Pay and Systems of Variable Remuneration 
Variable forms of remuneration have acquired increasing importance in BSCH in recent 
years. Not only has the percentage of the salary that is considered variable remuneration 
increased, but also the percentage of staff across the bank affected. In just one year, 
1999/2000, this percentage grew from 85% to 95% (BSCH, 200la:39). Variable 
remuneration is not regulated in the sector agreement, and neither are there company 
agreements in this area. Bank management unilaterally designs the systems of variable 
remuneration with scarce involvement of trade unions. A trade union official described 
that in certain cases a period of consultation with the main unions has taken place before 
72 Interview with trade union official- CCOO (November 2002). Similar comments were mentioned by a 
number of other trade union members interviewed. 
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changes in systems of variable remuneration were made official, with the aim of 
achieving consensus.73 Variable remuneration is not, however, subjected to negotiation 
at company level, and according to a union representative "they (BSCH management) 
have changed a right (collective bargaining) for a unilateral decision, since what 
before used to be included in the collective agreement is now an increasingly 
variable part of the salary. The Bank is prepared to give, but not to negotiate". 74 
The adversarial character of management-union relations in BSCH emerges from the 
review of these four areas. Whilst the unions have been able to achieve 'social' 
restructuring with the support provided by Spanish legislation, the dominance of the 
more aggressive and unilateral management style of BS (over BCH) has meant that 
management prerogative has emerged strongly in a number of areas of the employment 
contract. 
7.2.6 Transnational Employee Information and Consultation 
There is not an EWe in BSCH Group. At the time of the BS-BCH merger in 1999, 
management proposed the constitution of an EWe aligned to EU legal requirements. 
However, at the interviews with Group management and trade union officials no 
particular interest was shown by either group in a potential EWe. On the one hand, 
management did not see how an EWC could at present contribute to the Group's 
activities given the nature of its European businesses, including size and type of 
business. On the other hand, the unions clearly were more interested in developing 
relations with their Latin American colleagues, where most of the Group's workforce 
and operations outside of Spain are based. Indeed, a co-ordinating employee-only forum 
had been recently constituted, integrated by ec.oo and some of the main trade unions 
73 Interview with trade union officer - CCOO (November 2002). 
74 Interview with trade union representative - UGT (July 2001). 
197 
present in the BSCH Group in Latin American countries. The "Coordinadora Hispano-
Americana de Sindicatos Nacionales del BSCH" was created in May 2001, during the 
celebration of the IV Conference on Transnational Banking in Latin America. The 
agreement was signed by trade unions with a presence in the BSCH Group in some of 
the countries where it operates: Comfia-CC.OO from Spain; CNB-CUT from Brasil; 
AEBU from Uruguay; FETRABAN from Paraguay; CSTEBA from Chile; AB from 
Argentina; and FENASIB from Mexico. There is only one trade union per country, in 
order to avoid internal conflicts resulting from the potentially different positions of 
trade unions within any given country. The "Coordinadora" meets meet twice a year, 
although there is provision for extraordinary meetings when needed. The objectives of 
are to promote dialogue and understanding among the trade unions, as well as joint 
proposals aimed to improve the working and living conditions of BSCH employees in 
Latin America and Spain. Areas of special importance are working time, professional 
training, equal opportunities and a code of conduct for BSCH activities. 
7.3 BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA GROUP (BBV A GROUP) 
7.3.1 Group History 
BBV A emerged in 1999 following a merger between Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV) and 
Argentaria.75 Both banks were already the product of various mergers that had taken 
place over previous years. Banco Bilbao and Banco Vizcaya had merged in 1998 to 
create BBV, whereas Argentaria was a holding, created in 1991, grouping all public 
banks in Spain with the exception of I.c.O. 76 This holding would later be privatised, 
and at the time of privatisation was one the three main banking groups in Spain, 
together with BBV and Banco Central Hispano (BCH). The process of integration of the 
different entities was pushed by the decision to launch a single BBV A branding policy 
75 Argentaria Corporacion Bancaria de Espana 
76 lCO stands for lnstituto de Cn!dito Oficia1 
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in January 2000, which also embraces several smaller banking businesses purchased by 
the Group over the years. 77 
The international expansion of the Group has its origins in Paris, where Banco Bilbao 
opened a branch in 1902. Later on BBY's expansion was directed to Europe and Latin 
America. In Europe, expansion concentrated on the opening of BBY branches and 
representation offices as their own subsidiaries in countries of geographical proximity 
like Portugal. In Latin America expansion required high levels of investment through 
major financial participation in local entities and the creation of BBY branded 
subsidiaries. Since the BBY / Argentaria merger, presence in the Latin American 
markets has grown, mainly through external growth strategies build around mergers and 
acquisitions. In parallel, small local agencies have been acquired for the private pension 
fund part of the business. In Europe, BBY A has followed BBY's internationalisation 
strategy through further internal growth, with the creation of offices of representation 
and BBY A branches. In sum, nowadays the Group has a vast international presence, 
strongly concentrated in Latin America. 
7.3.2. Group Activities and International Operations 
BBY A Group is a large diversified group whose financial component has operations in 
37 countries, and a network of 9,000 offices and 108,082 employees (BBYA, 2001). Of 
those, 33,733 (31,2%) work in Spanish territory, 72,349 (66,9%) in Latin America, and 
2.067 (1,8%) in other areas of the world. The intensity of the expansion strategy in 
Latin America can be appreciated from figures regarding the number of employees in 
recent years; for example, in only a one-year period (1999-2000), the number of 
employees in Latin America grew frown from 49,286 to 72,349 (BBY A, 200 I b: 127). 
77 These include Banca Catalana, Banco del Comercio and Banco de Alicante. 
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BBVA's distribution of profits shows the importance of the retail and commercial 
operations of the Group in Spain and Portugal, and the weight of the Group in Latin 
America (see Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4: BBVA's Profits by Business Division 
Region ,. - " Profit before tax (percentage) 
Retail and Commercial Banking Spain and Portugal 43% 
BBY A America 25 ,1% 
Asset Management and Private Banking 16,1% 
Global Wholesale Banking 15% 
Source: BBYA Group Annual Report, 2001 
BBV A Group divides its activities into nine business areas: retail banking in Spain; 
wholesale banking; investment banking; asset management and private banking; 
America; Europe; insurance; E-business; and the industrial Group. 
Retail banking in Spain includes the retail banking activities of BBV A in Spain under a 
single BBV A branding policy. 
Wholesale banking embraces commercial banking, global corporate banking aimed at 
large corporations, and institutional banking. Global corporate banking operates both 
from Madrid and from five international offices in London, Paris, Milan, New York and 
Hong-Kong. A process of integration of these units was completed in 2000 through the 
'Transform@' program, including the adaptation of a uniform management model and 
tools which allow an improved service for international clients. Similar initiatives have 
also taken place at regional level, for example the launch of 'Cash Management 
Iberico', aimed at unifying management accounts across Spain and Portugal. 
Investment banking incorporates the functions of treasury, capital and stock markets, 
operating both in Spain and abroad. Integration has also been central to operations in 
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this area, and a recent merging of activities has taken place in the investment banking 
anns of BBY and Argentaria, as well as the Group's investment banking activities in 
Spain and Portugal (BBYA, 200Ib:98). 
Asset management and private banking activities spread across international markets. 
Asset management has affiliates in Portugal, Andorra, Luxembourg and various Latin 
American countries. 78 Private banking coordinates the activities of BBY A Privanza in 
Spain, Portugal, Jersey, Switzerland and Gibraltar, as well as the Banco lntemacional 
D' Andorra - Banca Mora. Branches are also located in Miami and Grand Cayman 
Island. During 2000, private banking completed a process of integration of the different 
fund and pension management agents in Spain, Switzerland and Miami, along with 
offices of representation in Latin America (BBYA, 2001b:101). This has meant the 
integration of HR, management systems, and technological resources, as well as the 
unification of the products and services offered. 
The business area America embraces operations in the American continent through a 
number of financial institutions in II different countries (shown in table 7.d of the 
appendix to this Chapter). These distinct banks and financial institutions are managed in 
a co-ordinated fashion, according to the business model adopted by the BBY A Group. 
The 'Cre@ Project', for example, was launched during 2000, and, among other things, 
involves 40 common working plans (BBY A, 2001 b: 1 06). 
Europe covers the Group's operations in other European countries, either through its 
own branch network or through participation in other financial institutions (see Table 
7.5). The main objective of this business area is to extend the presence of the group in 
78 Latin American affiliates include Bancomer Group (Mexico), Provida (Chile), Consolidar (Argentina), 
AFP (EI Salvador) and Copatria (Colombia). 
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Southern European countries, 111 particular Portugal, France and Italy (BBV A, 
2001: 115). Apart from financial participations 111 the ltalian Banco Nazionale del 
Laboro (9.93%) and the French bank Credit Lyonnais (3.82%), the Group's main 
European activities are subsidiaries in Andorra and particularly in Portugal (BBV A 
Portugal), where the Group has special weight with around 900 employees and a 
network of 118 branches. BBVA has also branches in Paris, London, Milan and Lisbon, 
and offices of representation in Frankfurt, Brussels, Zurich, and Moscow. Although 
presence in Europe is small compared to that in Latin America, the Group has a vision 
of expanding European operations, in particular in Southern Europe. At the March 2001 
general shareholders meeting, the Group's vice-president, when referring to the 
investment plans for the following years, stressed: "although we will continue with 
the expansion in Latin America we will work intensively in Europe" (BBV A, 
2001a:21). 
Table 7.5: BBVA's Operations in Europe 
Country Activity 
" 
Bank % Participation 
Andorra Private Banking Bane Internaeiona I D'Andorra- 100% 
Banca Mora 
Channel Islands Private Banking BBY A Privanza Bank (Jersey) Ltd 100% 
Gibraltar Private Banking BBVA Privanza International 100% 
(Gibraltar) Ltd 
Portugal Retail, Commercial and BBV A Portugal 100% 
Wholesale Banking 
Switzerland Private Banking BBY A Privanza Suiza 100% 
The industrial group controls the financial participation of the Group in industrial firnls. 
At the end of 2000, the Group had partnerships in around 158 societies, with the 
telecommunications sector representing around half of the Group's investments, 
followed by oil and electric companies (BBVA, 2001b: 117). 
The insurance business area emerged in 1999, reflecting the importance that this area is 
acquiring within the Group. In Spain, the Group operates through the BBV A banking 
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branch network. In Latin America, the Group has participation In 19 insurance 
companies although further investments are anticipated, and the Group sees the region 
as the natural zone for expansion of the insurance business (BBV A, 2001 b: 120). 
Finally, E-business embraces the financial operations carried out through new 
distribution channels, m particular Internet, both by individual customers and to 
b · 79 usmesses. 
7.3.3 Organisational Structure 
The Group's organisational structure has undertaken a number of changes since the 
merger. In April 2001, the administration board approved a new organisational structure 
with three general directors in charge of three global areas. This resulted in a divisional 
structure organised around three main functional areas: the two main businesses -
'retail' and 'wholesale' banking - and 'resources', with global responsibility for the 
whole Group. In stating the global nature of BBV A Group, one of its general directors 
maintains that "we must behave as such, that is looking at the different businesses 
from an international perspective" (BBVA, 200la: 28).80 In 2002 the present 
structure was adopted, still following a multidivisional form with three main areas: 
'support areas' and 'other' with global responsibility for the Group, and 'business areas' 
embracing a number of divisions for the different business of the Group. Within this, 
there are two globally organised divisions, namely the wholesale and investment 
banking division, and the asset management and private banking division. Top 
management at BBV A argued that the reason for choosing this type of organisation is to 
take advantage of the synergies in terms of distribution and knowledge between 
79 Besides the online banking services of BBV A through 'BBV A net', 'Uno-e' is the Internet bank of the 
Group and operates as an independent firm within the Group. BBV A holds 80% of the capital of Uno-e 
and the remainder (20%) belongs to the technology firm Terra (BBVA:2000:52). 
80 Interview published in the internal publication Cronica, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Madrid, n.5, May 2001. 
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different parts of the business. According to the General manager of the Group's retail 
banking operations, synergy occurs, for example, between the area of private banking 
and the Latin American banks, where relations should be clearer and distribution costs 
reduced. 81 Of particular interest for this study is the reorganisation of the retail and 
commercial divisions, which although still organised along geographical lines, have 
changed scope. 
Figure 7.3: BBVA Group-Organisational Chart 
President.: 
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Wholesale and Investment Banking 
Asset Management and Private Banking 
Industrial Group 
Operations 
Risk Management 
Human Resources 
Corporate Expansion 
Business Development 
In the previous structure a retail banking division existed to cover the operations 
previously undertaken by the BBV and Argentaria retail banking networks following 
the integration on a common platform of the Group ' s branch network in Spain. In the 
2002 structure, the retail banking division also includes commercial banking, and the 
geographical scope expands to cover the Portuguese operations of the Group, signalling 
a move towards international integration. The retail and commercial banking America 
division embraces the retail banking operations of the Group in Latin America through 
81 Interview published in the internal publication Cronica, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, Madrid, n.S, May 200 1. 
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the banks participated in by the Group in this region. Although financial control and 
budgeting is transferred to the different subsidiaries, the Latin American division at HQ 
have support teams in the areas of risk analysis, organisation, and management systems, 
whose job is to collaborate and work closely with the different banks. 
Another interesting development has been the removal of the 'Europe' division that 
previously existed within the wholesale banking area of the previous group structure. 
The Portuguese operations have been integrated with the retail and commercial Spanish 
division, and the rest of Europe, which is mainly wholesale and private banking, has 
been integrated into the two global divisions corresponding to these two areas.82 
7.3.3.1 The HR Function: Organisational and Management Structure 
The central HR function of BBV A is highly centralised at domestic level, covering all 
Spanish operations of the Group. Decentralisation predominates with regards to the 
foreign operations of the Group, with the exception of Portugal, which now falls under 
the Spanish structures (the HR structure implications of this are still being defined). 
Global wholesale banking and asset management and private banking have their 
respective HR units integrated within central HR. Given the importance of the Latin 
American operations of the Group, an HR unit for Latin America also exists in order to 
ensure a degree of alignment with HQ and consistency in the area. 
HR Function in Spain 
The HR function for the Spanish retail and commercial banking activities is divided 
territorially into 14 units. Although there are signs of increasing decentralisation to each 
of those units, central HR remains key to decision-making and policy-related issues. In 
82 Jersey, Switzerland and Gibraltar are integrated within the private banking global division. The London 
offices fall under the global wholesale banking division, as do the French operations of the Group. 
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addition, some additional HR units at central level provide servIces for the whole 
territory within Spain; for example, training and selection or quality. 
The 1R function is integrated in the HR department, and is very centralised at domestic 
level, but with strong decentralisation existing at intemational level. 
International HR Function 
The HR department has an intemational banking unit, with separate sub-divisions for 
Europe and Latin America (Figure 7.4). In the case of Europe, Portugal (the only 
country where there are retail banking operations) is in the process of being further 
integrated with the Spanish retail and commercial operations. The rest of the European 
countries have wholesale and private banking operations that are managed more 
globally from the respective global divisions. Local HR managers exist only in UK, 
France and Portugal, with no full time HR person in the rest of the European countries 
where the Group has operations. 
Figure 7.4: Structure of the BBV A Corporate HR Function 
Corporate HR ·BBVA 
7.3.4 HR Policy and Practice in BBVA 
7.3.4.1 Home Country Coordination ofHR 
BBV A presents a high degree of integration at home country level. BBV A operates 
through a number of territorial units within Spain, servicing the (retail and commercial) 
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branch network under a single brand (BBV A). HR policies emanate from the central 
HR department, including terms and conditions of employment, pay scales, and grades. 
There is limited local and regional autonomy of the operating units, with most HR 
decision-making emanating from or being referred to central HR. 
7.3.4.2 International Coordination ofHR 
With the exception of Portugal, most foreign European operations are wholesale 
banking, asset management and private banking activities, which are organised in two 
global divisions with a strong degree of HR co-ordination in each division. BBV A 
international retail and commercial operations are quite decentralised to subsidiary 
level, although ongoing processes within the organisation appear to emerge as an 
impelling force for HR convergence. According to management interviewed,83 Group 
policies emerge from HQ in Spain, and after evaluation they are adapted to the different 
locations in Latin America through the HR unit for Latin America, with common 
corporate policies in training, variable remuneration, recruitment and selection, 
promotion opportunities and equal opportunities, amongst others. 
7.3.5 Industrial Relations in BBVA 
7.3.5.1 Trade Union Recognition 
Trade union density is around 40% of the total workforce in BBV A. Similarly to BSCH, 
an array of trade unions operate in BBV A both at national and regional level. Trade 
union elections take place every four years (the last one in December 2002), with only 
those trade unions achieving more than 10% of nation-wide representation in the Bank 
having collective bargaining rights. CCOO-Comfia is the most widely represented trade 
union in BBV A with over 30% of representation, followed by AMI and UGT -Fes with 
83 Interview with the IR sub-director - BBVA (July 2001). 
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24,7% and 20% respectively. See Table 7.e in the Appendix for the results of the trade 
union elections in BBV A. 
Alongside the employee representation system VIa trade UnIons, a dual system of 
representation exists through works councils at regional and divisionalllocal level, 
organised in a similar fashion to those in BSCH. Likewise, works councils in BBV A 
tend to have a nominal rather than active role. 
Management-union relations within BB VA 
Although to a lesser extent than in the BSCH, inertia from the past can still be sensed in 
the minds and forms of those conducting negotiations, and this is reflected in 
confrontational as opposed to more participative IR. 
7.3.5.2 Collective Bargaining Structure and Content 
In BBVA the Sector agreement applies generally across the Bank's Spanish operations. 
Issues like working time, non-variable salary or non-performance based bonuses are 
established at the sector agreement. Alongside this, company collective agreements are 
agreed on issues such as special banking conditions for bank employees and social 
benefits.84 Agreements take place between unions and management at national company 
level, with no operative works councils at this level. Although most agreements are 
national, at divisional/local level some agreements also take place regarding specific 
issues to do with the nature of the work and specificity of the workplace in question; i.e. 
working time, flexible hours, or health assistance. Local/divisional agreements 
generally take place between trade unions at that particular level and management. Only 
occasionally do local works council engage in collective bargaining or consultation on 
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workplace related issues such as emergency exits, cleaning provisions, air-conditions or 
health and safety, although this latter aspect is increasingly being discussed within each 
trade union separately. Other than these such instances, the interlocutor is at group level 
(IR central) rather than territorial level. On some occasions there are so-called 'out of 
table negotiations' that are ad hoc and often negotiated with the most representative 
unions only, given that around 70% of the trade union representation in BBY A is 
attained by only three unions. However, in addition regional unions, for example, 
occasionally negotiate an agreement at regional level. 
Trade union input is strongly concentrated on long-service employees in retail and 
commercial banking, with terms and conditions in other segments of the Bank and for 
new staff increasingly falling outside the direct influence of the sector agreement. 
7.3.5.3 Main HRlIR Changes and Implementation of these Changes 
This Section explores the main changes affecting BBV A over recent years, and their 
HRlIR implications. An examination of how these have been dealt with enables a feel 
for the extent and nature of negotiation and consultation at company and local levels. 
1. Bank Restructuring 
Over the last two decades employment in the banks forming the current BBY A has 
decreased by 26% as a result of several merger processes and the introduction of new 
technologies.85 The BBY-Argentaria merger alone accounted for a large proportion of 
the fall in staff numbers; employment fell from 37,052 in 1999 to 33,733 in 2000 
(BBVA, 2001b:127). In parallel, 471 offices were closed during the year 2000, the total 
number dropping to 3,864 at the end of 2000 compared with 4,336 the previous year 
84 Examples of recent company agreements include a merger agreement (Nov. 1999), a payroll agreement 
(March 2000), an agreement on social benefits (Nov. 2000), a working time agreement (Feb. 2001), and 
an agreement on banking conditions (March 2002). 
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(BBVA, 2001b:128). Central functions within the Bank were also affected by staff level 
reductions, and various BBV A central function buildings in Madrid were closed. Job 
cuts however have been voluntary, mainly through early retirement and voluntary 
redundancy schemes. This has meant a progressive replacement of older bank 
employees, often by graduates. The unions have thus focused on improving pre-
retirement and voluntary redundancy schemes and the new-entry contracts. The terms 
and conditions for pre-retirement and voluntary redundancies have been negotiated 
between management and the most representative unions at national company level, 
often in the context of merger agreements. Following the creation of BBV A in 1999 a 
merger agreement was signed covering provisions on employment guarantees, PIT 
employees, training, working conditions and trade union rights. Compulsory 
redundancies have therefore been rare in BBY A. 
There have also been changes in the nature of activities carried out in the branch 
network, which as generally across the sector has changed focus to become a sales 
point. A second implication has been a reduction in administrative (back office) 
activities resulting from the introduction of new technologies that allow automatic 
processing. From discussions with union representatives, however, it became clear that 
back office activities have not been reduced to the extent initially foreseen by Bank 
management, and most administrative activities (around 95%) are still carried out in the 
branches.86 A result is that, with the launch of the 'Office 2000' designed to have less 
staff, excessive workload in the bank branches has become a frequent problem.8? 
Despite this, a union representative interviewed did not think that the Bank was 
85 Information provided by Banking Sector Trade Union Federation - Comfia-CC.OO. 
86 Interview with trade union representative - CCOO (August 2001). 
87 Interview with trade union representative - UOT (July 2001). 
210 
planning to increase staff levels, as they considered it a temporary problem accentuated 
by the recent integration of the operating systems ofBBV and Argentaria. 88 
2. Outsourcing and Introduction of New Technologies 
The first moves towards externalisation were cleaning and security staff, and over the 
years this has extended to include other areas such as internal post, and, more recently, 
marketing, payment, and telephone banking activities. Following Spanish labour law, 
information on the extent of outsourcing and the activities involved must be provided to 
the trade unions by Bank management. A number of union officials interviewed 
manifested however that information by the Bank on this issue is often not given or not 
accurate. They noted, for example, difficulties in estimating the extent of outsourcing in 
BBV A, as well as the resulting obstacle that this lack of knowledge placed on union 
recruitment activities: "BBV A has a centre in Madrid where part of the operations 
are subcontracted. I have been there and there must be around 1,000 people 
working in a big room, and you don't know who is working for the Bank and who 
isn't".89 One characteristic of outsourcing activities in BBVA is that they have not 
generally involved transfers of BBV A staff, apart from occasional cases. This has often 
been, according to union sources, the result of punitive measures in cases of staff not 
willing to accept pre-retirement. Given that non ex-BBV A staff therefore carry out 
much outsourcing, there has not been negotiation at company level within BBV A on the 
terms and conditions of employees in the subcontracted activities. 
A slight variation on outsourcing is the use of temporary work agencies and temporary 
employees. Although again there has not been consultation or negotiation at company 
level in BBV A regarding this, an agreement on temporary workers has been reached at 
88 Interview with trade union representative - UGT (August 2001). 
89 Interview with trade union official -CC.OO (July 200 I). 
211 
national sector level (temporary work agencies sector), by which temporary employees 
are to receive equal salary to permanent staff doing a similar task (the ETTs agreement). 
As a result, the economic incentives for companies to use temporary employees has 
decreased. Trade union officials interviewed indicated, however, that a new type of firm 
called a 'service firm' is emerging, which does not legally fall under the agreement. 
Consequently, according to union officials, banks including BBY A are by-passing the 
law by outsourcing and using 'service firms', which, as previously mentioned, are 
occasionally financially participated by the BBYA Group.90 Employees in 'service 
firms' are often covered by sector agreements other than the banking sector agreement 
(e.g. telephone banking), with generally less favourable terms and conditions. 
3. Flexibility and Working Time 
Spanish labour legislation provides for most fixed-term contracts to be made permanent 
after three years, and union-employer agreements at confederation level provide for 
employers to make available information on the types and number of contracts on a 
regular basis. Although agreements over the percentage of new entrants hired on non-
fixed terms and conditions to be transferred to permanent contracts do exist between 
unions and management at national company level, there is no consultation or 
negotiation over the terms and conditions of new contracts in BBY A. As a trade union 
offered maintained: "the bank now hires graduates and keeps them with temporary 
contracts for three years before offering them indefinite contracts. As a result 
these new employees do not enter the bank with negotiated conditions and social 
benefits as we used to, instead they are offered individual contracts in which many 
90 Examples of service companies mentioned in the interviews with trade union officials in BBY A are 
'Labonnan', 'BEX Directo' and 'Humano'. 
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benefits are still there but not reflected on paper, so the legal right is not there 
anymore.,,91 
Working time is regulated under the sector agreement, which establishes the official 
working hours for bank employees. Nevertheless, working time has become a major 
area of dispute over recent years, following growing evidence of employees working 
longer hours. Indeed, this has become one of the main issues that unions deal with at 
regional/local level (via trade union sections at that level, rather than via works 
councils). In parallel, there is an increasing tendency within BBV A to individual and 
localised arrangements in which working time is modified to suit the nature of the 
business. These agreements take place between unions and management either at 
national level (between trade union sections and company management), or at 
local/regional/divisional level (between unions and management at that level). A recent 
agreement on working time, for example, concerns specific arrangements for several 
workplaces in Madrid, Zaragoza and Catalufta. In addition to negotiation over specific 
arrangements, there are mounting concerns on the union-side of employees working 
increasingly long hours often under no agreement or extra remuneration. In BBV (pre-
merger with Argentaria), around 35% of employees prolonged their working time on an 
average of 2 hours daily, a small figure compared with other Spanish banks. 
4. Pay and Systems of Variable Remuneration 
Bonuses and variable remuneration systems are not regulated by the sector agreement, 
which only establishes fixed pay levels for the different professional categories. 
Variable remuneration used to affect high and medium management levels only, but has 
gained importance over the years and currently affects the entire workforce. Indeed, the 
Bank has introduced extraordinary remuneration and performance-based systems 
91 Interview with trade union representative - CCOO (August, 2001). 
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unilaterally, with no negotiation over such issues. Similarly, employee evaluation 
systems on which performance-based remuneration is based are not negotiated or 
consulted with unions. A trade union official referred to the salary, and in particular 
variable remuneration, as a strong mechanism used by Bank management in order to 
individualised IR in BBVA.92 Moreover, when asked about the extent of trade union 
input in the design and implementation of the new forms of variable remuneration, 
management interviewed confirmed: "nothing, they (unions) don't participate. 
Variable remuneration is something on which the Bank itself decides so that our 
employees get involved and therefore ambitious objectives can be achieved. In 
other words its a decision entirely from the autonomous decision and organisation 
capacity of the firm".93 
Although, traditionally, management-union relations in BBVA have been more cooperative than 
in BSCH, the current IR climate in the Bank can not be characterised of 'participative'. The 
Bank's responses to increased competition deriving from the changes that have taken place 
within the sector in general have meant that tensions in the management-union relationship have 
escalated over recent years. 
7.3.6 Transnational Employee Information and Consultation 
There is not an EWC operating in the BBV A Group. In 1997 BBV had a bank in 
Belgium with around 180 employees, from which an initiative to request the 
establishment of an EWC originated, together with the Spanish union Comfia-CCOO. 
At the time the interviews were conducted, negotiations towards the establishment of an 
EWC seemed to be at a halt, and neither management nor unions appeared to have a 
particular interest. The Belgian bank had since been sold, a major factor behind that 
apparent lack of interest from both management and trade unions, and management 
92 Interview with trade union officer - CCOO (July 2001). 
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interviewed emphasised imbalance between workforce presence across the Bank's 
European operations, with over 30,000 in Spain and around 2,000 in the rest of 
Europe.94 Furthennore, it was argued that the structure of the banking sector, in 
particular the multi-domestic and multi-workplace nature, with an average of 5-6 
employees in each, does not facilitate the functioning of an EWC-type body: 
"legislators are still thinking in old terms, they still think of an economy based on 
heavy industries, where decision-making is not necessarily agile, and things take a 
long time to start functioning and to disintegrate, and where representation is 
according to a large mono-centre workplace in which it is very easy to take 
decisions and rapidly organise meetings with the social partners. We, however, live 
in a very globalised and intensive knowledge society, and in the service sector in 
particular that dominates nowadays, there are multiple distribution channels and 
selling points". Representatives from the two main unions did not exhibit a great deal 
of interest either, mainly because of their greater focus on the potential establishment of 
an EWC-type arrangement beyond Europe. In fact, in 2002 the "Coordinadora Hispano-
Americana de Sindicatos Nacionales del BBV A" was established, although at the time 
of writing it is still in very early stages and has not achieved management recognition. 
7. 4 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has introduced the main features of BSCH and BBVA Groups, Spain's 
two most internationalised banks. In summary, in both cases internationalisation is 
particularly directed to Latin Americ~ with comparatively little presence in Europe 
other than their domestic operations. In both BSCH and BBV A retail banking is 
significant only in Portugal (other than Spain), with operations in the rest of Europe 
concentrated mainly in wholesale banking (and commercial banking in the case of 
93 Interview with IR-Group management - BBVA (July 2001). 
94 Interview with IR Sub-director - BBV A (July 2001). 
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BSCH). Moreover, BSCH's commercial banking activities 10 Europe are managed 
separately, and often under separate commercial brand names. Whilst no European unit 
exists in either Group, a Latin American division has been created in both, which 
through their HR departments allows the spread of relatively uniform corporate policies 
and principles throughout the different banks and institutions in Latin America. 
Integration is more pronounced in the case of BBV A, and is also extensive with regards 
the Portuguese operations, which operate under the same brand and in the same division 
as the Spanish operations. Spanish trade unionism, based on ideological roots and this 
perhaps more confrontational, is arguably an explanatory factor regarding management-
union relations in the Bank. The input of the unions on decisions regarding issues of 
work organisation or pay above those strictly established in the collective agreements 
seems to be limited, with a degree of inertia present in the minds of those in charge of 
negotiations. The framework in which collective bargaining is conducted, including 
legal provisions and the organisation and structure of the social partners, makes unions 
particularly strong at sector level, something seen as crucial for reaching national 
collective agreements on telephone banking and temporary workers. No EWC exists in 
either BSCH or BBV A, where efforts are directed towards the establishment of an 
employee information and consultation body embracing the Group's Iberian and Latin 
American operations. 
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Chapter 8 
EXPLAINING THE EXISTENCE OF EWCs 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this Chapter is to identify key factors triggering the existence, or in some 
cases the non-existence, of EWCs. Whereas both of the UK case firms have an EWe in 
operation, this is not the case of the two Spanish firms, and nor are there provisions for 
their establishment at the time of writing. A key question therefore concerns which factors 
facilitate the existence of an EWC among the two UK banks, and which hinder its existence 
among the two Spanish banks. The aim of this Chapter is to explore the complex 
relationships between the establishment of an Ewe and the various factors impinging on 
this process. The analysis follows from the framework developed in Chapter 3 (Fig 3.1), 
which has served to guide this investigation. However, in the process of the comparative 
analysis this framework will be refined to reflect the extent to which such a framework 
reflects the reality of the case study firms investigated. 
The analysis focus on the four main company cases, in order to comprehend the dynamics 
behind the establishment of an EWe in banking firms. To summarise the argument, the 
nature of group activities and group structure shapes the extent to which there is cross-
border coordination of HR policy and practice. These structural and strategy related factors 
in tum shape both management policy and trade union policy towards the establishment of 
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EWCs. Management policy reflected both in a corporate culture conducive to cross-border 
business integration and in participative company IR plays an important role too. Finally, 
trade union factors related to the business activities and organisational structure of the firms 
also shape union policy towards the potential establishment of EWCs. 
According to the design of this study (Chapters 3 and 4), the firm is our primary unit of 
analysis, and therefore the analysis will focus on explaining how the firm context 
influences the existence of an EWe. It is nevertheless acknowledged that firms are 
embedded in a sector and country context, the features of which are likely to have an effect 
on the firm's behaviour. It is also acknowledged that such effects are not likely to be 
homogeneous in nature, with different companies within a given sector and country context 
intemalising their features in different ways. 
Section 8.2 focuses on comparing the extent and nature of intemationalisation of the case 
companies. In Section 8.3 the extent to which business structures have in turn been 
internationalised is examined. Section 8.4 compares the extent of international HR 
coordination as a result of developments analysed in the previous two Sections, and Section 
8.5 draws conclusions around the impact of the factors explored in previous Sections on the 
role of both management and union officials in facilitating or hindering the existence of 
EWCs. Section 8.6 examines the role that factors around the legal negotiating framework 
and employee representation structures, including trade union policy issues play on the 
establishment ofEWCs. Section 8.7 draws conclusions from the Chapter. 
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8.2 THE EXTENT OF INTERNATIONALISATION OF GROUP ACTIVITIES 
As seen in previous Chapters, spatial diversification and the expansion of activities 
overseas has been a major development in banking over the last decade, following 
deregulation and the internationalisation of financial markets. Given the transnational 
nature of EWCs, the degree and nature of spatial diversification becomes crucial for this 
analysis. I shall explore the implications of spatial diversification for the existence of 
EWCs in Section 8.2.1. Section 8.2.2 focuses on the extent to which the firms have 
engaged in horizontal diversification within their spatially diversified businesses (in 
particular with regards to their international operations), and how this has had an influence 
on the existence/non-existence of EWCs. 
8.2.1 Geographical Diversification and Extent of European Operations 
Where MNCs are spatially diversified, offering the same or similar products in different 
locations, economies may be provided to management in establishing a common approach 
to IR (Marginson, 1992). This will clearly favour the establishment of an EWC-type 
arrangement. Many companies now have operations in several countries, and rather than 
opting for a globalised approach to IR they may be more likely to adopt common 
approaches according to specific world regions with common cultural features. According 
to this, whether management decides to adopt a common approach to IR at European level 
will be contingent on the degree of presence of company operations within the European 
Economic Area (EEA). 
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As seen in the previous two Chapters, the geographical diversification of the four banks 
varies substantially. This is true both in tenns of assets and employment. 95 According to 
The Banker (2001), HSBC, BSCH and BBVA are among the 30 most global banks in the 
world. Among them, HSBC appears the most internationalised, both in tenns of overseas 
assets (62.2%) and employment (66% of staff located overseas in 2001). BSCH and BBVA 
had respectively 52.7% and 44.3% of their assets, and 63.3% and 68.7% of their employees 
overseas in 2001 (Ibid). According to these figures, therefore, these three banks present a 
very internationalised profile. The picture is different, however, with regard to the 
geographical areas in which they have focused their internationalisation. HSBC is more 
equally spread across the world than both BBV A and BSCH, which tend to have their 
international assets and employment heavily concentrated in Latin America. HSBC's 
presence in Europe was relatively small until the acquisitions of Midland Bank and, more 
recently CCF, and while BSCH's and BBVA's European operations have been increasingly 
expanding over time, their main business apart from domestic operations has been in Latin 
America for several years now. As for L TSB, its international operations are much more 
modest compared to the other three banks, with only 13.9% of assets held abroad, a figure 
that includes both Latin American and European operations, and 15% overseas 
employment. Table 8.1 details the geographical distribution of employment for each bank, 
while Figure 8.1 illustrates the geographical distribution of assets. 
95 The geographical distribution of assets indicates the proportion of the total assets of the Group distributed 
in the different regions ofthe world. 
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Table 8. 1: Employment Profile and Geographical Distribution of Employment of the Main 
Case Studies 
Bank Offices! Total Home Rest of Total Non- Total 
Countries employment country Europe European European Foreign 
employment employment employment employment employment 
HSBC 6,500 offices 164,925 56,000 15,405 71 ,405 93,520 108,925 
78 countries (32.7%) (9.3%) (43 .2%) (56.7%) (66%) 
LTSB *3,000 offices 81,400 69,140 *1,000 70,140 11 ,260 12,260 
22 countries (84.9%) (1.2%) (86.1%) (13 .8%) (15%) 
BSCH 10,3930ffices 114,927 42,165 *2,700 *44,925 *70,062 72,762 
42 countries (36.5%) (23.4%) (39%) (60.9%) (63.3%) 
BBVA 9,000 offices 108,082 33,733 *2000 35,733 *72,349 74,349 
37 countries (31.2%) (1.8%) (33%) (66.9%) (68.7%) 
>I< Approximate fi gures 
Source: HSBC data obtained from interim report HSBC Holdings (200 I). L TSB data obtained from annual report (200 I). 
BSCH data obtained from BSCH web-page (www.grupos:lnl:lndcr.com/cs). with date 31/1210 I. BBVA data obtained from 
BBVA web page (www.bbva.es) and annual report (200 I). 
Figure 8.1: Geographical Distribution of Assets of the Main Case Studies 
HSBC (31/12/01) 
Europe (45.5%) Asia Pacific (33 .9%) North America (11.6%) 
LTSB (31/12/01) 
Domestic (86.1 %) International (13.9%) 
BSCH (31/12/01) 
I I 
Spain (47.3%) Rest of Europe ( 16.4%) 
BBVA (31/12/01) 
I I I 
Euro Zone (60.3%) Latin America (32.6%) USA and others (7. 1 %) 
Source: Annual Reports 
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The available data on employment and its distribution reflects to a large extent the 
internationalisation positions of the four banks in terms of the geographical distribution of 
assets, and for HSBC, BBV A and BSCH it is clear that overseas employment presents a 
very important part of total employment. A further figure of relevance for the purposes of 
this study, however, is the 'rest of Europe' employment, since it represents the workforce's 
size in Europe, other than in the home country operations. 'Rest of Europe' employment 
represents 21.5% of total European employment in HSBC, a figure that is high when 
compared with the other banks (1.5% in LTSB, 6% in BSCH and 5.5% in BBVA). Both 
BBV A and BSCH have the majority of their foreign employees concentrated in Latin 
America, whereas LTSB's workforce in Europe is mainly domestic with a relatively small 
proportion of foreign employment that is strongly concentrated outside Europe. 
8.2.2 Business Portfolio o/the International Operations 
An important factor to consider is the type of operations and business in each country, and 
the relationship between the activities in each of the countries of a given geographical area. 
This gives an indication of the potential for a common approach to employee and IR 
management. Following Marginson (1992), companies are more likely to have an interest 
in a transnational approach to IR where there is a strong connection between the business 
activities conducted in different countries. A strong link between business activities is 
likely if the same activity/activities is/are carried out across locations. 
Chapter 2 underlined the significance of the distinction between retail, commercial and 
wholesale banking for this study; the first tends to be the focus for collective employment 
relations (including indirect forms of employee involvement) and trade union activity. For 
the purpose of this discussion, I shall refer to wholesale banking to mean traditional 
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banking activities other than retail and commercial banking, including corporate and 
institutional banking, investment banking, and wealth management and private banking. 
The four banks are diversified in nature with a mixture of retail, commercial and wholesale 
banking operations. There are, however, substantial differences among the four banking 
groups in terms of the allocation of their activities across Europe. Whereas HSBC has 
significant retail banking activities in various other countries other than the UK, BBVA's 
and BSCH's retail banking in Europe remains mainly in Spain and more recently Portugal, 
and LTSB's non-UK European operations are primarily commercial and wholesale. 
Traditionally, due to, among other things, the nature of the industry and the higher 
internationalisation of customers, commercial and wholesale tend to be more 
internationally integrated than retail banking, which remains an example of a multidomestic 
type of industry (Porter, 1986). 
Further differences between the banks are also found in the level of international 
integration, depending on, for example, the type of ownership of foreign businesses. For 
instance, BSCH's private banking activities present a higher integration than consumer 
financing; BSCH private banking is BSCH branded, while consumer finance is an acquired 
business which has kept its original branding in the different countries of operation. Indeed, 
more generally, the emphasis of BSCH's strategy in Europe has been strategic and financial 
alliances with important banks in the UK, Italy, Germany and France, and the presence of 
the Group's own-branded network is limited to offices of representation in various 
European cities. It is only in recent years that BSCH has strengthened its position in 
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Portugal through the acquisition of two local banks,96 which, like their Spanish operations, 
provide a range of retail, commercial and wholesale activities. Commonalties between the 
Spanish and Portuguese markets, combined with parallels in the activities conducted, 
makes these two countries the only real platform for business integration in Europe. 
The business of BBV A in Europe (other than Spain) is fairly limited; there are two strategic 
financial alliances with French and Italian banks, and a network of branches and offices of 
representation in various European cities. Private banking is offered through a reduced 
number of branches (Portugal, Jersey, Switzerland, Gibraltar and Andorra) and in a very 
coordinated way from BBV A HQs. In this respect BBV A appears to be more highly 
integrated across Europe than BSCH, partly because of the smaller size of their European 
business and more extensive own-branding. Like BSCH, Portugal has a special weight 
within the Group, with the establishment of a BBV A branded subsidiary including a 
network of 118 offices. The integration between the Spanish and Portuguese operations is a 
major current development within the Group, reflected in recent changes in organisational 
structure, whereby a new common division has been created for the management of both 
BBV A Spanish and Portuguese retail banking operations. 
From this analysis it is clear that the retail banking operations of the two Spanish Groups in 
Europe remain mainly in Spain, with the exception of the recent but significant emergence 
of Portugal as a new attractive market. In both cases, although at a more advanced stage in 
BBV A, the cultural and geographical proximity appear to be driving increasing integration 
of their businesses in the Iberian Peninsula. It can also be observed that in both banks 
96 The acquisitions of Bank Totta & Ar;ores and Credito Predial Portugues have increased the market share of 
BSCH in the Portuguese market from 2% to 10%, and has meant the re-organisation of the BSCH structure in 
that country. 
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wholesale banking activities (especially private banking and asset management) present a 
high degree of European integration, although the level of employment and size of those 
activities implies limited impact on the potential establishment of an EWe. 
The case of the HSBC Group is somewhat different with regards its retail banking business 
in Europe. The Group provides significant retail services, with an extensive branch network 
in a number of countries, such as Cyprus, Greece and, more significantly, France. In all 
three of these cases, the banks have so far kept their original names, although the HSBC 
logo has also been incorporated into the local commercial name. More importantly, the 
Group's structure in Europe is divided into two main legal entities: HSBC UK (which 
embraces most Eastern European operations, Greece, Malta, Turkey and Sweden), and CCF 
(which embraces the Group's activities in various countries of the Eurozone). Moreover, 
there is limited integration in terms of Group structure between the two sides to date. The 
acquisition of the French CCF in 2000 has meant a major change in the retail banking 
operations of the Group in Europe, with CCF taking a leading role in the organisation of the 
HSBC businesses in the Eurozone. Although a closer coordination of the retail banking 
activities of the Group across Europe is envisaged, Group management has decided to 
maintain the CCF brand for now given its established reputation in France. With regards 
commercial and wholesale activities, as in retail, territorial rather than business line/product 
criteria dominates the organisation of the activities in Europe, something that has occurred, 
as management explained, "more as an accident of history rather than design itselr' .97 
In the case of the other UK-based bank, LTSB, its European market other than the UK is 
primarily concentrated in wholesale banking activities, mainly investment and corporate 
97 Interview with HR manager, HSBC Bank pic. (November, 2002). 
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banking, with businesses structured on a geographical rather than business basis, and with 
little integration among them. 
In conclusion, three main elements related to the strategic choices made by Group 
management have been identified as potential factors that might shape management 
decisions around the establishment of a common approach to IR across Europe. These are 
the extent of internationalisation, the geographical orientation of their internationalised 
operations and spread of the workforce, and the degree of diversification of the business 
portfolio across countries. With regards to the first element, all of the Groups with the 
exception of LTSB are highly internationalised, with around half of their assets and 
workforce outside their home country. A key factor, however, in distinguishing the nature 
of internationalisation is the geographical orientation of the non-home market operations. In 
this respect the two Spanish Groups present clear differences from HSBC. Both BBV A's 
and BSCH's overseas orientation strongly points at their Latin American markets, which 
suggests clear limitations to a common approach to IR in Europe, due to the comparatively 
small importance of their operations in that region. In addition, the nature of presence of the 
two Groups in Europe, predominantly through their wholesale businesses, diminishes the 
importance of a common approach to employment relations in Europe. This is because the 
largest workforce and traditional domain for collective employment relations and trade 
union activity remains in retail banking. A similar picture can be presented for L TSB. 
Despite its European presence being greater relative to the total weight of its overseas 
operations, retail banking activities are scarce in Europe. Out of the four case study 
companies, HSBC presents the most propitious conditions for a common IR approach 
within Europe according to the three elements identified above. It is highly 
internationalised, with a significant presence on the European continent, both within EU 
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and non-EU countries. Moreover, HSBC's wholesale banking activities In non-UK 
European countries is complemented by a significant presence in retail banking; the 
importance in terms of assets and workforce numbers is not overshadowed by the Group's 
retail banking operations in the UK. This is particularly true in the case of CCF, but also in 
the cases of the Group's Greek, Cypriot and Maltese operations. 
8.3 THE EXTENT OF INTERNATIONALISATION OF BUSINESS STRUCTURES 
A second important factor relates to the companies' business and management structures, 
and the extent to which organisational structures 'follow' the business intemationalisation 
strategies and become integrated across-borders. Management interest in establishing a 
common approach to JR across borders within the European context, and in tum in 
establishing an EWC, will depend mainly on two main factors. Firstly, and related to the 
previous Section, it will depend on the companies' prospects of satisfactory scope for 
product markets with the ongoing economic and monetary integration of markets. 
Secondly, it will depend on the provisions made around the company's own organisational 
and management structure to operate within that context. As explored in Chapter 2, 
different organisational and management structures are associated with different levels at 
which HRM implementation and decision-making takes place. 
8.3. J Group Structure 
Following Porter's (1986) typology of MNCs introduced in Chapter 2, most firms within 
the banking sector would fall under a combination of the multi domestic and global 
categories, depending on the part of the business examined. On the one hand retail appears 
as a largely multidomestic industry, where there remains an important degree of 
competition within national markets. On the other, commercial and wholesale banking 
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activities, and in particular investment and private banking, can normally be identified as 
global industries, and thus the organisation of the business will draw more on a global as 
opposed nationally segmented approach. Commercial banking often lies somewhere in 
between, sometimes organised alongside retail banking on a multidomestic basis and 
sometimes organised on a more global basis.98 
Generally, the case companies of this study show differences between the organisational 
structures of their retail and commercial operations on the one hand, and those of wholesale 
banking on the other. BSCH, for example, presents a mixed product-geographical 
multidivisional structure. Retail and commercial operations are organised on a geographical 
basis, with two different divisions within Spain (BSCH branded operations and Banesto), 
and a separate division called 'Latin America' with responsibility for the different 
subsidiaries in Latin America. A 'Europe' division then has responsibilities over the retail 
and commercial banking subsidiaries, and more crucially the alliances and financial 
participations, of the Group in European countries other than Spain. In reference to Porter's 
(1986) categories, this could be labelled a 'multiregional' structure, lying somewhere 
between 'multidomestic' and 'global' .99 Other areas of the Group such as asset 
management and private banking (AM and PB) or global wholesale banking (GWB) are 
organised on a more global business stream basis. 
BBV A has also a mixed product-geographical multidivisional structure. Retail and 
commercial banking are organised geographically (in two divisions; one for Spain and 
Portugal, and one for Latin America), while wholesale banking, and asset management and 
98 This often depends on the extent of the foreign operations, or whether they are brownfield or greenfield. 
99 Marginson (2000), for example. implicitly proposes such a distinction. 
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private banking, are organised as global divisions. However, the existence of a single retail 
banking division for Spain and Portugal shows a higher integration of retail activities in the 
Iberian Peninsula when compared to BSCH. As in BSCH, wholesale banking is structured 
on a global business stream basis, and the Group's commercial activities outside Spain are 
structured on a 'multiregional' basis with some kind of coordination from HQ. 
Both BSCH and BBV A structures suggest a marked difference between the organisation 
and operating principles of their retail and wholesale banking operations. The 
organisational structure of both firms reveals that retail banking operations are under 
separate differentiated management structures in different countries, with the exception of 
BBVA's operations in the Iberian Peninsula. On the other hand, wholesale banking 
operations are under a more global single management structure. This is particularly the 
case with regards to Europe, given that wholesale operations in Latin America, although 
globally coordinated (with certain guidelines from the 'global wholesale banking' division), 
are often part of the different national subsidiaries (to a larger extent in BSCH, where 
guidelines are also followed from the 'Latin America' division). As for commercial 
banking, in both BSCH and BBV A, this is structured on a country basis under the different 
subsidiaries (and under the umbrella 'Latin America' division). There are indications of 
steps towards further cross-national integration on a 'multiregional' basis in both banks, 
and to a greater extent in BBVA, where the 'multiregional' strategy is aimed more 
explicitly at the implementation of the Group's management model strategy. 
In HSBC, all European operations are under the UK-based subsidiary HSBC Bank PIc., 
which embraces retail, commercial and wholesale banking. There is not, however, a single 
management structure across Europe in the retail, commercial or wholesale businesses, and 
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as noted above European operations are divided into two legal entities: the UK (which also 
covers some countries in mainland Europe-including some within the Eurozone such as 
Greece) and HSBC Europe (headed by CCF). The acquisition of the French Group CCF in 
2000 has meant a significant reorganisation of the Group in the 'Euro' region. As an IR 
manager of HSBC in the UK noted: "within the EU there is some grouping of the 
subsidiaries, although even in those countries they often run different structures and 
report to different parts of the Bank".loo Nevertheless, recent changes in the Group 
structure and management structure indicate an increasing alignment of businesses; 
integration is currently in process in particular with regards commercial and wholesale 
operations. As table 8.2 shows, the integration of operations within Europe and the 
reorganisation of HSBC Bank Pic. and CCF operations is appreciable in a number of 
business areas. 
Table 8.2: Integration Process of HSBC in Europe 
"SBC Private Banking Integration of HSBC Republic (the Group's principal international Private Banking 
Business) and CCF private banking business during 200 I, with posterior alignment 
with HSBC Private Banking entities including the merger of entities with ofTshore 
clients (e.g. Suisse, Monaco and Luxembourg), creating a Swiss Holding company 
(HSBC Private Banking Holdings (Suisse) SA. 
"SBC Treasury and Creation of a Pan-European platform and management structure between HSBC and 
Capital Markets (TCM) CCF since April 2001. The service operates between London, Paris and Dusselfdorf 
with CCF senior management holding key position. 
"SBC Asset Truly international business with 10 offices around the world and 1293 stafT (April 
Management 2001). Creation in 2001 of HSBC Asset Management Europe (SA), formerly CCF 
which specialises on the 'Eurozone' in charge of the development in Continental 
Europe, through the establishment in Continental Europe (Italy and Belgium to begin 
with). 
"SBC Corporate, Integration of European business through the combination of CCF, HSBC 
Investment Banking Trinkaus&Burkhardt KgaA in Germany and the UK and continental European 
and Markets branches ofHSBC Bank pic. 
"SBC Commercial Creation of a central Payments and Cash Management (PCM) unit in CCF for the 
Banking provision of full banking services in France, Germany, UK and a wide range of PCM 
services in a further 6 countries 
Source: HSBC Holdmgs Annual Report 2001 and HSBC website (www.hsbc.co.uk) 
In terms of the organisational implications of these changes, a single unified management 
structure is starting to emerge in some of the wholesale and commercial businesses, with 
100 Interview with IR manager-Group HR, HSBe (June 2001). 
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retail still being conducted separately in each country on the whole. However, the 
increasing importance of CCF as a subsidiary within the 'Eurozone' suggests that further 
competencies and management responsibilities might be transferred to CCF from other 
European countries likely to enter the 'Eurozone' in coming years. Indeed, the acquisition 
of CCF appears as the main instigator of change in terms of the Group's structure across 
Europe, and, as managers who were interviewed confirmed, new management structures 
and decision-making and reporting lines have not yet been completely defined. The 
separation of HSBC's activities in Europe into two legal entities stems from primarily legal 
and historical reasons, and although still relevant, in particular for consolidation of balance 
purposes, management lines and responsibilities cutting across the legal entities are 
emerging. 101 Although this is a process still in its infancy, it suggests crucial implications 
for the existence and functioning of the Group's EWC, as is demonstrated in Chapter 9. 
LTSB Group's organisational structure follows a multidivisional form, with a mixture of 
product and geographical based divisions. 'Retail banking in the UK' is a geographical 
division covering all retail banking in the UK as well as 'European Internet banking'. Retail 
operations outside the UK are included within the 'Wholesale and International' division 
according to territorial criteria. International banking offers a wide range of banking 
services including retail, commercial, corporate and investment banking, and operates in 22 
countries both in Europe (including nine non-EU countries) and outside. There is not a 
European unit within the Group, however, and international operations are organised 
primarily on a geographical basis with differentiated management structures in each 
overseas location. In addition to LTSB owned activities, the Group conducts business 
10\ For example, HSBC UK owns some activities of the Group in Spain. While these assets appear in the 
balance sheet ofHSBC UK, for management purposes reporting is directed to eCF. 
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through a number of correspondent banking arrangements, for example in some of the non-
EU European countries, and does so also under separate structures. 
Table 8.3: Business Structure of the Main Case Study Firms 
Bank Business Organisation of Business Division European 
line Business division 
HSBC RB Multiregional (two divi sions) 
Bank pic CB Multiregional Yes 
WB Multiregional (HSBC Eurozone) 
LTSB RB Multidomestic No 
CB Multidomestic No 
WB Multidomestic No 
BSCH RB Multidomestic No 
Multiregional (L T) 
CB Multiregional Yes 
\VB Global No 
BBVA RB Multiregional (Spain and Portugal) Not European 
Multiregional (L T) (Spain and Portuga l 
CB Multiregional only) 
WB Global No 
*RB - Reta Il Bankll1g; C B - Commercial Bankmg; WB - Wholesale Bankll1g; L T - Latll1 America 
Source: Own 
Jnternational Business 
division 
Yes 
(HSBC UK - Intemational) 
Yes 
(International) 
Yes 
(Latin America) 
No 
Yes 
(RB and CB Latin America) 
No 
In sum, all of the banks have multidivisional structures that present a mixture of product 
and geographically based divisions. A clearly identifiable pattern in all except L TSB is the 
existence of differentiated arrangements for retail banking on one hand, and for commercial 
and wholesale on the other, with the latter often being organised on a more global business 
stream basis. Table 8.3 shows the features of the business structures of the four case 
studies. In most areas of wholesale banking HSBC, BBVA and BSCH have more integrated 
European structures. In the case of LSTB, although there is a wholesale banking division, 
this division includes a subdivision in charge of international operations, organised on a 
country by country basis. As for retail banking, all the banks but BBY A present a country 
by country organisation and a nationally fragmented structure. BBY A has recently created 
a division for the management of both its Spanish and Portuguese operations. Although a 
separate European divi sion exists in BSCH, cutting across business lines and in charge of 
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the different subsidiaries and alliances, the management of its operations in Europe is 
highly decentralised given the key role of the division as a financial monitoring centre for 
the subsidiaries. In HSBC, the two-tier legally divided organisation structure in Europe is 
countered by rapid developments towards further integration in its management structures, 
in particular with regards the commercial and wholesale operations of the Group. Given the 
size of its retail baking operations, likely similar integration here, in the Eurozone in 
particular, is central to developments around HRlIR at supra-national level. In the Spanish 
banks, the underdeveloped size of their retail activities in Europe (the base for the highest 
proportion of employees and for traditional IR), and the fragmented or non-existent 
management structures at that level, partly explain the non-existence ofEWCs. 
8.3.2 Structure of HR and IR Functions 
The way in which the HR function is organised across the firm, and the extent to which it 
mirrors the organisational structure, is an important determinant in terms of HR policy and 
decision-making. Higher levels of integration in the HR function at national and 
international level suggest an effective platform and greater potential for a common 
approach to HR policy and practice across the organisation. In turn, this has potential 
implications for the existence of an EWC. 
BSCH presents an integrated HR function for its main Spanish operations, although the 
Banesto subsidiary is managed separately through its own HR department, policies and 
practices. The HR function for the main Spanish operations is structured into units 
organised with respect to functions and geographical areas, with eleven HR geographical 
units. The HR function in BBV A presents a similar structure in that it is divided 
territorially into 14 units across the Spanish territory. However, BBV A launched a unified 
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brand following the merger between BBV and Argentaria, and, alongside this, a unified HR 
function with territorial units functioning according to the achievement of objectives set up 
at central level. 
Both of the UK banks' HR functions follow an 'HR business partner' model, which allows 
a close relationship between the HR function and the different divisions. In the case of 
L TSB some of the recently acquired businesses are still in the process of being integrated 
into this new model and structure, but otherwise it is a fairly centralised HR function. 
According to this model, strategic issues are dealt with through the HR business partner 
assigned to each division, while day-to-day HR issues are centralised in a call centre. 
Whilst LTSB's international operations are not yet using the call centre, in HSBC the call 
centre deals with enquiries of both UK and non-UK European businesses. In parallel, CCF 
has now appointed an HR team in charge of most of HSBC's offices in the Eurozone, to 
which those offices are directly accountable. 
All four banks have an international HR unit. HSBC's HR structure follows the structure of 
the bank in that it is divided into two main businesses: HSBC UK International, in charge 
of some of the Group's European business, and CCF, as a focal point in the Eurozone. As 
already mentioned, a call centre has replaced some of the functions of the previous 
international HR unit within HSBC UK International, and CCF is taking a key role in HR 
within most of Europe. Indeed, CCF can be seen as the focal point of a European unit for 
HR, and is becoming central to the activities of the Group's EWe. In BSCH, the 
International HR unit is exclusively for Latin America, the major focus of its international 
operations. With regards Europe, only in Portugal does the Group have significant overseas 
retail banking operations. Although a further coming together of the two countries is 
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anticipated, as reflected by the recent appointment of a Portuguese general director to the 
executive committee of the Group, the implications for the Group's general and HR 
structure are not yet clear. In contrast, BBV A does have a European HR unit, although this 
might be in the process of changing given that Portugal (their main European retail banking 
operations outside Spain) is in the process of being integrated with the Spanish operations. 
Indeed, the degree of integration to be achieved between the Portuguese and the Spanish 
arms of BBV A Group has the potential to have important implications for the establishment 
of an EWe, given that common commercial and HR related policies are likely to be 
implemented across the two countries. 
In all four banks the IR function is integrated within HR, being part of the same 
department. A very clear feature in all four cases is that the IR function is highly 
decentralised with regards overseas operations, something not unusual among large firms 
(Hill and Pickering, 1996:38). Whilst some areas of overlap can often be observed with 
regards HR, this is not the case with the IR function in overseas businesses. Indeed, 
overseas businesses tend to have their own IR function and policies. This policy of 
international IR segregation does not facilitate the establishment of transnational 
management-union relations, and it can be argued that the IR functions of the banks of this 
study are not organised in a way that facilitates international coordination. 
8.4 INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF HR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
In previous Sections the intemationalisation strategies and business structures adopted in 
the case study companies have been presented. Management choices over business 
strategies and structures have implications for the management of HR within those 
companies. The particular orientation of a parent firm places differing levels of pressure on 
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the HR function to maintain policies that are consistent with the general strategy of the 
group and its operational structure. It is important to see, for example, whether the 
existence of cross-national European structures or a commercially separate European unit 
are accompanied by European-scale HR activity. The greater the coordination and 
standardisation of practices across the different countries in which the company operates, 
the greater the scope for common issues to arise around those practices. On the contrary, in 
those firms whose subsidiaries' HR policies and practices closely follow respective local 
practices, it can be argued that management interest for consistency across countries is 
lower, and therefore a common forum for employee information and consultation across 
countries is less likely to be established. It is important to note, however, that differences 
are likely to be found between retail, commercial and wholesale operations, with those 
divisions organised on a global basis having higher degrees of coordination than those 
organised on a multi domestic or even multiregional basis. 
8.4.1 Degree of Coordination of HR Home Country Policies 
In considering the extent of international HR coordination, a preliminary step is to examine 
the degree of coordination at home country level. The argument is that if there is not 
coordination of HR practices and policy at national level within individual businesses, then 
the chances that cross-border coordination exists are expected to be low. Since this has 
already been considered in Chapters 6 and 7, the main salient features relevant to this 
analysis are reviewed briefly. 
Although at varying stages of development, there is a general trend towards the integration 
of home country HR operations in the four banks. Nevertheless, there are parallel moves 
towards models of strong central management lines, and higher degrees of autonomy at 
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business level in applying central guidelines whilst adapting to local market conditions. 
Differences appear in the extent to which this mixture of integration and decentralisation is 
achieved. HSBC and BBV A appear as the most standardised banks within national borders, 
whereas BSCH and L TSB present a lower degree of harmonisation of HR practice. 
Whereas LTSB is currently involved in a process of integration of its diversified UK 
businesses, BSCH is in the process of homogenisation of HR across the two pre-existing 
commercial brands (BS and BCH) with their separate policies and corporate cultures. 
8.4.2 Degree of HR International Coordination: Formalised Procedures and 
Management Policy 
In order to analyse the relationship between the degree of international coordination of HR 
policies and the potential implications for the existence of EWes, two aspects are explored. 
Firstly the formal division of responsibilities between the international business division 
and national operations, and secondly the extent of cross-border coordination or HR policy 
and practice. 
8.4.2.1 Division of Responsibilities Between International Business Divisions and National 
Operations 
Obvious implications for decision-making and coordination derive from whether 
responsibility for decisions on operational issues, in particular JR, HR and management 
development, lies with divisional HQ or subsidiaries. Devolved responsibility to subsidiary 
level suggests less integration amongst subsidiaries than when decisions are taken at 
divisional HQ, and implies that cross-border coordination of HRlIR issues are likely to be 
less developed. In consequence, the lower the degree of coordination, the less likely are 
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management (and possibly trade unions) to be interested In engaging In transnational 
mechanisms for employee information and consultation. 
Table 8.4 shows the levels at which responsibility for HR and IR issues lie in the four case 
companies. There are two overriding observations. Firstly, all banks present strong 
decentralisation of decision-making with regards IR at international level, something that 
reflects heterogeneity across countries given different IR legal contexts. Secondly, with 
regards to HR decision-making at international level, a more diverse picture emerges. 
Among the Spanish banks, closer integration both in Europe and Latin America is observed 
in BBV A. In both geographical areas, responsibility over HR is shared between the 
subsidiaries and the central division, suggesting more homogeneity of policies and 
practices. 102 In Europe, the recent integration of Portugal and Spain into a single division 
points to stronger cohesion of policies between the two countries. This is not the case in 
BSCH, where despite suggestions being made at interviews of further integration between 
Spain and Portugal, subsidiaries in Europe (including the Portuguese) are often under 
separate commercial brands and have devolved responsibility for HR issues. This is not so 
much the case for their Latin America operations, where the 'multiregional' management of 
the 'Latin America' division from central HQ shares responsibility for HR with the 
subsidiaries. With regards the UK banks, HSBC has greater HR centralisation than L TSB 
(in particular with regards to commercial and wholesale), despite its structural division into 
two legal entities within Europe. Although responsibility for commercial and wholesale lies 
primarily within the subsidiaries, a more global management approach to these businesses 
operates increasingly across borders. In retail banking, responsibility for HR in HSBC rests 
102 The Latin America division has indeed supported teams, in the areas of risk analysis, organisation and 
management methods, that co-ordinate policy and collaborate closely with the different subsidiaries. 
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primarily on the subsidiaries but increasing European-l evel management activity is also 
emerging. LTSB has a largely decentralised HR function , with HR responsibility for most 
wholesale, commercial and retail banking activities resting at subsidiary level. 
Ta bl 84 L e eve so fIR d HR an 'bTt . th M . C responsl 1 Hy m e am ase St d F" u Iy ' lrms 
Bank Business Organisation of Business Responsibility I R Responsibility HR 
line Division 
HSBC RB Multiregional (two divisions) Subsidiaries Subsidiaries/Division • 
Bank CB Multiregional Subsidiaries Di vi si on/Subsidiaries •• 
Pic. WB Multiregional Subsidiaries Division/Subsidiaries •• 
LTSB RB Multidomestic Subsidiaries Subsidiaries 
CB Multidomestic Subsidiaries Subsidiaries/Division • 
WB Multidomestic . Subsidiaries Subsidiaries/Division .. 
BSCH RB Multidomestic Subsidiaries Subsidiaries (Europe) 
Multiregional (L T) Subsidiaries/Division (L T) .. 
CB Multiregional Subsidiaries Subsidiaries/Division • 
WB Global Subsidiaries Division/Subsidiaries •• 
BBVA RB Multiregional (Spain&Portugal) Subsidiaries Division/Subsidiaries(Europe) .... 
Multiregional (LT) Subsidiaries/Division (L T) 
CB Multiregional Subsidiaries Subsidiaries/Division 
WB Global Subsidiaries Division/Subsidiaries 
. . . . . . . 
• Subsldlanes/Dlvlslon. DIrect hne ofresponslblhty to subsldlanes and 111dlrect (functIOnal) hne of 
responsibility with division . 
** Division/Subsidiaries: Direct line of responsibility to 'global' or' multiregional' division but some 
dependency from subsidiaries also. 
(L T - Latin America) 
8.4.2.2 Cross-border Coordination of HR Policy and Practice 
The Use of Formalised Policies and Practices 
.. 
•• 
.. 
Following patterns observed in the firm's management structures, striking differences 
appear between retail, commercial and wholesale activities. The degree HR international 
coordination in wholesale banking is generally much greater than that across commercial 
and, in particular, retail banking. This reflects Enderwick and Barber's (1992) findings that 
within the same organisation different business strategies often operate with different HR 
strategies. 
With regards retail banking, among the UK Banks only HSBC has operations in Europe. 
Although the management of HR in these subsidiaries is to this date largely autonomous, 
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with separate HR policies from country to country, there are signs of increasing cross-
border coordination. This is particularly the case with regards the European operations part 
of HSBC UK International, which has a relatively long history within the Group. CCF on 
the other hand is a fairly new acquisition and coordination there is at a less developed stage, 
both in CCF and in HSBC's operations under the CCF structure. However, following the 
acquisition of CCF, the existence of major retail banking operations in Europe other than 
the UK has brought significant changes to the way in which HR is managed within the 
Group, with an increasing shift from London to CCF as the management centre for the 
Eurozone. A number of European businesses that previously reported to London now report 
to Paris, which ultimately reports back to London. It is not clear at the moment what further 
changes might occur following CCF's acquisition, but it was perceived from the interviews 
that closer integration is definitely an issue under discussion within the Group. When asked 
about the potential for harmonised employment terms and conditions across the Group, an 
IR manager replied: "as a general principle we would like to have a common core of 
standards, but the application then would vary from country to country .... We can 
set some common standards, and how far that goes is a current debate".lo3 
LTSB has no retail banking in its European operations. Outside Europe, the Group has a 
significant presence in Latin America, where retail banking is also limited. The 
management of the Latin American businesses is based on the same principles as those in 
Europe. Besides some businesses embraced by the global wholesale banking division, there 
is a high degree of autonomy at subsidiary level with regards HR. As a Group manager 
commented: "HR at international level is quite decentralised and runs contrary to the 
model that we use in the UK where all support services are centralised and shared. 
103 Interview with IR manager, Group HR, HSBC (June, 2001). 
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Nevertheless, we in HR wholesale banking and international provide support and 
general guidance for operations abroad".104 More specifically with regards to Europe, 
he added: "there is no pan-European business strategy, and it is more a collection of 
businesses, each of which has their own individual business strategy. There are some 
things that cut loosely across, the main things would that would be common are 
probably the credit risk principles which you would expect countries to follow". 
Regarding retail banking in the Spanish banks, only in BBV A are there clear signs of 
emerging coordination of HR in Europe. This is mainly in term of their Spanish and 
Portuguese operations, given the move towards a more integrated management structure 
and the existing affinity between the two markets. With respect to non-European retail 
operations, coordination of HR policies appears to be more prominent among the Spanish 
banks. In BSCH certain areas of collaboration are emerging between the Spanish and Latin 
American operations; for example, the provision of top management positions in Latin 
America and the design of general principles for remuneration policies. A perhaps more 
important feature is the existence of common policies for the Latin American region, 
emanating from the Latin American division and its HR department. This shows the 
importance given by BSCH to Latin America as a distinctive region. A similar picture 
emerges from BBV A, which considers Latin America a region with its own HR division. 
Both in BSCH and BBV A, however, the existence of central HR divisions for Latin 
America does not imply that policies and practices are exactly the same for all the 
subsidiaries in the region. A certain degree of decentralisation exists (greater in BSCH than 
in BBV A) for the different banks, and the function of the central HR Latin American 
104 Interview with HR Business Partner -International, LTSB (September 2002). 
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division is that of overseeing the activities of the different banks and creating common HR 
guides and principles that the different country subsidiaries are to follow. 
Management Policy and the Extent of a Cross-national Corporate Culture 
As argued in Chapter 2, international coordination in the HR arena in MNCs is achieved 
not only through formalised structures and policies but also through what has been termed 
'social' or 'cultural' control mechanisms (Child, 1984; Barlett and Ghoshal, 1998; Harzing, 
1999). Indeed Ferner (2000a) stresses the increasing importance of this type of control 
mechanism for the effectiveness of more formal controls and procedures. The desire to 
'control' certain types of behaviour and practices through the organisation is presented as 
the rationale for management attempts to modify culture, and such attempts can therefore 
be seen as an expression of 'management policy' by central management. A management 
policy that reflects commitment to the development of supra-national corporate principles 
and ethos suggest management interest in integration and a certain degree of universal 
practice across the organisation. In this sense, it is argued that management policy is a 
crucial influence in the development of international HR coordination, and therefore 
influential too for the existence of EWCs. The varying extent to which a supra-national 
corporate culture is being developed in the four case companies is explored through three 
salient aspects in the corporate culture literature. 
International Mobilisation of Personnel: One of the most widespread types of social control 
is the international mobilisation of personnel across the organisation. Among the Spanish 
banks, both BSCH and BBV A have broad programmes for the exchange of personnel 
between different parts of the corporation, although in both cases they are particularly 
focused on linking Spain and Latin America. In 1999 BSCH launched the 'Future 
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Managers Programme', for the training and development of managers in Spain and 
America only. lOS Also in 1999 it launched the 'Mobility Programme', aimed at the 
mobilisation of managers mainly within Spanish and Latin American operations (but also 
including other European countries). As a summary of policy, a management interviewee 
maintained: "In terms of HR the main objective is to achieve globalisation. We move 
everyone, from analysts to executive managers, and want to have a high level of 
rotation so that our managers know all the markets and use the best practices, and 
this will contribute to create a climate of globalisation within the BSeH with a special 
focus on our Latin American markets,,}06 BBVA's programme for management 
development is called 'Plan 50', and is aimed at enabling managers to implement the 
'BBVA management model' in any of the Group firms in America. I07 In 1999 the Group 
launched its 'BBV A Corporate University', with the aim of developing critical aspects of 
the Group culture, corporate values, management style and basic HR policies, in order to 
strengthen a common Group project and its implementation. I08 
Among the British banks, HSBC is particularly known for its global approach and 'One 
Bank' culture. Part of this stems from a group of around 350 globally mobile international 
managers under a common HR policy.109 However, the transfer of specialist management 
across the organisation is almost exclusively in the wholesale and commercial banking 
businesses at European level, given the increasing commercial and operational alignment of 
these businesses. In L TSB, a programme for management mobility operates at Group level, 
105 The Programme consists of a group of young managers (at present 150) rotating around different functions 
and countries to become future country managers and general business managers in different areas, and it is 
structured around long-term and short-term assignments. 
106 Interview with HR manager-Latin American Division, BSCH (July 200 I). 
107 Cronica, BBV A, March 2001. 
108 Cronica, BBV A, July 1999. 
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with around 100 managers exposed to different environments at international level, though 
transfers at European level tend to be infrequent, partly because of the relatively small size 
of the Group's operations in Europe. 
Networks of HR Management at International Level: Meetings of HR management at 
international level have been increasingly formalised in the Spanish banks of this study, as 
a way of culturally and operationally integrating acquisitions in Latin America. In BSCH, 
international meetings of HR managers in Spain and Latin America are organised on an ad 
hoc basis around two-three times a year. IR managers often attend these meetings and 
issues for discussion include the evolution of the legal framework, principles regarding the 
management of trade unions, and specific problems affecting a group of staff within the 
Group. BBV A places more emphasis on the Portuguese operations, and meetings are 
organised one-two times a year for HR managers from Spain, Latin America and Portugal. 
These meetings have the aim of encouraging contact, sharing of practices, transferring 
knowledge, and the discussion of know-how, culture and common issues. 
In the UK, international management networks are more established and formalised in 
HSBC than in L TSB, which one would expect considering the greater international profile 
of the former. In HSBC, there are regular meetings of the so-called 'The Top 40' to discuss 
the Group's general strategy and future world-wide direction. I \0 Within the HR arena, there 
is an annual meeting at European level for the HR managers of EU countries under CCF 
management, to discuss common and future HR strategy and policy, as well as to 
familiarise themselves with each other. In LTSB, HR meetings at international level consist 
109 These 'global' managers can be placed at any level in any subsidiary of the Group with the aim to generate 
consistency across the organisation and increase the transfer of knowledge and shared practices. 
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of occasional ad hoc meetings between the head of International HR management and the 
local HR and/or country managers: "It tends to be more initiated by me. I think I've had 
one meeting in the last 6 years of all the European HR people together, and I think 
that was specifically to talk about the EWes. Other than that I would do it on a 
country by country basis, so I have a relationship with Spain and deal with them on 
issues that are different from the ones in Switzerland, etc".111 
Common Group Values and Guiding Principles: Corporate culture can also be fuelled 
through the dissemination of common values, standards and know-how in the organisation. 
Although the organisational impact and effect of such dissemination depends considerably 
on fonnal systems of management control (Ferner and Edwards, 1995), its mere existence 
indicates corporate management's will to bind the organisation together. 
HSBC is renowned for having a strong corporate culture, promoting the concept of 'One 
Bank'. In line with this, HSBC Holdings sets out some general standards and central 
polices, and operates under a set of core 'Business Principle and Values'. Among other 
things, these emphasise equality of opportunities and maintenance of effective employee 
relations. In parallel with the 'global bank' principle, HSBC also promotes the idea of a 
local bank, with the different subsidiaries and overseas operations adapting to the local 
environment. Accordingly, each subsidiary develops their own strategies and policies in 
line with the general guidelines set out by HQ. The promotion of a common corporate 
culture in L TSB appears to be to less developed than in the other banks in this study, 
although a set of Group principles, including risk exposure and equal opportunities, also 
110 The 'Top 40' are some of the most senior executives in HSBC Holdings. 
III Interview with H R Manager -Wholesale and International Business, L TSB (September 2002). 
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operate. Current management interest in promoting the idea of a 'Group philosophy' IS 
nascent, but mainly visible at domestic level given LTSB's predominant UK presence. 
In both BSCH and BBVA the integration of the extensive and diverse businesses acquired 
in Latin America is a primary objective. BBV A places a particular emphasis on the 
homogenisation and integration of the Group internationally, and promotes a common 
culture in both Latin America and Europe. A number of corporate values define BBY A as a 
Group: staff integration and motivation; quality; innovation; professional ethics; leadership; 
synergies; the client as priority; and output orientation. More specifically, in terms of HR 
the 'BBVA management model' is defined by common principles in evaluation systems, 
remuneration systems (a mixed salary incorporating a variable component related to 
performance and results), and training. Other universal principles which apply across the 
Group are equal opportunities and promotion, as well as areas such as policy transfers and 
selection, which must also follow certain lines established by HR at Group level. The 
integration of its Latin American businesses is also among BSCH's primary objectives, 
although in this case there is emphasis on financial results and adequate profit levels, with 
higher decentralisation to subsidiaries regarding management style/reporting. Accordingly, 
adequate levels of consolidated balance, risk management and efficiency are the pillars that 
subsidiaries and franchises follow. In addition there are ten Group management principles: 
the importance of the client; idea generation; ability to compete; importance of objectives; 
flexible organisations and structures; management development; teamwork and 
communication; risk management culture; and an adequate capital ratio. In HR terms, there 
are a number of governing principles based on remuneration, for example, although these 
tend to apply to higher level management. Likewise, global principles emanate from the 
central IR function in Spain, covering dialogue, participation and collective bargaining in 
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workplaces, where the local legal framework mandates are passed to the different units of 
operations at home and overseas, as well as guidance and technical assistance. 
Summary 
This Section has examined the degree of international HR coordination and has revealed a 
considerable degree of consistency between fonnalised HR procedures and systems/policy 
manifested through developments towards a Group-wide culture with international reach. 
In the wholesale and commercial businesses of the banks, although responsibility for HR 
might at times fonnally rest in the subsidiaries, coordination of HR policies is generally 
well developed. With regards to retail, HSBC presents emerging signs of cross-border HR 
activity, but the divided legal structure of the bank in Europe appears to have slowed down 
developments. Coordination of HR in L TSB remains domestically focused given recent 
acquisitions within the UK and the strong UK orientation of the Group. The Spanish banks 
show stronger signs of international coprdination of their HR policies and practices (in 
particular BBV A), but this is strongly focused towards their Latin American operations. 
Higher degrees of coordination of HR between the Spanish and Portuguese operations of 
BBV A are, however, foreseen. With regards to advancements in HR coordination through a 
common Group 'culture', developments are evident in the Spanish banks but again these 
are more prominent in Latin America. 
8.4.3 Implementation of an International Strategy in HR: Reward Systems as an Example 
Much of the existing literature on international HRM is concerned with issues affecting a 
relatively small part of the workforce. The transfer of management and use of expatriates is 
one of the most discussed aspects of international HR coordination (Edwards, et aI.1996). 
Similarly, executive compensation and training programmes are two major areas of debate. 
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Much less is known, however, about issues concerning the management of non-managerial 
employees across borders. For the purposes of this study, however, these issues are equally, 
if not more, important. First, they form the majority of the issues covered in processes of 
employee information and consultation, and, second, corporate harmonisation of HR 
policies affecting the majority of the workforce reflects to a larger extent management 
interest towards the establishment of common HR practices across the organisation. 
Rewards systems, including compensation and benefits, is one major area of HR policy 
(Walton and Lawrence, 1985), and is chosen as an example of one of the most prominent 
areas of current HR change across banking organisations. The extent of international 
coordination concerning compensation and reward systems in the four banks will now be 
explored, a key issue being the extent to which performance-based appraisal and reward 
systems have been or are in the process of being standardised across the home and overseas 
businesses of each Group. 
The two Spanish groups have formalised international Group-wide guidelines for 
remuneration policies which emphasise the use of variable remuneration, although detailed 
practices and remuneration levels are generally left to the subsidiaries themselves. BBV A, 
however, presents higher homogenisation in this area, having devised a benefits and reward 
system for general implementation across the Group, including retail banking. 1 12 In BSCH, 
however, there is greater coordination only in the global wholesale division. Indeed, at the 
time of the interviews this division was developing a common grade and job category 
system across countries. HR policies also emerge from the divisional HQs in BSCH. These 
include global compensation schemes (based on variable retribution and a long term bonus 
112 This embraces most BBV A operations, with the exception of a number of entities such as Investment 
Banking (suggesting the existence of separate methods for this division), E-commerce and Uno First. 
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plan), although salary levels and profit plans are locally detennined. The same principle 
guides the Group's activities in Latin America, though a more direct relationship exists 
with the subsidiaries' top management than with the Latin American division HQ. This is 
also because local banks in Latin America are concentrated mainly in retail and commercial 
banking as opposed to wholesale. 
Among the UK banks, compensation and reward systems outside the UK are more 
coordinated in HSBC, but again the situation differs between wholesale, commercial and 
retail, the first two operating more 'global' and coordinated systems. With regards HSBC 
retail, Group-wide guidelines on perfonnance management and the implementation of 
variable remuneration apply, although local adjustments need to be incorporated: "The 
principles are aligned but the detail isn't. In Malta, for example, we have a large 
branch network, heavily unionised, and as a consequence the negotiated pay deals are 
put in place for a three-year period, which we don't do in other countries, but the 
structure of the pay is the same. CCF is a fairly new acquisition, so it has slightly 
different compensation systems, but increasingly we are bringing them towards 
common features".113 In LSTB, HR (including remuneration) takes place on a country by 
country basis. Some specialist wholesale banking units have tailored remuneration policies, 
but generally geography pre-dominates in the organisation of the business and there are 
fewer signs of international convergence of reward policies than in HSBC. 
Taking reward and remuneration systems as an example has again highlighted the more 
general distinction regarding degree of HR coordination between more globally organised 
divisions and those that are locally focused. Generally, the wholesale and commercial 
113 Interview with HR manager-HSBC International (November 2002). 
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divisions of the four banks have developed fairly aligned reward systems. This supports 
Ferner's (2000b) proposition that the higher the proportion of internationally mobile staff, 
the higher management interest in developing coordinated HR systems. With regards to 
retail banking activities there is significant current development in three of the banks. In 
HSBC, the application of Group-wide systems in Europe is progressively incorporating 
businesses, although this is still at an early stage, and in the Spanish banks the size and 
importance of their Latin American operations justifies their efforts towards multiregional 
tailored policies (specifically adjusted for the Latin American context), although within 
Europe only BBVA is working towards the integration of Portugal and Spain. LTSB's 
reward policies reflect its strong domestic orientation, with little cross-border coordination. 
8.4.4 The Use afStandardised Control Mechanisms 
In addition to formalised procedures and systems, many compames operating across 
countries are opting to pursue strategies based on the monitoring of labour in order to 
increase coordination and control both nationally (Marginson et aI., 1993) and 
internationally (Mueller and Purcell, 1992; Marginson et aI., 1995). In organisations of the 
size of those examined in this study, this type of control mechanism could be important in 
achieving increased coordination of employment and HR policies of non-managerial 
employees. Among other reasons, this is because of the difficulties involved in having 
standardised policies and practices in large workforces, and across a variety of language, 
cultural, legislative and institutional contexts. 
Both BSCH and BBV A have well-developed information systems of business monitoring 
that are international in their reach. BSCH operates both nationally and internationally with 
exhaustive financial indicators playing a key role in investment and management decisions, 
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though monitoring is more thorough in Latin America than in European strategic alliances. 
Similarly, in BBVA monitoring systems operating across borders record data regularly, 
including total headcount, global and unitary costs, and training hours. In the two UK 
banks, standard systems of data collection and monitoring exist (including employee 
performance, headcount etc.), although only in HSBC are there signals of these being 
international in their reach. Although at present data on employee infonnation and 
headcount is compiled mainly on a country basis, an HR management information system 
is currently on trial in HSBC Middle East operations, and was to be extended to the US, 
Asia Pacific and Europe during 2003. In LTSB, HR measuring systems exist at national 
level, and figures are benchmarked mainly within the different businesses, with no 
significant cross-border developments in this area. 
8.4.5 Conclusion 
According to this analysis, a major distinction must be made between wholesale, 
commercial and retail banking businesses. In those businesses organised along global lines 
(often wholesale banking, private banking, asset management, investment banking, and, on 
some occasions, commercial banking), HR policy and decision-making is rather centralised 
and tends to involve small workforces. In commercial or wholesale businesses not 
organised along global lines (e.g. when they are part of subsidiaries), steps towards more 
coordinated management of HR are visible in a number of areas. 
As regards retail banking, there are signs of greater HR coordination among the Spanish 
banks. BBV A in particular, although also BSCH, is devoting extensive resources to 
integrating its foreign business into the Group culture. Both banks have acquired a large 
number of foreign businesses in less than ten years, which has resulted in the doubling of 
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existing workforces, so that, for the first time, the number of employees in overseas 
businesses exceeds the number of home employees. The management of the diverse 
acquired businesses in equally diverse national, legal and institutional environments 
presents a considerable challenge, and the promotion of a 'group culture' has been key to 
simplify and homogenise these different realities. Among the UK banks, HSBC is 
presently under a process of re-organisation in Europe following the acquisition of the 
French CCF and the introduction of the Euro. CCF is to take a leading role as centre of 
Group operations in the Eurozone, and although its integration with the more traditional 
European businesses (Malta, Cyprus) is still at an early stage, in particular with regards 
retail banking, developments in commercial and wholesale are already advanced. LTSB 
presents a low degree of coordination, with the management of its overseas subsidiaries 
largely devolved from the centre and reflecting it's predominantly domestic focus. 
8.5 HR COORDINATION VERSUS THE NATURE OF 
INTERNATIONALISATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT AND 
TRADE UNION POLICY TOWARDS EWes 
According to the initial hypothesis outlined in Section 8.1, the evidence presented on the 
higher integration of organisational and management structures of the two Spanish banks, 
as well as greater international HR coordination, would suggest that these are more likely to 
have a European-level body for employee information and consultation than the two UK 
banks. This is not the case, however, since EWCs exists in both of the British firms and not 
in the Spanish firms. A key factor explaining this apparent paradox is the geographical 
location of the international operations. This appears to dominate over the other factors; it 
intervenes, differentiating the most internationalised Spanish banks from the most 
internationalised British banks. As already mentioned, both BBV A and BSCH have 
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followed extensive intemationalisation strategies, strongly concentrated in Latin America. 
In comparison, their European expansion has been very limited (with the exception of 
Portugal), and essentially based on the expansion of their wholesale banking activities (and 
therefore involving small, not highly unionised workforces), and the establishment of 
alliances with other European financial entities. Indeed, BBV A's European activities 
consist of a small number of offices of representation, wholesale banking offices, and 
alliances with two European banks. While BSCH has a more extensive presence, its own 
branded operations are scarce; it operates mainly through alliances and acquisitions of less 
than 100%, and thus tends to be focused not on organisational integration, but on market 
presence. In sum, both Spanish Groups have a strong focus on their activities in Latin 
America, which is consistent with the lack of interest from both management and trade 
unions towards the establishment of EWCs that was revealed during the fieldwork. 
In BBV A, an EWC was requested in 1997 following a joint petition of the Spanish. Belgian 
and French unions. While interviewees on the union side stated that they had officially 
requested the establishment of an EWC and not had any response from Group management, 
their demand lost impetus following the sale of the Belgian and French banks. Only 
recently, subsequent to the acquisition of the Portuguese subsidiary, are there signs of re-
emerging interest. Indeed, the existence of significant operations in Portugal, including 
major retail banking activities and a larger workforce, was mentioned by trade union 
sources as a reason for revived interested in an EWC: "we would be interested in an 
EWe, because the law back us to do so, and it would give us more chance to extent 
trade union policy to other countries like Portugal, because together we can be 
stronger and propose Group-wide policies for better employee conditions. We would 
like to know why in Spain a continuous and fluid communication framework does 
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exist, and not in Portugal" .114 Similarly, Group management referred to the lack of a 
significant European presence (in terms of the workforce's imbalance across countries, and 
the irrelevance of Spanish IR and HR issues for workforces in the rest of Europe), as a 
factor behind the EWC not being a priority: "Perhaps because of the imbalance between 
the 35,000 staff in Spain and at the most 1,500 in the rest of Europe, the EWe would 
be very disproportionate, and everything we would comment or say in that forum 
would be related to Spain, that is the main nucleus, because we don't really have a 
sufficient number of people in each of those countries, and our decisions are not going 
to affect any other financial or productive system. Our presence in other European 
countries is not significant in terms of which policies at Group level can be applied. 
The only thing we would achieve would be a very formal and administrative body that 
would mean only costs. And we would be dealing with the issues we deal with in other 
Spanish forums with the domestic unions, with the subsequent costs in terms of days 
lost, translators, travelling, and all for nothing! EWes are a very nice body, politically 
and philosophically speaking, but legislators have not adequately thought of how to 
implement them, because if the threshold is 150, it is not the same to talk about 200 
than 30,OOO!"IIS 
In BSCH, management-union talks around the establishment of an EWC were initiated in 
1999. Group management then offered the possibility to establish an EWC based on the 
terms of the EWCD, that is with a European remit and based on information and 
consultation rights only: "We, in BSeH, suggested at due time, the establishment of the 
Ewe, and told the trade unions that we wouldn't have any problem in creating an 
114 Interview with trade union official, VaT (August 200 I). 
115 Interview with IR manager, BBV A (July 200 I). 
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Ewe. We told them we would give them what is established in the Directive and 
nothing more because we don't want to encourage a European trade union 
movement" .116 It became apparent from interviews with both management and trade union 
officials that the union side was not very keen on the idea of an EWC, but were keen on 
similar initiatives with a wider scope and covering Latin American trade unions. 
Despite the lesser degree of international HR coordination across the operations of HSBC 
and LTSB, an EWC exists in both Groups. A common feature is that in both banks the 
EWC was set up as a voluntary agreement, before the EWCD deadline for the 
establishment of EWCs. Nonetheless, there is a three-year difference between the EWC 
agreements of HSBC and LTSB. In HSBC, an agreement was reached in September 1996 
between UK HSBC management and UK and German union officials, and was also signed 
by the French union recognized in HSBC France, 117 and by Uni-Europa (the European trade 
union federation for the finance sector). In LTSB a voluntary agreement was set up in 1999, 
just before the deadline for implementation of the UK's Ewe legislation (which specified a 
statutory negotiating procedure), following the country's opting in to the Social Chapter. 
The later establishment of the EWC in LTSB reflects two issues. Firstly, a greater reticence 
from management towards the establishment of an EWC (compared to HSBC). Indeed, 
Unifi officials had previously requested the establishment of an EWC, but management 
argued that resources towards further domestic integration (in terms of IR) as a result of 
recent mergers and acquisitions within the UK should be priority. Secondly, the relatively 
small scale of the Group's operations in the EU (outside the UK) meant less pressure to 
establish an EWe. Indeed LTSB's operations in Spain (the only country qualifying for 
116 Interview with IR manager, BSCH (July 200). 
117 Syndicat parisien du credit force Ouviere. 
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seats in the EWC at the time) had notably decreased in size and workforce in previous 
years. The stronger stake of HSBC in Europe was influential in setting up an EWC at an 
earlier date, due to greater demands from unions in other countries, as well as increasing 
management interest following organisational developments. 
8.6 EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION 
One factor frequently mentioned as influential for the existence of EWCs has been the 
existence of long standing tradition of employee representation and cooperative IR at home 
country level or in the country/ies with larger workforce (Lecher et aI., 1999; 2001). This 
aspect is explored in this Section. 
8.6.1 Trade Union Recognition and Employee Representation Structures 
All four Banks have union recognition at home country level. In fact, three of them 
(BBY A, BSCH and LTSB) recognise more than one union or employee association at 
domestic level. Only HSBC has single-unionism. In all four cases the unions have well-
developed structures of representation at company level and formal structures of collective 
bargaining. There is nonetheless a pronounced gap in the levels of trade union density 
among the Spanish and the UK cases. As Table 8.5 shows, these are around 40% in BBV A 
and 35% in BSCH, as compared to approximately 50% in HSBC and 63% in LTSB. This 
difference is, however, lessened by the fact that union influence in Spain is not so much 
reflected by the levels of trade union density but by the support unions receive from 
workers in the work councils' elections (Martinez Lucio, 1998). 
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Table 8.5: Trade Union Recognition in the Main Case Studies 
RSBC LTSB BBVA BSCH 
Trade union Yes Yes Yes Yes 
recognition 
Trade union *50% *63% *40% *35% 
density 
Trade unions Unifi L TU, Unifi , MSF CC.OO, UGT, AMI, CC.OO, UGT, AM I, 
recognised GMB FICT, CIG, ELA, FICT, CIG , ELA, 
(home country LAB, ESK , SABEl , LAB, ES K, SABEl , 
operations) SOL, USO SOL, USO 
Trade unions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
recognised abroad 
Source: Own 
* Approximate figures 
Given the lack of formal mechanisms in the UK's legal system for providing ongoing 
employee representation (e.g. a system of statutory representation through work councils), 
most employees are either represented by trade unions or have no representation at all. 
Employer recognition of one or more unions is therefore key to the existence of company 
and workplace representation. As already mentioned, both British banks have union 
representation within their UK operations, whereby workplace representation is carried out 
by trade union representatives, with no work councils system in place. 
In the two Spanish banks a system of dual representation exists through trade unions and 
works councils. There are not, however, group-level works councils; councils exist only at 
regional and local/divisional level. Moreover, it became clear from the interviews that in 
BSCH and BBV A works councils have a nominal rather than active role; that is, their 
configuration reflects the level of representation of the different unions. Indeed, interviews 
with trade union representatives revealed that in many cases the work councils had not met 
for considerable time. Their function as an information and consultation body is thus often 
replaced by management interaction with union 'sections' (the entities that group members 
of a particular union within the firm) at eitherlboth national and/or local/regional level. In 
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both cases, however, the existence of group-level structures of representation within the 
Spanish operations has not led to the formation of EWCs, the main reason being the Latin 
American orientation; the Spanish unions are trying to establish EWC-type structures here. 
In both HSBC and L TSB, on the other hand, existing structures of employee representation 
at group level have facilitated the formation of their respective EWCs; a union-management 
relationship at group level was already established, and channels existed for creating 
awareness and drawing representatives within the firm at home country level. Nevertheless, 
it is not easy to assess whether the EWCs would not exist if these structures did not exist. 
There was a three-year delay in the formation of the EWC in LTSB, but arguably due to the 
lack of geographical presence in Europe and integration of their organizational and 
management structures. The lack of demand for an EWC from foreign union counterparts, 
that is mainly the Spanish side, facilitated the postponing of the EWC, while in HSCB the 
initial larger presence of the Group in Europe, and their immediate plans for further growth 
and integration in Europe, prompted the establishment of an EWC at a much earlier stage. 
8.6.2 Extent of Information and Consultation over Employment Matters 
This Section explores the content and scope of information and consultation / collective 
bargaining in all four banks, and, in the case of the Spanish banks, the extent to which 
bargaining takes place through each representation channel. The aim is to obtain a feel for 
the depth of management-union 'jointness' in employment matters, in order to assess the 
extent of trade union input or influence on employment matters. The argument is that if the 
union-management agenda is wide-ranging, it is more likely that this relationship may then 
be built up to European level. 
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Tables 8.6 and 8.7 summarise the levels and content of negotiation and information and 
consultation in each of the four main case studies (examined in detail in Chapters 6 and 7). 
In practice the distinction between information and consultation, as well as between 
consultation and negotiation, is not clear-cut. The data collected in each bank regarding the 
extent of information and consultation as well as negotiation, confirmed that the lines 
between the two (or three) categories are often blurred. This was also noted by a large 
number of the respondents themselves, and often management-union relations are 
conducted in a context of dialogue that can involve simultaneous consultation and 
negotiation, with negotiations not always ending in the conclusion of agreements. 
A comparative analysis of the four banks reveals that the extent of management-union 
'jointness', in terms of the scope of the agenda and depth of the relationship, in the two UK 
banks is greater than in the two Spanish banks. Paradoxically, despite greater legal rights at 
company level, the Spanish unions have achieved advances more through sector 
agreements (often in other sectors) than within the banks, where management continues to 
erode union's influence through a relationship characterised by confrontation. 
The extent of information and consultation in HSBC and L TSB appears to be very similar, 
with slightly more formalised procedures in L TSB. Consultation takes place over most 
major changes affecting employment, including issues of restructuring, job losses, 
redundancy plans, pensions, flexible contracts and working time. Since their lowest point in 
the mid-80s, management-union relations in both have significantly improved, with unions 
being consulted and involved in dialogue over major employment issues. 
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Table 8.6: Levels and Content of Bargaining in the Main Case Studies 
HSOC .,-'"~ LTSB -, .. ,(:;' OSCH Ii nOVA e", 
COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Sector level No No Sector Framework Sector Framework 
Agreement covering most Agreement covering most 
as pects re lat ing to the work aspects rel ating to the work 
contract, e,g . Professiona l con tract, e,g, Professional 
ca tegories, promotions, categories, promot ions, 
sa lary levels, remuneration sa lary levels, remuneration 
of extraordinary hours, of extraordi nary hours, 
holidays, socia l benefi ts, holidays, soc ia l benefits , 
Company-level Yes Yes Yes Yes 
collective National coverage National coverage National company wide Nationa l company wide 
agreement Does not cover First Does not some of the agreements on certa in agreements on cellain 
Direct, Asset Finance recently annexed companies issues, issues . 
and Off-Shore 
banking, 
Method Ad hoc negotiation Joint Negotiating Commillee Trade union structu res at Trade union structures at 
arrangements between (for every union) and ad hoc company leve l (secc iones company leve l (sccc iones 
trade union negotiat ing negotiation arrangements. sind ica les at company s indica les at company 
team and management leve l), level), 
team (employee 
relations team and 
business manager) 
Issues Non managers: Basic Pay, working time, job Improvements on sector Improvements on sector 
pay for each clerica l security, work flexibi lity, agreement on issues agreement on issues 
grade and technical pensions. including sa lary levels, including salary leve ls, 
starr, working time, holidays, working time, working time. Saturday 
geographica l soc ia l bcnefits, pensions, work ing, ho lidays, 
allowances, holidays holidays and leave. pensions and leave, 
and pensions. 
No subject of Bonus payments, Design and implementation Work organisa tion, Work organ isation, new 
negot iation managerial salaries, of productivity measures, variable part o f the sa lary, contracts for new sta IT, 
work organisation , management individual branch closure program. branch c losure program, 
starr deployment , new bonuses, variab le part of the sa lary, 
contracts, 
Local/division Yes Yes. Yes Yes 
collective Separate conditions for Separate condi tions for Some large workplaces- Some large workplaces-
bargaining First Direct, Offshore Card Services (South East), centres or specialised centres or specia li sed 
banking and Asset Transmission Services functions, functions, 
Finance. (Birmingham), Telephone 
Working time Centres, Operations, IT sta rr. 
arrangements at loca l Working Time arrangements 
and regional leve l. at loca l and regional leve l. 
Increasing business Increasing business level 
level negotiations. negotiations, 
Method Ad hoc arrangements Subcommittees of JNC, and Trade union sections at Trade union sections at 
for negotiating ad hoc arrangements for regionall iocallcvel and regional/loca l leve l and 
between management negot iation, works co unci Is works counci ls 
and union officials. 
Issues Work ing time Minor issues such as the Minor issues such as the 
arrangements moni toring and monitoring and 
coordina tion of socia l and coord ination of socia l and 
workplace facilities , Also workp lace faci li ties , Also 
reso lution of individual resolution of individual 
conflicts (trade union conflicts (trade union 
sections) , sections) . 
. , 
Firs t DIrect: full negO\la tlll g posttlOn with both managerial and non-manageri a l staff. Dtfferent unIOn negottatlon body 
a lthough subordinated to Unifi nationa l committee. 
Source: Own 
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Table 8.7: Levels and Content of Infonnation and Consultation in the Main Case Studies 
"SBC LTSB 
"" " 
Bsell :- ., "OVA 
INFORMATION 
AND 
CONSULT A TION 
National Company Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Level 
Method Nati onal consultation National consultation (as Trade un ion secti ons! Trade un ion sections/ 
for HSBC Bank pic , opposed to regional in the structures at company structures at company 
Non·managers: no old TSB) leve l. leve l. 
fomlal arrangements , 
Ad hoc meetings 
between union 
ollie ials and employee 
relati ons management. 
Job Security 
agreement - allows to 
call for meetings to 
di sc uss proposa ls 
Managers: 
Management Forum 
Issues New jobs and changes Homogeneisati on of post- Ilomogenisation o f pos t- Homogenisa tion of post-
in job categories, merger employee temlS and merger employee temlS merger employee terms 
changes in conditions, design of and conditions. stafT and condit ions, staff 
remuneration systems incenti ve schemes and restructuring and pre- restructuring and pre· 
towards perfomlance bonuses arc consulted with retirement schemes, retirement schemes, 
based systems the union at nationa l outsourcing, 
barga ining level. 
Local/Divisional Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Level (loca l and regional 
leve l) 
Method Ad hoc arrangements Consultative committees Works council s and trade Works counci ls and trade 
between union union sections union secti ons 
ollicials and 
management. Job 
securitY,agreement. 
Issues Working time, Working time, spec iali st Working timc, tra ining, Working time. tra ining. 
spccialist contracts, contracts, holidays. sta ff restructuring. staff restructuri ng, 
holidays, absenteeism statistics, absenteeism stati st ics, 
outsourci ng. 
Source: Own 
In HSBC, although recognition of unions for managerial levels was removed in 1996 and 
replaced by management divisional councils (with no union representation) for consultation 
purposes, this has been substituted recently by a national council with union representation . 
For non-managerial levels, consultation through staffing review committees takes place 
often at divisional level with more ad hoc anangements at national level according to 
business requirements. Union officials maintained that while they would prefer greater 
fomlalisation (other than the annual collective bargaining), IR in HSBC are currently good, 
with a great deal of union involvement over management of change. Both managers and 
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employee representatives interviewed recognised the influence of the current CEO in 
acknowledging the legitimate role of the unions in the firm. It was also acknowledged that 
there has been a change in the union's approach conducive to the change in IR climate, 
with less opposition and a greater understanding of the business easing the attainment of 
agreements. I 18 An example is the emergence of global processing and transfer of work to 
Asia. Although the union was initially fearful because of potential implications for job 
losses, management promised to avoid redundancies with re-deployment policies. The 
emphasis thus focused on agreements on life-long learning schemes, which aid employees 
taking on new roles. Management has also sponsored the union to travel to Asia to 
examine HSBC's global processing centres with the aim of establishing potential links with 
local unions and assessing local practices. Regarding working time, a company-wide 
framework agreement exists, but work-life balance issues have started to be negotiated at 
divisional level as part of the widening of the bargaining agenda. 
In L TSB, the obligation to consult derives from the 1996 Job Security Agreement; this 
followed the merger between Lloyds Bank and TSB, and has widened and deepened in 
recent years. It now covers not only contractual issues and redundancies, but also changing 
work patterns, new strategies and management reporting lines. Negotiation over contractual 
issues takes place at national level, with divisions becoming increasingly involved in 
consultation and negotiation over other employment issues such as redundancies, transfer 
terms and conditions, special contracts and working time, etc .. Both union and management 
stressed, however, that in practice consultation and negotiation processes often overlap, and 
that the trend is for a great deal of informal debate to take place outside the formal IR 
structure. An example is the union input over pensions, redundancy payments and changes 
118 Interview with trade union official, Unifi (June 2001). 
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to bonus schemes derived from outsourcing strategies. In the words of a union official: "it 
is negotiation because it affects changes of contract, but it is done under the 
consultative framework".119 Similarly, employment levels and redundancy plans, which 
were generally consulted at national level, have recently been raised at the Joint 
Negotiation Committee (JNC). Union officials see this as a sign of these issues having a 
higher profile and being more in debate, again reflecting blurring boundaries between the 
notions of consultation and negotiation. Part of the move towards a widening consultation 
agenda is the creation of specialist sub-committees,120 to deal with 'non-traditional' 
bargaining issues such as equal opportunities or work-life balance on which the unions 
expect to reach a framework company-wide agreement in coming months. 
Spanish labour law regulates consultation in BSCH and BBV A. Most issues are consulted 
at national company level through the union 'sections' at that level. Occasional consultation 
exists at local level or in particular areas of the Bank (e.g. investment or corporate banking 
divisions in BSCH) through works councils. Although the consultation agenda is in theory 
wide-ranging, embracing issues such as professional training plans, organisation and 
control systems, and the establishment of employee bonus and incentive systems, in 
practice trade union input is fairly limited. Union sources highlighted insufficient legally 
required management information on employment issues (e.g. stress related illnesses, 
outsourcing and temporary agency workers). Regarding training, for example, union 
sources from BSCH maintained that consultation exists only when training plans are 
dependent on public EU-related funds which to be granted require previous consultation 
with company unions. Similarly, variable performance related remuneration systems are an 
119 Interview with trade union official, Unifi (September 2002). 
120 Subcommittees of the JNC. 
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area of management prerogative with little union intervention, both in BSCH and BBV A. 
Union officials at BSCH maintained that only in certain cases does the Bank offer a 
consultation period, aimed at achieving consensus and preventing potential social contlict 
(given the importance of the banking sector in the Spanish economy, adverse publicity 
could cause considerable reputation and economic damage). Regarding work organisation 
issues, management and unions in both banks agreed that decisions were taken unilaterally 
by management with little or no union consultation. "Salary distribution is partly linked 
to work organisation, and when you talk about how much is the variable 
remuneration for each employee, you are really talking about what salary and 
functions are attached to that post, and they (bank management) don't want to 
negotiate that".121 
The legacy of the IR tradition in BSCH and BBV A continues to shape the current IR 
climate. For example, the old BS had relatively non-participative union-management 
relations and scarce company-level negotiation, a culture that prevails in BSCH. Indeed, 
interviews with union representatives indicated that IR in BSCH overall were moving in the 
direction of the old BS, with a greater degree of unilateral decision-making by Bank 
management and less company-level negotiations. BBV A traditionally has had friendlier 
management-union relations, although increasing market pressures were claimed by union 
officials to be introducing changes towards a less consultative and participative culture. 
BBVA's management interviewed confirmed that "it is of course the firm itself that 
decides to introduce variable remuneration so that staff involvement increases 
towards the achievement of ambitious objectives. In this sense we are prepared to give 
121 Interview with trade union official - CCOO, BSCH (August 2001). 
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away a percentage of the profits but always on the basis that it is a totally unilateral 
decision based on the autonomy of the firm's decision-making".122 
Another source of eroding levels of union influence in BBY A and BSCH is the increasing 
role of the sector collective agreement as a framework agreement; a reference for minimum 
standards that mainly regarding the pay, terms and conditions of older, longer-service 
members of the retail workforce. This means that aspects such as salary levels, working 
time, career progression and professional development, which appear in the sector 
agreement, are not relevant to increasing numbers of bank employees. For example, staff 
grading systems and professional categories are regulated in the sector agreement. 
However, both banks have unilaterally developed their own job classifications within the 
wide functional categories established in the sector agreement, with no negotiations with 
trade unions. Likewise, in the past higher grading equaled higher pay, whereas now this 
correlation is not always the norm. Salary levels tend to be individually negotiated with 
employees, and salary increases are often not accompanied by higher grading, so that salary 
does not get consolidated regarding the pension. The efforts of BSCH and BBY A to 
circumvent the rigidities of the sector agreement involve unilateral decisions on, for 
example, the introduction of flexible contracts for new staff, working time (a continuous 
source of conflict with unions), outsourcing practices, and the use of temporary workers. In 
contrast to the UK Banks, outsourcing of activities in BSCH and BBYA has not generally 
involved the transfer of existing staff. Instead new companies with new staff are often set 
up as part of the Banks' Groups. This means that negotiation of existing terms and 
conditions is not needed. Conflict arises, however, on the one hand from union's efforts to 
122 Interview with IR Group manager, BBV A (July 2001), 
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keep sub-contracted activities under the remit of the banking sector agreement, and on the 
other from management's efforts to de-regulate by employing temporary agency workers. 
Unions at national level have been successful at enacting legislation to regulate the 
employment conditions of those workers in a number of new sectors and activities, such as 
the sector agreement for telemarketing workers and the sector agreement on temporary 
agency workers. Despite these achievements, union influence in the banking sector itself 
has significantly weakened, since terms and conditions set in the collective agreements for 
telemarketing and temporary agency workers are considerably lower. Further, the attempts 
of BSCH and BBY A to bypass legislation on temporary workers has seen the emergence of 
so called 'service' firms (as part of the Groups' operations or by outsourcing work to 
'service' firms), which are not legally classified as temporary work agencies and therefore 
not affected by legislation. Moreover, unions claimed that management information on the 
extent of such activities was un-reliable and under-provided. In BSCH, an agreement was 
reached at national company level not to outsource core activities to 'service' firms. 
According to the unions, this agreement has not been respected on number of occasions, 
and the issue has been taken to the tribunals, where the Bank has been sanctioned. 
Despite being a facilitating factor, from this analysis it can not be uncovered whether 
existing degrees of employee information and consultation (and even negotiation) in the 
two UK banks appear conclusive in determining the existence of their respective EWC, as 
other factors dominate in the two companies. For example, management will in HSBC to 
set up an EWC before the 1996 deadline, and a large restructuring process in LTSB at 
domestic level. 
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8.6.3 Trade Union Policy: Cross-National Trade Union Cooperation 
The existence of international contacts between unions has also been advanced in the 
literature as a factor on which EWes can build (Marginson et al., 2004). In the case of our 
UK case companies, none of the domestic trade unions had developed a significant working 
relationship with foreign unions previous to the establishment of the EWe, although there 
is no evidence that this has obstructed the creation of an EWe in each company. In the case 
of the Spanish banks an EWe does not exist, and nor do significant working relations with 
other European unions (except some contact with Portuguese unions in more recent times). 
Yet when considering the Latin American operations of BBVA (and BSCH), domestic 
trade unions have already developed significant contacts with Latin American unions. This 
has clearly not facilitated the development of Ewes. What is more it can be seen to have 
delayed the establishment of an EWC since the union side in Spain is working towards the 
establishment of a similar type of body with wider coverage to include Latin American 
activities. A key issue is again the geographical orientation of the international contacts. 
Although cultural and language proximity have no doubt played a part in the development 
of these links, a central factor it is also the size and integration of the Groups' operations in 
Latin America. 
A combination of stronger cultural affinity and the weight and nature of operations in Latin 
America (large universal banks with extensive retail banking operations) has fuelled a 
working relationship between the Spanish and Latin American unions. A trade union 
official noted "we are on that (EWes), but still starting. We are working on a kind of 
world-wide employee-only coordinating body, although in reality it is 'Hispano-
Americana' only (Hispanic-Latin America) because this Bank has huge assets in Latin 
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America, and much less in Europe, apart from Spain and some in Portugal".123 
Management interviewed expressed: "trade unions in Europe do not participate or 
collaborate much with the Spanish trade unions, whereas American trade unions 
increasingly depend on the Spanish trade unions; there is more communication and 
information than within the European context,,124. Similarly in BBVA, the importance 
of Latin America was stressed by union officials: "we have asked for an Ewe officially, 
and we are going to look at ways of making a legal case against the Bank. The 
problem is also that the Bank's operations in Europe are quite insignificant; Portugal 
is the only country with more than 150 staff, so the EWC would not have a lot of 
virtue; what we would like instead is to use the existing legal provisions to include 
other firms within the Group, including those in Latin America, but this is still an 
uncertain possibility".125 In the BBVA the extent of collaboration between Spanish and 
Latin American unions has recently materialized in the creation of a cross-national 
employee representative body recognised by Group management, very much based on 
EWC principles. In BSCH, a trade union 'cooperating' body was created in 2000, although 
management recognition has not been achieved yet, arguably as a result of the less 
participative management style ofBSCH's culture. 
8.7 CONCLUSION 
In previous Sections the factors that have influenced decision-making on the establishment 
or non-establishment of EWCs in the four case companies have been discussed. Whilst the 
anal ytical framework developed in Chapter 3 (Fig. 3.1) has helped to guide the discussion, 
the analysis of the fieldwork data has enabled a refinement of the elements that have 
123 Interview with trade union official - CC.OO, BSCH (August 200 I). 
124 Interview with Group IR manager, BSCH (July 2001). 
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intervened in shaping the decision to set up or not an EWe in the four banks under study. 
Figure 8.2 depicts the way in which the initial analyti ca l fra mework has been re fined as a 
result of this research, where thicker lines represent the more relati ve importance in shaping 
the decision to establish or not an EWe of some of the fac tors identi fi ed. 
Figure 8.2: Explaining the Establi shmentINon- Establi shment of EW s in Banking: Four 
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Thi s research has not provided conclusive evidence on the influence of company size on the 
existence/non-ex istence o f EWes given that a ll four main case studi es are o f considerably 
125 Interview wi th trade union offic ial - CC.OO, BS VA (July 200 I). 
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large size. Nevertheless, it is included in the above diagram as smaller banks in the UK and 
particularly in Spain have not to date established an EWC, which supports Kerckhofs 
(2002) findings on EWC's compliance rates oflarge versus smaller firms. 
The investigation of the four banks has confirmed however that the extent of a firm's 
overseas workforce and operations and the extent to which they are spread across countries 
are key considerations for the existence of an EWe. It has also confirmed that the 
geographical location of the firm's overseas operations is a prime influential factor, not 
only in relation to the extent of operations and workforce in EEA countries, but also the 
extent of EEA workforce in relation with the operations of the firm worldwide. The cases 
of BBVA and BSCH have shown that the much larger weight of the Groups' activities in 
Latin America than their overseas operations in Europe has made a potential EWC a less 
meaningful body both in the eyes of management and trade union representatives. This is 
accentuated by the diverse nature and multi-business strategy of the Groups' overseas 
operations in Europe, and the lack of an integrated European management structure (in 
BSCH in particular). With the exception of Portugal, the internationalization of BBV A and 
to an extent BSCH in Europe is largely based on commercial and wholesale businesses that 
often differ in natur~ (type of business) from country to country and employ a small 
workforce in each of them. This means that there are few common working areas among 
the different businesses, and hence little perceived need to set up a body to jointly deal with 
issues affecting the workforce at European level. Indeed, a related factor that has been 
shown to be central to the discussion is the extent to which company operations are 
integrated across borders, since the greater the integration the more the likelihood of 
common employee concerns across countries, and the need for greater cross-border 
management coordination. Although there are greater signs of cross-border coordination of 
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HR policies in the two Spanish banks, such coordination is geared towards their operations 
in Latin America rather than Europe. The features of BBVA's and BSCH's international 
presence, business and management structures and cross-border HR coordination have been 
crucial in shaping not only management but more significantly trade union policy on 
establishing an EWe. Management's policy towards an EWC is also informed by their 
approach to cooperative IR, which in the case of the Spanish banks helps to explain their 
reticence to the establishment of an EWC-type body with wider scope to include the 
Groups' operations worldwide, especially in Latin America. 
As for the two UK banks, a different combination of the above factors can explain the 
earlier establishment of an EWC in HSBC. The larger presence of HSBC' in Europe, 
together with central management policy towards further European future expansion, and 
small but emerging signs of cross-border coordination, led to an employer-union agreement 
on the establishment of an EWC at an earlier stage. In the case of L TSB, the three year 
delay in the establishment of an EWC since the 1996 deadline can be largely attributed to 
the lack of international presence and business and management integration of its European 
operations, at a time where major restructuring at UK domestic level was taking place. 
It has been argued that strong domestic employee representation legislation and traditions 
of cooperative IR are likely to prompt EWC-type (Lecher et al.,1999; 200 I). According to 
this, one could expect that Spanish banks are more likely to be conducive to EWC-
fonnation. The analysis in this Chapter, however, has revealed that although Spanish 
legislation supports a dual system of employee representation through works councils and 
trade unions, trade unions are the main channel through which representation is 
operationalised in large banks. The particularities of such firms and the industry itself mean 
271 
that there is not a single channel of infonnation to employees but rather a divided stream 
running through each union. This resembles the UK banks of this study. In the case of the 
UK banks, HSBC and LTSB in particular, existing levels of employee infonnation and 
consultation/negotiation and the existence of representation structures at UK company level 
as well as can have surely helped in the establishment of an EWCs, but it is difficult to 
assess their true role given that other factors dominated that decision in each company ( 
management willingness to set up a voluntary EWC before the 1996 deadline in HSBC, and 
internal restructuring processes at UK level in L TSB). Employee representatives in the two 
Spanish banks, backed by a more favorable domestic employee representation legislation in 
principle, have not realised these advantages towards the creation of an EWe. Whilst the 
argument of maintaining privileged access might be true in the case of the European 
operations given their little significance in both BBV A and BSCH, it does not appear to be 
true regarding their Latin American activities, where Spanish unions are keen to forge links 
with their counterparts. Within this aspect of trade union policy, the argument of 
geographical orientation of the Group's operations regains importance. The geographical 
orientation of the two Spanish Banks towards Latin America, where they operate large 
retail banking operations under fairly integrated 'multi-region' strategies, structures and 
policies, has been key for the lack of interest of both management and trade unions in the 
establishment ofEWCs. 
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Chapter 9 
EXPLAINING THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF EWCs 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter aims to assess the actual influence and role of EWes in HSBC and L TSB. 
To illustrate the variation found between the development paths and experiences of the 
two EWes, Lecher et at. 's typology (2001) introduced in Chapter 3 is drawn on. To 
briefly recall, Lecher et al. (2001) distinguish between 'symbolic', 'service-oriented', 
'project-oriented', and 'participation-oriented' EWes, each representing different 
development stages according to what they refer to as 'ability to act'. The 'symbolic' 
category refers to an EWC which, while fonnally established, does not truly operate, 
usually being confined to the annual meeting with group management. The other three 
categories represent 'active' EWCs. A service EWe is one where the domestic 
employee delegation (or dominating employee group) see the forum as a tool for the 
exchange of infonnation and provision of support to other employee representatives, 
rather than for exercising their advantageous position in their own interest. The project-
oriented EWC is a more advanced stage, marked by the development of systematic 
internal and communication structures through which it can initiate its own specific 
projects. Finally, a participative EWC is that where the EWC is recognised for purposes 
beyond information and consultation, and moves towards formalised consultation, 
negotiation and/or the implementation of joint projects. Central to Lecher et at. 's (2001) 
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analytical framework is an integrated treatment of external and internal influences, 
which had previously been largely considered separately in individual case studies. 
9.2 THE NATURE OF THE EWC AT HSBC AND LTSB 
Table 9.1: Lecher et a1.'s Typology (2001) ofEWCs' Development 
Type of EWe Symbolic EWe Service EWe l'roject-Ori(,lltcd Ewe Participative EWe 
Level of 
Interaction 
EWe and Poor in formation- Satisfactory information- Satisfactory information with Scope for participation 
Manag('ment passive EWe but no participation acti ve EWe participation beyond information in the 
beyond information confined to informati on form of formali sed 
con ultation procedures, 
negotiations/agreements 
and/or bi lateral projec ts 
EWe and No exchange of Mutual Information Mutual exc hange of resources Mutual exchange of 
Nat ional resources Exchange in particular transfer of national resources - in parti cular 
Level to European level which trJnsfer of national to 
strengthens capabilities at European level which 
European level strengthens capabilities at 
European level 
EWe No exchange of Spontaneously- Systematic developed internal Distinct internal stl1lctures, 
Internally resources developed structures and structures and procedures and proced ures and activities 
procedures for internal which guarantee capacity which guarantee cupac ity 
communication. 
Sufficiently cohesive to Sufficiently cohesive to define Sufficiently cohesive to 
ensure flow of and implement projects deliver opinions as a body to 
information (mostly (hegemonic or eq ual structure) management and negotiate 
hegemonic stmcture) (hegemonic or equal 
structure) 
EWe and At best forn1al Integration of trade Integration of trade unions Integra tion of trade unions 
Trade integration unions possible but not possible but not necessary necessary in the own interest. 
Unions necessary but not indi spensable from 
standpoint of EWe 
Source: Elaborated from Lecher et al. (2001) 
Lecher et al.'s (2001) typology (Table 9.1) can be used to locate the development 
trajectory of the EWes at HSBC and LTSB. The EWe at HSBe began as a 'symbolic' 
forum, with little activity beyond the stipulated meetings. There was constrained scope 
for participation, with poor information provision and little or no discussion of relevant 
issues. Nevertheless, since its creation, and in particular from the time of the re-
negotiation of the original agreement in 200 I, the EWe has become' active' . It can now 
be described as what Lecher et al. (2001) term a 'service-oriented' EWe. Whilst the 
scope for meaningful participation still remains limited, the home country employee 
delegation does not abuse its dominant position and has shown readiness to contribute 
to the building of mutual trust and infom1ation exchange among representatives. In 
parallel, management's approach to the EWe has moved from a rather passive and 
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minimalist approach to an active willingness to make the Ewe' fit' within the activities 
of the Group, in particular with regards their expansion and integration in mainland 
Europe. In the case of LTSB, the EWC also started as a 'symbolic' forum, and in this 
case it continues to be so. A combination of structural and agency-related factors have 
blocked development towards an 'active' EWe. Within Europe, L TSB is predominantly 
a UK-centric group, and the emergence of the EWe coincided with a period of 
substantial expansion within the UK. Moreover, a fragmented employee side both 
within the UK and internationally, together with lack of coordination across borders, 
have resulted in weak cohesion and organisation to establish any kind of systematic 
communication and cooperation. 
Table 9.2 shows the nature of the EWes in HSBC and LTSB according to the four 
dimensions or 'fields of interaction' established by Lecher et al. (1999:47). A 
significant difference between the two EWes is the stronger and more cohesive 
employee and trade union input at HSBC. Here the initial dominance of the home 
country employee side has been met by more experienced foreign delegations 
(particularly French and German) in terms of statutory systems of employee 
representation. Although the nature of this relationship is still being defined, the foreign 
delegations are recognised by the home country representatives and union as legitimate 
and valuable counterparts, and there is a readiness to contribute towards the 
development of mutual support. At LTSB, however, the initial development of the EWC 
was set back by the absence of the foreign employee delegation (which initially 
consisted of Spanish delegates only). This was due to a combination of expectations 
among the potential Spanish delegation for the inclusion of negotiating rights, and 
existing rivalries between the two main Spanish unions. Thus the EWC meetings were 
predominantly UK centric, a replica of national domestic arrangements. Moreover, the 
replication of national arrangements has accentuated the existing divide between the 
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two mam UK trade umons present m the EWC to the extent that the company trade 
union, which is the largest, has threatened to withdraw their participation in the EWe. 
Table 9.2: Fields of Interaction at HSBC's and LTSB's EWCs 
Fields of Dimension Indicator HSBC LIoyds TSB 
Interaction 
Ewe and Scope to Money Budget allocated by management Budget allocated by managcmcnt 
Management operate Time 2 EWCs meetings a year + I EWC meeting + employee on ly 
employee on ly pre-meeting pre-meeting 
Joint management/employee Joint managcment/employee review 
steering committee from 2002 committee sincc 2000 (UK only 
Previously employee designated until 2002) 
representative (UK) Management only steering 
commmittcc 
Control of Joint; frequent contact Management Icd ; sporadic contact 
meetings 
Participation Information/ Deficient information exchange; Deficient information exchange; 
Consultation/ problems with timing. and problcms with timc. confidcntiality 
Negotiation relevance of issues issues. and timely distribution of the 
agenda 
Internal EWe Capacity Duration EWC I Full day I Half Day 
Structures Increasing structures for agreeing Limited development of structures. 
and coordinating interests. Re- No communication with foreign 
negotiating committee included representati ves (Spain) and between 
foreign representatives. Joint the two main UK unions. 
steering committee introduced 
following re-negotiation of 
agreement. 
Actors Initially led by employee Joint review committee formed by 
designated representative (UK UK delegates and management. 
origin). Employee only steering EWC sutTers from lack of unity. 
committee currently operates with both a domestic level and 
involvement form foreign internationally. 
representatives ( more A positive sign is however 
experienced in employee extension of full rights to a number 
information and consultation of foreign reps whose countries do 
structures). not fall under the threshold of the 
Directive. 
Structure Parent-company 26 members (10 UK,5Fr, 20e, 19 members (14 UK. I Sp. 1 Fr, I Nl. 
dominance 2Gr. I Be, I Lux, lit , I Sp). I Be, I Lux) 
!-leading towards eQuality UK dominance 
Language Translation facilities provided Translation facilities provided 
Inter trade Divided French side (four Divided UK side (the two main 
union different trade unions). This can unions), and divided Spanish side 
competition potentially hinder developments. (politica l differences) 
EWes and Resource Infrastructure Close links between actors at Close links between actors at 
National transfer from national level and EWC delegates national level and EWC delegates 
Employee national to (often the same). (often the same) 
Representation European Information Good information supply via Good information supply via 
Structures level national representation structures national representation structures 
Resource Infrastructure Close links between actors at Close links between actors at 
transfers from national level and EWC delegates national level ancl EWe delegates 
European to (often the same) (often the same). 
national level Information Deficient infomlation at Deficient information at European 
European level, but increasing level 
filtering of centrally held (in UK) 
information to foreign delegates 
(eg. on global processing 
strategy) 
European' Early signs No 
added va 1 ue' 
EWe and Trade Formal Full Full membership Partia l (only one of the two main 
Unio ns integration membership. UK union. and the Spanish unions) 
guest status 
Specialist and Organisational StTOng support Partial support (on ly by one of the 
policy assistance, two main UK unions. and the 
support training. advice, Spanish unions) 
political focus 
Source: Complied from own data from the case company studies. 
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Regarding the relationship between the EWC and trade unions, the implication is that 
trade union support for LTSB's EWC is only partial, with no support from the company 
union, whose priority is domestic representation. Likewise, the links between national 
employee representation structures and the EWC are blocked with regards to the 
company union, although these remain strong with the remaining Ulllons, whose 
members are often both EWC delegates and representatives at the national forums. 
Nonetheless, the lack of relevant information obtained at the EWC has meant poor 
information exchange with national representation structures. 
Regarding the EWC-management relationship, both HSBC and L TSB began with 
management adopting a rather minimalist approach, signing up to an EWC mainly to 
comply with legislation. However, HSBC has subsequently departed from that initial 
position, and although the scope for participation given to the EWC remains somewhat 
limited, current management demonstrates a more pro-active approach, viewing the 
EWC as a potential tool to fit within the increasing size and integration of their 
operations in continental Europe. This is shown, for example, not just by the larger 
allocation of resources (including financial resources), but also by the systematic 
involvement of foreign (in particular, French) management in the EWC. 
The potential influence and role of an EWe can be assessed by conducting an 
examination of its impact or effectiveness in number of areas of the company at 
different levels. This is the aim of the next Section. 
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9.3 ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE EWCs AT HSBC AND L TSB 
9.3.1 Impact on Management Decision-making 
In order to assess the impact of the EWCs on management decision-making, Marginson 
et aI. (2004) distinguish between impact on process and impact on outcome. Impact on 
the process of management decision-making refers to increased upward or downward 
management communication, and signalling of transnational issues between different 
levels of management. Impact on the outcome of a transnational decision potentially 
extends to changes in the implementation of a decision or the way in which the decision 
is framed as result of EWC intervention. In neither HSBC nor L TSB was there any 
evidence of the EWe having an impact on the outcome of management decision-
making. However impact on the process was evident in both companies. 
In HSBC, management from different subsidiaries (particularly from the French 
subsidiary, CCF) attend the EWe. They attend not specifically to give presentations, but 
as executive management members. This is seen as a way in which the EWe stimulates 
greater cross-border management cohesion (Lamers, 1998; Lecher et aI., 2001; 
Marginson et. aI., 2004). Moreover, meetings between management from different 
departments and businesses across Europe are starting to take place in relation to the 
activities of the EWe. An IR manager from HQ stated that: "we have attempted to 
facilitate the meeting of seven units (business) that have never spoken to each 
other, and now meet regularly, including management coming to talk to one 
company and vice versa, and between representatives, and representatives and 
management, and are now starting an interaction within Luxembourg for example 
which has never occurred before. Indeed from an HR point of view, the biggest 
interaction between HSBC pic Bank and HSBC Group would be the EWC".126 
126 Interview with IR manager, HSBC (June, 200 I) 
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The EWC in HSBC has also provided a means to increase management awareness of 
decision-making in the different subsidiaries around issues such as training or the 
dissemination of EWC-related information, following employee representatives' 
comparisons and questions at the EWC meeting. In relation to this, lines of 
communication have been stimulated between the Group general manager for HR and 
country CEOs. At the 2001 EWC-meeting, for example, the Group's general manager 
for HR assured delegates that he would get in touch with the CEO of HSBC Spain in 
order to find out his position on training. Similarly, he mentioned that he had reminded 
CEOs of the need to ensure wide distribution of the internal Group magazine in which 
the EWC is publicised. 
In LTSB, signs of the impact of the EWC on processes of management decision-making 
are more limited. To date the EWC has centred on management communication 
regarding general issues about Group results, the Group's position on mergers and 
acquisitions, and likely future movements of L TSB within the industry. In the 2002 
EWC-meeting, however, the Group's position on the role of the 'University for LTSB' 
within Europe was included in the EWC agenda, suggesting the emergence of 
communication around more 'tangible' cross-border issues. Despite the Group's lack of 
management and business integration in Europe, the EWC has raised management 
awareness on the need for increased coordination in internal management 
communication. In the words of IR Group management, "the EWe has meant that if 
there is something happening in any of the other European locations, the local DR 
manager would think ... 'Ahh! ... is there an issue here maybe that I need to tell 
Group DR?' So the process of decision-making starts to create that sort of 
perspective,,127. Indeed, the greater demand for communication posed by the EWC may 
be forcing management to re-think internal communication channels for information 
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and European company-level (Wills, 1998), something that is also reflected in the 
emergence of an internal management steering committee for the purposes of the EWe. 
This committee is formed by the HR business partner for the 'International' division, 
the head of Group IR, and the head of Group strategic planning, and it meets regularly 
previous to the annual EWC-meeting itself. This is a clear example where a centralised 
information requirement may create pressures for centralisation within the company, 
even if economic needs or corporate culture demand devolution to local decision makers 
(Streeck and Vitols, 1995). 
9.3.2 Impact on National Company Level IR 
The establishment of European-level structures for employee representation might have 
consequences for company IR at lower levels, derived for example from the 
establishment of new coordination mechanisms as supporting structures for the EWC. 
As seen in Chapter 3, the study of the 'downward' influence (Hoffmann et aI., 2001) of 
EWCs on IR at lower levels can be divided into direct effects relating to structural 
changes, such as the emergence of new structures for coordination and information, and 
indirect effects relating to the emergence of new attitudes and approaches. 
9.3.2.1 Direct Effects: New Structures for Information and Coordination 
In countries with no statutory system of employee representation at company level, such 
as the UK, it has been argued that EWCs can be a vehicle for the creation or 
strengthening of group-level employee representation structures (Hall, 1992; 
Marginson, 1998). However, in both HSBC and LTSB, group-level employee 
representation structures at domestic level existed prior to the creation of the EWC. 
Nevertheless, in HSBC the EWC has brought together under a single forum managerial 
and non-managerial employees, who domestically are kept under separate consultation 
127 Interview with Group IR manager, LTSB (December 2002) 
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arrangements. Furthennore, the EWC has extended representation, through seats on the 
EWC, to parts of the Group where no previous fonn of collective representation existed. 
Contrary to Wills' (1998) suggestion that EWCs might be seen as a threat to single-
union channels of representation because of the direct involvement of non-union 
representatives, Unifi perceives this as an opportunity to expand union influence across 
the Group. A union official in HSBC maintained: "when they (employees) have to 
elect EWC's members, they suddenly start to become exposed to the whole idea of 
employee representation, and from the union point of view this gives us an 
opportunity to start to identify people who may wish to become involved in the 
union or help us to extend the union's influence,,128, Consequences of EWC activity 
for local IR in the home country appear limited in HSBC, however. There is consensus 
among the employee side that awareness of the EWC by the workforce in general is 
low, caused perhaps by the lack of 'tangible' (directly affecting the workforce) results 
achieved by the EWC to date. In the words of a Unifi official at HSBC, "if by using the 
EWC we could get the Bank to agree to a consistent approach based in best 
practice, and that improves what it is already there for our members, then we 
would see that as a major victory and that will instantly raise the profile of the 
In L TSB the picture is more complicated. As in HSBC, structures for representation at 
national level existed prior to the EWe, but their remit did not cover some non-
traditional banking and non-unionised business recently annexed to L TSB Group. The 
non-unionised EWe delegates belong to these businesses, and their integration within 
the EWC's employee side is hindered because of cultural (corporate culture) and 
professional differences. A non-unionised EWC delegate maintained that he saw no 
128 Interview with trade union official, Unifi, HSBC (May 2001) 
129 Interview with trade union official, Unifi, HSBC (May 2001) 
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benefit from the EWe for his constituency since "the main strategy in the EWe is 
focused on retail and commercial banking and does not really apply to us. I indeed 
find difficult to relate to union representatives because their experience relates to 
mainly bank (branch) employees which is quite removed from our area,,13o. 
Furthermore, the EWe in LTSB has not been effective as a catalyst to improve the 
relationship between the two main UK unions within the Group (LTU and Unifi). In the 
words of management interviewed, "they refuse to sit together both in the EWe 
meeting and at dinner; they just don't talk to each other"l3I. An employee 
representative from Unifi ratified this: "at one of the EWC-meetings, we took the 
union side out to try to resolve something and they (LTV) did not come in the 
room with us, even if other unions from abroad were there,,132. From the start, LTU 
has been less interested in the EWC, and has chosen not to have a seat in the joint 
management-employee committee that sets the agenda. A Unifi EWC delegate noted: 
"if LTV wishes to include something in the agenda, they would phone Bank 
management rather than Vnifi,,133. 
Lack of cohesion amongst the employee side is also evident at international level in 
LTSB. In the first two years of the EWC's existence, the Spanish members (the only 
foreign representation at the time) were absent. In the words of a Unifi official: "we 
(Unifi) have no contact with our Spanish colleagues, who appear to have their own 
problems that they want to keep to themselves,,134. The absence of the Spanish 
representatives was justified by Bank management as a result of existing domestic 
rivalries between the Spanish unions at LTSB, and as a result of their dissatisfaction 
130 Interview with employee representative, L TSB (June 2001) 
131 Interview with HR Business Partner-International, LTSB (September, 2002) 
132 Interview with EWe member and employee representative, Unifi- L TSB (September 2002) 
133 Interview with EWe member and employee representative. Unifi- L TSB (June 2001) 
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with the legal scope of the EWC: "if they (Spanish EWe delegates) do not really 
come because the EWe is not set up according to Spanish legislation, well ... they 
are never going to come unless legislation changes. One of the problems is that they 
want it to be for negotiation and that's not going to happen unless the law 
changes,,135. The absence of the Spanish delegates resulted in a UK only attendance of 
the first two EWC-meetings, which, in the words of a Unifi official, were "just a 
rehearsal of the national joint negotiation committee,,136. As a result, the impact of 
EWC activity at lower IR company level is hardly noticeable. General employee 
awareness of the existence of the EWC is very low because of the lack of relevant issues 
and activity of the EWC. As an employee representative involved in the early days of 
the EWC stressed: "my manager came to me with the EWe communication and 
said, 'I do not think anybody would be interested in this, only you'. 1 guess it is like 
most things, you are not going to read about a committee until something happens 
137 that makes you do so" • 
9.3.2.2 Indirect Effects: Access to New Information 
Structural changes in IR might also derive from the nature and extent of information 
made available within the firm (Lecher et a1. 1999). Hall (1992), for example, notes that 
improved access to new information might lead to changes in union strategies derived 
from more frequent contacts with foreign representatives. 
In HSBC, there is a clearer case of changes in the nature and extent of information 
emerging from EWC activity, in particular since the change in management approach to 
the EWC (which coincided with the acquisition of CCF). Although the issues of cross-
134Interview with trade union official, Unifi-LTSB (May 2001) 
135 Interview with HR manager, LSTB (September, 2002) 
136 Interview with trade union official, Unifi-LTSB (May 2001) 
137 Interview with EWe member, Unifi-LTSB (June, 2001) 
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border comparison and hannonisation appear to still be remote for employees and EWe 
members, the EWe agenda and climate has taken promising steps over recent years. 
Whilst initially the agenda was largely set by management and centred on the mere 
conveyance of business infonnation such as group results, management's more active 
and participative approach has meant that employee input has played a larger role over 
recent years. As a result, and despite the existing structural problems mentioned earlier, 
the EWe has served to establish some European-level dialogue within the Group, and 
has increased awareness over issues such as group ethics, training strategy and global 
processing. For example, the experience of the UK employee side on global processing 
is likely to feed into the French unions' strategy at national/local level in the case of 
future implications for the French operations ofthe Group\38. 
Although the union side acknowledges the limited effect of the EWe on the prospects 
for European-wide company bargaining, it sees the EWe as a way forward for 
maintaining pressure for consistency, particularly in areas of employment policy 
regulated by EU directives, such as maternity leave and working time. New flows of 
infonnation have also led to the UK employee side to re-think and propose changes to 
their domestic procedure for seat allocation on the EWe, to become more in line with 
the French system whereby unions have guaranteed seats. With regards to foreign 
representatives, in countries with an adversarial IR tradition, such as Spain, where 
infonnation to local works councils might be kept to the minimum legally required, the 
Ewe can be a source for infonnation which might be used in local bargaining 
processes. For example, it was through the EWe rather than through the local works 
138 In the April 2001 EWC meeting, following a discussion on the Group's strategy on global processing. 
the UK delegates expressed the positive experience of the UK in this field, despite initial trade union 
concerns over domestic job losses. This can potentially reassure French delegates in case of a future 
expansion of the global processing strategy to CCF. 
284 
council that the Spanish employee side obtained infonnation on changes in the Group's 
management structures across Europe following the acquisition ofCCF. 
In L TSB, however, substantial improvements in tenns of the infonnation made 
available in the company as a result of the EWC have not been apparent. Despite the 
UK employee side (in particularly Unifi) recognising the potential of the EWC as a tool 
to communicate and compare infonnation across borders, the absence of the Spanish 
delegates has limited potential outcomes in this area. Indeed, the overwhelming weight 
of the UK within the Group's European operations means that national consultative 
forums remain the centre of company IR. When asked about the balance between 
national consultative forums and the EWC in L TSB, Group management maintained: 
"if an issue affects lots of countries of course we would call an EWC, but if it only 
affected two, we would first deal with the two countries concerned rather than 
calling an EWC,,139. Generally, it can be said that the modest attempts by both 
management and union representatives to broaden the agenda of recent EWC meetings 
(2001-2002), to include more European-wide issues such as the 'Lloyds-TSB University 
for Europe', remain strongly limited by the lack of common cross-national issues. 
9.3.3 Impact on Attitude Related Factors 
In their comprehensive research on EWCs Lecher et at. (1999) highlight three 
dimensions of particular importance for the internal process of constitution and 
development; the communicative, the institutional and the socio-cultural dimensions. 
The first two have been discussed earlier in this Chapter, and this Sub-section explores 
the impact of EWCs on the pre-existing cultural, political and industrial relations 
traditions of the actors involved. 
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9.3.3.1 Attitude Changes amongst Management 
Management interviewed in both HSBC and L TSB acknowledged that the legislative 
requirement was the major reason behind management agreeing to an EWC at the time 
of its establishment. Interviews with employees involved in the early stages of the 
EWCs also revealed considerable criticism of their initial functioning. In HSBC, 
however, a change towards increased management interest in and enthusiasm for the 
EWC is appreciable from 2000-2001. This coincides with two crucial developments. On 
the one hand, the beginning of an important restructuring process of the Group in 
Europe following the acquisition ofCCF. Secondly, changes in the management team in 
charge of the EWC, with some of the new management believing in the legitimate and 
valuable role of unions and relations with unions within the firm, having previously 
been active employee and union representatives. In LTSB, although more 'cosmetic' in 
nature, there has also been some adjustment in management's approach to the EWC. 
This has coincided with the final stages of a complex process of company re-
organization following a number of mergers and acquisitions at domestic level, which 
was considered a priority for company management. In both banks the EWC was 
reported to have played a role in fuelling central IR management involvement in 
European social policy developments in terms of, for example, EU legislation affecting 
companies within the EEA (e.g. directives on working time, parental leave or 
information and consultation at national company level). Furthermore, the IR managers 
at both banks, those currently directly in charge of the respective EWCs, are the only 
two British members of the European Banking Industry Federation, representing the 
BBAI40. 
139 Interview with IR manager-Group HR, L TSB (December. 2002) 
140 British Banking Association 
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In HSBC the shift in management interest is noticeable in a number of areas. There has 
been a marked increase in financial resources allocated to the EWe, as implied by an IR 
manager following the extension of the council from 11 to 23 employees: '"it is costing 
us a lot of money, so you might as well make it work,,141. Other areas of 
improvement relate to resources allocated to employee delegates in terms of time off to 
dedicate to EWe tasks, improved dissemination of EWC-related information across the 
firm, a more joint union-management approach to setting the EWC agenda, and 
perhaps most importantly a more genuine approach to consider the EWC a forum for 
effective consultation with employee representatives. Another change has been the more 
structured approach to management-union EWC-related meetings: "previously, the 
designated representative would meet tbe head of HR on occasions, but they did 
not meet on a regular basis by agreement, in the sense of baving a timetable to 
meet every one or two montbs,,142. In addition, the re-negotiation of the EWC 
agreement in 2001, in which a team of British, French and German EWe employee 
delegates took part, resulted in the lowering of the threshold of a minimum of 150 
employees for representation in the EWC to 50. This brought in three more countries, 
and the attendance as observers of those representatives from countries with agreed 
future membership to the EU a year before their accession. 
The type and levels of management involved in the EWC are also reflective of attitudes. 
Marginson et al. (2004), for example, report that where only HR management leads the 
EWC, its impact on management decision-making tends to be less tangible. In this area 
there has been a significant advance in HSBC, with a progressive involvement of more 
senior and varied management. Whilst HR and IR management are those primary in 
charge of the EWe, general business managers also attend on an ad hoc basis. Very 
141 Interview with IR Manager, HSBC pic (June 2001) 
142 Interview with trade union official, Unifi-HSBC (May 2001) 
287 
significantly, the last two years have also seen the involvement of foreign management 
from CCF as executive members of the EWe. The attendance of the Group's Chairman 
to social events associated with the EWC was also perceived by both management and 
employees as intended to increase the EWC's profile within the Group. 
To a lesser extent, partly due to the shorter life-span of the EWC and greater structural 
limitations in terms of the Group's presence in Europe, management attitudes in L TSB 
also seem to have departed from the initial minimalist approach: "The forum started 
up with a very top down feel to it, very much like we (management) are here to tell 
you things, so it started up very much about giving information on general 
business performance,,143. A key move towards a more effective functioning of the 
EWe, in particular given the recurring absence of the Spanish representatives, was the 
2002 inclusion as full members of those employee representatives from European 
countries that do not reach the 150 workforce threshold set up in the EWCD. These 
included France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Further steps include the 
proposal in 2003 for Switzerland, Monaco and Gibraltar to participate as observers and 
possibly become full members in 2004, and a concession on the management side that 
from 2003 there will be an employee-only pre-meeting to the EWC itself. 
In examining changing management attitudes, while the approach of Group 
management is key for the development of an active role of the EWC, the approach of 
local/national foreign management must not be underestimated. National management, 
with their established traditions and culturally contextualised relations with local trade 
unions, can play an important role in promoting or blocking the attendance of local 
representatives. This was suggested by Group L TSB management as partly explaining 
the reasons behind the non-attendance of the Spanish representatives: "I think their 
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non-attendance suits the country manager, who I believe portrays to us that 
relations with the unions are more difficult than they really are, and I think he is 
not keen for the unions to come to a wider forum and show their position,,144. 
Controlling the flow of infonnation was implied to be key for Spanish management in 
tenns of exerting influence over local trade unions: "any information that comes from 
London, like an issue of communication to all staff in Europe, when it arrives in 
Spain will be thrown away by management and is not always issued to local staff. 
If we send a letter to the union, management manages to intercept it somehow, so 
the unions don't get it,,145. It must also be noted that EWC-related documentation 
examined highlighted that none of the Spanish representatives speak English, the 
language used by Group central management to send infonnation, which indeed is 
addressed to the unions c/o Spanish HR management. This facilitates a withholding or 
re-interpretation of infonnation on the side of the Spanish management. 
9.3.3.2 Attitude Changes on the Employee Side 
As already established, a crucial differentiating factor regarding the domestic employee 
side of the EWC is the contrast between union division at LTSB and union cohesion at 
HSBC. HSBC's employee side in the EWC is more homogeneous in the sense that the 
different representative's constituencies are under the HSBC global brand, so there is a 
stronger sense of belonging to the Group. Equally, the union is strongly in favour of the 
EWC, and four of the five UK employee representatives at the EWC are union 
representatives. In L TSB, however, several mergers and acquisitions in recent years 
have brought together a number of unions which have only been recently included in 
the EWe. While their inclusion certainly helps them to increase their feeling of 
integration within the Group, a potential limitation is the focus of the EWC agenda and 
143 Interview with HR Business Partner, LTSB (September 2002) 
144 Interview with HR Business Partner (September 2002) 
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activities in traditional banking areas, due to the experience of the main EWe actors. 
Indeed, when asked about the motivation for participation in the EWe, a non-unionised 
delegate of a non-traditional banking finn within the Group noted: "more than 
anything it is personal interest, because you get an insight into business strategy 
and other issues that you do not normally get; but for the people I represent there 
is no benefit at all, because they are not really bank employees so they are not 
interested,,146. 
At UK domestic level, another potential limitation is that the EWe has not alleviated 
existing differences between the two main UK unions within the Group. In contrast with 
Unifi which has been a strong supporter of the EWe from its start, L TU's initial 
expectations of the EWe were low and have been con finned three years into its 
existence. As a LTU's official expressed: "we very strongly value our independence 
and do not do anything that compromises it; equally we have no time for other 
unions within the Bank, there is no joint work whatsoever, because in our view 
they are in a quite weak position and often compromise their independence. This 
often colours the way we do things and in our view the EWe, for example, has 
been largely a waste of time,,147. Among the reasons behind LTU's pessimistic view of 
the EWe are structure and strategy related factors to do with the Bank's presence in 
Europe. The same official claimed: "there is no pan-European dimension to what 
this Bank does which might be unusual, very little view of where it is going in 
Europe, and no real presence in Europe other than to a degree in Spain, and our 
members do not get any benefit from it". A further reason was LTU's UK centric 
approach, as also expressed in the views the mentioned official: "we insisted that at 
the EWe we must not find out anything new about the UK because we have 
)45 Interview with HR Business Partner (September 2002) 
)46 Interview with employee representative- EWe member -LSTB (June 2001) 
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domestic arrangements to deal with that, so therefore we do not want things left to 
be told in the EWe that we ought to know anyway. Most of all, we wouldn't like 
the Spanish representatives at the EWe making any impact on anything that 
affects our members here in the UK, and the opposite,,148. In line with the above 
approach, LTU was considering the withdrawal of their five seats from the EWe. This 
infonnation had not been made public at the time of writing, however, and Group 
management were involved in negotiations in an attempt to persuade L TU to maintain 
their EWC presence. Indeed, concern was expressed: "I think it is symptomatic of the 
typical UK voluntarism, rather than talking about legislation anyway. But they 
(L TU) represent a lot of people, and we have a statutory responsibility to consult, 
so if they are not there, how do we do that?,,149. 
At domestic level, therefore, it can be argued that the stronger, more united and pro-
EWC approach of the employee side in HSBC has implied a greater effect of the EWe 
on the organisation and cohesiveness of the employee side than is the case in L TSB. It 
must be pointed out, however, that this has also been facilitated by the change in 
management approach in HSBC, and also the structural characteristics of the Group in 
Europe and higher extent of European-level management activity. 
At international level, in neither HSBe or L TSB has the EWe dealt with issues 
affecting employees in which agreement among employee delegates needed to be 
reached, and it is therefore difficult to assess the extent to which the EWe has exerted a 
strong influence on the attitude of the employee representatives themselves. The more 
extensive interaction of the HSBC's EWC and its delegates demonstrate more visible 
signs of collaboration or 'social-cohesion' among the different employee country 
147 Interview with trade union official, LTSB (January 2003) 
148 Interview with trade union official, LTU, LTSB (December, 2002) 
291 
nationals. Nevertheless, issues related to the 'trust' embraced in the union-management 
relations associated with different national IR traditions were reported to still remain in 
both LTSB and HSBC. In HSBC, for example, the French delegates remained to an 
extent suspicious of the UK delegates as a result of their traditional association between 
single, 'sweet heart' unionism and compromising the union's independence to 
management. In LTSB, distrust was reported to have played a part on the non-
attendance of the Spanish unions, who distrusted management invitations to a 
committee concerned with the infonnation and consultation of employees. 
9.4 EXPLAINING VARIATION ACROSS CASES AND OVER TIME 
It is clear from the above analysis that the impact of the EWCs on various dimensions is 
greater in HSBC, where it has developed a limited but nonetheless more significant 
presence. It is therefore in a position at this time to playa more active role, and has 
developed the potential to add greater value to the Group than is the case in L TSB. A 
number of factors, both actor-centred (Lecher et aI., 1999,2001; Marginson et aI., 2004) 
and structure-related (Marginson et aI. 2004), help to explain the variation found across 
the two case companies, and over time within each case. 
As already established, the impact on decision-making at company level as a result of 
EWe intervention in these two case companies is tangible only with regards to process, 
and to a larger extent in HBSC than in LTSB. Marginson et aI. (2004) argue that the 
nature of the company's business operations or 'business alignment' is a key factor 
shaping the impact of EWCs. With reference to Table 9.3, the 'business alignment' of 
EWCs is closer in companies whose operations concentrate on a single business, are 
spread across countries, and where production is integrated across borders (Ibid., 2004). 
149 Interview with IR manager, Group HR (January 2003) 
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HSBC's activities in Europe are spread across a larger number of countries, most of 
which contain operations of larger size. Moreover, a larger base of retail banking 
operations exists in more than one country. In HSBC a stronger 'global' Group culture 
also exists, and there is a greater degree of coordination across borders, in particular in 
some of its commercial and wholesale business. Perhaps more importantly, although 
cross-border coordination is not fully developed in HSBC's European retail businesses, 
which remain fairly independently run, CCF is strongly emerging as a key coordinating 
agent for most activities in the 'Eurozone'. This is in turn reflected in the emergence of 
European level management activity. Indeed, despite cross-border integration of 
operations being at the level of individual business streams (mainly in commercial and 
wholesale banking), there are signals that a cross-border management structure at Group 
'Eurozone'-level is expanding. Such an emerging structure closely 'fits' (with the 
exception of the UK, which is not included) the EWC's scope and structure. Moreover, 
while the UK operations are not yet part of the 'Eurozone' structure and activities of the 
Group (led by CCF), company management has not ruled out this possibility in the 
foreseeable future. Indeed, central management appears to be increasingly considering 
further European level activity involving its two main retail banking businesses in 
Europe (UK and France). Thus the HSBC case also conforms with Lamers's (1998) 
proposition that the existence of a European-level management structure at the level at 
which the EWe is established is likely to result in the EWC having a stronger impact on 
management decision-making. A further set of structural conditions likely to shape the 
impact relates to the existence of an IR 'platform' on which the EWe can build 
(Marginson, et aI., 2004). In this regard, Group level national employee representation 
structures existed in HSBe prior to the EWe, with union officials and representatives 
familiar with employee representation systems. 
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The combination of these factors are associated with emerging changes in the operation 
of the EWC, and particularly in more visible signs of an impact on IR at lower national 
and local levels within the company. Examples of such signs are the establishment, 
following suggestions from the EWCs' employee side, of an Intranet communication 
system among the EWC members, both employee representatives and management, so 
that emails can be sent and received by all members. Similarly, the re-negotiation of the 
EWC-agreement has led to the creation of a joint management-union 'steering 
committee', which meets at least twice a year to deal with issues concerning EWC-
meetings. Whilst previously the role of the 'steering committee' was undertaken by a 
single UK delegate, it now includes foreign representatives, and the committee itself has 
meant a more structured approach to union-management meetings. 
In terms of actor-based factors, the stronger impact of the EWC at HSBC can be related 
to the existence of a cohesive employee side organisation at domestic level, represented 
mostly through a single union very much in favour of the EWC. Initial feelings of 
distrust between foreign delegations are slowly lessening given the readiness of the UK 
side to cooperate and use their advantageous position of proximity to central 
management in the interest of the EWC as a whole. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether existing differences (politically divided unions) within the French employee 
side, the other largest employee group, will effect the EWC in the long term. 
Another key explanatory factor regarding the greater influence of the EWC in HSBC is 
management policy. A more proactive approach from central management exists, in 
particular from the time of the acquisition of CCF. There are two reasons behind this 
change of approach: structure-related changes within the Group and changes in the 
management team in charge of the EWe. Following the acquisition of CCF, the 
European workforce (excluding the UK) represents around 25% of the total group 
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workforce, which has caused central management to see the EWC as a more useful 
institution within the present structure, and therefore become more willing to invest in it 
and make it work. Equally significant are the changes that have recently taken place in 
the central IRIHR management team with leading responsibilities over the EWe. A few 
key members of the new management team have a union related background as well as 
experience of EWCs in other banking organisations, and have adopted a less adversarial 
and minimalist approach to management-union relations in general, including processes 
for national information and consultation within HSBC in the UK. 
The increased capacity of the employee side on the one hand and a pro-active 
management policy on the other are resulting in a more joint approach to the 
management of the EWC, with ongoing contact between the two sides and more 
constructive interaction between management and the employee side. 
In LTSB, however, the role of the Ewe has barely developed since its creation, and 
continues to be 'symbolic' rather than active. The life span of the EWC is one factor 
that helps to explain its inactivity. LTSB's EWC had met only three times at the time of 
this study, with only one annual meeting since its creation in 1999 and little activity 
between the stipulated meetings. Marginson et al.'s (2004) framework suggests 
underlying reasons for the lack of a more 'tangible' impact of the EWe. Crucially, the 
lack of issues transcending national borders are a consequence of structure-related 
factors to do with the strategy and management structure of the Group. 
In LSTB, the majority of the Group's operations and workforce in Europe are in the 
UK, where the Group's largest business is concentrated (see Table 9.3). In addition, the 
nature of activities differs across the EEA, and there is little or no cross-border business 
integration. Whereas the UK business is strongly concentrated in retail banking, France 
operates a private banking business, Belgium and the Netherlands a largely corporate 
295 
banking business, and Spain is mainly focused on private banking with some corporate 
banking activities . In consequence, the 'business alignment ' with the EWC is low in 
LSTB. The limited 'business alignment' is accompanied by a rather ' multi -domestic ' 
(Porter, 1986) corporate culture and a fragmented international management structure; 
there is hence no European level management structure to 'fit' the EWC's activity 
(Lamers, 1998). Correspondingly, employment and employee related issues remain 
fairly separate, with little scope for commonly relevant topics to discuss. Indeed, the 
LTSB case supports Hoffmann et a1. 's (2001) research on the operation of EWCs in 
manufacturing companies; few or no consequences for national and local IR and 
management decision-making might be expected due to the lack of ' fit' between the 
EWC and the Group's management stnlcture within Europe. 
Table 9.3: EWC's Profile in HSBC and LTSB 
Comoany ~. ~. HSDC .. :~ LTSB .. ;~. 
EWC since 1996 1999 
EWC meetings until 12 3 
31/12/02 
Business Alignment Sinf!le/M ulti-business Multi-business Multi-business 
Spread of operations across Large Limited . 
borders 
Extent of cross-border Emerging Inexistent 
intef!ration 
Dusiness& Business/divisional coverage of Multiple Multiple 
Management EWC 
Structures Innuential level of European Parti al No 
manaf!ement 
IR Platform (Nat. Level Yes Yes 
Organisation of the Number of countries covered by 8 (i 
Employee Side the EWC 
EUropean country with most UK (75%) UK (90%) 
employees (ADOrOx. in 0/..) France (18%) 
Composition of Select UK, France, Joint manage ment-employee 
Committee (Chair) Germany (UK only)· 
Manaeement Policy Proactive Minimal ist 
Trade Union Policy Proactive Divided (divergent positions 
of the two main UK unions) 
.. 
* The main company UK umon does not partIcIpate 
Concerning the presence of an IR platfonn from which the EWC might build , employee 
representation at national level in the UK is divided within LTSB, This is not only 
because of the range and different nature of businesses, but especia lly because of 
differences between the main two unions within the Group. This last division 111 
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particular has influenced the activity of the EWe. Whereas the second largest union 
within the company strongly supports the EWe, the largest union in terms of employees 
does not advocate the benefits of an EWe within the L TSB Group. The lack of 
interaction and cooperation between the two main unions at national company level has 
also been transferred to the EWe during its first three years of existence, before the 
potential withdrawal from participation in the forum of the largest union. The lack of 
cohesiveness on the employee side was reinforced by the absence of the only foreign 
EWe delegation with participating rights in the EWe during its first two years (two 
EWe-meetings). As a result, the meetings have had a very strong UK focus and agenda, 
almost as a rehearsal of existing domestic IR arrangements. The joint management-
employee steering or 'review' committee is mainly an 'agenda committee' (Lamers, 
1998), with little ongoing role between EWe meetings in terms of contact between 
members or with management. Although formally joint, the agenda is largely 
management led, and there were complaints on the employee side regarding the short 
time given to them to contribute to the agenda. It is also significant that the largest 
union has not (of its own choice) participated in the review committee, considerably 
relying on management for any EWe-related communication. The explicit anti-EWe 
stance of the largest UK trade union highlights the importance of trade union policy 
towards the development of an active role of EWes. 
Bringing other considerations of agency into account, LTSB management policy on the 
EWe can be characterised as minimalist for most of its short existence. Two reasons 
help to explain this approach. First, the above mentioned considerations of Group 
structure and strategy do not help in placing the EWe as a priority for management. 
Secondly, during the second half of the 1990s, and until very recently, the Group has 
been immersed in a lengthy and complex process of integration of its UK businesses, 
following a series of mergers and acquisitions of both traditional and non-traditional 
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banking businesses. In consequence, most IRlHR activity has been connected to the 
integration of terms and conditions of the Group's staff at domestic UK level. 
As a result, the interaction between management and the employee side tends to be 
sporadic, and, although it can not be termed adversarial, there is discontent on the 
employee side regarding management approach to the EWC and its operation in 
general. More specifically, the employee side had reservations about the nature, extent, 
and timing of information provided at the EWC meetings, and the lack of transnational 
issues discussed. Despite the present situation, there are signs that might improve the 
functioning of the EWe in the near future. Management concessions have occurred in a 
number of areas, including the enlarging of the employee side of the EWe by allowing 
participation of other countries, and the celebration of an employee-only pre-meeting 
previous to the EWC itself. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the problems 
regarding the lack of transnational integration within the Group structure and strategy, 
as well as the internal divisions of the employee side, allow a more effective 
functioning. 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
In previous Sections the factors that have influenced the operation and development of 
the EWes in the two UK banks have been discussed. Whilst the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter 3 (Fig. 3.2) has helped to guide the discussion, the analysis of the 
fieldwork data has enabled a more sophisticated definition of the elements that have 
intervened in shaping the operation and role of the EWes in these two banking 
organisations. Figure 9.1 depicts the way in which the initial analytical framework has 
been refined as a result of this research, where thicker lines represent a greater relative 
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importance attached to specific factors identified in shaping the functioning of the two 
EWCs. 
As suggested by Lecher et al. (1999), the orientation of the corporate intemational 
activities is key for the development of EWCs. The case of HSBC shows that the 
significant business expansion in Europe has led to marked changes in both 
management policy (increased interest due to perceived potential 'added value' of the 
EWC for the firm) and trade union policy (stronger employee organisation following 
the expansion of the more experienced French side). This has in tum resulted in a more 
meaningful operation of the EWC, and transformation being 'symbolic' to 'active'. On 
the contrary, the EWC's operation at LTSB has been systematically limited by the 
strong UK orientation of the Group, which largely influences the approach of both 
central management and a considerable portion of the domestic employee 
representatives. Only the prospects of upcoming expansion in Europe were mentioned 
by Group management as the main motive for their increasing interest in the EWC once 
domestic restructuring was in its later stages. 
A related key influential factor is the existence of an integrated management structure at 
European level, partly in response to emerging attempts at business integration across 
borders, in particular within the various business streams. Steps towards further 
integration of HSBC's European operations have resulted in increased European level 
management activity (including initial signs of a European level management structure), 
and the EWC is starting to be seen by management as a potential vehicle facilitating 
such integration. Nevertheless, as highlighted by Marginson et al. (2004), the existence 
of multi-divisional business embraced by a Group EWC still poses a problem for 
integration and meaningful consultation in the EWC, given the diversity of issues 
concerning the different businesses. 
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Figure 9.1: Explaining the Role and Development of Ewes in Banking: Two UK Firms 
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A related key influential factor is the existence of an integrated management structure at 
European level, partly in response to emerging attempts at business integration across 
borders, in particular within the various business streams. Steps towards furth er 
integration of HSBC 's European operations have resulted in increased European level 
management activity (including initial signs of a European level management structure), 
and the EWe is starting to be seen by management as a potential vehicle facilitating 
such integration. Nevertheless, as highlighted by Marginson et al. (2004), the ex istence 
of multi-divisional business embraced by a Group Ewe still poses a problem for 
integration and meaningful consultation in the EWC, given the diversity of issues 
concerning the di fferent businesses. 
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Regarding considerations of agency, the attitude of individual managcmcnt emerged as 
key for the development and role of the EWe, as the case of HSBC clearly shows. This 
analysis has revealed, for example, that the confrontational IR style hetween local 
management and trade unions in the Spanish operations of LTSB must not he 
underestimated in considering the reasons behind the employee representatives non--
attendance to the EWe. Finally, the employee side (and union) division at LSTB, both 
within the UK and in tenns of the non-participation of the Spanish representatives, has 
been revealed as a very clear constraint to EWe activity. Other factors, such as a good 
level of information and consultation within the company, and the existence of well-
established company structures for employee representation have, as expected, acted as 
facilitators of EWe activity. However, a more significant effect of such factors has been 
prevented by the stronger influence of the internationalisation argument already 
mentioned that has overshadowed developments in this area. 
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Chapter 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This final Chapter brings together the results of the comparative case study findings and 
analysis, in order to assess how this investigation has contributed to the understanding 
of issues surrounding the existence and operation of EWCs in banking organisations. 
The next Section will review and discuss the main findings of the research. Some 
implications of these findings then follow, and I also offer some suggestions for further 
research in order to maximise the benefit of the research methods and findings of this 
project. 
10.2 THE MAIN FINDINGS 
Several main findings can be drawn from this investigation. Firstly, the key forces 
imparting an influence on the existence/non-existence and role of EWCs have been 
identified. A framework has been developed as a result, which provides an integrated 
analysis of the operation of these forces, an exercise that has enhanced understanding of 
the relationships and dynamics inherent within them. Secondly, the process of the 
comparative analysis of the four case studies has led to the refinement of the original 
framework, facilitating a better understanding of the mentioned relationships and 
dynamics in banking organisations. Within this context, the key role of the strategic 
intemationalisation of the firm, and especially the geographical location and importance 
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(in tenns of workforce, business volume etc.) of its international operations, the 
internationalisation of its management structures, and its cross-border HR coordination 
have been identified as central in explaining the existence/non-existence of EWes. 
Thirdly, by focusing on the banking sector, this research has revealed that this sector 
presents specific features which, in terms of the implications for the formation and 
operation of EWes, diverge from those in other sectors more extensively examined by 
previous research (e.g. manufacturing). From a methodological point of view, the 
suitability of qualitative research based on comparative case study research has also 
been confinned. This methodology has facilitated an in-depth understanding of the 
dynamics surrounding EWe's existence and operation, which has allowed an 
exploration of the factors, and their interaction, determining the establishment and 
operation of EWes. Furthermore, it has enabled an incorporation of multiple 
perspectives, including various levels and actors within the organisation to obtain a 
more comprehensive picture of the phenomenon under study. A more detailed 
examination and analysis of these main findings proceeds. 
10.2.1 Key Forces and Analytical Framework 
A key aim of the research has been to identify the different forces shaping decision-
making around, first, the establishment, and, second, the operation of EWes. A related 
aim has been to explore the interaction ofthese variables with the assumption that while 
the combination of some of them may trigger the establishment of a transnational body 
of employee information and consultation, others might run counter to it. Whereas the 
analytical framework suggested a set of complex and multiple forces, the empirical part 
of this research has provided evidence from international banks on which factors are 
more important to the establishment of EWes on the one hand, and to their role and 
operation on the other. Indeed, this investigation has shown that the interaction and 
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dynamics involving these forces differ when considering their influence on the 
establishment of EWCs and on the role of EWCs once established. In contrast to 
existing studies in the area, the study of EWC's establishment was explicitly separated 
from the study of their operation, since only then is it possible to obtain a better 
understanding of the factors influencing each aspect or both. In particular, on the issue 
of establishment the research has accounted for the non-establishment of EWCs in two 
of the largest MNCs based in Spain. 
In examining the existence of EWCs in the four case study firms, it has been found that 
a number of factors have played a key role. The extent and spread of internationalisation 
in European countries is a significant factor. However, alongside dispersed international 
presence, an equally significant factor is the extent to which such internationalisation 
strategies are mirrored in international business and management structures, preferably 
at European level, as well as in the existence of cross-border coordination in the HR 
arena. These factors have proved particularly relevant in shaping management and, even 
as significantly, trade union policy on the establishment of a potential EWC in the two 
Spanish case study banks. Indeed, it has been argued that the advantages of stronger 
legal representation rights and well-established company-level structures of 
representation in Spanish the banks can be countered by considerations of this nature. 
Regarding the establishment of an EWe in the two UK banks. the influence of such 
factors was mediated by a willingness on the employee-side to obtain stronger 
representation rights through the EWCD alongside management willingness to arrive at 
a voluntary EWC-based agreement. Nonetheless. in the case of HSBC. its larger 
presence and integration (even if still weak at the time) of its businesses in Europe 
facilitated the establishment of an EWC at a much earlier time. 
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In examining the role and operation of the EWCs in the two UK banks, this study has 
confirmed Lecher et al. 's (1999) findings that the extent and spread of 
intemationalisation, In Europe particularly, are influential factors. As with their 
establishment however, a very influential factor is the existence of a European or 
international management structure at a relevant level, and the extent to which 
integration ofHR policy and practice are pursued within each business stream. As noted 
by Marginson et al. (2004), the existence of multi-divisional businesses covered by a 
single group-wide EWC poses a problem for meaningful consultation at the EWe. 
Indeed, this study has shown that a lack of integration within business streams across 
different countries also hinders development towards an 'active' and meaningful EWe. 
This is because management policy is more likely to dedicate resources to the EWC 
when it underpins the strategic direction of the finn, in terms, for example, of moving 
towards an international coordination of HR policy and practice or wider corporate 
objectives. Moreover, this investigation has shown that a mismatch between the 
operation of the EWC and corporate objectives regarding, for instance, business and HR 
integration across Europe, can also shape the employee-side approach to the EWC. This 
is the case, for example, of one of the UK trade unions in LTSB, which given the 
predominantly UK-centric character of the Group has manifested no interest in 
participating in future activities of the EWC. A related factor, which has been revealed 
as a dominant influence, is the effect of a strong or weak cohesion among the employee 
side that, as seen in Chapter 9, differentiates HSBC from the LTSB case. 
This research also contributes in that the analytical framework developed, and therefore 
the explanation, embraces considerations of both structure and agency, and the way in 
which they interact, something which, with the exception of Hall et at. (2003) and 
Marginson et al. (2004), has not been explicitly addressed in previous research. 
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Furthermore, this research presents a comparative case study analysis on the bases of in-
depth research of both management and trade union I employee representatives, 
something which earlier research (Lecher et al.,1999; Lecher et al..2001; Lecher et aI., 
2002) has not paid detailed attention to, but which the common research project of Hall 
et a1.(2003) and Marginson et a1.(2004) can claim to have done in tenns of comparative 
case studies. 
10.2.2 The Importance a/the Firm's Internationalisation Strategy 
A second key set of findings of this research, already touched upon. relate to the 
implications of the nature and extent of the finn's internationalisation strategy for the 
decision to establish an EWe. This research has found that the nature of group activities 
and organisational and management structures, which together shape the extent to which 
there is cross-border coordination of HR policy and practice, are crucial factors which 
influence not only management policy towards EWes but also trade union policy, an 
often neglected aspect of the literature. 
Spatial diversification and business expansion overseas has been a major development 
among banking organisations over the last decade, following the relaxation of banking 
regulations and the intemationalisation of financial markets. Given the transnational 
nature of EWes, the degree and nature of spatial diversification becomes crucial in 
decision-making concerning their establishment. As the Spanish cases have shown, the 
geographical orientation of the firm's international expansion must be considered 
alongside factors such as the degree of internationalisation, diversification of the finn's 
business portfolio and the integration of the international operations. These factors 
impact on both management and, as significantly, trade union policy towards EWes. In 
cases of a management minimalist approach towards EWes, a pro-active employee or 
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trade union side seeking the establishment of an EWe is crucial for its existence. 
However, questions regarding the lack of presence in European countries or 
concentration of the bank's operations in other regions of the world and the lack of 
integration among foreign operations, can result in lack of interest from the union side. 
The findings of this thesis offer partial support to Streeck's (1997) argument. according 
to which workforces from countries with well-established national representation rights 
and structures at company level might have little interest in requesting an EWe in their 
effort to maintain privileged access to central management or national representation 
rights. Evidence from this research has shown that interest from the employee side in 
forging links with foreign counterparts can also vary depending on the geographical 
situation of those foreign employees or trade unions. As seen in BBV A and BSCH, 
whilst the establishment of an EWe appears of little interest to union officials, interest 
in forging links and a similar forum with Latin American trade unions is considerably 
greater given the significant presence of the two banks in that continent, and possibly 
also the cultural proximity of the employees. This in turn supports one of the main 
findings of this thesis, relating to the crucial importance of the geographical orientation 
of the banks' internationalisation, alignment in the type of business conducted in the 
different countries, and potential for integration of such businesses. 
With regards the operation of EWCs, evidence at HSBC suggests that when Streeck 's 
(1997) suggested characteristics of strong national representation rights and welI-
established representation structures at company level are partially met there remains a 
strong incentive for unions to engage in both the establishment and operation of an 
EWC. In HSBe for instance, whilst there are national level representation structures in 
their UK retail operations, the trade union-side was keen to further the relationship with 
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European trade unions, and especially those present in the bank's French subsidiary, 
because oftheir greater experience in national representation rights. 
The case of LTSB is closely aligned with previous literature in that a cohesive 
employee organisation is key to the EWC's role (Fulton, 1995~ Lamers, 1998~ Lecher et 
al. 1999). A divided workforce at domestic level can be seen as one main reason behind 
the inability of the EWe to overcome a 'symbolic' status, a situation which is 
reinforced by the lack of cohesive employee organisation at international level too. An 
interesting question relates to the degree and nature of the interest in the EWe (lack of 
interest in fact) of the main UK trade union within the Group. Their largely UK-centric 
approach is reinforced by a view of the EWe as a forum of little use in a predominantly 
UK-oriented group with little European presence and cross-border coordination. It is 
clear, therefore, that the argument around the key role of geographical orientation of 
internationalisation and business alignment also becomes relevant here. 
10.2.3 The Importance of the Firm's Sector and 'Sub-sector' 
A 'firm in sector' approach has been crucial for the understanding of the establishment 
and operation of EWCs in a specific sector setting. Despite differences derived from the 
different institutional settings of the UK and Spain, the study of the transformation of 
the banking industry in the two countries in Chapter 2 has shown a certain degree of 
international isomorphism with a considerable number of common elements. Whereas 
the existence of common elements in work organisation issues across national borders 
and within the international operations of banks with operations in a number of foreign 
locations suggests a promising future for EWes, it is very much the variation found 
within each individual bank that determines whether management and employee 
representatives engage in more meaningful information and consultation processes. 
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By concentrating on one particular sector the study has been able to explore its 
particular workings. For example, the UK banking sector is characterised by the relative 
strength of the unions as compared to other service sectors, and indeed the existence of 
systems of employee representation at company level, something not usual in some 
other productive sectors within the UK. Likewise, Spain's dual system of representation 
presents peculiarities within the context of the banking sector, with works councils 
largely inoperative, particularly in the case of larger banks. It is therefore found that, 
effectively, a system of employee representation through trade unions reaching across 
the different parts of the business exists in the four main case studies. In terms of the 
implications for the establishment of an EWe, this can be interpreted as the UK banks 
not being disadvantaged by the, in principle, less favourable domestic employee 
representation legal system. 
The importance of 'sub-sector' variation has also been highlighted by this study. This 
has been illustrated by the different characteristics of banking businesses such as retail, 
commercial or wholesale banking. Despite commercial and, in particular, wholesale 
banking often having greater degrees of internationalisation, more integrated 
organisational and management structures, and higher degrees of HR coordination 
across borders, the characteristics of their workforce - smaller size, low unionisation 
rates, highly individualised working terms and conditions (including pay) - do not make 
them propitious for the emergence of a voice requesting the establishment of EWes. 
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10.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
The findings of this research present a number of implications that can be grouped into 
four themes. These are the implications for research, for within-country research. for 
EWe's practice, and policy implications. 
10.3. J Implications for Research 
One of the primary implications for ongoing research in the EWC field relates to 
debates surrounding EWCs as a platform for the 'Europeanisation' of JR. This is based 
on the idea that EU legislation has created for the first time a truly 'European' 
institution for the development of a company-level transnational system of JR. Within 
the context of current 'disorganised' decentralisation (Traxler, 1995) of IR in the UK 
and beyond, EWCs have been seen as driver for the convergence of workplace 
employee representation across Europe, and in this sense as a vehicle for the 
Europeanisation of IR at company level. Indeed, the more optimistic views in assessing 
their impact on the Europeanisation of IR emphasise the potential role that EWCs have 
to promote cross-border relations that in tum are likely to develop EWC's internal 
workings and the Europeanisation of trade union structures and policies (Turner. 1996; 
D/2Jlvik, 1997). The findings of this study, however, reveal a mismatch between the 
prospects for Europeanisation and the organisational reality of some European MNCs. 
A common assumption among perspectives feeding the Europeanisation debate is that 
European MNCs focus their main foreign activities and investment within the European 
region. As this research has shown, both in the instances of Spanish and British 
international companies, this is not always the case. Historical and cultural factors may 
playa significant role in strategic decision-making around internationalisation. When 
this happens, evidence from this investigation has shown that interest in EWCs as a 
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European transnational structure for enterprise-based IR declines not only among 
management but, as significantly, among trade unions too. 
In terms of future research, therefore, there is a need to pay more attention to the wider 
context of companies' operations and HR policies, not just within the European context, 
but worldwide. In particular, the implications for transnational information and 
consultation arrangements which extend beyond Europe could prove to be an important 
area of research, as the case of the Spanish banks clearly indicates. Although in the 
short-term EWCs might not be established, an indirect effect of the EWCD in the 
medium to longer term might be that it can potentially lead to the establishment of 
beyond-Europe information and consultation arrangements that embrace Latin America 
or other areas of the world. Indeed, future research in this direction could address the 
establishment and development of employee information and consultation forums that 
are mayor may not be based on the EWCD, but that extend beyond Europe. Research 
by MUller and RUb (2002), for example, has shown the scope of such activities in the 
Scandinavian manufacturing company SKF and the German car manufacturer 
Volkswagen. Whereas in SKF a 'world works council' pre-existed the company EWC, 
in Volkswagen a world council grew out of the company EWC and has now become as, 
if not more, prominent as its predecessor. As shown by the differing roles played by 
international trade union organisations in SKF's and Volkswagen's world councils, 
future research could explore the role of European trade union federations in pursuing 
'beyond Europe-EWCs'. 
10.3.2 Implications/or Within-Country EWC Research 
A second key implication of this research is that it has opened a new perspective on the 
understudied Spanish (and Mediterranean more generally) EWC experiences. It has 
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been shown that far from being a 'backward' IR model, Spain may display specific 
features, such as economic and cultural links with areas like Latin America, which 
affect the existence and functioning of EWCs and need further investigation. 
A further implication is to draw attention to the importance of within country and even 
within sector variation in EWC practice. Literature in the area has established that both 
the sector and the specific form of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) characterising 
countries seem to predominate over country factors in determining EWC practice 
(Waddington, 2001a; Waddington and Kerchofts, 2003; Marginson and Sisson, 
forthcoming). The cases of HSBC and L TSB in this research have provided further 
evidence on the differences arising not only within countries but also within sectors as 
regards the 'capacity to act' of EWCs. Geographical differences in the organisation of 
their foreign operations seem to be important in accounting for the variation in practice 
found between the two EWCs. Likewise, the differences in trade union policy and 
strategy observed in unions within HSBC and L TSB emerged as a key factor for the 
'activation' of EWC's activity. Although many authors (Turner, 1996; Dolvik, 1997; 
Lecher et al., 1999) have seen EWCs as drivers towards the Europeanisation of trade 
union structures and policies, the case of L TSB has shown that the establishment of 
EWes does not automatically lead to enhanced coordination and cooperation at ' 
transnational level. 
10.3.3 Implications/or EWe's Practice 
The review of the literature on EWC practice conducted in Chapter 3 revealed ample 
variation in their 'capacity to act' and potential influence, ranging from those largely 
'symbolic', whose activities are often confined to the annual meeting with no scope for 
influence over management decision-making, to those engaging in a more 'active' 
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exercise where information and consultation are implemented to sometimes a larger 
extent than stipulated in the EWCD itself. An important implication of this research 
relates to the significance of focusing on the banking sector. The findings obtained 
improve understanding on existing knowledge of EWCs within the specific context of 
the banking sector (e.g. previous studies of Cressey, 1998; Lecher et aI., 2001). In 
particular, while earlier studies have predominantly focused on German or central 
European banks with EWCs based on the German IR system of co-determination, this 
study has explored new terrain in terms of focusing on Southern European banks, with 
different IR systems and organisational realities. Furthermore, it was also revealed in 
Chapter 3 that in examining the role of EWCs in the financial sector, a considerable 
number of firms were engaged in EWCs whose activities could be classified towards the 
'symbolic' end of the line. The investigation presented in this thesis has helped to 
understand the conditions that may contribute to the existence of a large number of 
'symbolic' EWCs. Research into the relationships between issues around the business 
activities, company structures and coordination of HR policies on the one side, and the 
potential role of EWCs on the other, has shown that cooperation on the employee side 
can be impeded by issues related to the international nature of the company concerned. 
Indeed, this appears to be the case not just among the different foreign employee 
delegations, but also within the home country employee side. 
More generally, this investigation has provided an opportunity to contrast the findings 
of the research with previous studies concentrated mainly in manufacturing industries. 
Hancke's (2000) work in the car manufacturing industry can be considered a critical 
case in that the specific industry has been identified as one where EWCs have the 
potential to exercise larger influence given the strength the employee side organisation 
at national and local levels, as well as the presence of pre-existing cross-national trade 
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union networks. The focus on an industry belonging to the service sector has provided 
different lenses with which to examine a similar phenomenon. The in-depth study of the 
banking sector has revealed a number of distinctive features. Contrary to the 
manufacturing industry, where integrated production structures are common, the 
banking industry is more likely to present 'multi-domestic' (Porter 1986) structures, 
with more independent internal and management structures across countries. This is 
particularly so in retail banking where the bulk of employment is found, and where 
collective organisation is most firmly established. This is in tum likely to decrease the 
desire of management to have integrated HR policies reaching across countries, and 
therefore their willingness to dedicate their time to the development of an EWC. 
A significant development, however, is the emergence of 'regional' structures within 
banks in which more closely aligned strategies and policies are likely to be pursued. 
This has been seen, for example, in the case of the two Spanish banks as regards their 
operations concentrated in Latin America, and in HSBC's operations in Europe, which 
are emerging as a block within their worldwide operations. Indeed, the existence of 
'Europe' as a regional block within banking groups is likely to be key for the 
development of an 'active' EWe. On a different note, it is worth underlining the 
peculiarities of the banking sector (retail banking in particular) in terms of greater trade 
union strength and organisation when compared with many other service industries. The 
implications of a similar study in service industry firms with lower trade union presence 
are likely to be different from those of this study. Indeed, existing research has 
suggested strong links between the existence of well-established structures for 
employee representation and IR at company level and the effective operation of EWCs 
(Marginson et aI., 2004). Since the former are more likely to exist in firms with greater 
trade union presence, an interesting exercise would be to contrast the findings of this 
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investigation with those of a study including service sector firms with lower degrees of 
unionisation. 
Finally, an investigation of the banking industry has provided insight into the 
implications ofthe different types of banking businesses for the establishment of EWCs. 
The extent to which internationalisation of banking business is pursued and 
subsequently matched with internationalisation of business structures and HR policies 
varies significantly among the different banking business, with markets in wholesale 
banking much more internationalised and integrated than those in retail banking. 
Nevertheless, retail banking is more likely to provide an environment conducive for the 
emergence of EWCs, given the greater presence of collective employee representation, 
trade union strength and less individualistic employee terms and conditions. 
Opportunities for further research can be provided by replicating this study in banking 
organisations both from the same and from different country origins, to provide further 
evidence on the validity of the country of origin effect and sector dependency 
arguments. Further research would also be useful in European banking firms of smaller 
size but still under the EWCD requirements, in order to examine the relationship 
between size and the nature of international company activities. In addition, while 
further investigation of the banking sector can still provide very useful insights, little is 
known about other service sector industries. This could be another area where in-depth 
comparative research, which could then be related back to the banking industry, would 
be fruitful. 
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10.3.4 Policy Implications 
In tenns of policy implications, this research has helped to improve understanding on 
the factors behind the relative lack of quantitative progress of EWCs. As noted in 
Chapter 3, despite the steady increase in the number of EWCs during the nine-year 
period since the adoption of the EWCD, there is still to date a large proportion of MNCs 
that have not set up an EWC, accounting to around two-thirds of the total number of 
MNCs covered by the EWCD (Kerckhofs, 2002:33). Chapter 3 also stressed the 
significance of size in detennining compliance rates, with large MNCs more likely to 
have higher compliance rates. Likewise, it can also be expected that the stronger 
domestic employee representation legislation at national level, the greater compliance 
rates will be. This investigation of banking finns has provided novel insights into the 
factors lying behind the lack of EWCs in large and relatively well union-organised 
MNCs. 
Finally, it is important to consider the implications of the analysis conducted in this 
thesis for the revision of the EWCD. Article 15 of the EWCD allows provisions for a 
review of the Directive, something that has been delayed for several years. In relation to 
this revision, a long-standing debate has referred to extending the scope of the EWCD 
by, for instance, lowering the company size threshold from 1,000 to 500 employees, 
with at least 100 employees in 2 different member states. Indeed, this is a theme for 
revision pursued strongly by the European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) (ETUC, 
2004). This thesis does not provide much explicit evidence on the potential effects of 
such a change. This is partly because the thesis has examined large MNCs, and is thus 
not in a position to draw meaningful comparison with other sized finns. However, the 
analysis has shown that factors additional to size can dominate in providing influence 
regarding the establishment of EWCs. In particular, it has been found that the nature of 
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the finn's activities and its internationalisation strategy (where, what activities, and their 
degree of integration) have been overbearing factors in the large Spanish MNCs 
considered. 
Another key issue in view of the revision of the EWCD relates to the triggering of 
requests to establish EWCs from employee representatives in a larger number of EWes. 
This is especially important in scenarios where management adopts a passive approach. 
In the Spanish cases analysed in this research the activities and organisational 
characteristics of the two Groups were instrumental in employee representatives not 
requesting an EWC. The revealed importance of such factors suggests that a change in 
legislation on the basis of the ETUC's position on the revision of the EWCD (ETUC, 
2004) may have limited effect in certain cases. The changes suggested do not explicitly 
augment the provisions of the Directive in relation to companies whose operations 
significantly extend beyond the confines of the EU. Having said this, the suggested 
'one-year negotiation period' might have had an impact, in particular in the case of 
BBV A, where speedier negotiations once employee representatives in Belgium and 
France initially showed interest could have led to the establishment of an EWC. 
Most fundamentally, however, the ETUC position does not engage with the issue of the 
nature and integration of company activities, which this thesis suggests to be crucial. 
There is an increasing tendency for developments such as the strategic orientation of 
some companies towards foreign markets, and especially beyond the European confines. 
These have increased the necessity for company-level employee initiatives that extent 
towards other regions of the world. While to date there are limited examples of this 
happening, such as in SKF, Volkswagen, Renault and DaimlerChrysler (MUlier and 
Riib, 2002), this research has demonstrated that such activities might need to be 
explored more fully in the future, in particular in sectors other than manufacturing, 
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where most experiences thus far have taken place. The evidence presented in this thesis 
could prove instructive in informing future research and policy-making around 
company international works councils and the revision of the current EWCD to include 
provisions for such developments. 
A final issue that has become apparent in the research relates to how to move from the 
'symbolic' to the 'active' end of the spectrum in EWC practice. As the cases of the 
EWCs at HSBC (for the first few years of its existence) and LTSB demonstrate, and as 
is suggested more generally from a recent survey conducted among employee 
representatives of EWCs in six countries (Waddington, 2003), a large number of EWCs 
in place "represent a case of structure before action" (Ibid: 32 I ). It should be 
acknowledged that EWC practice presents ample variation according to factors such as 
stage of development, approach of employee representatives and management, and the 
particular circumstances of the firm in question. Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
revision of the EWCD regarding a more exhaustive definition of 'information and 
consultation' in line with other subsequent community legislation on employee 
information and consultation and provision for adequate sanctions in the case of 
infringement of the dispositions laid down in the EWCD, in particular in terms of 
information and consultation provisions, would almost certainly prove useful in 
increasing the changes of EWCs becoming a meaningful component of a European 
system of IR at company level. 
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Appendices 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table 3.a: EWes in the Financial Services Industry 
M UL TINA TlONAL Origin EWe Since MULTINATIONAL Origin EWe Since 
Aachener Und Munchener DE EUl'ociear Group BE 
Abbey National Pic UK Euronext FR 
ABN-Amro Holding NV NL Yes 12/12/1997 Fondazione Cariplo IT 
Aegon NV NL Yes 01 /04/2000 Forsakrings Ab Skand ia SE 
Aker RGI NO Yes 01110/1999 Fortis NV NL Yes 201091 1996 
Allianz AG DE Yes 24/07/1996 Garantie Mutuelle Des I'R 
Fonctionnaires 
Allied Irish Banks Pic IE Gerling Konzem DE 
American Express US Yes 30/ 10/1998 Groupama SA Holding I'R Yes . 
Aon US Grupo·l'inanciero Danco·Bilbao ES 
Mag Allgemeine Rechtsschutz DE Guard ian Royal Exchange Pic UK Yes 01 10 III ()(.H~ 
Verich . AG. 
Assicurazioni Generali Spa IT Yes 11 / 11 /1997 H&R Block Inc US 
Assurances Generales de France FR Yes 21 /04/1994 Hartford Financial Service Group us 
Inc 
Axa·UAP FR Yes 20/061 1996 1ID1 Haftpnichtverband Ocr DE 
Deutschen Industrie VAG 
Banco Santander Central Hispano ES Helvetia CII Yes 17/07 /1990 
Banco Comerciale Italiana IT HSBC Holdings PLc UK Yes 0(/01)/ 19% 
Banco di Roma IT Hypoverinsbank DE 
Banco Nazionale del Lavoro IT Intemational Nedcrlanden Grocp NL Yes 06/03/ 1996 
NV (ING) 
Banco Popular Espanol ES Irish Life PIc IE 
Banesto ES KDC DE Yes 19/0')/ 1996 
Bank Austria AG. AT Yes 04/09/1996 Kredietbank DE Yes 1994 
Bank of Ireland IE Lloyds Register of Shipping UK 
Bankgesellschaft Berlin AG DE L10yds Bank Pic UK Yes 1')99 
Banque Bruzelles Lambert (ING) BE Yes 24/0611996 Marsh&Mc Lennan Companies Inc. US Yes 
Banque de Bruxelles ES Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena IT 
Barclays Pic UK Yes 18/09/ 1996 Morgan J.P.&Company Incorp. US 
Basler Versicherung CH Yes 06/1996 Morgan Stanley. Dean Witter US 
Bayerische Hypotheken-Und DE Munchener DE 
WechseJ·Bank Ruckvcrsicherungsgesell schaft 
Bayerische Vereinsbank AG DE Yes 11 /09/1996 National Australia Group AU Yes 29/07/ 1997 
Beneficial Corporation US Nomura Securi ti es Ltd . JP 
BNP Pari bas FR Yes 10/07/1996 Nordbanken (NDH Koncem) SE 
Caixa des Depots Et FR Norwich Union Insurance Group UK Yes I 0/07119% 
Consignations 
Caixa General de Depositos PT Royal&Sun Alliance Insurance UK 
(CGD) Group PIc 
Caixa rgan de Depositos (CGD) ES Royal Liver Assurance Ltd UK 
Canada Life Assurance Company CA Sam Paolo 1M I IT 
Cartiere Burgo Spa IT Yes 19/09/ 1996 Schweizerische CII Yes 13/09/ 1')96 
Lebensversich&Retenans 
CGNU Pic UK Yes 01/07/ 1996 Schweizerischer D/lIlkverein CII 
Chase Manhattan Chemical Bank US Sedgwick Group Pic UK Yes 191091 1996 
Cigna US Skandinaviska Enskilda Bankcn SE (SE-Banken) 
Citi group US Yes 19/08/1996 Societe Generale I'R 
Commerzbank DE Societe Generale Alsacienne de FR 
Banque 
Compagne Di San Paolo IT Sofinco FR 
Coop. Centrale Raiffesen· NL Standard Life Assurance Co. UK 
Boerenleenbank BA 
Credit Commercial de France FR Svenska Handelbankcn A13 SE 
Credit Lyonnais FR Yes 12/09/1994 Union Bank of Switzerland CII 
Creditansta l-Bankverein AT Victoria Holding AG DE Yes 061 1996 
Deutsche Bank AG DE Yes 10/09/1996 Winterthur Gruppe CII Yes 12/09/ 1996 
Dexia BE Yes 24/06/1996 Worms (Athena Assurances) FR 
DG Bank DE Wustenrot&Wurttembergische DE 
Dresdner Bank AG DE Wuttecrmbcrgisc he DE 
Aktiengesellscha fl Versichenlllgs· 
BeLGes 
Eureko BV NL Zurich Financial Services Group C II Yes 17/09/ 1996 
Source. Own uSll1g II1formattOn from vartous sources, mall1l y Kerchofts (2002). 
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Appendix to Chapter 6 
Table 6.a: HSBC Bank's Operations in Europe 
Country Subsdiary's name Activities offered 
Armenia HSBC Armenia Bank CII3 , TCM , PB, I 
HSBC Insurance (Armenia) 
Belgium HSBC Bank pic. (branch) GP&CM 
Cyprus HSBC Private Bank (Cyprus) PB, I, CIB, Retail Banking 
HSBC Insurance Brokers Ltd . 
Cyprus Popular Bank (2 I ,84%) 
Czech Republic HSBC Bank pic . (branch) cm, TCM IIJ 
France HSBC Bank pic. CIIJ, TCM, IIJ , EB, WM , PO, Rctuil 
HSBC Investment Bank pic. Oanking 
HSBC Securities (France) Ltd. 
CCF 
Germany HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt KgaA CIB, TCM, EB, PO 
Greece HSBC Bank pIc. (3 branches) WM, FM, EB, CM, AS, CIO, TCM, 
HSBC Investment Bank pic. PO, Rctail Banking 
European Popular Bank, S.A. 
Guernsey HSBC Bank pIc. Offshore banking 
Ireland HSBC Bank pIc. WM, CIB, I 
HSBC Global Investor Services (Ireland) Ltd . 
HSBC Life (Europe) Ltd. 
HSBC Insurance Brokers (Ireland) Ltd . 
Isle of Man HSBC Bank pic. Off-shore bankinl! 
Italy HSBC Bank pIc. CIO, TCM 
HSBC Investment Bank pic. 
HSBC Investment Services (Italy) 
Jersey HSBC Bank pic. Off-shore banking 
Luxembourg HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt (International) IB , MF, PB 
S.A. 
HSBC Investment Funds 
Malta HSBC Bank Malta pic. CB, TCM, Offshore l3anking, FM , PO, 
HSBC Bank pIc. Retail Banking 
HSBC Life Assurance (Malta) Ltd. 
HSBC Fund Management (Malta) Ltd. 
Netherl ands HSBC Bank pic. (branch) P&CM 
HSBC Investment Bank N.V. 
Poland HSBC Investment Services (Poland) -branch IB ,B 
HSBC Securities Polka 
Russia Office of representation IB 
Spain HSBC Bank pic. 
HSBC Investment Bank 
CIB, TCM, WM , FM, PI) 
HSBC Fund Management pic 
Sweden HSBC Bank pIc. (branch) CIB, 10, EO 
HSBC Investment Bank pic. 
Switzerland HSBC Private Banking PB, IB, TCM, AM, 
HSBC Guyerzeller Bank AG 
Turkey HSBC Bank A.S. CIB, TCM, WM , PI) 
UK HSBC Bank CO, PB, IB, Ret:Ji l Banking 
HSBC Insurance Brokers Ltd. 
HSBC Asset Management Ltd. 
HSBC Private Banking 
HSBC Asset Finance (UK) Limited 
HSBC Investment Bank 
* CIB-Corporate and Inst itutIOnal Bank mg; WM-Wealth Management ; CB-Corporatc Bankmg; PO-Prlvatc Oanking: 
TCM-Treasury and Capital Markets; I-Insurance; GP&CM-Global Payments and ash Managcmcnt ; 113-
In vestment Banking; EB-Equity Brokerage; FM-Fund Managcment; CM-Capital Markets; A -Adviso ry Scrvi cs. 
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Appendix to Chapter 7 
Table 7.a: BSCH's Operations in Latin America - Retail and Commercial Banking 
Country Institution ,- .. %Participation 
Argentina Banco Rio de la Plata 52,39% 
Banco Tornquish (OHCH) 100% 
Bolivia Banco de Santa Cruz 92 ,45% 
Brasil Banco Santander Brasil , S.A. 89,23% 
Banco Meridional 97% 
Chile Banco Santander Chile 89,01 % 
Santander Leasing (Chile) 99,04% 
Santander de Factoring (Chile) 99,02% 
Corredora de Seguros Santander Ltda. 89% 
Banco de Santiago 43,57% 
Santiago Corredora de Seguros 43 ,53% 
Santiago Leasing 43 ,35% 
Colombia Banca Santander Colombia, S.A. 68,86% 
Banco Santander Colombia-Panama, S_A. 100% 
Bansaleasing Colombia, S.A. 100% 
Mexico Banco Santander Mexicano, S.A. 83 ,89% 
Invermexico, S.A. de CV de Bolsa 83 ,89% 
Panama Sucursal BCH Panama 100 
Paraguay Banco de Asuncion, S.A. 98 ,09% 
Peru Banco Santander Central H ispano Peru 100% 
Puerto Rico Banco Santander Puerto Rico 80,41 % 
Bansander de Leasing Corporation 100% 
Uruguay Banco Santander Uruguay 100% 
Plata Card (personales, S.A.) 100% 
Venezuela Banco de Venezuela, S.A. 97,79% 
Santander Global Bank USA 100% 
Source: EI Banco - Inforrnattvo BSCH (n.4 Mayo 2000: (3) 
Table 7.b: BSCH's Operations in Latin America - Wholesale Banking 
Country Activitv Institution e, ':::h "". ."t. %Partlclpatlon 
Investment Banking Santander Merchant 99,97% 
Argentina Santander Sociedad de Bolsa 52,39% 
Asset Management Origenes AFJP 48 ,98% 
Brasil Investment Banking Santander Merchant (Brasil) 89,23% 
Bozano Simonsen 97,00% 
Asset Management Santander Brasil Asset Management Ltda. 89,22% 
Chile Investment Banking Santander Investment Chile Ltda. 99,99% 
Santander Corredores de Bolsa 99,99% 
Surandinas Agentes de Valores 100 
Asset Management Santander Administrador de Fondos Mutuos 88,96% 
AFP Summa 99,04% 
Santiago Administradora-Fondos de Inversion 43 ,55% 
Colombia Investment Banking Santander Investment Trust Inc. Colombia 100% 
Asset Management Colmena AIG 100% 
Davivir 100% 
Mexico Asset Management A fore Santander 87,92% 
Gestion Santander (Mexico) 83 ,89% 
Peru Investment Banking Santander Sociedad Agente de Bolsa 100% 
Asset Management AFP Union Vida 97,29% 
Fondos Mutuos (Peru) 100% 
Puerto Rico In vestment Banking Santander Investment International Bank 100~% 
Uruguay Asset Management Santander Afap 99,91 % 
Fondos Santander 100% 
Venezuela Investment Banking Valores Santander 76,5% 
Santander Investment International Bank 100% 
Source: EI Banco - In forrnatl vo BSCH (n.4 Mayo 2000:p.13) 
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Table 7.c Results of Trade Union Elections in BSCH (2002) 
Trade union No. of deleeates Percental!c 
CC.oo. 396 31 .88% 
U.G.T. 366 29.44% 
F.I.e.T. 177 14.24% 
A.M.1. 132 10.62% 
e. 1.T. 98 7.88% 
e.S. I. F. 15 1.21% 
E.L.A. 14 1.13% 
LA B. II 0.88% 
S.A.S. II 0.88% 
e.G. I. 9 0.72% 
I.S.B.S. 6 0 .48% 
Coalicion 4 0.32% 
e.e. 3 0.24% 
E.S.K. I 0.08% 
Source: (Comfi a-Ce.OO. ) 
Table 7.d: BBY A Group - Operations in Latin America (BBYA America) 
Country Bank % Participation 
Argentina BBY A Banco Frances 100% 
Bras il BBYA Bras il 100% 
Colombia BBY A Banco Ganadero 100% 
Chile BBYA Banco BHIF 100% 
Mexico BBY A Bancomer 100% 
Panama BBYA Panama 100% 
Paraguay BBY A Paraguay 100% 
Peru BBY A Banco Continental 100% 
Puerto Rico BBYA Puerto Rico 100% 
Uruguay BBY A Banco Uruguay 100% 
Yenezuela BBY A Banco Provincial 100% 
Table 7.e: Results of Trade Union Elections in BBVA (2002). 
Trade union No. of delcl!:atcs Percental!c , 
CC.oo. 218 30.15% 
U.G.T. 145 20.06% 
A.M.1. 179 24.76% 
F.I.e.T. II 1.52% 
e.I.G. 12 1.66% 
E.L.A. 29 4.01% 
LA B. 13 1.80% 
E.S.K I 0. 14% 
SABEl 7 0.97% 
S.O.L I 0. 14% 
U.S .o. 3 0.41% 
Source: (Comfia-Ce.OO.) 
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